"Linear-Time Resource Allocation in Security Games with Identical Fully" by Octavio Lerma, Vladik Kreinovich et al.

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Departmental Technical Reports (CS)

Title

Linear-Time Resource Allocation in Security Games with Identical Fully Protective Resources

Authors

Octavio Lerma,
Vladik Kreinovich, University of Texas at El PasoFollow
Chris Kiekintveld, University of Texas at El PasoFollow

Publication Date

5-2011

Comments

Technical Report: UTEP-CS-11-17a

Published in Proceedings of the AAAI Workshop on Applied Adversarial Reasoning and Risk Modeling AARM'11, San Francisco, California, August 7, 2011

Abstract

Game theory has become an important tools for making resource allocations decision in security domains, including critical infrastructure protection. Many of these games are formulated as Stackelberg security games. We present new analysis and algorithms for a class of Stackelberg security games with identical, fully protective defender resources. The first algorithm has worst-case complexity linear in the number of possible targets, but works only for a restricted case. The second algorithm can find and optimal resource allocation for the general case in time O(n log(n)).

tr11-17.pdf (149 kB)
Original file: CS-UTEP-11-17

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