Third party deterrence as a strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism

Sudeshna Bhattacharyya, University of Texas at El Paso

Abstract

The possibilities of further terrorist attacks and terrorist usage of nuclear weapons have increased especially after 9/11. This has been a constant source of fear and concern among the western democracies. This thesis is essentially built in that context. This work maintains and tests that a third party deterrence policy will be a more logical and viable policy to counter nuclear threats by terrorist groups. Third parties, such as North Korea, Iran and Pakistan form the crux of this study. United States delegates deterrence to these third parties, who in turn, deters terrorist groups from getting access to nuclear and fissile materials. ^

Subject Area

Political Science, General|Political Science, International Law and Relations

Recommended Citation

Bhattacharyya, Sudeshna, "Third party deterrence as a strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism" (2006). ETD Collection for University of Texas, El Paso. AAI1436518.
http://digitalcommons.utep.edu/dissertations/AAI1436518

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