U.S. Perceptions Of Economic Mobility Since The Enactment Of NAFTA And Their Impact On American Politics And Society

Jairemy Quinton Edwards
University of Texas at El Paso, Jairemy.Edwards@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd

Part of the Behavioral Neurobiology Commons, Economics Commons, and the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd/63

This is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UTEP. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UTEP. For more information, please contact lweber@utep.edu.
U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC MOBILITY SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF NAFTA
AND THEIR IMPACT ON AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY

JAIREMY Q. EDWARDS

Master’s Program in Political Science

APPROVED:

José D. Villalobos, Ph.D., Chair

Irasema Coronado, Ph.D.

Selfa Chew, Ph.D.

Stephen Crites, Ph.D.

Dean of the Graduate School
Abstract

In this study, I examine how perceptions of NAFTA developed over 20 years since its enactment, measured as perceived economic mobility in 2016, have affected more recent public perceptions leading to increased, controversial tendencies towards nationalism, protectionism, and pessimism about the future of the U.S. economy. I then assess whether and how such perceptions in turn may have affected voter perceptions about Donald Trump, setting the stage for his 2016 election victory. Therein, I have found that among U.S. voters in 2016, those with perceptions of reduced economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA were significantly more likely to have supported changes in U.S. macroeconomic policies, to implement greater economic protection from elitism within the U.S. government and foreign competition. Additionally, U.S. voters holding said preferences were significantly more likely to support Trump’s candidacy during the 2016 Presidential election rather than Hillary Clinton. However, U.S. voters who identified as victims of racial discrimination were significantly less likely to support Trump’s candidacy in 2016, even when holding preferences congruent with the Trump campaign policy agenda.
# Table of Contents

Abstract..............................................................................................................................iv

Table of Contents...............................................................................................................v

List of Tables......................................................................................................................vii

List of Figures.....................................................................................................................viii

1. Introduction....................................................................................................................1

2. Literature Review.........................................................................................................6
   2.1 Economic Mobility.....................................................................................................6
   2.2 NAFTA.......................................................................................................................8
   2.3 Perceptions of Economic Mobility Since the Enactment of NAFTA.......................10
   2.4 The Trump Campaign..............................................................................................13

3. Theoretical Framework.................................................................................................16

4. Data & Methods...........................................................................................................21
   4.1 Data..........................................................................................................................21
   4.2 Hypothesis 1.............................................................................................................24
   4.3 Hypothesis 2.............................................................................................................30
   4.4 Hypothesis 3.............................................................................................................31
   4.5 Hypothesis 4.............................................................................................................31
   4.6 Control Variables.....................................................................................................33
   4.7 Methods....................................................................................................................33

5. Results...........................................................................................................................35
   5.1 Hypothesis 1a..........................................................................................................35
   5.2 Hypothesis 1b1.........................................................................................................36
   5.3 Hypothesis 1b2.........................................................................................................37
   5.4 Hypothesis 1c..........................................................................................................38
   5.5 Hypothesis 2.............................................................................................................40
   5.6 Hypothesis 3.............................................................................................................41
5.7 Hypothesis 4..................................................................................................42
6. Conclusions........................................................................................................44
   6.1 Discussion......................................................................................................44
   6.2 Limitations....................................................................................................45
   6.3 Implications..................................................................................................46
7. References..........................................................................................................48
8. Appendices.........................................................................................................65
Vita.........................................................................................................................85
## List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1a</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1b1</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1b2</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1c</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

Figures 1........................................................................................................................................52
Figures 2 & 3..................................................................................................................................53
Figures 4..........................................................................................................................................54
Figures 5 & 6a.................................................................
Figures 6b. & 7.................................................................56
Figures 8 & 9...............................................................................................................................57
Figures 10 & 11a..........................................................................................................................58
Figures 11b. & 12..........................................................................................................................59
Figure 13......................................................................................................................................60
Figure 14......................................................................................................................................61
Figure 15a. and 15b.................................................................62
Figure 15c. and 15d.................................................................63
Figure 15e. and 15f.................................................................64
1. Introduction

The 2016 U.S. election period was perhaps one of the most significant and controversial elections in U.S. history. A variety of salient topics were debated, linking sociopolitical and socioeconomic issues to foreign and domestic policy preferences. The marginalization of individuals and groups amid a divide and conquer campaign strategy employed by Donald Trump and other political entrepreneurs was a key focal point for constituents weighing their voting options (Jensen & Bang, 2017:355). Race/ethnicity, income, access to education, healthcare, firearms, immigration, and social status were but a few of the salient issues discussed by candidates (Winder, 2016; Walley, 2017; Swedberg, 2018). Quite notably, another key issue which became a critical policy debate for U.S. voters and political candidates across the ideological spectrum (and perhaps particularly among blue collar, middle class workers) was the renegotiation of free trade agreements (FTAs) with foreign countries, namely the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), along with other salient FTAs such as the Transpacific Partnership (Brookshire, 2018:10-11,15; Walley 2017: 334). Many U.S. voters seemingly felt that their economic mobility had been somehow negatively impacted overtime by the terms of NAFTA and other agreements in observing, often firsthand, reductions in wages, employment opportunities, and the influx of immigrants into the United States (Swedberg, 2018:16). Working-class voters in the Midwest increasingly developed a resentment toward former President Barack Obama (as well as his predecessors dating back to George H. W. Bush) because they felt forgotten often perceiving that FTAs had fallen short in being negotiated or renegotiated for their personal interests, despite previous assurances from President Obama on the campaign trail in 2008 (Walley, 2017:234).
Meanwhile, a bloc of voters in the Southern U.S. felt that the influx of immigrants was degrading the economy and/or even the U.S. identity\(^1\) (Walley, 2017:233).

One can then fast forward to the 2016 election cycle where issue linkages between growing perceptions of reduced socioeconomic mobility, desires for immigration reform, and adjustments to FTAs became resilient campaigning stump speech points, for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump (Walley, 2017: 234; Swedberg, 2018:16; Kluver, 2015:149). The platform of the victor and current U.S. President Donald Trump was bolstered by incessant and insistent guarantees (often covered live - far more than any other candidate - by the major news outlets) to renegotiate FTAs across the board, tighten immigration policies, and improve the economic and social mobility of the working-class (Swedberg, 2018:15, 18, 20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231). By doing so he presumably gained new levels of staunch support among voters who preferred a more populist, nationalistic, protectionist macraneconomic policy agenda (Swedberg, 2018:15, 18, 20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231).

In the midst of the backdrop of Trump’s rhetorical overtures, some working-class voters even began showing increased resentment toward Latino countries among which was Mexico, claiming that the movement of multinational enterprises from the United States to Mexico to employ cheaper labor was unfair and harmful to their economic mobility (Wally, 2017). Primarily areas near the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexico borders contained importers and exporters who have historically shared varying opinions toward NAFTA. Unlike the Transpacific Partnership, NAFTA is a regional preferential free trade agreement allowing lower tariffs on goods traded

\(^1\) In some regions, most notably rural areas of within the Bible Belt, U.S. constituents believe that the election of former U.S. President Barack Obama was a significant change in U.S. national identity. The former Presidents was viewed as non-American due in part to misperceptions about his religious beliefs and citizenship (Walley, 2017:233).
between Mexico, the U.S., and Canada (Hills, 2014). These opinions paired with xenophobic rhetoric, issue linkages, and political framing exacerbated the idea that NAFTA was a key source of economic disparity for working-class voters who desired greater market protection from foreign competitors. NAFTA was enacted in 1994 during the Clinton Administration and was an update to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement established in 1988 (Brookshire, 2018:8). The latest version of the FTA over the trilateral bloc, negotiated under the Trump administration, is now referred to as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (UMCA) (Hains, 2018). While researchers will take time to determine the effectiveness of the renegotiated agreement (i.e. UMCA), the long-term debate over the full effects of NAFTA on U.S. citizen economic mobility continues (Hains, 2018).

Prior to the creation of the UMCA, NAFTA had existed for over two decades and during this 20-year period opinions about its ongoing effects on the U.S. economy were mixed (Brookshire, 2018; Pinto-Leon, 2011; Hills, 2014; Lederman & Serven, 2005; Thakkar & Sands, 2011). Although economic data related to NAFTA are robust, U.S. voters share differing opinions about NAFTA based on their rules of reference, rules of meaning, and rules of value linked to characteristics of their socioeconomic status (SES) and sociopolitical ideology.

Further research is necessary to determine the overall perceptions of U.S. voters about their economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA. This study seeks to investigate the perceptions that U.S. voters have about their economic mobility over a 20-year period since the enactment of NAFTA and add to the existing research aimed at understanding criticisms about its perceived impact on the overall economic mobility of U.S. voters. I will next move on to my literature review, which will begin with an overview of related national economic outcomes that have occurred since the drafting and enactment of NAFTA. I will investigate opinions of favor or opposition toward
said outcomes and by extent NAFTA’s ratification. The linkages between political economic outcomes and perceived economic mobility have greatly influenced voter perceptions of transnational trust toward Mexico, and Latino immigrants. Perceptions of relative deprivation have led to and exacerbated in-group and out-group competition, greater contrasts in racial divisions, increased resentment toward regional integration, and ultimately heightened nationalism to restrict Latino migrants and foreign imports (Greitemeyer & Sagioglou, 2017:774). I believe that perceptions of relative deprivation across blue collar U.S. voters are mostly, or at least in notable part, due to issues politically linked to FTAs such as reductions in wages, employment opportunities, and increases in foreign competition. These issues lie at the center of perceptions about economic mobility during the 20-year period since NAFTA’s enactment, and have inflated voter preferences toward protectionism.

Based on voters’ preferences for or against increased nationalism and protectionist trade policies, I will also discuss growing discontent among voters who favor increased nationalism and protectionist trade policies, and the increased likelihood for these voters to desire a change in the macroeconomic practices of the national government. This change seems to have led to what is commonly been referred to as, “the vote against the establishment” (Jensen & Bang, 2017:355). These anti-establishment voters seem to have desired a change from the conventional handling of the U.S. economy and had preferences aligned with more populist campaign platforms (Jensen & Bang, 2017). I will discuss how these voters were more likely to be pessimistic about the future of the economy based on their past experiences, SES, and location within the U.S. Finally, by combining each of the key preference areas I will discuss the congruence between the Trump campaign platform and voters who favored nationalist immigration policies, protectionist policies restricting foreign trade, and populist-leaning political ideology. Perceptions of economic mobility
presumably became more negative over a 20-year period after the enactment of NAFTA, particularly for voters who favored increased nationalism, protectionism, and populism (e.g., see Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231).

At the same time, since bigotry was a key rhetorical device used by President Donald Trump, I also expect to find a lower likelihood of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election among voters who identify as having experienced racial discrimination, while controlling for policy preferences congruent with those of the Trump campaign (i.e. greater nationalism, protectionism, and populism) (Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017; Pinto-Leon, 2011). Many racial minorities are sensitive to bigotry based on their experience with past mistreatment which is well documented in U.S. history. Although most U.S. voters may perceive economic mobility as reduced and harder over the past 20 years since NAFTA’s enactment, racial minorities in the U.S. are less likely than the U.S. racial majority to perceive a reduction in overall economic mobility. Therein, I expect in line with previous research that emotions such as empathy for others being mistreated (rhetorically and/or policy-wise) even in the face of real (or at least perceived) economic competition with those being mistreated, here namely Hispanic and Latino/a immigrants, can affect voter’s political preferences differently based on their sensitivity to racial discrimination (Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017).
2. Literature Review

The literature review is divided into five sections which cover the theoretical arguments I will use to substantiate my contentions related to the political, social, and economic dynamics mentioned above. “Section a” discusses the concept of economic mobility in terms of what it is and how it is measured based on U.S. perceptions. “Section b” provides information on the policy scope and coverage of NAFTA, as well as economic data related to each member of the trilateral bloc. “Section c” discusses U.S. perceptions of economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA with an analysis of U.S. attitudes toward NAFTA, and political responses to NAFTA based on its perceived impacts among U.S. constituents. “Section d” is an analysis of the 2016 Trump campaign which discusses key policy positions and agendas through political rhetoric during the campaign related to nationalism, protectionism, and populism, each of which were reportedly preferential to a significant number of U.S. constituents, but simultaneously and vociferously rejected by those sensitive to the candidate’s bigotry. In the literature review’s final section, I present my seven hypotheses and provide a theoretical framework for each.

2.1 Economic Mobility

Although there is no singularly adopted measure of economic mobility, the description I use is based on perceptions among U.S. constituents about whether their overall chances to improve their socioeconomic position (e.g. achieve or improve their financial well-being or ability to access opportunities to get ahead) has increased or decreased over a given period of time (see Figures 1 through 4) (Athreya & Romero, 2015:169; Bertotti & Modanese, 2016:1951). Evidence shows that U.S. citizens generally tend to underestimate economic inequality and overestimate upward economic mobility (Davidai & Gilovich, 2018:300). Inversely, as perceived income
inequality increases perceived mobility should decrease (Bertotti & Modanese, 2016). Either way, perceptions of economic mobility should be negatively correlated with economic inequality. However, individual characteristics of socioeconomic status (SES) shape perceptions about inequality differently and play a key role in how U.S. citizens determine the causes of disparities between income and economic status. Differences in gender, race/ethnicity, education, occupation, location, and familial endowments affect individual-level economic trajectories differently.

Given that my analysis is based on U.S. perceptions of NAFTA over a 20-year period, the effects of intragenerational mobility, which is a measure of changes in economic status during a person’s life, are of increased interest because they relate to perceptions of U.S. constituents who may have experienced changes in economic status throughout different periods of earnings (Athreya & Romero, 2015:174). Intergenerational mobility is of importance because it provides a comparison of a constituent’s economic status to that of their parents. Perceptions of intragenerational economic mobility depend on perceptions of intergenerational mobility and vice versa. Choices made by a constituent over the duration of their lifetime impact economic outcomes, especially those related to risk-averse and risk-acceptant behaviors (Athreya & Romero, 2015:186). A constituent’s perceptions of overall change in economic status begins with a measure of perceived change since their youth. Therefore, a measure of perceived change in economic mobility over a 20-year period combined with measures of perceived income inequality and social mobility should suffice in capturing changes in either type of mobility discussed here (i.e. intergeneration, intragenerational, social, and economic) for constituents varying in socioeconomic status and ascribed as well as achieved characteristics. The past 20-year period is significant due to increases in U.S. involvement with free trade agreements, especially NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a regional preferential free trade agreement which was enacted in 1994 during the Clinton administration (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27). The agreement was established between Canada, Mexico, and the United States acting as an extension of the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and eventually superseding it (Brookshire, 2018:8). A rich history of trade had already existed between the U.S. and Canada through the Elgin-Marcy Treaty (Canadian-American Reciprocity Agreement) which contributed to setting the foundation for the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and the Auto-Pact of 1965 (Brookshire, 2018:8). Although cross-border travel has tripled since NAFTA’s enactment – and it should be noted more broadly that cross-border travel between Mexico and the U.S. has overall generally decreased to present – it does not establish political and economic integration like within the European Union (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27). NAFTA does not allow the free movement of migrants and each member-state continues to use its own currency. However, NAFTA does cover key areas aimed at reducing economic inequality amongst its three members, especially Mexico, such as reductions in tariffs, rules of origin, financial services, intellectual property rights, a means of reviewing and settling trade-related disputes, investment resolutions for claims made against state-actors, protections for Mexico’s petroleum-related industries, and sanitary measures and policies for agricultural goods (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27).

The inclusion of Mexico was intended to enhance the country’s economy by decreasing unemployment while increasing Mexico’s overall convergence with the U.S. and Canada.
A reduction in wage disparities between the U.S. and Mexico was also an expectation of the agreement which would curtail migration north into the U.S. from Mexico. Although Mexican wages in areas along the U.S.-Mexico border have grown faster compared to southern Mexico (e.g. as relating to maquiladoras), there is little evidence of convergence in wages between U.S. and Mexican unskilled laborers, with most of the convergence occurring between high-skilled workers within the U.S. and Mexico (Lederman & Serven, 2005:339-341; Brookshire, 2018:9). However, the wages earned have been disproportionate between U.S. Hispanic and non-U.S. Hispanic blue-collar workers with those from the U.S. earning more (see Figure 5) (Mora & Davila, 2011: 851-853). Since the enactment of NAFTA, a regional market estimated between $17 and $20.6 trillion in value has been created with between 440 and 489 million consumers located across each of the three countries (Hills, 2014:122; Pinto-Leon, 2011:27). In 2015, the combined gross national income had increased to $20.6 trillion and consumer base of 489 million consumers (Brookshire, 2018:10). However, U.S. and Mexican blue-collar wages have generally remained stagnant compared to CEO earnings, which have increased substantially since the early 2000’s (see Figure 5) (LCLAA, 2018).

Among the three countries, the United States seems to have benefited the most from the trilateral bloc (Brookshire, 2018:10; Thakkar and Sands, 2011: 153). The U.S. had increased international trade by nearly 128% between the years 1994 and 2000. Its exports to Mexico and Canada were increased by 24% during the same period (Brookshire, 2018:10). The geographic proximity of the U.S. with Canada and Mexico has allowed for it to reduce the transaction costs of exports into the countries making them top consumers of U.S. exports (Brookshire, 2018:10). Revenue generated by U.S. goods and services were estimated at $1.1 trillion, with $482 billion of it generated from exports and $596 billion generated from imports (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27).
in 2008, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico and Canada combined was $322.9 billion compared to a combined estimate in FDI of $229.8 billion from Canada and Mexico (see Figure 6a and 6b) (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27). NAFTA has allowed almost no restrictions on agricultural goods from the U.S. into Mexico. U.S. investment into Mexico is primarily allocated to manufacturing and automotive industries (Hills, 2014:123). Although economic data and the perceived gains of NAFTA for the trilateral bloc are robust and attribute the greatest beneficiary as the U.S., the perceptions of some U.S. constituents run contrary to this (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27). Income inequality has increased over time while U.S. and Mexico blue-collar wages have remained mostly stagnant (LCLAA, 2018:10). The misperceptions of Americans in responding to this FTA merits further research and this study intends to help fill that gap, both theoretically and analytically. The next section begins to address this trend in negative perceptions toward NAFTA.

2.3 Perceptions of Economic Mobility Since the Enactment of NAFTA

Perceptions of NAFTA vary among constituents within the participating countries. For this study I am interested in the perceptions of U.S. constituents about NAFTA. Due to lower wages in Mexico, related to the divergences in income and exchange rates, multinational corporations have displayed a tendency to move some unskilled and low-skilled manufacturing jobs to Mexico since NAFTA’s enactment (Pinto-Leon, 2011:28; Mora & Davila, 2011). The off-shoring of U.S. jobs is a key issue that receives increased attention among U.S. constituents (see Figure 7). The U.S. has experienced an estimated loss of roughly 45,000 jobs per year to Mexico which was related to NAFTA, but the transference of jobs from the U.S. to Mexico have been a net benefit to the U.S. economy (Brookshire, 2018:11). Brookshire contends that for every 100 jobs lost to Mexico, 250 jobs in skilled labor are created in the U.S. (Brookshire, 2018:12). However, attention to data displaying the net benefit is usually overshadowed by an increased inclination among U.S.
constituents to disfavor FTAs and instead focus on political and ideological factors (Brookshire, 2018:11). For example, evidence related to the textile industry in 2007 showed that regional FTAs were not the direct cause of unemployment in areas like the northeastern U.S. and that trends in job loss and decreased wages were occurring prior to U.S. involvement in NAFTA (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:150). Between 1992 and 2008, job losses in the region were more closely related to the movement of unskilled labor to developing countries with lower wages, excluding Mexico (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:150).

This analysis suggests that perceptions of U.S. constituents about the economic effects of NAFTA since its enactment are inaccurate. During election periods disproportionate portrayals of current events are used to frame political, social, and economic information to provide cues to the constituent audience (Jensen & Bang, 2017:348; Hicks, Milner, & Tingley, 2014:109). Economic data gathered by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) indicates that the highest rates of unemployment in the U.S. manufacturing sectors between years 1985 and 2007 occurred between 1985 and 1986. This predates the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement which was enacted in 1989; other periods of increased unemployment inconsistent with FTA enactments are 1991 to 1993, and 2008 to 2009 (see Figure 8) (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:151-152; Brookshire, 2018:8). Perceptions that job losses in U.S. manufacturing were directly related to NAFTA or its predecessor CUSFTA may be ill-founded. The BEA data suggests a decreased likelihood of job loss in the U.S. manufacturing sector to Mexico due to regional FTAs, based on the dates in which there was a significant increase in unemployment and the times of enactments (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:151).

However, some U.S. constituents believe that Mexico is unfairly gaining an economic advantage through NAFTA at the expense of the U.S. As shown in Figure 9, although Mexico’s
overall position within the global economy has improved, its national economic growth has not been nearly as robust when compared to the U.S. since NAFTA’s enactment (Brookshire, 2018:10; Thakkar & Sands; 2011:153). Mexico is no longer as reliant on its petroleum sector and since NAFTA’s enactment, has been able to benefit from the stability of an improved export-oriented manufacturing sector (e.g. maquiladoras) (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:151). Movement from rural areas to urban areas of Mexican citizens to occupy positions of employment in the maquiladoras, has also resulted in a decrease of agricultural laborers which has increased the demand for U.S. produce Mexico (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:150; Lederman & Serven, 2005:339). Due in part to these developments, during recessionary periods Mexico can fall back on its petroleum endowments to mitigate the effects of exogenous economic shocks and increase its purchasing power parity (PPP) as it did from the year 2000 to 2009 (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:153). I contend that this is a benefit to the U.S. agricultural sector, yet a tremendous loss that sent shocks through rural Mexico.

The percentage of the Mexican gross domestic product (GDP) attributed to agriculture decreased from an estimated 5.6% in 1993 to 3.8% in 2003 (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:150). Mexico’s agricultural and rural townships were devastated by the influx of subsidized agricultural goods received from the U.S. and many have lost their livelihoods (see Figure 10) (LCLAA, 2018; Lederman & Serven, 2005). Minimum wage is 14% less now than it was prior to NAFTA’s enactment with factory wages 40% lower than those in China (LCLAA, 2018). There is a positive association between influx in U.S. agricultural goods to the Mexico and increases in annual illegal immigration into the U.S. from Mexico (LCLAA, 2018).

Although Mexico has notably improved, this does not suggest that distributional effects within the country are not skewed (Lederman & Serven, 2005: 338-340). What it does show is that
a key goal associated with the purpose of NAFTA’s enactment was somewhat fulfilled at the expense of the livelihood of many Mexico citizens, and that Mexico’s gains were by no means as robust as gains made by the U.S. according to economic data (Lederman & Serven, 2005: 338-340; Thakkar & Sands, 2011: 152). Overall, perceptions of economic mobility as having been negatively affected by NAFTA because of Mexico have an increased tendency to be founded on misunderstandings and sociopolitical preferences driven by misinformation and disinformation. Job losses due to NAFTA have occurred on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border (LCLAA, 2018). The political implications of the U.S. constituents preferring to adopt policy positions based on these misunderstandings provide opportunities for political entrepreneurs seeking to draw political support, with an executable platform from which to gain it. One such unabashed political entrepreneur was Donald J. Trump.

2.4 The Trump Campaign

On June 16, 2015 Donald J. Trump formally embarked on a campaign largely based on economic nationalism using anti-globalist rhetoric, assurances of protectionism through trade strategies aimed at renegotiating FTAs to benefit U.S. constituents, taking policy positions promising greater restrictions on immigration into the U.S., and supporting populist policy positions ensuring his constituents that he would take care of blue collar workers (Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231). He topped of the official launch of his campaign with rhetorical vitriol aimed directly at Mexico (including its trade relationship with the U.S.) and Mexicans immigrating to the U.S.: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people” (Reilly, 2016). According to survey conducted by PEW Research Center, among registered voters who identified as Trump supporters, 66% believed that immigration was a problem of increased severity; ANES 2016 data are
congruent with this (see Figure 12 through 14) (Doherty, 2016). However, immigration from Mexico to the U.S. has actually been decreasing with more Mexicans leaving than arriving between 2009 and 2014 (Winders, 2016:291). Throughout the campaign, Trump’s base displayed high, sustained, and seemingly increasing propensity to favor his approach based in part on these positions and political rhetoric. Some constituents with negative opinions toward FTAs based their opinions of the perceived effects that economic competition with foreign markets had on their economic mobility, and thus favored increased economic nationalism (see Figure 11 a and b) (Walley, 2017:234; Swedberg, 2018: 20, 16). Economic nationalism is described as a readiness to support nationalist economic policy as, as such, presumably serves as a function of the perceived economic threat posed by foreign competition (Swedberg, 2018:15).

In 2016, according to surveys administered by Bloomberg and Gallop, between 34% and 68% of the U.S. population supported economic protectionism; the differences between the two statistics is believed to be due to the wording of the questions pertaining to protectionism. In the Bloomberg survey, protectionism was linked to the idea of protecting U.S. jobs (Swedberg, 2018:19). Various definitions were thrown around across media outlets leaving U.S. voters to determine for themselves how to politically conceptualize their positions which were sometimes confusing (Walley, 2017: 234-235). The Trump campaign played on the notion of protecting jobs by blaming immigrants and foreign competitors for U.S. job losses (Walley, 2017:231; Winders, 2016). The Trump campaign then went on to make political promises to supporters, ensuring that it would bring back jobs and renegotiate trade deals (Walley, 2017: 232). Blue collar workers who identified as working-class made up a significant portion of Trump constituents following Clinton’s apparent lack of attention toward renegotiating free trade agreements in the initial Presidential debates (Walley, 2017: 232).
Populism has increased in the last decade due in part to increases in resentment, movement away partisan politics, and declining trust in politicians and political institutions (Jensen & Bang, 2017: 344). The Trump campaign tailored its position in disfavor of the economic establishment and championed a change in economic policies different from conventional practices (Jensen & Bang, 2017: 344). The definition of populism I will apply here is ideologically centrist viewing society as separated into primarily two parts, the first being the pure people and the second being the corrupt elite; the perspective contends that political action should be the general will of the people (see Figure 13) (adopted from Jensen & Bang, 2017: 346). Economic nationalism, protectionism, and populism were key aspects of the Trump campaign, but another key aspect was Donald Trump’s use of racial bigotry. During the 2016 election Trump’s bigotry toward Mexicans was aimed at divisively inflating negative perceptions of Hispanic and Latino immigrants overall, and had become a key speaking point of Trump’s campaign rhetoric (Winders, 2016: 291).

As previously mentioned, Trump accused Mexico of “sending” its worst nationals such rapists, drug-runners, and criminals across the U.S. southern border, rarely citing that among the immigrants were those seeking work or asylum (Winders, 2016:291). Although there was an increased propensity for the average U.S. voter to favor candidates with populist, protectionist, and economic nationalist policy positions, the use of racial bigotry was simultaneously a definite “turn-off” for some U.S. constituents. For these latter individuals, there is presumably a powerful level of sensitivity, and even empathy (see Sirin et al. 2016), toward those attacked due to having experienced racial discrimination during their own lives, perhaps even overpowering the strength of opinions about economic mobility and factors contributing to perceptions of its reduction.
3. Theoretical Framework

This study seeks to investigate the perceptions that U.S. voters have about their economic mobility over a 20-year period since the enactment of NAFTA and add to the existing research aimed at understanding criticisms about its perceived impact versus actual impact on the overall economic mobility of U.S. voters. Specifically, the overriding research question is as follows: how did U.S. perceptions of economic mobility affect voter perceptions of the U.S. economy overall, and what are the implications therein related to individual and group preferences toward NAFTA and Trump’s candidacy, during the 2016 U.S. elections?

My first hypothesis will investigate the relationship between U.S. perceptions of NAFTA over the past 20 years as a measure of perceived economic mobility and the three policy positions of the Trump campaign (i.e. protectionism, economic nationalism, and populism). Below I outline my first hypothesis (and additional hypotheses thereafter) and provide footnotes with the details of the survey questions employed to operationalize each of the major factors conditioning perception dynamics for the analyses I plan to conduct.

- H1. I suspect that as a voter’s inclination to perceive economic mobility\(^2\) as reduced (harder) in 2016 since the past 20-year period following the enactment of NAFTA

\(^2\) The question within the 2016 ANES survey referring to economic mobility is drawn from section 127.6, item 2, and reads, “When it comes to people trying to improve their financial well-being, do you think it is now easier, harder, or the same as it was 20 years ago?”. Response are “1. Easier, 2. Harder, 3. Same” (Athreya & Romero, 2015:169; Bertotti & Modanese, 2016:1951). Section 127.6, item 3, reads, “How much easier or harder compared to 20 years ago?”. Responses are, “1. A great deal easier 2. A moderate amount easier 3. A little easier 4. A little harder 5. A moderate amount 6. A great deal harder”. Also, section 127.6, item 1, and reads, “How much opportunity is there in America today for the average person to get ahead?” Responses are “1. A great deal, 2. A lot, 3. A moderate amount, 4. A little, 5. None”. Section 33.7, item 1, reads, “Do you think the difference in incomes between rich and poor people in the United States today is larger, smaller, or about the same as it was 20 years ago?” Responses are, “1. Larger 2. Smaller 3. About the same” (Athreya & Romero, 2015:169; Bertotti & Modanese, 2016:1951).
increases, they are more likely to prefer greater nationalism\textsuperscript{3}, protectionism\textsuperscript{4}, and are more likely to hold populist beliefs such as resentment toward elitism\textsuperscript{5} (see Figure 15a.) (Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231).

- **H1a.** As a voter’s inclination to perceive economic mobility as reduced (harder) since the past 20-year period following the enactment of NAFTA increases, they are more likely to prefer greater economic nationalism.

- **H1b.** As a voter’s inclination to perceive economic mobility as reduced (harder) in 2016 since the past 20-year period following the enactment of NAFTA increases, they are more likely to prefer greater protectionism\textsuperscript{4}. I have two ways to measure preferences for greater protectionism in this study supported by their conjunction with the literature review and available survey data, so I will test them separately as \textit{H1b1}. and \textit{H1b2} (Swedberg, 2018:19).

- **H1c.** As a voter’s inclination to perceive economic mobility as reduced (harder) in 2016 since the past 20-year period following the enactment of NAFTA increases, they are more likely to hold populist belief.

\textsuperscript{3} The statement within the 2016 ANES survey referring to nationalism is from section 127.2, item 1, and reads, “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans.” Responses are “1. Agree strongly, 2. Agree somewhat, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Disagree somewhat, 5. Disagree strongly” (Swedberg, 2018:15).

\textsuperscript{4} The questions within the 2016 ANES survey referring to protectionism against FTAs and job competition are from section 136.8, item 2, and reads, “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. making free trade agreements with other countries?” Responses to this question are “1. Favor, 2. Oppose, 3. Neither favor nor oppose.” (Walley, 2017:234; Swedberg, 2018: 20, 16). Section 134, item 2, reads, “How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here (i.e. U.S.)?” Responses are “1. Extremely likely, 2. Very likely, 3. Somewhat likely, 4. Not at all likely.”

\textsuperscript{5} The questions within the 2016 ANES survey referring to an operationalization of populism is from section 48.6, item 4, and reads, “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” Responses are “1. Run by a few big interests or 2. For the benefit of all the people.”
My second hypothesis test the relationship between economic mobility, economic nationalism, protectionism, and populism with the likelihood of voting for Donald Trump.

- H2. Given these characteristics, I predict that voter inclinations greatly depend on their SES and sociopolitical ideologies, in that as preferences for greater nationalism, protectionism, and populism increase, their likelihood of intending to vote for U.S. President Donald Trump during the 2016 U.S. elections also increased (see Figure 15b.) (Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231).

My third hypothesis test the relationship between the intent to vote for Donald Trump and perceptions of economic mobility.

- H3. If a voter is intent on voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election then they are more likely to perceive that their economic mobility is reduced (become harder) in 2016 compared to the past 20 years (see Figure 15c.) (Walley, 2017:234; Swedberg, 2018: 20, 16).

My final hypothesis tests the effects of identifying as a victim of racial discrimination on the likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump, and therein implicitly overpowering perceptions of economic mobility and opinions toward economic nationalism, protectionism, and populism like those which would align the constituent with the Trump campaign. It can be argued that perceptions of fairness and equal opportunity are divided between U.S. constituents based on race, and that non-white constituents show an increased level of empathy toward immigrants and subaltern members of the U.S. population (Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017).

---

When perceiving mistreatment or inappropriate social exchanges, non-whites show an increased propensity to respond in support of victims, especially those outside of their ethnic/racial group (Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017). This suggests that non-Anglos are more likely than Anglos to display empathy across group boundaries equivalent to members from the ethnic/racial category of the victim. This was more apparent in African Americans and Latinos (Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017). Therefore, the propensity to show increased sensitivity toward racial discrimination is likely to be higher among non-Anglo U.S. constituents. Additionally, I control for self-identified race and isolate the explanatory power of racial discrimination regardless of self-identified race, so that my results can apply to U.S. constituents regardless of race.

*H4. I contend that as the level of experienced racial discrimination increases among U.S. constituents⁷, their likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump decreases, especially when additionally controlling for perceptions of economic mobility and preferences congruent to the Trump campaign platform (see Figure 15d) (Winders, 2016:291; Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017).

The theoretical framework is somewhat transitive in that if H1 holds true, then so should H2 and H3. However, if transitivity exists between H1, H2, and H3 then there should be increased likelihood that H4 is true as well in that sensitivity to discrimination should override the economic opinions of U.S. constituents based on how representative the survey sample is of the U.S. electorate (see Figure 15e & Figure 4). Regardless of socioeconomic status and sociopolitical

---

⁷ The question within the 2016 ANES survey referring to importance of U.S. constituent’s racial identity are from section 165, item 2, and reads, “How much discrimination have you personally faced because of your skin color (e.g. light, medium, or dark)?” Responses for each item are “1. A great deal, 2. A lot, 3. A moderate amount, 4. A little, 5. Not at all.”
preferences H4 provides a strikingly significant counterargument to the transitivity and combined explanatory power of H1, H2, and H3.
4. Data & Methods

4.1 Data

Data used will originate from the 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) cross-section survey. Appendix A provides an overview of distributions within the 2016 ANES sample across a variety of socioeconomic and sociopolitical characteristics as well as general distributions related to U.S. Hispanics and Latinos. These distributions are important whereas they substantiate the validity of using this dataset as the main source of statistical data by providing general estimates and descriptors of U.S. constituents, and the country’s electorate (see Appendix A).

4.1a Sample Distributions (see Appendix A)

I chose this dataset because the sample’s demographic and socioeconomic distributions were relatively like some of the distributions reported by the U.S. Census Bureau within the V2018 U.S. population estimates (see Appendix B). The 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) cross-section survey has a sample size of 4,271 survey respondents (N=4,271) of which 54% identify as women. The primary racial categories used in the survey are white (72%), Hispanic (11%), black (9%), Asian/Hawaiian/Pacific (3%), New World Indigenous (1%), and multi-ethnic (4%). I grouped reported income levels into quantiles; the first quantile uses a range from 0 to 22.49 thousand USD (15%), the second ranges from 22.5 to 49.9 thousand USD (25%),

8 “V2018” is a vintage year and is the final year of a particular series of sampling years (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018).
9 Section 63.1, Item 1.5, asks respondents, “What is your gender?” Responses are “1. Male 2. Female 3. Other.”
10 Section 62, Item 52.5, reads, “Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be.” Response are “1. White, 2. Black or African-American, 3. American Indian or Alaskan Native, 4. Asian, 5. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander.” The Hispanic category is present within the summary of self-identified race, and the distribution represents Hispanic as its own category.
11 Section 63.3, Item 1, reads, “What was the total income in 2015 of all your family members living here / your total income in 2015? Respondents were direct to type the figure between 0-99,999,999.
the third ranges from 50 to 89.9 thousand USD (29%), and the fourth ranges from 90 to 250 or more thousand USD (31%). The highest levels of education\textsuperscript{12} reported in ANES 2016, and used for my analysis, consisted of constituents who indicated having either a 12\textsuperscript{th} grade education with no diploma or less (7%), either a high school diploma/GED or some college with no degree (40%), an associate degree (i.e. occupational or academic degree) (14%), a bachelor’s degree (e.g. BA, BS, etc.) (23%), or a graduate degree (e.g. MA, MS, Ph.D., J.D., etc.) (16%). Of those respondents who perceive that they belong to a social class\textsuperscript{13} 11% identified as lower class, 33% identified as middle class, 52% identified as working class, and 5% identify as upper class. 61% of the sample identified as being employed during the survey. The size of respondent households varies from 1 to 12 additional occupants.\textsuperscript{14} 30% of survey respondents identifying as renters, 41% as homeowners paying a mortgage, 21% owning their home with no payments due, and 7% who identified as having other arrangements.\textsuperscript{15} When asked about having any form of health insurance, 91% identified as being insured\textsuperscript{16} and 10% of the survey respondents are naturalized citizens\textsuperscript{17}. Of respondents who identified their political party orientation\textsuperscript{18}, 36% claimed orientation toward the Democratic party, 30% claimed orientation toward the Republican party, 34% identified as

\textsuperscript{12} Section 62, Item 7.1, reads, “What is highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?”

\textsuperscript{13} Section 62, Item 49.3, reads “How would you describe your social class? Are you in the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class?” Responses are “1. Lower class 2. Working class 3. Middle class 4. Upper Class.”

\textsuperscript{14} Section 30, Item 1, reads “How many family members are living with you?” Responses to this question were numeric entries that could range from 0 to 20.

\textsuperscript{15} Section 62.7, Item 6.5, reads “Do you pay rent home, make monthly mortgage payments for your home, own your home outright with no payments due, or have some other living arrangement?” Response are “1. Pay rent 2. Pay mortgage 3. Own home with no payments due, 4. Some other arrangement.”

\textsuperscript{16} Section 31.2, Item .5 reads “Do you presently have any kind of health insurance? Responses are “1. Yes, 2. No.”

\textsuperscript{17} Section 62, Item 58, reads “In what state, country, or territory were you born?” Responses are 1. A U.S. state or D.C., 2. Puerto Rico, 3. Another U.S. territory (Guam, Amer. Samoa, U.S. Virgin Islands), 4. Another Country.”

\textsuperscript{18} Section 39, Item 1, reads “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican / a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?” Responses are “0. No preference, 1. Democrat/ Republican, 2. Republican/ Democrat, 3. Independent, 5. Other party.”
independent. Distributions by age show that 25% of survey respondents are between 18 and 34 years of age, another 25% are between 35 and 50 years of age, 36% are between 51 and 69 years of age, and 14% are between 70 and 90 years of age or older.

The second largest primary racial category used in the survey is Hispanic (see Appendix C). Keeping in mind that Hispanics were a primary target of disinformation during the U.S. 2016 election cycle, and that 57% speak Spanish more often to none or very little\(^\text{19}\), I also include distributions of preferences for Spanish and English language use among Hispanics (Reilly, 2016; Winders, 2016: 291). 47% of Hispanics within the sample speak either mostly or only English within their household, while 20% speak either mostly or only Spanish at home, and 33% speak both languages equally. 80% of Hispanics within the sample view news in English more often than Spanish and only 4% view news in both languages equally. Based on the distributions I conclude that respondents of the Hispanic category are mostly bilingual, prefer to speak English, and use news outlets broadcasted in English more often than Spanish. I think due to the subsample size of respondents identifying as Hispanic the concepts and relationships being tested are in part representative of participating Hispanic voters. 64% of Hispanics within the subsample believe that either some, or a major portion of their lives, is affected by what generally happens to Hispanic people in the U.S.\(^\text{20}\) I think the bigotry used during the 2016 Presidential election affected the political opinions of some Hispanics, and that the Hispanic subsample of the 2016 ANES cross-

\(^{19}\) Section 151.6, Item 1.8, reads “Comparing how often you speak in English or Spanish in your day-today life, would you say you are generally speaking…?” Responses are “1. English and little or no Spanish, 2. Mostly English but Spanish at least some of the time 3. Both English and Spanish about equally, 4. Mostly Spanish but English at least some of the time, 5. Spanish and little or no English.”

\(^{20}\) Section 151.7, Item 11, reads “How much do you think that what happens generally to Hispanics people in this country will affect what happens in your life…?” Response are 1. A lot, 2. Some, 3. Not very much, 4. Not at all.”
sectional survey provides enough observations to test for this. I will now discuss the data I used to measure concepts within each of my hypotheses.

4.2 Hypothesis 1

To test my first hypothesis, I use three separate dependent variables and hypotheses to test the marginal effects that perceptions of economic mobility\(^2\) have on the likelihood of desiring greater nationalism and protectionism and holding populist beliefs. Since there is more than one definition and measure of economic mobility, I use three related concepts presented in the literature and theoretically associated with economic mobility (i.e. social mobility, financial economic mobility, and opinions of income inequality) to more fully test for significant marginal effects. I will discuss each of the data used for this multivariate multiple regression analysis.

4.2a Hypothesis 1a. Dependent Variable: Increased Nationalism (Binary) (see Appendix D)

The dependent variable for hypothesis 1a. is increased nationalism.\(^3\) I measure it using survey responses that indicate a constituent prefers the expansion of the U.S. national identity within the global footprint. Of the original 3,644 respondents who responded to the respective survey question of whether they disagree or agree with the statement, the world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans, 85% of the total sample selected one of the values from 1. through 5., 35% of the 85% (N=3,644) who selected one of the values 1. through 5. selected value 3.- neither agree nor disagree. 30% of the 3,644 respondents showed agreement with the statement either somewhat or strongly, and 35% disagree either somewhat or strongly. In hypothesis 1a. I am testing to detect the likelihood of a preference for an expansion of the U.S. national identity within the global footprint being affected by the perception dynamics theoretically linked to perceptions of reduced (harder) economic mobility.
I believe that the survey question captures a preference for greater nationalism by asking constituents if they agree that the spread or increase of U.S. ideology in other countries would improve the world, thereby showing a preference for an expansion of U.S. national identity. I recoded the response data to generate a binary variable for nationalism, where agreeing in either capacity (i.e. somewhat or strongly) is represented by the value 1 and disagreeing in either capacity (i.e. somewhat or strongly) is represented by the value 0 (see Appendix E). I also removed observations for the 35% of constituents who selected that they neither agree or disagree, making the contrast between agreement and disagreement greater, and reducing the number of observations used for this variable (N=2,372); of the two outcomes used 47% agree and 53% disagree, and the distributions are almost equal. By specifically measuring the outcome of agreement or disagreement with this variable, I can statistically test the likelihood of preferences for an increase in the prevalence of the U.S. national identity.

4.2b1 Hypothesis 1b1. Dependent Variable: Opposes Involvement in FTA's (see Appendix D)

The dependent variable for hypothesis 1b. is opposes involvement in FTA's which is used as an operationalization protectionism. I measure it using survey responses which indicate that a voter prefers greater economic protection nationally from foreign competition, based on their attitude toward free trade agreements between the U.S. and foreign countries. Responses (N=2,147) to the survey question that were values 1. and 2. were used as a means of contrastingly measuring the attitude of respondents who favor or oppose the U.S. making free trade agreements with other countries. 34% of respondents oppose the U.S. making free trade agreements with other countries however, the remaining 66% favor the U.S. making free trade agreements with other countries. In hypothesis 1b. I test here to determine if the likelihood of preferring greater protectionism increases if voters oppose U.S. involvement in FTA’s. I believe that the survey
question provides a means of measuring preferences for increased protectionism because it directly focuses on FTA’s and is therefore a measure including some attitudes toward NAFTA. The marginal effects of perception dynamics theoretically associated with economic mobility will be tested against a binary operationalization for protectionism recoded from the response data. The variable - opposes involvement in FTA’s - is a binary measure of favoring or opposing FTA’s; I set the oppose value as 1 and favor value as 0 (see Appendix E). The distributions remained the same. I think the protectionism variable properly measures opposition toward foreign economic competition, and that I can statistically test characteristics of the relationship between protectionism during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, and perception dynamics associated with economic mobility.

4.2b2. Hypothesis 1b2. Dependent Variable: Job Loss Due to Immigration (see Appendix D)

Concerns about job losses due to foreign competition were accompanied with opinions that job losses are also related to immigration levels⁴. I use this question’s response data (N=3,630) to generate an interval variable as a measure of opinions among voters about foreign influences on the U.S. domestic labor market. When asked how likely recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here, 15% believed it to be extremely likely, 20% believed it to be very likely, 41% believed it to be somewhat likely, and 24% believed that it is not likely at all. I will test the marginal effects of perceptions of economic mobility as reduced (harder) on this variable which measures the prevalence and intensity of the belief that U.S. immigration levels will result in job loss. I recoded responses for this variable so that values increase with the perceived likelihood of domestic job loss due to U.S. immigration levels (see Appendix E).

4.2c Hypothesis 1c. Dependent Variable: Holds Populist Belief (see Appendix D)
The dependent variable of hypothesis 1c., *holds populist belief*, is a measure of *populism* among voters based on their opinions about the interests of the U.S. government.⁵ I measure it using survey responses (N=4,214) that indicate either a belief that the government is run by a few big interests or for the benefit of all the people. 17% of voters believe that the government is run for the benefit of all the people and 83% of voters believe that it is run by a few big interests. In hypothesis 1c. I will test the likelihood of holding populist beliefs based on perceptions of economic mobility being reduced and harder in 2016 compared to 20 years prior during the period immediately following NAFTA’s enactment (i.e. circa 1996). I contend that the survey question provides a clear reference to the anti-elitist populism discussed within the literature review (Jensen & Bang, 2017: 346). I recoded the response data to generate a binary variable for populism where beliefs that the government is run by a few big interests are coded as 1 and beliefs that the government is run for the benefit of all the people are coded as 0 (see Appendix E). This variable allows for me to test the marginal effects of perceptions toward economic mobility on the likelihood of holding populist beliefs.

4.2d Hypothesis One Independent Variables: Finances, Opportunities, and Income Inequality (see Appendix D)

I use four variables to collectively represent the perception dynamics theoretically linked to economic mobility. I measure the independent variable in part as a measure of voters’ perception of their economic mobility as harder in 2016 compared since NAFTA’s enactment² using binary and interval measures. Although the economic mobility variable captured in ANES 2016 survey is an evaluation of one’s ability to improve their financial well-being, the timespan corroborates with using the survey questions that measure perceptions about characteristics of economic mobility over a 20-year period. The period is during the earliest years of NAFTA, whose enactment
was 2 years prior to the measured timespan. Therefore, I use responses to these survey questions (section 127.6, item 2 and 3)$^2$ as a measure of perceptions of economic mobility in terms of income (i.e. easier, harder, or the same) made based on the opinion of the respondent, after reflecting over the 20-year period since the enactment of NAFTA. Of respondents who answered item 2 (N=3,633), 13% perceived their economic mobility as easier, 73% as harder, and 14% the same. I recoded responses to item 2 and generated a binary variable (i.e. Economic Mobility Harder) whose values are 1 if economic mobility is perceived as harder or 0 if economic mobility is perceived as easier (see Appendix E). This variable is used as a binary measure of perceptions of economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA. Of respondents who answered item 3 (N=3,109), 85% perceive harder, or reduced economic mobility in 2016 compared to 20 years ago and 15% have perceptions of easier, or greater economic mobility in 2016 compared to 20 years ago. I also recoded item 3’s responses to generate an interval variable (i.e. How Much Harder Since NAFTA) that provided a scalar measure of how much easier or harder constituents perceived their economic mobility using values 1 through 7 except value 4, which consists of neutral responses and renumbered the scale from 1 to 6 (see Appendix E). I also use two additional measures theoretically related to measuring the perception dynamics of economic mobility based on the literature review (Athreya & Romero, 2015:169; Bertotti & Modanese, 2016:1951; Davidai & Gilovich, 2018:300; Bertotti & Modanese, 2016).

Responses to section 127.6, item 1 (N=3,639) were recoded to generate an interval variable (i.e. estimate of social mobility) that measures perceptions of social mobility which shares a close theoretical association with economic mobility, and serve as a measure of how easily constituents believe they can get ahead, based on the perceived level of opportunity available in the U.S. (see Appendix E). 9% of voter responses were that there was a great deal of opportunity in America to
get ahead. 17% of voters who responded perceived that there was a lot of opportunity in America to get ahead. 40% of voters believed that there was a moderate amount of opportunity in America to get ahead. 29% of voters believed that there was a little opportunity in America to get ahead, and 5% perceived that there was no opportunity in America to get ahead at all. Finally, I include a measure of how the income gap is perceived in 2016 compared to 20 years ago, as a partial measure of economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA. Lower levels of perceived economic mobility are strongly associated with opinions that the income inequality is greater (Bertotti & Modanese, 2016). Therefore, I expect that a measure for perceptions of the income gap in 2016 compared to 20 years ago, will corroborate with the theoretical assumptions I used to develop a means of measuring perceptions of economic mobility in 2016 compared to 20-years prior. I recoded the responses to section 33.7, item 1, which asks respondents if the difference they perceive in incomes between rich and poor people in the United States today is larger, smaller, or about the same as it was 20 years ago (see Appendix E). I am particularly interested in those who perceive the income gap between rich and poor households as larger. I coded responses (N=3,683) of the gap being larger as value 1 and smaller as value 0 to create a binary operationalization (i.e. Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA) of income inequality theoretically associated with economic mobility (see Appendix E).

These four operationalizations of perceived economic mobility (i.e. economic mobility harder, how much harder since NAFTA, estimate of social mobility, and larger income gap since NAFTA) are used in each of the 4 hypotheses being tested to satisfy the necessary rigor of testing hypothesis 1, to measure characteristics theoretically associated with economic mobility, and to test for a link to NAFTA based on the 20 year period comparison. Additionally, inclusion of each
measure collectively generates greater strength in the relationship between perceptions of economic mobility and their impact on American politics and society.

4.3 Hypothesis 2

My second hypothesis tests the marginal effects of preferring greater nationalism and protectionism and holding populist beliefs, on the likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump in 2016. I will now discuss each of the data used for this multiple regression analysis.

i. Hypothesis 2 Dependent Variable: Will Vote for Trump In 2016 (see Appendix D)

The dependent variable, will vote for trump in 2016, of hypothesis 2 is a measure of the likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump rather than Hillary Clinton (N=2,927). The original survey question asks who voters think they will vote for and the possible responses are the presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, or other. I recoded the response data to generate a variable which includes only observations for Hillary Clinton valued as 0, and observations for Donald Trump valued as 1 (see Appendix E). Of the survey respondents 54% identified as intending to vote for Hillary Clinton, while 46% identified as intending to vote for Donald Trump. I coded this variable to include only observations for Trump and Clinton because I want to test for congruence between the Trump campaign (i.e. intending to vote for Donald Trump) and preferences for the outcomes tested in hypothesis 1 (i.e. greater nationalism and protectionism and holding populist beliefs), as oppose to the Clinton campaign.

4.3a Hypothesis 2 Independent Variables: Nationalism, Protectionism, Populism

The outcomes tested in hypothesis 1 (i.e. preferences for greater nationalism and protectionism and holding populist beliefs) are also the independent variables used to measure the
marginal effects of congruence with the policy orientation of the Trump campaign, on the likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump. Measurements and coding for each of the independent variables for testing hypothesis 2 remained the same as they were for measurements tested in hypothesis 1, however the interval measure of increased nationalism will be used as a covariate rather than the binary measure. This is to provide a wider range of values to use when testing the marginal effects of hypothesis 2.

4.4 Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 is a test to establish the causal link between intent to vote for Trump as the independent variable and holding perceptions of reduced (harder) economic mobility as the dependent variable. 89% of respondents that showed an intent to vote for Donald Trump also perceive economic mobility in 2016 as harder compared to 20 years ago, while 11% of Trump voters perceive easier economic mobility in 2016 compared to 20 years ago. Therefore, I believe that cross-analyzing the perceptions of reduced economic mobility with voter election preferences will test the transitivity between holding perceptions of reduced economic mobility, preferring campaign which promote populism and calling for greater nationalism and protectionism, and voter support for Donald Trump (see Figure 15c.).

4.5. Hypothesis 4

My final hypothesis tests a possible counterargument to the transitivity among concepts measured within hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. I contend that even if constituents hold perceptions of reduced economic mobility, preferences for greater nationalism and protectionism, holds populist beliefs, and holds policy preferences congruent to those of the Trump campaign, as the level of
experienced racial discrimination increases among U.S. constituents\textsuperscript{7}, their likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump decreases (i.e. Will Vote For Trump in 2016).

4.5a Hypothesis 4 Independent Variable: Level of Experienced Racial Discrimination (see Appendix D)

I test hypothesis 4 using response data from are from section 165, item 2 (N=3,583) which asks voters to record the level of discrimination they have personally faced because of their skin color (e.g. light, medium, or dark). 2% of voters indicated having experienced a great deal of discrimination, 3% indicated they had experienced a lot, 11% had received a moderate amount of discrimination due to their skin tone, 26% indicated having experienced discrimination a little, and 58% claimed to not have experienced any discrimination of their skin tone at all.” I recoded the response data, keeping only survey response that were value 1 through 5 and developed a scalar variable (i.e. Racial Discrimination Exp’d) to serve as measure of the experienced discrimination due to skin tone (see Appendix E). Given that skin tone/hue is the foundation from which race is perceived, I think that this variable measures the concept of racial discrimination well without focusing on a specific category of race. I want to capture the experience of discrimination due to race/skin tone among constituents, and attempt detect if it has an overriding effect on the outcome of the dependent variable. I include five additional control variables in this model which include operationalizations of measures for perceptions of economic mobility\textsuperscript{2} as harder in 2016 compared to 20 years prior, preferences for greater nationalism\textsuperscript{3} and protectionism\textsuperscript{4}, and holding populist beliefs\textsuperscript{5} (i.e. Economic Mobility Harder, Increased Nationalism (Interval), Opposes Involvement in FTA’s, Job Loss Due to Immigration, and Holds Populist Belief).
4.6 Control Variables (see Appendix E)

The variables I use to control for alternative explanations associated with political preferences and outcomes tested in all of my hypotheses are total household income\textsuperscript{10} divided into quantiles, employment status\textsuperscript{21}, highest education level\textsuperscript{11}, self-identified as racial minority\textsuperscript{9}, political party orientation\textsuperscript{17}, recorded age of respondent that is not the surveyor’s estimate, and perceived gender.\textsuperscript{8} I also include the pre-election and post-election sample weights. The socioeconomic status (SES) of voters is closely related to these demographic characteristics which are by no means entirely balanced in distribution among voters. Therefore, by controlling for the explanatory power of these differences among U.S. constituents I am controlling for possible perceptions of relative deprivation perceived between them and attempting to isolate the perception and preference dynamics within each of my statistical models.

4.7 Methods (see Appendix F)

This section consists of the details pertaining to how I conducted the statistical analysis within my cross-sectional study to test each of my hypotheses, the structure of each statistical model, and how I interpreted the results of my manipulations. Based on the structure of my hypotheses, they are all one-tailed tests and statistical significance was determined using alpha levels of 5%, 1%, and .01% for all results regardless of regression method, as well as the corresponding confidence intervals (Pollock III, 2016:158). I controlled for heteroskedasticity in all regression models using robust clusters based on the voter’s state within the sample (see Appendix E) (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:391). I used logit regression analysis to test each of my

\textsuperscript{21} Section 62, item 14, reads “We’d like to know if you are working now, temporarily laid off, or are you unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, a homemaker, a student, or what?” Response are “1. Working now, 2. Temporarily laid off, 4. Unemployed, 5. Retired, 6. Permanently disabled, 7. Homemaker, 8. Student.” Value 3. Is not recorded or used to indicate an employment status in the survey.
hypotheses, except $H1b2$, for significant marginal effects based on the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of outcomes regressed within each. I also used logit regression analysis because its primary statistical function is to regress binary outcome variables, and binary is the coding for each of my dependent variables, except job loss due to immigration, the dependent variable of $H1b2$ (see Appendix E) (Pollock III, 2016:216-218).

The results provided from each logit regression were tested for goodness of fit using 100 groups (i.e. each regression sample is divided into 100 groups) because the differences between the number of observations and covariate patterns is minimal. Additionally, post-estimations were used to determine the change of predicted probabilities occurring across various intervals. To test $H1b2$ for significant marginal effects I used ordinary least squares regression analysis (OLS). OLS regression analysis allowed me to test for significant marginal effects that covariates have on the intensity of believing that immigration levels will result in job loss (see Appendix D). The dependent variable of $H1b2$ is also scalar and works best with OLS regression analysis to measure the intensity of the respective covariates’ effect on job loss due to immigration (see Appendix E) (Pollock III, 2016:203-208). I used the variance inflation factor to check the OLS regression results of $H1b2$ for multicollinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:328-330). Statistical methods for my data analysis were completed using the Stata 15.1 statistical software.
5. Results (see Appendix E, F, and G)

The following section consists of the statistical analysis for each regression model used in testing my hypotheses. For each model I report statistically significant findings, related marginal data, and how I determined either the justification or falsification of the corresponding hypothesis. Overall, I rejected the null hypothesis for hypotheses 2., 3., and 4. However, I could not reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1.

5.1. Hypothesis 1a. Model Results (see Table G1a.)

The results of testing hypothesis 1a. for statistically significant marginal effects were moderately supportive in justifying my acceptance of the null hypothesis. As perception dynamics associated with opinions of harder economic mobility increase among U.S. voters, the likelihood of preferring increases in U.S. nationalism increase as well, however these results were only marginal. Also, as estimates of social mobility increase, the likelihood of preferring greater nationalism increases (**0.160) (see Appendix E). I believe this is the result of U.S. citizens overestimating the level of opportunity there is to get ahead in the U.S., and although this does not support my hypothesis it validates points made in previous studies (Davidai & Gilovich, 2018:300). The change in predicted probability from 1. None to 5. A great deal - values of the estimate of social mobility variable, on the likelihood of U.S. voters preferring greater nationalism was a 15.7% increase in likelihood. The change in predicted probability for one movement half of the standard deviation was an increase or decrease of .7% between values. Additionally, among the control variables total income (*-0.106), age (**-0.027), and the gender (*-0.234) of the voter had significant marginal effects on the likelihood of preferring greater nationalism within the statistical model. As total income increased, the likelihood for U.S. voters to prefer an increase in
nationalism decreased, however as the age of the voter increased, their likelihood of preferring increases in U.S. nationalism increased as well. Also, women within this sample of voters were 5.8% less likely than men to prefer increases in U.S. nationalism. The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was an 11.8% capacity to explain the variance in preferring increases in nationalism within the model for hypothesis 1a. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 172.52 which supports keeping some variables within this model for future tests. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic has a p-value below .1% and indicates a greater likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample may apply to the U.S. voter population.

5.2. Hypothesis 1b1. Model Results (see Table G1b1.)

The results of testing hypothesis 1b1. for statistically significant marginal effects were robust and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. Among U.S., the likelihood of preferring protectionism increases significantly (*0.137), as the level of perceived hardship in economic mobility increases. Since one of the perception dynamics used here to partially measure perceptions of economic mobility resulted in a significant marginal effect, this supports hypothesis 1b1. (Swedberg, 2018:19). These results are congruent with some of the attitudes of voters who perceive harder economic mobility due to foreign competition (Walley, 2017:231; Winders, 2016). This also validates the operationalizations used here. As estimates of social mobility increased, a preference for less protectionism was more likely (**-0.268). Here there is a possibility of having captured relatively similar results to previous studies where voters overestimated the level of opportunity there was to get ahead in the U.S., and although this does not support my hypothesis it validates points made in previous studies (Davidai & Gilovich, 2018:300). The change in the predicted probability from minimum to maximum in the intensity of perceiving harder economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA, increased the likelihood among voters to prefer greater
protectionism by 13.2%, and a 4% increase or decrease based on 1 movement half the standard deviation between values. The change in the predicted probability from minimum to maximum categories of voter estimates of social mobility was a -22.1% decrease in the likelihood of favoring greater protectionism. One movement half the standard deviation between values of social mobility estimates, changes the likelihood by 5.7%.

Additionally, among the control variables total income (**0.151) yielded significant marginal effects on the likelihood of preferring greater protectionism within the statistical model. As total income increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters to prefer an increase in protectionism decreased. The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was a .6% capacity to explain the variance in preferring an increase in macroeconomic protectionism within the model for hypothesis 1b1. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 99.27 which supports keeping perhaps some of this model’s covariates. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic has a p-value below .1% and indicates a greater likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample may apply to the U.S. voter population.

5.3 Hypothesis 1b2. Model Results (see Table G1b2.)

The results of testing hypothesis 1b2. for statistically significant marginal effects were robust and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. As the intensity of perceiving harder economic mobility increased, the intensity of believing that immigration levels would result in job losses nationally, increased significantly by 4.3% of a 1-point value (**0.043). This supports hypothesis 1b2. since one of the perception dynamics used here to partially measure perceptions of economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA, had a statistically significant effect on the intensity the tested belief (Swedberg, 2018:19). The results are congruent with some of the
attitudes of voters who perceived harder economic mobility due to foreign competition resulting in job losses (Walley, 2017:231; Winders, 2016). As estimates of social mobility increased among voters within the tested sample, the intensity in the expected likelihood of job losses decreased by 5.8% of 1 value point (*-0.058). However, voters who perceived the income gap between rich and poor families as larger in 2016 since the enactment of NAFTA, also showed a reduced inclination to believe job loss would occur due to immigration levels by 18.6% of a 1 value point (*-0.186). Additionally, among the control variables total income (***-0.113) and voter age (***0.005) yielded significant marginal effects within the statistical model. As total income increases within the model, the inclination to expect immigration-related job loss reduces by 11.3% of 1 value point. As voter age increased, the inclination to expect job losses due to immigration levels increased by .5% of 1 value point. The model’s mean variance inflation factor was 1.13 and showed no signs of issues related to multicollinearity. The F statistic showed significant model fit below .1% which supports keeping some of this model’s covariates. The model’s R-squared statistics showed that the covariates explain 3.7% of the change in the intensity of the tested belief.

5.4 Hypothesis 1c. Model Results (see Table G1c.)

The results of testing hypothesis 1c. for statistically significant marginal effects were robust and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. Among U.S. voters within the sample, the likelihood of holding a populist belief toward the government increased significantly as opinions of reduced economic mobility intensified (**0.165) (Jensen & Bang, 2017). The change in the predicted probability of the economic mobility perception dynamic increase by 11.5% from its minimum to maximum value, and a 2.6% change occurs half a standard deviation from a value point. As the estimate of social mobility (***-0.238) increases, the likelihood of U.S. voters holding a populist belief toward the government decreases significantly. The change in the
predicted probability of the estimate of social mobility decreases by 11.5% from its minimum to maximum value, and a 2.8% change occurs half a standard deviation from a value point. U.S. voters within the tested sample who perceived the income gap to be larger in 2016 since the enactment of NAFTA, were more likely to hold a populist belief towards the U.S. government (**0.702). The change in the predicted probability of holding a populist perspective based on perceiving the income gap to be larger increases by 10.2% from perceiving it as smaller (0) to perceiving it as larger (1), and a 1.8% change a half of a standard deviation between the two values. This supports hypothesis 1c. since both perception dynamics used here to partially measure perceptions of economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA, had a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of U.S. voters within the sample holding populist beliefs toward the U.S. government.

These results show that U.S. voters within the sample who perceive greater economic hardship since the enactment of NAFTA, are more likely to hold populist beliefs. Additionally, among the control variables total income (**0.158) and partisan ID (*-0.132) yielded significant marginal effects on the likelihood of holding a populist belief about U.S government interests. As total income increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters to hold a populist belief toward their government increased. U.S. voters within the sample who identified as independent rather than Democrat or Republican were more likely to hold a populist belief about their government’s interests (Jensen & Bang, 2017: 346). The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was a 52.7% capacity to explain the variance in the likelihood of U.S. voters holding populist beliefs within the model for hypothesis 1c. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 83.09 which supports keeping perhaps some of this model’s covariates with higher frequencies. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic has a p-value below .1% and indicates a greater likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample may
apply to the broader U.S. voter population.

5.5 Hypothesis 2. Model Results (see Table G2.)

The results of testing hypothesis 2. for statistically significant marginal effects were robust and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. U.S. voters with preferences congruent to the policy positions of the Trump campaign were more likely to intend on voting for Donald Trump rather than Hillary Clinton (Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231). As the intensity of favoring greater nationalism increased among U.S voters within the test sample, their likelihood of intending on voting for Trump in 2016 increased (***0.625). The change in the predicted probability of the likelihood for voters who favored greater nationalism to intend on voting for Trump in 2016 from the minimum to maximum value was 41.9%. Movement half of a standard deviation between values would result in a positive or negative change of 14.5%. U.S. voters within the tested sample who opposed U.S. involvement in FTA’s were more likely to intend on voting for Trump in 2016 (***0.941). The change in the predicted probability on the likelihood of voters who oppose FTA’s to intend to vote for Trump in 2016 from the favor to oppose value was 22.4%. Movement half of a standard deviation between the two values would result in a positive or negative change of 10.2% on the likelihood of voters opposed to FTA’s voting for Trump. As the belief that job losses are likely to occur due to immigration levels intensifies, the likelihood of intending to vote for Trump in 2016 increases (***1.062). Within this model a change in the predicted probability on the likelihood of intending to vote for trump based on the intensity of voter perceptions about immigration-related job loss from the minimum to maximum value is 65.9%. Movement half of a standard deviation between values of the measured results in a positive or negative change of 24.9% on likelihood of intent to vote Trump in 2016. U.S. voters within the model sample who held populist beliefs about U.S. government showed an increased
likelihood of voting for Trump in 2016 (***1.575). The change in the predicted probability between voters within the sample who identify as holding a populist belief and those who do not is a 29.6% increase from the minimum to maximum values. Half a standard deviation between the two values results in a positive or negative change of 13.5%.

Additionally, among the control variables total income (*0.223), voter age (**0.017), and gender (**-0.415) yielded significant marginal effects on the likelihood of intending on voting for Trump in 2016. As total income increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample to vote for Trump in 2016 increased. As voter age increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample to intend to vote for Trump in 2016 increased. Women were 9.6% less likely to vote for Trump in 2016. The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was a 36.3% capacity to explain the variance in the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample to intend on voting for Trump in 2016. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 442.09 which supports keeping perhaps some of this model’s stronger covariates. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic has a p-value below .1% and indicates an increased likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample may apply to the broader U.S. voter population.

5.6 Hypothesis 3. Model Results (see Table G3.)

The significant marginal effects of testing hypothesis 3. were moderate and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. U.S. voters who intended on voting for Donald Trump rather than Hillary Clinton in 2016 were more likely to perceive their economic mobility as harder since the enactment of NAFTA (*0.342). Here I used the economic mobility perception dynamic which had the strongest relationships in hypothesis 1 overall, rather than perceptions of the income gap. No other significant effects from covariates (i.e. the controls) resulted from the analysis. The change
in the predicted probability of voters who intended to vote for Trump in 2016, on the likelihood of perceiving harder economic mobility in 2016 from the easier to harder was 4.1%. Movement half of a standard deviation between from either would result in a positive or negative change of 2.1%. The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was a 21.7% capacity to explain the variance in the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample who intended on voting for Trump in 2016 to perceive reduced economic mobility. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 32.27 which is a reason to seek stronger covariates holding greater explanatory power. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic has a p-value below .1% and indicates an increased likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample may apply to an untested or broader characteristic of the 2016 Trump supporter.

5.7 Hypothesis 4. Model Results (see Table G4.)

The results of testing hypothesis 4. for statistically significant marginal effects were robust and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. These data suggest the level of transitivity between hypotheses 1a., 1b., and 1c is reduced after introducing the racial discrimination characteristic to the profile tested in hypothesis 4. As the level of experienced racial/skin tone discrimination among voters within the tested sample increased, there likelihood of intending to vote for Trump in 2016 decreased (**-0.310). The change in the predicted probability between the minimum and maximum levels of discrimination experienced on the likelihood of U.S. voters intending to vote for Trump in 2016 was decreased by -25%. Movement half the standard deviation from a value results in a positive or negative change of 7.1%. Additionally, among the control variables all preferences congruent with the policy positions of the Trump campaign in hypothesis 2, except for perceptions of economic mobility in terms of income, which served to act as a proxy for perceptions of economic mobility overall, had similarly significant marginal effects on the likelihood of a Trump voter in 2016. Also, total income (*0.207), voter age (*0.013), and gender
(***-0.619) yielded significant marginal effects on the likelihood of intending on voting for Trump in 2016. As total income increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample to vote for Trump in 2016 increased. As voter age increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample to vote for Trump in 2016 increased. Women were 14.5% less likely to vote for Trump in 2016 within this model. The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was an 8.9% capacity to explain the variance in the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample who have experienced racial/skin tone discrimination to intend on voting for Trump in 2016. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 579.11 and most of this model’s covariates displayed strong statistical relationships. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic has a p-value below .1% and indicates an increased likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample may apply to the broader U.S. voter population.
6. Conclusions

6.1 Discussion

Overall the results of this study were robust, and three-fourths of the theoretical framework held. Based on my results, greater overlap between constituent preferences and the policy positions of the Trump campaign in 2016, increased the likelihood of U.S. voters to have supported Donald Trump (see Figure 15b and Table G2) (Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231). Also, U.S. voters who supported the Trump campaign in 2016 were significantly more likely to describe their economic mobility in 2016 since the enactment of NAFTA, as harder (see Figure 15c and Table G3) (Walley, 2017:234; Swedberg, 2018: 20, 16). However, U.S. voters who identified as victims of racial discrimination were less likely to support Trump in 2016 regardless of having preferences congruent with the campaign (see Figure 15d and Table G4) (Winders, 2016:291; Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017). This is a voter characteristic which overrode the best performing perception dynamic of economic mobility in this study. Although the likelihood of U.S. voters to prefer greater economic protection from foreign competition and hold populist beliefs increased with perceptions of economic hardship, the likelihood of preferring greater nationalism was marginal in this study (see Figure 15f and Table G1a). The answer to my research question\textsuperscript{22} is that among U.S. voters in 2016, those with perceptions of reduced economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA were more likely to have supported changes in U.S. macroeconomic policies, to implement greater protection from elitism within the U.S. government and foreign economic competition. Additionally, U.S. voters holding said preferences were

\textsuperscript{22} “How did U.S. perceptions of economic mobility affect voter perceptions of the U.S. economic overall, and what are the implications therein related to individual and group preferences toward NAFTA and Trump’s candidacy, during the 2016 U.S. elections?”
significantly more likely to support Trump’s candidacy during the 2016 Presidential election rather than Hillary Clinton. However, U.S. voters who were victims of racial discrimination and had preferences congruent with the campaign agenda were less likely to support Trump’s candidacy over Clinton’s.

I believe my study adds to the literature concerning political campaigns, the 2016 U.S. elections, research concerned with how the perceived effects of trade policy influences voter behavior, and how empathy may affect voter behavior in overriding ways. NAFTA has benefitted the U.S. exponentially, yet the distribution of proceeds across U.S. society has remained uneven, especially since wages in unskilled labor have remained plateaued since 2000 and decreasing in 2008. The conditions of a 16-year wage stagnation and increased competition among domestic laborers, led many to favor populist leaning candidates such as Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, however following Bernie Sanders’ concession to Hillary Clinton during the primaries, some supporters for Sanders shifted away from Clinton, potentially creating additional support for Trump (Kurtzleben, 2017). Donald Trump’s pledge to renegotiate FTA’s, implement immigration reforms, and drain the swamp in Washington D.C. was what many U.S. voters wanted from a Presidential candidate in 2016.

6.2. Limitations

I believe that a subsequent study using a better specified operationalization for nationalism would help to retest hypothesis 1a. and investigate the implications of preferences for greater nationalism among U.S. voters. I think the likelihood of preferring increased nationalism based on how much harder economic mobility is perceived might increase significantly, if measured in a way that captures a more conservative economic nationalism. The distributions of the sample data
used also contained super-majorities and this can result from the data gathering process. The overrepresentation of groups within the sample may also contribute to the behaviors of certain variables, and in turn bias these results in a way not necessarily applicable to other studies concerning topics which use similar concepts. The control variable for racial minority voters was not significant and this might have to do with an underrepresentation of minorities within the survey. However, based on the census data one can infer that the underrepresentation may also be due to low participation from U.S. voters who would add to the underrepresented groups.

This may be due to less perceived commonality between voters who identify as a racial minority and the candidate who eventually hold offices (Barreto, Villarreal, & Woods, 2005:75). Minority voters may be more likely to participate in surveys such as ANES, the U.S. census, and display increased participation in elections if political outcomes were more evenly distributed between majority and minority groups (Barreto et al., 2005:76). Additionally, my research does not address high skilled positions in the U.S. being filled by immigrants rather than U.S. citizens, and perhaps among U.S. citizens an additional category of high skilled positions filled between natural born and naturalized may also yield findings of scholarly interest (Freeman & Kessler, 2008:667).

In conclusion this study’s voter-choice regression models could be improved with better operationalizations of economic nationalism, lower overrepresentation among racial groups within the original sample data, and additional operationalizations to test the marginal effects of job competition among categories of higher skilled laborers.

6.3. Implications

I predict that the Trump campaign will again target voters concerned primarily with
economic self-interests, and that competing campaigns will attempt to attract voters who identify as victims of discrimination since the 2016 election (e.g. sexual assault, sexism, and racism) in addition to the broader opposition to Trump’s reelection in 2020 (Keith, 2017). With the creation of the UMCA and measures taken to address issues along the U.S.-Mexico border, the Trump administration continues to address and seemingly fulfill its 2016 campaign agenda. As we advance to 2020 it will be interesting to see how much momentum populist targeting campaigns gain, considering the success of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in 2016. It will also be interesting to see what new promises candidates will make to constituents, and of those promises which gain traction among U.S. voters who overridingly vote according to empathy rather than economic self-interests in 2020. If a Trump victory were to occur in 2020 I believe it would require some level of support from Hispanic and Latino U.S. voters. As domestic unrest continues in Venezuela the situation is a has become a political speaking point for Donald Trump leading up to 2020 and quite possibly a means of attracting Hispanic and Latino voters (Kelemen, 2019). However, his position on immigration remains a key policy position which could be sending Hispanic and Latino voters in the direction of other candidates (Collingwood, Barreto, & Garcia-Rios, 2014). Hispanics and Latino U.S. voters are among the fastest growing groups in the U.S., and like many other racial/ethnic groups consists of people with individual differences (Kenski & Tisinger, 2006). Thus, it will be interesting to see how Hispanics and Latinos behave during the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
7. References


Hains, T. (2018). President Trump signs USMCA trade deal with Mexico, Canada.


https://www.npr.org/2019/03/27/707358205/trump-vows-to-keep-pressure-on-venezuelan-president-nicol-s-maduro


Klüver, H. (2015). Interest Groups in the German Bundestag: exploring the issue linkage
between citizens and Interest groups. *German Politics, 24*(2), 137-153.


Figure 1.

1. Easier, 2. Harder, 3. Same, N=3,633. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 127.6, Item 2. “When it comes to people trying to improve their financial well-being, do you think it is now easier, harder, or the same as it was 20 years ago?”
N=2,663. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 130, Item 1. “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the government trying to reduce the difference in incomes between the richest and poorest households?”

N=3,109. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 127.6, Item 3. “How much easier or harder compared to 20 years ago?”
Figure 4.

Figure 5.

Figure 6a.
Distributions of U.S. import and export revenue.
Figure 6b.
Distributions of foreign direct investment (U.S., Mexico, and Canada).

Figure 7.
N= 3,621. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 137, Item 1. “Recently, some big American companies have been hiring workers in foreign countries to replace workers in the U.S. Do you think the federal government should discourage companies from doing this, encourage companies to do this, or stay out of the matter?”
Figure 8.

Figure 9.
Figure 10.


Figure 11a.

N= 3,641. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 134.7, Item 7. “During the past 12 months, has anyone in your family or a close personal friend lost a job, or has no one in your family and no close personal friend lost a job in the past 12 months?”
Figure 11b.

N= 1,727. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 133, Item 1. “Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you Favor or Oppose new limits on imports?”

Figure 12.

1. Increased a lot, 2. Increased a little, 3. Left the same as it is now 4. Decreased a little 5. Decreased a lot. N=3,622. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 134, Item 1. “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the U.S. to live should be…?”
Figure 13.

1. Extremely likely, 2. Very likely, 3. Somewhat likely 4. Not at all likely. N=3,630. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 134, Item 2. “How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here (i.e. U.S.)?”
Figure 14.

Figure 15. Theoretical Frameworks of Hypotheses:

**Figure 15a.**

**Figure 15b.**
Hypothesis 3. Theoretical Framework:

Figure 15c.

Hypothesis 4. Theoretical Framework:

Figure 15d.
Figure 15e.

Figure 15f.
Appendix A.

Overview of ANES 2016 sample data:
General Socioeconomic Characteristics.
N= 4,272 Variables = 1,196

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of Gender:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2,332</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,319</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of Race:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White, alone</td>
<td>3,038</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black, alone</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian, Hawaiian, Pacific, alone</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous American, alone</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi. Ethnic</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,238</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-22.49K</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.5-49.9K</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50K- 89.9K</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90K-250+K</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,793</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Level of Education:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade 1st to 12th (No Diploma)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Diploma/GED or Some College</td>
<td>1,709</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Degree (Occupational or Vocational)</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's Degree (e.g. BA, BS, etc.)</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Degree (e.g. MA, MS, Ph.D., JD.)</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,227</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions of Social Class:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,637</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor Characteristics:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>2,596</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1,659</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4255</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of Household Other than Self:</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>40.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>24.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>17.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>10.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>4.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Living Arrangement:</strong></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>1,754</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own no payments due</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other arrangement</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,234</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Have Health Insurance:</strong></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insured</td>
<td>3,891</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uninsured</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,265</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Party Orientation</strong></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>1,451</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>1,231</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,049</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Age Groups</strong></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 to 34</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 50</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 to 69</td>
<td>1,491</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 to 90 or older</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,150</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B.

Parallel U.S. Population Estimates Adapted From The U.S. Census Bureau V2018 Data

N = 327,167,434

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex Across U.S.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race and Hispanic Origin Across U.S.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White, alone</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black, alone</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian, Hawaiian, Pacific, alone</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous American, alone</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi. Ethnic</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Across U.S.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School Grad. or Higher 25+ Yrs. Old</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's Degree or Higher 25+ Yrs. Old</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Miscellaneous:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-U.S. Citizen or Natural Born</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons in Civilian Labor Force</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income (2017 USD)</td>
<td>$57,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Persons Per Household</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C.

**Overview of ANES 2016 Hispanic, Latino, and Immigrant Data Characteristics:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naturalized or Natural Born Citizen</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Born</td>
<td>3828</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalized</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4243</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language at Home Spanish/English:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only English</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly English</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Equally</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Spanish</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Spanish</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News in Spanish or English:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English More</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish More</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Equally</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How Much Use of English and Spanish</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English and little or no Spanish</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly English but Spanish at least</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both English but Spanish at least</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Spanish but English at least</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish and little or no English</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix D

Overview of ANES 2016 Distributions By Non-Control Variables After Coding For Analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased Nationalism (Binary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Agree</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Disagree</td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,372</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Nationalism (Interval)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Disagree Strongly</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Disagree Somewhat</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Agree Somewhat</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Agree Strongly</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,372</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposes Involvement in FTA's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Oppose</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Favor</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,147</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Loss Due to Immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Not Likely at All</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Somewhat Likely</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Very Likely</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Extremely Likely</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,630</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holds Populist Belief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Government Run by Few</td>
<td>3,498</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Government Run For All</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,214</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will Vote for Trump In 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Trump</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Clinton</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,927</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Mobility Harder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Harder</td>
<td>2,645</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Easier</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,111</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Much Harder Since NAFTA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. A great Deal Easier</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A Moderate Amount Easier</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A Little Easier</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of Social Mobility</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. None</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. A Little</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A Moderate Amount</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A Lot</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A Great Deal</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,639</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Larger Income Gap Since</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Larger</td>
<td>3,462</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Smaller</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,683</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Discrimination Exp'd.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. None</td>
<td>2,077</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. A Little</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A Moderate Amount</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A Lot</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A Great Deal</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,583</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Economic Mobility Harder 20Yrs. Across Trump Voters:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harder</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easier</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Trump Voters</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E.

Variable Index:

**Nationalism.** 
*Increased Nationalism, Binary*

**Original Name:** V162123
**Original Label:** Better if rest of world more like America
**Question:** Section 127.2, Item 1, “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans. Do you agree… with this statement?”
**Responses:** 1. Agree strongly, 2. Agree somewhat, 3. Neither agree or disagree, 4. Disagree somewhat, 5. Disagree strongly
**Coding for Analysis:**
_binary coding:_ 1. Agree, 0. Disagree. (1/2= “1”, option 3 removed, 4/5= “0”).
_scalar coding:_ 4. Agree strongly, 3. Agree somewhat, 2. Disagree somewhat, 1. Disagree strongly. (option 3 removed)

**Protectionism.** 
*Opposes Involvement in FTA’s*

**Original Name:** V162176
**Original Label:** Does R favor or oppose free trade agreements w/other countries
**Question:** Section 136.8, Item 2, “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S making free trade agreements with other countries?”
**Responses:** 1. Favor, 2. Oppose, 3. Neither favor nor oppose
**Coding for Analysis:**
_binary coding:_ 1. Oppose, 0. Favor. (option 3 removed)

**Protectionism.** 
*Job Loss Due to Immigration*

**Original Name:** V162158
**Original Label:** How likely immigration will take away jobs
**Question:** Section 134, Item 2, “How like is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here?”
**Responses:** 1. Extremely likely, 2. Very likely, 3. Somewhat likely, 4. Not at all likely
**Coding for Analysis:**
_Scalar coding:_ 3. Extremely likely, 2. Very likely, 1. Somewhat likely, 0. Not at all likely.

**Populist Belief.** 
*Holds Populist Belief*

**Original Name:** V161216
**Original Label:** Govt run by a few big interests or for benefit of all
**Question:** Section 48.6, Item 4, “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?”
**Responses:** 1. Run by a few big interests, 2. For the benefit of all the people
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Run by a few big interests, 0. For the benefit of all the people

Intent to Vote for Trump. *(Will Vote for Trump In 2016)*
Original Name: V161031
Original Label: For whom does R intend to vote for President
Question: Section 21.1, Item 16, “Who do you think you will vote for?”
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Donald Trump, 0. Hillary Clinton. (options 3/5 removed)

Perception of Reduced Economic Mobility in 2016 Compared to 20 Years Ago. *(Economic Mobility Harder)*
Original Name: V162135
Original Label: Economic mobility compared to 20 years ago
Question: Section 127.6, Item 2, “When it comes to people trying to improve their financial well-being, do you think it is now easier, harder, or the same as it was 20 years ago?”
Responses: 1. Easier, 2. Harder, 3. The same

Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Harder, 0. Easier. (option 3 removed)

Perception of Economic Mobility Interval. *(How Much Harder Since NAFTA)*
Original Name: V162136X
Original Label: Summary – Economic mobility easier/harder compared to 20 years ago
Question: Section 127.6, Item 3, “How much easier/harder is economic mobility compared to 20 years ago?”
Responses: 1. A great deal, 2. A moderate amount, 3. A little
Coding for Analysis:

Perception of Social Mobility. *(Estimate of Social Mobility)*
Original Name: V162134
Original Label: How much opportunity in American to get ahead
Question: Section 127.6, Item 1, “How much opportunity is there in America for the average person to get ahead ?”
Coding for Analysis:
Interval Coding: 4. A great deal, 3. A lot, 2. A moderate amount, 1. A little, 0. None

Perception of Income Gap. (Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA)
Original Name: V161137
Original Label: Income gap today more or less than 20 years ago
Question: Section 33.7, Item 1, “Do you think the differences in incomes between rich people and poor people in the United States today is larger, smaller, or about the same as it was 20 years ago?”
Responses: 1. Larger, 2. Smaller, 3. About the same
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Larger, 0. Smaller. (option 3 removed)

Experiences of Discrimination Due to Skin Tone. (Racial Discrimination Exp’d)
Original Name: V162369
Original Label: Discrimination due to skin tone
Question: Section 165, Item 2, “How much discrimination have you personally faced because of your skin color (e.g. light, medium, or dark)?”
Coding for Analysis:
Interval Coding: 0. None at all, 1. A little, 2. A moderate amount, 3. A lot, 4. A great deal

Employment Status. (Employed)
Original Name: V161277
Original Label: Initial R employment status, start of occupation module
Question: Section 62, Item 14, “We’d like to know if you are working now, temporarily laid off, or are you unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, a homemaker, a student, or what?”
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Working now, 0. All other classifications. (2/8 = “0”)

Total Income. (Total Income by Quantiles)
Original Name: V162309X
Original Label: Summary- Total income
Question: Section 63.3, Item 1, “What is the total income in 2015 of all your family members living here/ your total income in 2015?”
Responses: Numeric hard range 0-99999999 (1 to 28 ranges)
Coding for Analysis:
Interval Coding: 1. 0-22.49k, 2. 22.5k – 49.99k, 3. 50k – 89.99k, 4. 90k – 250k or more. (1/7= “1”, 8/14= “2”, 15/21= “3”, 22/28= “4”)
**Highest Education Level.** *(Education)*

**Original Name:** V161270

**Original Label:** Highest level of education

**Question:** Section 62, Item 7.1, “What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?”

**Responses:** 1. Less than 1st grade, 2. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade, 3. 5th or 6th grade, 4. 7th or 8th grade, 5. 9th grade, 6. 10th grade, 7. 11th grade, 8. 12th grade no diploma, 9. High school graduate or equivalent, 10. Some college but no degree, 11. Associate degree in college – Occupational/Vocational, 12. Associate degree in college – Academic program, 13. Bachelor’s degree (e.g. BA, BS), 14. Master’s degree (e.g. MA, MS), 15. Professional School Degree (e.g. MD, LD), 16. Doctorate degree (e.g. Ph.D., Ed.D.), 95. Other

**Coding for Analysis:**
Interval Coding: 1. 12th grade no diploma or less, 2. High school graduate and/or some college, 3. Occupational/Vocational/Academic Associates, 4. Bachelor’s degree, 5. Master’s, Doctorate, or Professional Degree. (1/8= “1”, 9/10= “2”, 11/12= “3”, 13= “4”, 14/16= “5”, option 95 removed)

**Self-Identified Race.** *(ID as Racial Minority)*

**Original Name:** V161310X

**Original Label:** R Self-identified race

**Question:** Section 62, Item 52.5, “Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be.”

**Responses:** 1. White, 2. Black or African-American, 3. American Indian or Alaska Native, 4. Asian, 5. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, (Hispanic treated as own category in distribution).

**Coding for Analysis:**
Binary Coding: 1. Non-white, 0. White. (2/5= “1”, 1= “0”)

**Party Orientation.** *(Voter Partisan ID)*

**Original Name:** V161155

**Original Label:** Does R think of self as Dem, Rep, Ind, or what

**Question:** Section 39, Item 1, “Generally Speaking do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an independent, or what?”

**Responses:** 0. No preference, 1. Democrat, 2. Republican, 3. Independent, 5. Other

**Coding for Analysis:**
Interval Coding: 3. Republican, 2. Independent, 1. Democrat. (option 5 removed)

**Years of Age.** *(Respondent Age)*

**Original Name:** V161267

**Original Label:** Respondent age

**Coding for Analysis:**
Interval Coding: Numeric hard range 18 to 90 or older.

**Self-Identified Gender.** *(Gender ID)*  
**Original Name**: V161342  
**Original Label**: R Self-identified gender  
**Question**: Section 63.1, Item 1.5, “What is your gender”  
**Responses**: 1. Male, 2. Female, 3. Other  
**Coding for Analysis**:  
Binary Coding: 1. Male, 2. Female. (option 3 removed)

Post-Election Sample Weight – *(PstWght_Full)*  
**Original Name**: V160102  
**Original Label**: Post-election weight – full sample

Pre-Election Sample Weight – *(PreWght_Full)*  
**Original Name**: V160101  
**Original Label**: Pre-election weight – full sample

Cluster – *(State Location of Voter)*  
**Original Name**: V163001A  
**Original Label**: Sample: Sample location FIPS State
Appendix F.

Regression Formulas:

H1a.

\[
\ln \left( \frac{\text{Increased Nationalism (Binary)/1- Increased Nationalism (Binary)}}{1} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ How Much Harder Since NAFTA} + \beta_2 \text{ Estimate of Social Mobility} + \beta_3 \text{ Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA} + \text{ Controls (Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)}
\]

H1b1.

\[
\ln \left( \frac{\text{Opposes Involvement in FTA's/1- Opposes Involvement in FTA's}}{1} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ How Much Harder Since NAFTA} + \beta_2 \text{ Estimate of Social Mobility} + \beta_3 \text{ Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA} + \text{ Controls (Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)}
\]

H1b2.

\[
\text{Y(Job Loss Due to Immigration)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ How Much Harder Since NAFTA} + \beta_2 \text{ Estimate of Social Mobility} + \beta_3 \text{ Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA} + \text{ Controls (Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)}
\]

H1c.

\[
\ln \left( \frac{\text{Holds Populist Belief/1- Holds Populist Belief}}{1} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ How Much Harder Since NAFTA} + \beta_2 \text{ Estimate of Social Mobility} + \beta_3 \text{ Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA} + \text{ Controls (Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)}
\]

H2.

\[
\ln \left( \frac{\text{Will Vote for Trump In 2016/1- Will Vote for Trump In 2016}}{1} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Increased Nationalism (Interval)} + \beta_2 \text{ Opposes Involvement in FTA's} + \beta_3 \text{ Job Loss Due to Immigration} + \beta_4 \text{ Holds Populist Belief} + \text{ Controls (Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)}
\]

H3.
\[ \ln \left[ \text{Economic Mobility Harder}/1- \text{Economic Mobility Harder} \right] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Will Vote for Trump In 2016} + \text{Controls} (\text{Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight}), \text{ Robust Cluster} (\text{State Location of Voter}) \]

H4.

\[ \ln \left( \text{Will Vote for Trump In 2016}/1- \text{Will Vote for Trump In 2016} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Racial Discrimination Exp'd.} + \text{Controls} (\text{Economic Mobility Harder, Increased Nationalism (Interval), Opposes Involvement in FTA's, Job Loss Due to Immigration, Holds Populist Belief, Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight}), \text{ Robust Cluster} (\text{State Location of Voter}) \]
Appendix G.

Regression Results:

Table G1a. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood of Prefering Increased Nationalism Among U.S. Voters In 2016 Based On Perceptions of Economic Mobility Since The Enactment of NAFTA. N= 1,460

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 1a. Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Z-Ratio</th>
<th>PR Min to Max</th>
<th>PR SD/2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How Much Harder Since NAFTA</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of Social Mobility **</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA</td>
<td>-0.358</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed/Working</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Income by Quantiles*</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID as Racial Minority</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Partisan ID</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Voter***</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender ID*</td>
<td>-0.234</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.338</td>
<td>-2.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Pseudolikelihood = -951.63487
Wald Chi2 = 172.52
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.1179
Pseudo R2 = 0.0520

Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
### Table G1b1. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood of U.S. Voters Opposing U.S. Involvement in FTA's in 2016 Based On Perceptions of Economic Mobility Since The Enactment of NAFTA. N= 1,340

**Hypothesis 1b1.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Z-Ratio</th>
<th>PR Min to Max</th>
<th>PR SD/2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How Much Harder Since NAFTA**</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of Social Mobility***</td>
<td>-0.268</td>
<td>-4.87</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA</td>
<td>-0.307</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed/Working</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Income by Quantiles**</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>-2.34</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID as Racial Minority</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Partisan ID</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Voter</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender ID</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.504</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Pseudolikelihood = -797.06317  
Wald Chi2 = 99.27  
Prob > Chi2 = ***  
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.0060  
Pseudo R2 = 0.0379

**Note:** Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
Table G1b2. Marginal Effects of OLS Regression Analysis on Opinions Among U.S. Voters In 2016 on The Likelihood of Domestic Job Loss Due to Immigration Based on Perceptions of Economic Mobility Since The Enactment of NAFTA. N= 2,227

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 1b2.</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>T-Ratio</th>
<th>VIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How Much Harder Since NAFTA***</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate of Social Mobility*</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>-2.06</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA*</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
<td>-1.81</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed/Working</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Income by Quantiles***</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>-5.69</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ID as Racial Minority</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voter Partisan ID</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age of Voter***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender ID</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.255</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F= ***
R² = 0.0377
Mean VIF = 1.13

Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
Table G1c. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood of U.S. Voters Holding Populist Beliefs In 2016 Based on Perceptions of Economic Mobility Since The Enactment of NAFTA. N= 2,218

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 1c. Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Z-Ratio</th>
<th>PR Min to Max</th>
<th>PR SD/2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How Much Harder Since NAFTA**</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of Social Mobility***</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
<td>-3.76</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA**</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed/Working</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Income by Quantiles**</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID as Racial Minority</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Partisan ID*</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>-1.98</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Voter</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender ID</td>
<td>-0.177</td>
<td>-1.25</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Pseudolikelihood = -884.19313
Wald Chi2 = 83.09
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.5273
Pseudo R2 = 0.0395

Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***1%) are based on analysis for a one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
Table G2. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood That U.S Voters Would Vote for Trump In 2016 Based on Their Congruence With Trump Campaign Policy Positions. N= 897

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 2.</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Z-Ratio</th>
<th>PR Min to Max</th>
<th>PR SD/2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased Nationalism (Interval)***</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposes Involvement in FTA's ***</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Job Loss Due to Immigration ***</td>
<td>1.062</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Holds Populist Belief***</td>
<td>1.575</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Income by Quantiles*</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed/Working*</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ID as Racial Minority</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voter Partisan ID</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age of Voter**</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender ID**</td>
<td>-0.415</td>
<td>-2.98</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.257</td>
<td>-7.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Pseudolikelihood = -406.05358
Wald Chi2 = 442.09
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.3630
Pseudo R2 = 0.3329

Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
Table G3. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood of U.S. Voters Perceiving Economic Mobility Harder In 2016 Compared to 20 Years Ago If Intending To Vote For Trump in 2016. N= 1,783

**Hypothesis 3.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Z-Ratio</th>
<th>PR Min to Max</th>
<th>PR SD/2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will Vote for Trump In 2016*</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Income by Quantiles</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed/Working</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education*</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>-1.81</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID as Racial Minority</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Partisan ID</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Voter</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender ID</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.347</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Pseudolikelihood = -725.0527
Wald Chi2 = 32.27
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.2171
Pseudo R2 = 0.0116

*Note:* Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
Table G4. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood of U.S. Voters Intending To Vote For Tump In 2016 Who Have Experienced Racial/Skin Tone Discrimination. N= 757

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 4. Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Z-Ratio</th>
<th>PR Min to Max</th>
<th>PR SD/2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial Discrimination Exp'd.**</td>
<td>-0.310</td>
<td>-2.51</td>
<td>-0.250</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Mobility Harder</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Nationalism (Interval)***</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposes Involvement in FTA's***</td>
<td>1.016</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Loss Due to Immigration***</td>
<td>1.067</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holds Populist Belief***</td>
<td>1.438</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Income by Quantiles*</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed/Working</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID as Racial Minority</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Partisan ID</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Voter*</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender ID***</td>
<td>-0.619</td>
<td>-4.22</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-election Full Sample Weight</td>
<td>-0.167</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.448</td>
<td>-6.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Pseudolikelihood = -341.67091
Wald Chi2 = 579.11
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.0893
Pseudo R2 = 0.3374

Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
Vita

Jairemy Q. Edward, B.A. Double-Major Psychology & Political Science

Prior to the completion of my undergraduate degree I served in the U.S. Army and specialized in human resources, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and security. During my 8-year span of service, I participated in joint domestic, and international security operations near the Iraqi-Syrian, North and South Korean, US-Mexico, and Afghan- Pakistani borders. I hold two honorable discharges and a zero-casualty count among soldiers under my responsibility during both my combat tours. My core research interests are international and domestic political economy, political marketing, and identity politics. I decided to pursue an advanced degree in political science so that I could continue to serve the United States after my military service.

Contact Information: Jairemy.Edwards@gmail.com