"I was nothing but a lender of what I was ordered to supply..." Francisco Amangual, Trustee of the Presidio and Las Companias Volantes in the Spanish Borderlands, 1701-1812

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“I WAS NOTHING BUT A LENDER OF WHAT I WAS ORDERED TO SUPPLY…”

FRANCISCO AMANGUAL, TRUSTEE OF THE PRESIDIO
and
LAS COMPAÑÍAS VOLANTES IN THE SPANISH BORDERLANDS, 1701 – 1812

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Dedication

To Kurt, best friend.
Thank you for the gift of time.

Á Capitán Amangular, gracias por su vida. Me quedo su estudiante de por vida.
“I WAS NOTHING BUT A LENDER OF WHAT I WAS ORDERED TO SUPPLY…”

FRANCISCO AMANGUAL, TRUSTEE OF THE PRESIDIO

and

LAS COMPAÑÍAS VOLANTES IN THE SPANISH BORDERLANDS, 1701 – 1812

by

Roland Rodríguez, BAFA (Art History), MA (Art History)

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

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of the Requirements

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Acknowledgements

About twenty years ago my interest in collecting *mexicana*, often referred to as the ‘popular arts’ of Mexico, began with a visit to the Houston Public Library. That journey into scholarly inquiry began with two books devoted to objects of inquiry in a genre that lead me to study the history of Mexico. One was Nicholas Barnard’s *Living with Folk Art* (1991), and the other, the seminal study by Gloria Giffords, the 1974 text *Mexican Folk Retablos*. Giffords’ book represented the published manuscript of her Master’s thesis, the fact that ignited my determination to complete my long-abandoned undergraduate studies. After four years of filling my home with artifacts from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the range of which consisted of *retablos*, *santos*, *cristos*, Mexican *sarapes* and New Mexican textiles, pottery and dishware from Tlaquepaque, lacquerware from Olinalá, clay figures, *charrería*, and early twentieth-century furniture, I had become a collector as much interested in the art historical context of these artifacts as I enjoyed living and engaging with them on a daily basis. Reading about the objects spurred me on to formal study of my collecting interest and once I had completed the bachelor’s degree, it seemed only natural to continue with a Master’s program in Art History with an emphasis on Ibero-American material culture.

I thank my professors in the Department of Art and Art History at the University of New Mexico for providing a stimulating and supportive environment for me to explore the history of art with an emphasis on the intersection of *text* and *image*. No mere study of iconography in coursework here; we, students, were trained in the process of understanding and, indeed, foregrounding the social, political, economic, and intellectual context of historical objects of art. Ibero-American colonialist Raymond Hernández-Durán persistently encouraged me to think critically, spending hours helping me to reshape my ways of engaging with objects, evaluating historical events and processes, and grappling with theoretical frameworks as mechanisms to achieve understanding and assess meaning in the trans-Atlantic colonial world. The late Mayanist scholar Flora Clancy expanded my intellectual horizons by supporting my interest in nineteenth-century Mexico while encouraging me to think about the wide array of achievements of the ancient people of pre-Conquest Mexico. Since it seemed only natural for me to include history coursework into my art history program of studies, I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to study with UNM History professors Bárbara Reyes, Kimberly Gauderman, and Cynthia Radding.

I am particularly indebted to Dr. Radding for encouraging me in my coursework, for her unending support as I merged art historical inquiry with historical processes and periodization, and for serving on my Master’s thesis committee. Dr. Radding introduced me to the late Dr. Richard Greenleaf when I received a Richard E. Greenleaf Graduate Fellowship from the Latin American and Iberian Institute in 2007. I worked with Dr. Greenleaf in a limited capacity but our brief interactions were rewarded by his challenging my preconceptions about the Iberian colonial experience. I will never forget his great generosity with his time and critique as I worked on a project, at his suggestion, devoted to an intellectual skirmish between two Dominican powerbrokers in seventeenth-century Guatemala. This cohesive program of scholarly study at UNM set me on the path towards the development of the skills necessary for critical analysis and interpretation. I carried this rigorous training to my doctoral program in borderlands history.

At the University of Texas in El Paso, I am grateful to former administrative assistant Alma Acosta for being the best facilitator when challenges emerged between an often befuddled doctoral student and administrative and bureaucratic procedures inherent in the academic setting.
I thank Alma for always being supportive and congratulatory when the Department of History and the College of Liberal Arts saw fit to find my work worthy of funding or system-wide recognition. Thank you to fellow comrades in the Borderlands doctoral program, Scott Comar and Susie Aquilina, for always being supportive of my work and for making seminar class discussions tolerable by their appreciation for my contributions and for their highly valued sense of humor. Special thanks to Cristóbal Borges for his unending enthusiasm for my project and his advice specifically targeted to the dissertation defense.

My research has benefitted from the unstinting knowledge of and assistance by several archivists who have contributed to this study in immeasurable ways. I thank the archivists at the State Archives of New Mexico and former State Historian of New Mexico Estevan Rael-Gálvez; José Montelongo, Librarian for Mexican Studies, at the Nettie Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas in Austin; the late Ann Massmann and her staff at the Center for Southwest Research at the Zimmerman Library of the University of New Mexico; Jill Crane at St. Mary’s University in San Antonio for the interlibrary loan of the Index of the Laredo Archives; Scott Cossel at the University of Arizona Library for his electronic delivery of a 284-page document inclusive of material related to the First and Second compañías volantes and the presidios of Nueva Vizcaya; and, I am especially grateful to John Wheat, Archives Translator at the Briscoe Center for American History at the University of Texas in Austin, for his kind assistance with the digitized colonial documents held in the Bexar Archives. Having John’s good opinion of several of my attempts at difficult translations is enormously encouraging, and I appreciate his willingness to share with me his extraordinary knowledge of the complex, and often frustrating, syntax of eighteenth-century Castilian. This project is that much more cohesive because of his contributions and I am much wiser from his help.

I thank History Department faculty members, Dr. Charles Martin and Dr. Ignacio Martínez, for their insightful critique and for making me understand very specific ways to improve the dissertation. Ten years ago as an undergraduate art history student at UNM, I met University of Arizona faculty member Dr. Stacie Widdifield of the Department of Art History, and a leading specialist in nineteenth-century Mexican art history. Inspired by her insightful work in various publications in two languages, I was determined to have her on my committee and I am grateful for her participation and for her support. I only hope that I can count on her in the future as this project develops into a book manuscript.

Finally, words here cannot express my deep appreciation to my dissertation chair and main advisor Dr. Jeffrey Shepherd for his enduring patience, his invaluable direction with the content of my dissertation, and his unfailing good humor throughout my often dispirited trajectory as a doctoral student and candidate. Were it not for Jeff’s presence in the UTEP Department of History, I would have left the program long ago. This dissertation likely would never have emerged and for his ongoing support and perceptive critique, I remain forever grateful. And, I thank Jeff for always being a gentleman.

To Kurt Simmons, you gave me the gift of TIME, that elemental part of research and writing that we all want so much more of and rarely acquire. For that, I will always be grateful. I am not deserving of your kindness, endless patience, and goofy sense of humor. Truly, this dissertation would not have been completed without you.
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Introduction

On March 30, 1808, Captain Francisco Amangual (1739-1812) left San Antonio de Béxar with an expedition of two hundred men and traveled for nine months to Santa Fé, New Mexico. Amangual headed the Segunda Compañía Volante de San Carlos de Parras a unit that originated from Coahuila but was more recently based at La Bahía and other locations. The so-called ‘flying squadrons’ of the frontier presidio system emerged to fill the necessity expeditious military units charged with patrolling the despoblado. The goals of the one thousand mile expedition were to establish a safe passage between two extreme frontier outposts of the Spanish colonial borderlands, to visit the indigenous communities of the area, explore the Red River as well as the Oscura Blanca and El Sacramento mountain ranges, and return to Texas. Part of this study focuses on Francisco Amangual’s leadership of the San Carlos company and the ethnic composition of the various teams of soldiers comprising other units of the compañía volante. The volantes developed as mounted patrol for the frontera of an area that included the presidios of the San Antonio de Béxar municipality, Santa Fé in New Mexico, Tucson in Arizona, and their environs. Scholars of colonial borderlands history are familiar with Amangual’s journey to Santa Fé and his association with a Texas-based unit of the flying squadrons.

While Francisco Amangual (1739-1812) emerges in Spanish colonial military history as the leader of an expedition from Béxar to Santa Fé in the waning years of the era, it becomes clear that it was his role as the presidial paymaster (habilitado) and, subsequently, captain of the San Carlos flying squadron (compañía volante) that elucidates one individual soldier's experience within the context of borderlands daily life. I argue that this aspect of the colonial military experience has not been sufficiently examined in scholarly efforts to understand the dynamics of social interactions within and outside of an interdependent presidio network. Amangual's career was structured by exchanges with, among others, frontier soldiers within his own company and from outside; indigenous groups encountered as visitors, friends, and fugitives; and, non-Hispano migrants into the province of Texas, and beyond. The present study shows that
the social dynamics and the asymmetries of power triggered by these complex interactions within the ranks of the presidial soldiers often gave way to an imprecise adherence to orders and regulations issued by commanders, governors, and even the Viceroy himself. Moreover, the on-the-ground realities over the course of Amangual's career and that of others fulfilling the role of soldiers for the King can advance our understanding of intra-presidio military life in the colonial borderlands.

The present study explores the military career of Amangual by analyzing the measured trajectory of his ascension in the presidial ranks through extensive sources that record his participation in convoys, skirmishes, and the routine of company interaction. However, the main thrust of this study considers Francisco Amangual’s tenure as a presidio paymaster, or, (h)abilitado. In this capacity he served as his garrison’s chief accountant, responsible for keeping the general accounts of debits and credits and ensuring their accuracy. This duty was especially important since the payroll and expenses would eventually be examined and approved by his superiors, the captain of the presidio and other officers, as well as the comandante inspector. The paymaster administered the individual accounts of each soldier and was responsible for admonishing spendthrift members of the unit to restrict their expenditures to absolute necessities. He was in charge of having a sufficient reserve of “every type of item,” and the paymaster was to ensure its confirmation to the aforementioned specifications.

A secondary but no less important focus of this study examines the emergence of the so-called flying squadron units, or, compañías volantes that served as a kind of make-ready military force in the Provincias Internas. The compañías volantes – referred to variously as ‘cuerpos volantes,’ ‘mobile troops’ or tropas volantes,’ and, simply ‘volantes’ – evolved in tandem with the development of the presidio system and served as a mounted military squadron charged with

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1 The Spanish word for ‘paymaster’ is spelled in several ways; as such, I use the various spellings as found in the primary sources and thus it will be spelled differently throughout this study. In all cases, the words mean the same thing.

2 Reglamento de 1772, Título catorce, obligaciones y nombramiento del habilitado; further discussion of the duties and responsibilities of the presidio paymaster follows.
defending the New Spain’s Far Northern regions. Thus, the flying squadrons were developed for quite specific reasons relating to increasing security in the colonial borderlands. Garrisoned forts to protect established towns and even new communities of armed civilians were established at strategic positions, sometimes in more remote locales, distant from population strongholds.3 Ongoing Spanish incursion onto indigenous ancestral lands fueled a series of rebellions carried out by various groups including the Xixime, Acaaxee, Tepehuan, Tarahumara, Concho, Chiso, Suma, Manso, Jano, Toboso, and Julime nations subsequent to the 1680 punitive response by the Pueblo nations of New Mexico. Indeed, the Council of the Indies concluded that a major factor responsible for the Pueblo Revolt was an inadequate presidial system. From 1599 – 1700, intermittent revolts surfaced with the goal of severing Iberian control of the central corridor of the northern frontier.4 These reactive events prompted Iberian reassessment of the treatment of indigenous peoples and a new policy of frontier defense to include the compañías volantes.5

The Viceroy José Sarmiento y Valladares emphasized the need for the soldiers of the presidio of Coahuila to assist the compañia volante and that from this company three squads of ten men each were to be formed. Two of these squads, along with the presidiales from Coahuila, were to “travel continually over all the land,” conducting a manifold surveillance activity with an emphasis on protecting the religious personnel and their missionizing agenda. Moreover, the volantes were charged with maintaining vigilance on the activities and maneuverings of the French, especially where it concerned French settlements and behavior. The remaining company of ten men was directed by the Viceroy to be “maintained always in company” with the

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4 As Hadley and Taylor describe it, the central corridor of the colonial borderlands constituted territory contained within a single, gigantic province, Nueva Vizcaya. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the province included territory now located in the contemporary Mexican states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and portions of Durango. Immensely rich with mineral resources, the region was populated with indigenous groups who, from the conquerors’ perspective, could provide an important labor pool for the mines. Viceregal officials were determined to protect the major trade routes that passed through the province with its attendant elements of communication and supply, all of which traversed some portion of Nueva Vizcaya. Diana Hadley, Thomas H. Naylor, and Mardith K. Schuetz-Miller, *The Presidio and the Militia on the Northern Frontier of New Spain, A Documentary History, Vol. 2, Part 2, The Central Corridor and the Texas Corridor, 1700-1765* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1997) 3
missionaries, and “without losing them from sight,” with the goal of defending them against hostile indigenous groups. During this time period, the presidios of both, San Antonio de Béjar, and Sante Fé in New Mexico, were not included in the line of defense; the end of the Seven Years’ War transformed the borders across North America and further established the northern provinces of New Spain as an independent administrative – but still highly militarized – entity, the Provincias Internas. Governance came under the responsibility of a commandant general reporting directly to the Council of the Indies in Seville.

In his seminal study of the presidio system, Max Moorhead noted that when new presidios were being established (part of a larger process intended as a mechanism with which to cope, pragmatically and psychologically, with the stunning effects of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680), some of the older ones [presidios] were, in turn, suppressed. Briefly, when Cametla and San Hipólito, both located in western Nueva Vizcaya -- today Chihuahua and Durango -- were abolished, four new presidios – El Pasaje, El Gallo, Conchos, and Casas Grandes – were created. When Janos was established, the garrison at Casas Grandes dwindled to a mere post, which eventually became the headquarters for a compañía volante, or, what Moorhead describes as a “roving company” of 40 men. Then, in 1693, with no “systematic coordination” planned for the several presidios in the ‘war zone’ and, with governors and commandants unable to visualize an over-all strategy, many military personnel of varying rank began to offer new approaches to the presidial line of defense. The viceroy received one such suggestion that the newly created presidios of Conchos, El Pasaje, El Gallo, and Casas Grandes be suppressed and their forces consolidated into a single compañía volante. Moorhead indicates that a ‘flying company’ could provide protection for both travelers and merchandise, along the roads, but also deploy rapid assistance to any place in Nueva Vizcaya that might be attacked. Further, in delineating the differences between a ‘presidial’ company and

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6 Ibid
8 Ibid 22
9 Ibid 23
a ‘flying squadron,’ Moorhead uses the example of the unit at Coro de Guachi (Fronteras) in Sonora that, by 1692, had not been “formally established,” and was, therefore, still considered a *compañía volante*.10

As the foregoing summary shows, changes across time and within military directives underscored the element of transformation that structured both conceptually, and materially, the squadrons’ two types of functional status: sporadic movement, and site-specific permanence, and this process reoccurs in the history of the flying squadrons. Inconstancy as a defining element of the *volantes* serve as a key point of departure for thinking about all of the military units of the *presidio/misión/ranchería* complex. Were the defining elements that differentiated the units so distinct that there was no blurring of the intended function of each of the units, and thus their relationship to the civilian community? Moreover, was it possible that much overlap, in the administrative arenas of purpose and function, existed between, and among, the various military companies and especially within the geographic space of the borderlands? As this study will show, on the ground realities of frontier life made indistinct the prescribed objectives of not only the *volantes* but also other military operations.

My study draws upon the essential work of Max Moorhead insofar as contextualizing the on-the-ground processes of compromise and modification structuring the socio-economic dynamics of the presidio and its environs. Long-standing jurisdictional fluidity in these ‘frontier’ spaces served as an impetus for both 1) the most opportunistic, if not guileful, among colonial inhabitants to manipulate to their own advantage the organization of life as bureaucratically codified rules applied across several spheres of borderlands communities; and, for 2) the inevitable socio-political interactions that may have allowed for the cross-positioning of tasks – prescribed or otherwise -- among the military. Where it concerned the strict adherence to military protocol, or not, opportunities clearly existed for those task-driven individuals keen on carrying out the orders of superiors operating out of Mexico City or from military commanders in closer proximity

10 Ibid 23-24
to the far northern provinces. Another question that emerges within the context of the soldiers’ stakes in the frontier community, impacted as that investment was by presidial obligations that often left them, individually and collectively, the recipients of far less rewards than losses: was the devotion to duty, especially as it was manifested in evolving ‘reglamentos,’ not enough of a positive motivator that dedication could be usurped by necessary, if often extralegal, adjustments to life on the frontier? Given the harsh realities of carving out what must have seemed like nothing more than an existence, were even the most conscientious-minded military men willing to partake of the advantages of negotiation, accommodation, and perhaps even a deliberate bending of the rules, in order to ensure survival? My findings demonstrate that questionable scenarios transpired in myriad ways among the key players in the present study to the extent that the deeply human dimensions of presidial life become all too apparent and yet, many episodes of social cleavages in presumably intimate spaces have rarely penetrated the field of late colonial military history in any extensive study to date.

Moreover, the *Hispano* flying squadrons’ subsequent disappearance from much of the Anglo-centric historiography of the ‘cowboy west’ evinces an incipient marginalization of the historiographical frontier that requires a rethinking of their presence in the socio-political culture and militarization of the borderlands. I locate common strands between the men of the *compañía volante* and members of other units of the colonial presidio system as a method of ascertaining those disparate responsibilities that collectively aligned with the larger project of maintaining imperial authority in the borderlands. The army’s methods of control extended widely, and often covertly, especially among the pacified indigenous groups. The latter communities’ loyalty to Spanish colonial authority was often haphazard at best, as was that of non-Iberian interlopers, such as the English, French, and Anglo-Americans, individuals and groups that more persistently emerged during the twilight of the empire. With hostile Indians, the mechanisms for soldierly containment of the enemy ranged from avoidance to clever manipulation, and from nonstop harassment to outright extermination. In many cases of resistance by Native groups, acquiescence
on the part of the Spanish military population including the flying squadrons emerged as best practice to ensure peace.

Much like their appearances across the colonial frontier, imagined by some as an audacious cavalry unit coiled and ready to spring into action at a moment’s notice, the volantes emerge in the documentary record in short historiographical bursts. Mingled into the scholarly detritus, their activities unfold for a brief period only to recede into the archival record once other more substantively documented military units arrive to occupy larger page counts across historical time and space. However, my findings indicate that there, indeed, exists a more expansive context for the volantes as key players in colonial borderlands history given their multiple, if diffused, appearances in the archival record. Episodes of daring escapades through the wide open spaces of the borderlands and thrilling horse rides across the frontier landscape do not represent the bulk of the flying squadrons’ actual experiences chronicled in the archival record.

Rather, there does exist among the primary sources the more conventional, mundane record of participation that includes the inventories of company storehouses; records of the belongings of its individual soldiers and their military service records; the volantes’ appearance as units intended to patrol the despoblado; and, their inevitable shortcomings in certain locales as an effective surveillance detachment for the frontier. My research has uncovered incidences of both, compelling significance, and routine undertaking and serves to reinsert the squadrons’ presence into the larger context of presidial contributions to regional history. Apart from their specialized functions as described in the ‘official’ record, remarkable commonalities existed between all of the assorted military borderlands units that straddled diverse ethnic, social, and geographic boundaries. Furthermore, mutual objectives of containment fluctuated even as those collective borders were often unified, if only temporarily, and then blurred in the face of danger, intrusion, and the ongoing defensive strategy of managing the frontier.

One aspect of supervising the border and administering to its garrisons of soldiers was the promulgation of ordinances intended to impart uniformity to the line of presidios positioned across the borderlands of New Spain. This study interprets the Reglamentos of 1729 and 1772 as a means
to compare these sets of regulations with that of the *Instrucción* of 1786 in order to ascertain the key differences and subtle changes that emerged from the deployment of these viceregal edicts among the colonial inhabitants and the military personnel affected by their content. Pedro de Rivera entitled the compilation of his three-and-a-half year inspection tour of the provincial presidios, *Año de 1728 Proyecto*, which in Spanish law had the connotation of a preliminary report or provisional policy that set down the circumstances of a contract or treaty. The Proyecto is composed of three *estados*, or, statuses; the first, conveys the status of the presidios as Rivera found them. The second is a brief account of immediate reforms implemented by Rivera at each presidio, and the third essentially summarizes his recommendations for reform and conveys his expectations for each presidio’s future existence. Compiled thus, the *Proyecto* inspired the thinking of Viceroy Juan de Acuña, Marqués de Casafuertes and its content – especially that contained in the third *estado* – would underpin his eventual *Reglamento de 1729* that was the expected result from the Rivera inspection.\(^\text{11}\) These regulations differed from the earlier 1719 *Reglamento de Habana* in that the ordinances that governed military life in the Caribbean could not be so easily rewritten to suit the needs of the mainland frontier. Rivera knew that territory from firsthand experience.

The *Reglamentos* of Havana (1719) and those of 1729 and 1772 structure the narrative of this study so as to provide the fundamental set of reference material for the guidelines to which presidial personnel were expected to conform. Further, the three *Reglamentos* serve as a triad of viceregal testimonies that I use to compare and contrast their content -- especially within the articles that concerned official behavior in the inter-presidio setting, as well as in the civilian sphere of contact -- with that of the Gálvez *Instrucción* of 1786. This is essential in order to ascertain the key differences, and the changes, both, dramatic and subtle, that emerged from the deployment of the regulations among the colonial inhabitants and the military personnel affected by their content.

At certain intervals within the narrative of this study, I will refer to La Ordenanza de Intendentes para la Nueva España [The Ordinance of Intendants for New Spain] for the purposes of showing how this significant attempt at reform of the administrative functions of the empire’s colonies functioned in the broadest manner. New conditions across the Ibero-American colonies arose after the Seven Years War and multiple ordinances served as one method of instituting badly needed reforms. The former system of governance, based on the Laws of the Indies, deemed outdated and inflexible by changing demographics and urbanization, had necessarily to be renovated. After two centuries of transformations, enlightened perspectives that included the emergence of progressive, rational-based ways of thinking, had galvanized both the Iberian Peninsula and the North American continent.\textsuperscript{12} The Ordenanza is valuable to the present study for its discussion of the Department of Finance and those articles referring to expenditures for the military, its personnel, and especially so for the revenue of tobacco. In its various manifestations, the plant was a source of litigation involving many including Francisco Amangual, entrusted with conducting an important inventory in 1796 of the commodity, and those who abused their office of supervision over this valuable resource.

The Department of War’s articles specifically addressing inventory, account, computation, and merchant interactions are yet another significant component of the Ordenanzas and form to a lesser degree my discussion of Amangual’s responsibilities as a presidio paymaster. From the perspective of viceregal authorities in Mexico City, and of commanders on the ground in the borderlands, it became evident that a deteriorating condition existed where it concerned the presidios, and some of those shortcomings stemmed from the failures of certain companies not fulfilling their missions effectively. As a result, in 1693 Field Marshall José Francisco Marin, on orders from the viceroy with instructions to carry out a comprehensive report, suggested three proposals to remedy the situation. First, Marin recommended that the five aforementioned presidios \textit{not} be consolidated into a single compañía volante but, rather, each be retained for the

\textsuperscript{12} Lillian Estelle Fisher, \textit{The Intendant System in Spanish America} (New York: Gordian Press, 1969), 1-3
present; second, he proposed that the new *compañía volante* of Sonora be converted into a presidio, and that its stabilizing efforts coordinate with those at Janos in order to stem Apache invasions and Pima rebellions. Finally, Marín insisted that several presidio companies dispense with concentrating on convoy or garrison duty and, instead, unite from time to time in “large scale offensive operations.” Marín’s logic behind this part of the proposed changes was that “the waging of continuous offensive war on the enemy tribes” placed them on the defensive and left them no opportunity to plan and execute raids on frontier settlements.

Adding to the more aggressive policy of defense by Marín, one historian argues that by the time the Royal Regulations of presidios appeared in 1772, a more formal organization – that was still subject to change over a span of several decades -- of the *volante* units emerged. Andrés Tijerina contends that the flying companies were initially organized by landowners in the *frontera* as “flying companies” to thwart on a moment’s notice indigenous incursions. However, by the 1770s a more formalized organization comprised of local volunteers, mostly Tejanos, and trained by professional officers, materialized. They served longer terms of duty and engaged in extensive *campañas* (offensive maneuvers) across the borderlands. The most significant change, according to Tijerina, was that now the *compañías volantes* maintained an offensive strategy against intruders, rather than simply defending the home front. Alternatively, a systematic process of colonization underscored by representatives for private interest groups led to the settlement of Nuevo Santander, a part of the uncultivated *seno mexicano*. Formal organization on the part of José de Escandón led to his formation of a group of prominent investors devoted to a military form of government for the entire jurisdiction and equally desirous of replacing what his members considered an antiquated mission-presidio system with a large civil population. In the process of colonization, Escandón has been credited with reorganizing the militia corps in the frontiers of Nuevo Santander. In 1787, one of the landed elite of the region, José Florencio Barragán, a

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13 Moorhead, 23 -24
14 Ibid 23-25
15 Andres Tijerina, *Tejanos and Texans Under the Mexican Flag, 1821-1836* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1994) 79-82
wealthy merchant of Rioverde and heir to an immense fortune, created, armed, and directed the *companía volante* of the villa of Santa Bárbara. Barragán provisioned the company with food, gunpowder, and bullets and he directed campaigns against the hostile Indians of the region.\textsuperscript{16}

However, it is clear that after Pedro de Rivera’s inspection of the presidios was completed in 1728, the presence of the *volantes* was indeed made plain. In his *Proyecto* their function and organization is delineated to the degree that it becomes obvious that the actual performance of the flying squadrons witnessed by Rivera clashed with his expectations. What he found in several companies he described in no uncertain terms in his report. The inspector grappled with the flying squadrons’ ambiguous military presence in the borderlands in stark contrast to the fixed position and more precisely described function of the ‘regular’ presidial units in fortified garrisons. Moreover, there is the sense that Rivera was deeply troubled by the *volantes*’ presumed specialized status. As his concerns unfold in Chapter 1 of this study, Rivera’s recommendation for reform of the presidio system involved careful planning, the close management of resources, and entrusting his best officers with effectuating beneficial changes.

\textbf{I. 2: CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD OF BORDERLANDS AND TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY}

As I indicate above, my study centers upon Francisco Amangual’s military career and his ascent in the ranks of the presidio system over a period of forty years. Understanding the trajectory of his military performance has simultaneously cast a light on many of his fellow soldiers and their professional relationships with him as either, subordinates to his authority, or, as his commanders. In the chapters that follow, I show how he and other soldiers carried out their duties to varying degrees by adhering to, or, just as often resisting, the prescribed behavior for strict conduct dictated by the various *Reglamentos* that emerged between the years 1729 and 1786. I trace Amangual’s acceptance of the duties and responsibilities as his presidio’s duly elected paymaster and how the

\textsuperscript{16} José Alfredo Rangel Silva, “Milicias en el oriente de San Luis Potosí, 1793-1813” in \textit{Las armas de la nación, Independencia y ciudadanía en hispanoamérica (1750 – 1850)}, Manuel Chust and Juan Marchena, eds. (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2007). Rangel Silva further indicates that “El teniente coronel José Florencio Barragán presenta relación de méritos y servicios, pide el grado de coronel.” And, “Las compañías volantes fueron creadas por José de Escandón, al tiempo de fundar el Nuevo Santander, como una manera de auxiliar de manera rápida y efectiva a las localidades que estuviesen siendo atacadas por indios.” 53-55, fn 6
position of keeper of the company funds proved to be an obligation fraught with controversy. We will see how the customary functions of his office came under attack from his fellow company members as he was charged, on at least three occasions, with allegations of misappropriation of funds that required ongoing rebuttals on his part. Contraband, gossip, and hard feelings among civilian family members paralleled the very same behavior enacted by some wayward presidial soldiers. Illicit activity by company soldiers complicated Amangual’s job performance as did the ebb and flow of funds from several large and important accounts. From these unfortunate circumstances, the personalities and eccentricities of individual soldiers, merchants, and others tied in one way or another to the borderlands presidios transpire so as to reveal the personal motivations and often criminal inclinations of certain key players in colonial garrison life.

Further, Francisco Amangual’s periodic task of executing often substantive inventories and regular documentation of gifts for the various Indian nations constituted a significant aspect of his job performance that has been little examined until the present study. The wide array of social interactions that devolved from the routine generation of paperwork that documented ‘peace by purchase’ among presidial commanders and merchants has been little examined in the historiography. This is remarkable given that the sources for various interactions – military service records, legal proceedings, censuses, ledgers, inventories, and multi-person correspondence – are extensive. The present study contributes to an understanding of how individual soldiers and commanders across the multiple units of garrisons, vendors, civilians, missionaries, indigenous folk, and frontier governors interacted with one another across large swaths of the colonial borderlands. Since these exchanges often involved episodes of illegal transactions, unsubstantiated accusations, and severe punishments that often affected career advancement or, led to exile, they can be contrasted with those events where high praise, and monetary and titular rewards were distributed. Moreover, system-wide acknowledgement and broadcasting of outstanding individual and collective performance underscored the military experience. By critically engaging with both the brief and often extended episodes in presidial life, specialists can come to understand at many
levels the thought processes and emotional reactions of frontier soldiers engaged in the difficult and often hazardous conditions of life in and around the garrisons.

In his monumental work about the presidio, Max Moorhead critically engaged with the several *Reglamentos* that served as reference material for the commanders and their subordinates in the borderlands’ many garrisons. Similarly, this study incorporates much of the content of the three *Reglamentos* – of 1719, 1729, and 1772 – as well as the *Instrucción* of 1786, in order to cross compare the content of each set of regulations across the almost seven decade trajectory of their intermittent issuance. I employ this method as a two-prong tool of analysis by 1) evaluating the Viceroy’s commands regarding presidial soldiers’ and commanders’ behavior among themselves and outsiders, and 2) how the separate articles devoted to the *volantes* enhance the understanding of their function and in what areas of martial performance the squadrons fell short or, conversely, accomplished the tasks set specifically for these cavalry units. Pinpointing the responsibilities of presidial soldiers in their interactions with each other, their commanders, and merchants and indigenous groups and discovering those moments when and why military personnel deviated from their prescribed duties and responsibilities forms the essential narrative of my study.

The archival evidence for a unique type of community that evolved from the collective processes of expansionism includes detailed narratives of life among individuals affiliated with the military system of the Spanish empire. This prolonged process often included violence and warfare and was then superimposed onto indigenous planes of existence. The socio-economic apparatuses that transferred from the earliest colonial systems deep within Mexico to frontier outposts included the deployment of time-tested settlement patterns among civilian, ecclesiastical, and military communities. The entirety of this process dislodged native people from ancestral homelands. However, in the Texas borderlands, multiple indigenous communities used accommodation, manipulation, and of domination to create systems of spatial control to their advantage and for their well-being. Their resistance to ongoing forces of change, in turn, generated ‘outsider’ incursion evinced by the exponential presence of Iberian commanders and their soldiers. The military community must be imagined so for the purpose of analyzing mechanisms for social
control, however ineffective against powerful native groups, employed by colonial enforcers. Fueling the patterns of military intrusion was an overarching imperial agenda, administered from a distant metropole that insisted on the necessity of buffering ‘isolated’ regions from trans-Atlantic rivals equally determined to garner a foothold in new economic and political spheres.

At certain points along the trajectory of borderlands and American West historiography, the use of the term ‘myth’ and its variations emerges. Its deployment comes from a range of sources, including David Weber who affirmed that myth is, “of course, a slippery word that has come to have many meanings,” including: its “classical sense” of telling the exploits of gods and heroes;” and, in another sense of its meaning, by the deployment of myth in “narrative form” to explain a society’s beliefs or institutions, its cultural ideals, or, as a way to refer to “any imaginary person or thing.”17 Comparable in certain ways to Weber’s conceptualization of myth, Mexican scholar Enrique Florescano explains that the process of recovering the past does not solely rely upon that which is “customary among historians, to explain only the so-called scientific reconstructions of the past, which are, naturally, those elaborated by historians themselves.” Further, the process includes the “rescue [of] the collective imagination that, by means of a different temporal dimension from that of the western categories of measuring time’ and reconstructing the past, manages to compose “its own memory of the occurrences, creates a hierarchy of the importance of these events [and] brings them up to date.”18 Moreover, Florescano states that

It can be said that, since the birth of the profession of historian, the popular representations of the past have been qualified as mythic, legendary, or false, principally because they do not conform to the conceptions that historians accept as scientifically trustworthy. Independently of whether they are deformed versions or false interpretations of the past, they were considered true by those who spread them and were accepted as true by those who heard them and transmitted them to the following generations.19

18 Enrique Florescano, Memory, Myth, and Time in Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994)
19 Ibid, 229
Florescano concludes by indicating that the most powerful argument in favor of myth as valid testimony of the representation of the past is that, “in spite of the passage of a long period of time since they were first stated, and in spite of the disqualification of these testimonies by those who practiced written history, nowadays these expressions for the collective memory continue to live,” and for many people myths are the most trustworthy instrument for recalling the past and maintaining its identity in the present [emphasis mine]. This identification has ramifications for modern day textual and pictorial imaginings of the cowboy and other men (and women) including bull riders, rodeo performers, and rustlers, working with large animals all closely related identities with similar workaday tasks. The cavalry units of the Spanish colonial period have acquired the veneer of mythic identification akin to that of others in frontier historiography, not only in the Américas but in transnational discursive spaces.

Stemming from indictments of the use of the word ‘myth’ and other similarly compensatory jargon from the scholarly community and put through a process of intentional revisioning, the borderlands has been (re)imagined as a kind of liminal space in the realm of academic engagement. Here, I use the term ‘liminal’ in the context of individual negotiation of boundaries, both conceptual and material, across the Ibero-Indian frontier. To my mind, that process involved the preservation of a type of ambivalence where and when it concerned arrival and departure, settlement or continuous movement among multiple human populations and their activities. Further, this designation provides an opportunity to chart the course of multiple communities’ engagement with perceived outsiders, adherence to administrative dictums emerging from a distant metropole, and the consequences of inter-ethnic developments, including marriage, military service, and economic transactions. The significance of the latter cannot be minimized; as western historian Richard Slatta has indicated, economic significance is often related to historical visibility and cultural importance. While the eighteenth-century borderlands

20 Ibid, 228-229.
presented yet another geographic space in which to play out competing strategies of conquest and subjugation, the more distant reaches of the imperial realm presented challenges unique to the locale and its primary protagonists. It is evident that members of the various flying squadrons chronically faced the fluctuating nature of maintaining both aggressive defense of the presidio (and its environs), the colonial empire’s symbolic marker of control and surveillance on the frontier; and, productive relationships with groups perceived to be subjugated. The latter were often construed in the form of so-called “Friendly Nations” of indigenous inhabitants. Moreover, as in the case of Texas, communities like the Comanche -- a regional power wielding enormous significance -- had to be appeased. Ongoing hostilities with the Apaches were dealt with in elaborately designed strategies of supervision that included deception on the part of both sides. For his part, Francisco Amangual juggled the weight of his soldierly obligations with the demands of maintaining fiscal propriety, all within the context of intricate social relationships among various presidio clientele.

The necessity for such an approach has been examined by other historians. The general conclusion is that the imprecise positioning of the flying squadrons’ purpose – functioning in multiple intertwined capacities, that is, as residents, community law enforcement, and as soldiers of the King – underscored their frontier presence as military personnel with ambiguously prescribed duties. Further, they had to negotiate the closely interwoven activities of gift giving, capturing and detaining lawbreakers (within and outside the presidio), and fostering productive interpresidial relationships among those from other locales. As if this profusion of tasks were not enough, the squadrons were required to maintain cohesion within the military unit itself by setting examples of both proper behavior, and, respect for the civilian population.

I.3: LITERATURE REVIEW/CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD OF TEXAS REGIONAL STUDIES

In this section, I discuss the primary and secondary sources constituting the historiography and explain how the dissertation contributes to the field of borderlands, transnational history and,

more specifically, Texas regional studies. I consider the most relevant sources related to studies concerning the presidio system as a mechanism of social control in the frontier; the ways in which army life gave rise to both, soldier misbehavior, and, strict adherence to written and orally-conveyed commands; how and where the compañías volantes functioned in their commission as cavalry units of patrol, and reconnaissance. Further, I examine texts related to inter-ethnic trade activities – including the ongoing transgressions committed by soldiers dealing in contraband -- in the Bourbon Reform period and during the waning years of the Spanish colonial empire. Since the focus of this study centers on Francisco Amangual’s life, I investigate the literature related to his military career as both, a soldier and, the aspect of his life that has been little examined, if at all, that included ongoing conflicts during his tenure as a presidial company paymaster. Enduring seemingly endless accusations made against him by fellow soldiers and citizen merchants, and his multiple rebuttals of each of these claims constitute a remarkable and underappreciated factor in his accounting career. Finally, I analyze his 1808 expedition from San Antonio to Santa Fé, and compare the significance of that journey with other earlier exploratory forays across the colonial frontier. A separate review of the historiography related to antecedent expeditions to that of Amangual’s 1808 venture to New Mexico appears in Chapter 5.

Portions of Francisco Amangual’s life, including his expedition to Santa Fé and his command of a compañía volante in the last five years of his life have been documented, as have brief episodes from the history of the volantes and their presence across the borderlands. Prior to this project, no concentrated study of a presidial soldier’s career, much less his work as a paymaster, has been attempted that specifically targets the multiplicity of social interactions and complicated scenarios that transpired across the span of almost eighty years. Other studies have indeed divulged individual personality traits and other conflict-and-resolution incidents that have focused attention on frontier soldiers and administrators in the Iberian colonial system.

Prior scholarly endeavors enhance our understanding of the more intimate dimensions of borderlands military life but also function as catalysts for further investigation. In the present study, the extensive original documents written by and about Amangual offer a platform from
which to project the ‘voice’ of the soldier himself – and that of others -- that allow specialists of frontier colonial history to become acquainted with the circumstances under which the documents were written. Moreover, an array of testimonials provide a context with which the reader can better understand the broader issues impacting the narrative within the sphere of closely related subject matter. By (re)inserting the existence of several other flying squadron companies, including those in Nueva Vizcaya, Nuevo México, Nuevo Santander, and Laredo, Texas this study reorients the historiographical positioning of these specialized units in the larger context of colonial borderlands inquiry.

Excerpts from textual and visual sources describing the events of the siege of the Álamo stem from studies concerning the development of San Antonio de Béxar as a frontier outpost and allude to the compañía volante’s presence as a kind of early borderlands mounted patrol. Spanish-language primary sources devoted to the life and military career of Francisco Amangual, his squadron members, and those of others, demonstrate the compañía’s investment in maintaining productive, if tenuous, relationships with the Comanche, Apache, and other indigenous groups. At the same time, these sources reveal the squadrons’ internal development, replete as it was with its members’ often erratic adherence to military code; conflict resolution among various social groups; and, accommodation to persistently hostile environmental conditions.

The Bexar Archives significance to studies of Texas history during the colonial period cannot be overstated; the same can be said of the masterful compilation by Adán Benavides, Jr., The Bexar Archives (1717 – 1836), A Name Guide. The latter is indispensable as a reference source and as a three-dimensional alternative to the online resource.22 Cross-referencing by periodization was facilitated by the Archives’ on-line feature of narrowing the document list by year -- the researcher can access scanned images of documents from a specific year, say, 1803; the capability of visual enhancement of difficult-to-read (if not otherwise illegible) documents with ‘zoomify’

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22 Adán Benavides, Jr. The Bexar Archives (1717 - 1836), A Name Guide. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1989. It was to my good fortune that I was able to locate, and purchase relatively inexpensively, a deaccessioned library copy of the book from the resources at Amazon.com.
technology; and, with the added ability to compare the original Spanish-language document with its English translation.

Amenguál’s life and military career figure most notably, if briefly, in Noel M. Loomis and Abraham NP. Nasatir’s *Pedro Vial and the Roads to Santa Fé* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), with a description of Governor Cordero of Texas requesting from Commandant-General Salcedo a reconnaissance of soldiers through the territory bordering and penetrating into New Mexico and Texas. The Loomis and Nasatir text is significant, chiefly, for its translation of the original Amangual diary, written during the 1808 expedition to Santa Fé, varying from the copy held at the Bexar Archives with its small differences in the Spanish-to-English translation, and in its brevity. The Bexar copy, *Diary of Operations and Events Occurring in the Expedition undertaken under Superior Orders from this Province of Texas to that of New Mexico by Captain Francisco Amangual, First Commandant, and Captain Don José Agabo de Ayala, Second Commandant beginning March 30, 1808*, was translated by Mattie Austin Hatcher, Archivist at the Library of the University of Texas’ Department of Archives in 1934.\textsuperscript{23} The Amangual Diary figures in the final chapter of this study and in the context of my discussion of precedent expeditions across the borderlands, with routes stemming from Coahuila, Texas, and other areas of Nueva Vizcaya, and on through to New Mexico or other locales, and back again. Further, the Diary has to date never been examined in context with other events in Amangual’s life, and much of its content recalls earlier episodes of interaction with native peoples, contending with recalcitrant soldiers, and effectuating the goals of fulfilling his responsibilities in an appropriate time frame.

Several inaccuracies exist in the summary paragraph of Francisco Amangual’s biography contained in *The Handbook of Texas*, and its content is drawn from C.E. Castañeda’s *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-1936*, v.4. (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones Company, 1942). The soldier’s birthdate and location, and years of military service and notable accomplishments, are

\textsuperscript{23} *Francisco Amangual Diary, 1808*, Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin.
included as are his eventual retirement and death dates. As a point of departure for the present study, it served its purpose; my research broadens the knowledge base presented by the *Handbook*.

Amangual’s heading of the Compañía Volante de San Carlos de Parras is mentioned in Andrés Tijerina’s *Tejanos and Texans Under the Mexican Flag, 1821-1836* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1994), but his appearance in the text is that of one particular company member out of the multiple military units of the Texas flying squadrons. In this capacity, Amangual functions in the same manner as the commander of the Third Flying Squadron of Laredo, Nemesio Sánchez, and, José Antonio García, a member of a four-man troop from the same Laredo company that pursued and then arrested an immigrant, and presumed murderer, named James Stuart. The Tijerina book’s cover illustration is instructive in that the author devotes part of his chapter “Military Reorganization in Texas” to the activities of the *companía volante*, described by the author as a mounted military squadron charged with defending Texas and the surrounding provinces. Tijerina suggests that the company of equestrians as depicted in the “*Sobre la huella*” painting by the French artist and immigrant to Texas, Teodor Gentilz, are members of one specific company among the many detachments of the flying squadrons. Tijerina indicates that the various units’ emergence in the Mexican borderlands were the creation of Teodoro de Croix who proclaimed the necessity of groups of military units charged with patrolling the *despoblado*. Tijerina’s text provides brief glimpses of these borderlands equestrians and further discloses that the transitioning of the *volantes* as the force assuming the function of *juez de campo* materialized since that entity had begun to “lose the powers of effective pursuit” during the Mexican independence years.24

Recurring acts of courageous determination described by Tijerina – and, occasionally, episodes of indifference and slovenliness -- appear to be interwoven characteristics of the frontier soldier across time and space, and in a short excerpt from *Trails of Historic New Mexico: Routes Used by Indian, Spanish, and American Travelers through 1886* (Jefferson: McFarland & Co.,

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24 Andrés Tijerina, *Tejanos and Texans Under the Mexican Flag, 1821-1836* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1994), 82
2010), authors Hunt Janin and Ursula Carlson suggest the successful leadership abilities of Francisco Amangual. The authors similarly draw upon the 1808 diary in order to highlight his perseverance, and that of his men, during the most difficult segments of the trek across the Texas llano. Gritty determination appears to be Amangual’s chief personality characteristic in the brief description of his San Antonio to Santa Fé journey in Frederick Rathjen’s *The Texas Panhandle Frontier* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University, 1998), where his exploratory efforts are compared with those of the key protagonist of the Loomis and Nasatir text described above, Pedro Vial (ca.1746-1814), who traveled from San Antonio de Béjar to Santa Fé in 1786 and 1787; and, José Mares (? – 1788?), who traveled from Santa Fé to Béjar in two trips; one in 1787 and then, again, the following year.

The garrison of San Juan Bautista de Rio Grande, established in 1701 among a cluster of missions, originally developed from a *companía volante* post, with a two-pronged goal in the borderlands. Initially, this region of Coahuila required a flying squadron in order to ensure the safety of the Rio Grande missions, and French encroachment was rumored to have occurred above the Bay of Espíritu Santo. In his well-known and oft-cited *San Juan Bautista; Gateway to Spanish Texas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968), Robert S. Weddle notes that the soldiers of the presidio of Coahuila were required to assist the *companía volante* and, as the author explains in one of the first references to their mobility, the squads, along with the *presidiales* from Coahuila, were to travel continually over the land accomplishing the original goal of vigilance over the region.25 While his text is devoted to Coahuila during the colonial period and the nineteenth century, brief mention is made of the Álamo de Parras company in Regino F. Ramón’s *Historia General del Estado de Coahuila* (Saltillo: Leonor Ramón de Garza, 1990). According to its author, after the wars of Independence the Álamo de Parras detachment withdrew from the buildings and wall enclosures of the Valero mission. Apparently, this was their second time doing so, but since

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it remained abandoned after their departure, Ramon suggests that the company may have been the last occupants of the famous San Antonio complex until its renovation.

Though there is no mention of Amangual specifically, in Max Moorhead’s *The Presidio, Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), and it remains the seminal text on the presidio of New Spain’s northern frontier. For the purposes of the present study, the Moorhead text is particularly useful for its substantive chapters on the historical evolution of the presidio in its Part One, with multiple references to the *compañías volantes*’ presence across the Spanish borderlands. The chapter devoted to “The Payroll” included in its Part Two, under the heading “Descriptive Analysis” is particularly valuable since Amangual functioned in the capacity of presidio paymaster, and the text has underscored the overarching points of key transformations implemented by the colonial authority at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Ongoing abuse by paymasters in the form of arbitrary deductions and extortions provides a point of departure for thinking about how the *Reglamento* of 1772 attempted to curtail these pernicious practices. Profound changes become evident especially in the sections where Moorhead describes the efforts made at improving the situation of soldiers’ pay and centralizing the role of the presidio captain in dealings with area merchants.

The central role that the *soldado de cuera* (leather-clad soldier) played in the colonial frontier forms the crux of Moorhead’s 1969 essay “The Soldado de Cuera, Stalwart of the Spanish Borderlands.”26 The text is particularly useful for the present study since its content expands upon the *soldado de cuera*’s appearance in the aforementioned, full-length *Presidio* of 1975 by Moorhead. Indeed, as the author states, there is little in borderlands historiography that “relates his true circumstances” and what scholars know of this specific type of soldier has emerged from only “incidental attention.” The *soldado de cuera* differed from other categories of troops, including the *Voluntarios de Cataluña*, the *Dragones de España*, and the *Dragones de México* since all of these were members of the regular Spanish Army with distinctive uniform, equipment and

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regulation. The ‘regulars’ differed as well from the militiamen of the local regions, as well as from the Indian auxiliaries that assisted the Spanish companies. Since it is often difficult to discern among the various categories of troops in military histories, Moorhead’s explanation of those differences, often more subtle than dramatic, the essay is essential for those components of my research that concern establishing criteria for making comparisons and contrasts among military units. Moreover, the limitations placed upon presidio habilitados reveal the precarious supply system that, according to Moorhead, further eroded the soldado de cuera’s morale, a significant point since its often deleterious impact could be viewed as a viable reason for disloyalty to the army by some of the frontier soldiers examined in this study.27

Since the presidio at Janos was centrally located and one of the oldest of the established garrisons, Paige W. Christiansen selected the site as the focus of her short article The Presidio and the Borderlands: A Case Study.28 However, her designation of Janos as the example for her study because of its presumed centrality presumes that Nueva Vizcaya was, indeed, the “center” of the presidio line, and even the maps included with her essay – from 1765, and then, 1776 – do not validate this statement. Christiansen claims that “the presidio, itself, however, was inanimate, and thus of minor importance to the future of the frontier” further indicating that military personnel constituted the “vital element that gave life and meaning to the presidio.” However, by the conclusion of the article the author states that “the presidios were able to exert a powerful stabilizing influence on the frontier, and it was because of them […] that the frontier was held at all. While she credits the “men like those in the company at Janos” for being a factor in that containment, Christiansen appears to grant a symbolic force to the garrison as a metonym for security, permanence, and refuge. I contend that the presidio did embody a stable force in the largely desolate Far North of New Spain, and that it functioned as a type of international hub for its continuous flow of indigenous, European, and mestizo visitors, inhabitants, and, also, animal

27 Ibid
herds. The author’s discussion of the ethnic composition of the presidio, with Janos used as the encompassing example, is valuable for its emphasis on the eighteenth-century definition of the word ‘mestizo’ as a “strict mixture, not the general mixture” that the term connotes in contemporary times. Further, Christiansen provides very brief inclusion of the soldado de cuera and the clothing supplies of the troops at Janos.29

Distinctions are drawn between the presidial soldier and the equestrians comprising the flying squadrons in María del Carmen Velázquez’s *El estado de guerra en nueva españa, 1760-1808* (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1950) with its emphasis on several military units and their relationship to the immediate terrain of the villa/mission/presidio complex. Moreover, the compañía presidial was distinct from the compañía volante in that the former garrisoned a fixed, fortified, and strategic position and did perform surveillance duty, but only of a type directed at the adjacent terrain and with the sole purpose of intercepting invading groups or individuals. In both cases, in the northern frontier presidial soldiers were required to preserve the tranquility of the region and were deemed capable of resisting the invasion of a tribe of Indians. Performing their assigned tasks, the men of these companies were expected to be daring and display physical fortitude -- more than fighting effort -- in order to defeat the intermittent and unexpected attacks by native communities. In the case of the compañías volantes, these units were headquartered at a village or town behind the presidial line, they patrolled the roads, and more aggressively pursued those hostiles who managed to penetrate the first line of defense.

Through his work with military service records, the Spanish military historian Juan Marchena Fernández has imparted important facets of documentation about military life that germinated on the Iberian peninsula before its emergence in the Américas. His extensively researched *Oficiales y soldados en el Ejército de América* has proven essential reading to the present study and especially so for its Chapter 1, dealing with the army in América in the context of the military institution in the Indies. Marchena Fernández provides descriptions of the infantry,

29 Ibid
artillery, cavalry, and includes definitions of the various military ranks. One section of the first chapter is devoted to the sociological dimensions of the colonial Spanish Army of the eighteenth century, and delineates the officers of the fixed army, officers of the militias, and those of the reinforcement troops. The second part of the Oficiales... consists of Chapters 3 through 7, with important discussions of the operability of the army in the Indies, the dilemma of military health and sanitation, and the soldiers and recruits of the military population. More so than any other text other than Moorhead’s The Presidio, a compendium of research by Marchena Fernández has underscored much of my thinking about several of the overarching themes of my project. These include social interaction, conflict and resolution, and devotion to or rejection of duty and responsibility among some presidio personnel during the colonial era.

I have wondered over the course of my research whether the colonial borderlands represented a locus for a certain amount of leniency granted by those in charge of (in)subordinate troops, and those who resisted authority. My grappling with this persistent state of affairs divulged from the historical record has stemmed from the notion that there existed a devaluation of prestige attached to a career in the military. The scholarship of Marchena Fernández has contributed to my engagement with this concept, as has my research of the primary source documentation of commanders ‘speaking’ from the era. Given intermittent royal issuances of general pardons and an apparent ongoing tolerance by commanders for subordinate misbehavior, I have imagined that in the borderlands forbearance from on high was magnified where it concerned strict adherence to military protocol. Where a case of military misconduct emerges in the archival record, the trajectory of its narrative is often truncated from an apparent lack of any other documentation. This will become evident in the forthcoming chapters. Thus, without further information detailed in later months or years, I have surmised that in litigation where an accused soldier has continued on in their role as a functioning employee of the King’s army, pending or final charges were ultimately rescinded or otherwise concluded to the benefit of the accused.

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30 Juan Marchena Fernández, Oficiales y soldados en el ejército de América (Sevilla: Escuela de estudios hispano-americanos de Sevilla, 1983)
However, in other circumstances, the extant proceedings demonstrate that harsh penalties including banishment and the curtailing of pensions befell those soldiers implicated in misdoings. This study will show how several inquests, some of which involved more than one accused individual implicated in scenarios ranging from contraband to mismanagement of key responsibilities, could result in various forms of prosecution for a wide range of company members.

Marchena Fernández’s short essay “Las reformas militares en América y su influencia en la reformulación del estado colonial,” included in the Actas de las I Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Militar compilation Aportaciones militares a la cultura, arte y ciencia en el siglo XVIII hispanoamericano, summarizes the transformation of martial structures intended to reach a variety of aspects of colonial administration, including: the elaboration of a new concept of defense; the implantation of a new tactical order; the formulation of new projects of defensive strategy at the regional and supra-regional level; the creation of new [military] units; and new systems of coordination and new logistical networks; all intended to cohere with the necessity of application of the military structure to the reorganization and rationalization of the American space.31 The Aportaciones compilation incorporates over twenty-nine short (approximately ten pages each) essays, each with an emphasis on some aspect of colonial military history. Several are included as sources for the present study including Carmen Gómez Pérez’s “La Recluta en el Ejército de América,” Epifanio Borregon García’s “Fondos Documentales para el Estudio de la Historia Española en Ultramar y Apuntes Históricos: Los Artilleros en Indias durante el Siglo XVIII,” and two essays: “La Expansión de las Fronteras Indianas en el Siglo XVIII” by Luis Navarro García, with a discussion of the significance of the American borderlands cavalry as the antecedent for the Chilean llaneros and the Mexican charros, among others, and a short paragraph devoted to the soldado de cuera; and “Las Ultimas Expansiones Territoriales de España en América,” by Manuel

Parreño Casado, the latter concerned with the strategies of Gálvez, especially in his role as the “pacifier” of Sonora.

Marchena Fernández and Gómez Pérez collaborated on the comprehensive *La Vida de Guarnición en las Ciudades Americanos de la Ilustración* with chapters devoted to “La Mala Vida del Soldado de Guarnicion,” “El Funcionamiento de La Estructura,” an examination of the mechanisms of funding, i.e. the “economic circuits” that linked the internal functioning of the Royal Coffers with the fiscal bureaucracy. The authors include a global analysis of the expenditures generated by the military apparatus in the eighteenth century for the purpose of supporting the troops and itemized in part: *Sueldos de la Oficialidad y Tropa del Ejército de Dotación; Sueldos a Oficiales regulares destinados al Adiestramiento de las Milicias;* the *Gastos de Fortificaciones;* and, *Material Militar.* Since my research involves the duties of a presidio paymaster and expenditures related to a multitude of necessities, this section of the text – albeit truncated – is a worthwhile read especially as it describes the spending for everything from fortifications and clothing to hygiene and infrastructure. An especially insightful section is subtitled “El Regimen de Situados,” a concept central to the administration of expenses drawn from preset amounts to cover military expenses.

The role played by the military in the social, economic and political processes during the Bourbon Reforms underscores many of the Spanish-language texts used in the present study and corresponding to this trajectory is the Allan Kuethe offering, co-edited by Juan Marchena Fernandez, *Soldados del Rey, El Ejército Borbónico en America colonial en Vísperas de la Independencia* (Castelló de la Plana: Publicaciones de la Universitat Jaume I, D.L., 2005). The two essays that were most applicable to my research were both by Kuethe; the first, “Las Milicias Disciplinadas en América,” describes the evolution of the militia and its regimen, but since its form was almost always provisional, it lacked certain privileges and advantages that the regular army

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32 Juan Marchena Fernández and María del Carmen Gómez Pérez, *La vida de guarnición en las ciudades americanas de la ilustración* (Madrid: Artegraf, 1992), 272-275
33 Ibid, 275-292
enjoyed. The historical development of the militia system in Spain, with its establishment of a new plan for provincial militias and its organization into regiments, and the eventual granting of the privilege of *fuero militar* to its members, forms the prelude of the article. The transference of the system to the Américas is important for Kuethe’s discussion of the challenges presented by the change in geography. The second essay “Carlos III, Absolutismo Ilustrado e Imperio Americano,” explains the risks that Carlos III assumed after the horrendous loss of Havana in 1762. The King made the potentially dangerous decision to arm his American subjects in the same manner as the disciplined militias – men enlisted, were equipped and standardized like the soldiers of infantry and cavalry in battalions and regiments. Then, officers and soldiers of the regular army trained the militiamen and in time many new units in the service of the King received privileges and other rights of less importance. But, Kuethe makes the point that the *fuero militar* was of profound significance to what were essentially ‘part-time’ employees – since the militia soldiers received no salary when not mobilized – and that the King felt obliged to compensate these units in some way if he hoped that they would, if called upon, take up arms in his name.

Diana Hadley, Thomas H. Naylor, and Mardith K. Schuetz-Miller, *The Presidio and the Militia on the Northern Frontier of New Spain, A Documentary History, Vol. 2, Part 2, The Central Corridor and the Texas Corridor, 1700-1765* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1997) has as its primary organizing goal the inclusion of documents that “reveal the disparate points of view of the major interest groups on the northern frontier as they relate to the presidio and its evolution as an institution [describing] its “conditions, maintenance, staffing activities, and scope of operations” while reflecting the “overriding concerns of presidial commanders and frontier administrators.” Since the text is divided into three sections covering two main geographical areas, the text provides a narrowing of focus for a regional study and thus serves as a key reference for thinking about the spatial arena of this dissertation’s area of concentration. The central corridor of

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35 Kuethe, “Carlos III, Absolutismo Ilustrado e Imperio Americano,” in Ibid, 19-30
the colonial borderlands described by Hadley and Taylor constituted territory contained within a single, gigantic province, Nueva Vizcaya; at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the region included territory now located in the contemporary Mexican states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and portions of Durango.

The authors describe the Texas corridor as a region initially valued by Spanish administrators as a “strategic buffer” against French expansion but recognized, too, that Texas contained “little of the mineral wealth and indigenous populations that made the central corridor so important to Spain.” A vast compendium of primary sources is intrinsic to any study of the colonial borderlands. But for the purposes of this project, it is those documents that specifically concern Texas and its presidios, and how frontier garrisons were expected to perform functions meriting the presumed high standards of the army, that inform the present study. Two of these original documents (included in both English and Spanish) include “Casafuerte’s Order Suppressing the Tejas Presidio, 1729”, and, Governor Pérez de Almazán’s report to the Viceroy, “Dereliction of Duty at La Bahía Presidio, 1724.” The compañías volantes are mentioned in the Introduction to the main text, described as “highly mobile mounted troops” having the flexibility to respond quickly and efficiently as events required.36 There is also a brief discussion of the unit in relation to the military career of Ladrón de Guevara, who with colonists and soldiers from the presidio of Boca de Leones, founded the villa of Cinco Senores (Nuevo Santander). When Ladrón de Guevara explored the region of the Bahía de Santander, he formed a flying company for the protection of settlements and roads in the new colony.37

Naylor and Polzer collaborated again for their Pedro Rivera and the Military Regulations for Northern New Spain, 1724-1729, from which those sections largely devoted to the compañías volantes and the individual articles [artículos] specifically targeting the soldiers comprising the

37 Ibid, 80
squadrons, form the narrative of the opening pages of Chapter 1 of the present study.\textsuperscript{38} Rivera’s observations reveal his tremendous disappointment with the specialized units and he minces no words in conveying his keen displeasure. The Rivera report is particularly valuable for its author’s astute examination of the various terminology in his own report, including ‘volante,’ and his interpretation of what the word actually meant and, further, where it concerned the on-the-ground activities of these specialized soldiers employed in the service of the King. Since the report, titled the \textit{Proyecto de Año de 1728}, is divided into three statuses [estados]. It is the third that is the most revealing about Rivera’s recommendations for reform and his expectations for each presidio’s future existence and, in the case of the flying squadrons, for their continued efficacy in the defense of the borderlands. Too, since the present study compares and contrasts the 1729 \textit{Reglamento} – which stemmed from the three-and-a-half year inspection tour and subsequent \textit{Proyecto} of Rivera – with that of 1772, and then the \textit{Instrucción} of 1786 -- the text is instrumental to a discussion of the regulations that emerged across the span of almost seven decades of borderlands administration. These efforts at reform targeted the maintenance and functionality of the various presidios, their individual companies, and the changeable conditions of an unstable frontier.

The Spanish language publication of the Rivera diary by Vito Alessio Robles predates the Naylor-Polzer text by forty-two years. The grammatical structure of the former differs only slightly from the latter, but the original Castilian is identical in both texts.\textsuperscript{39} Further, the Introduction by Alession Robles is valuable for its explanations of terminology as it was used at the time the Rivera diary was written, and for his discussion of the antecedent royal writs that led up to the 1724 departure of the expedition. While the Naylor-Polzer text contains the maps and descriptions of the \textit{Provincias Internas} by Francisco Alvarez Barreiro, a lieutenant colonel of infantry and the chief engineer of the province of Texas; and, two appendices with the 1721 meritos de servicio of Pedro de Rivera and his 1726 interrogatory against Captain Tuñón y Quiroz, the Alessio Robles


\textsuperscript{39} Vito Alessio Robles, \textit{Diario y derrotero de lo caminado, visto y observado en la visita que hizo a los presidios de la Nueva Espana Septentrional el Brigadier Pedro de Rivera} (Mexico, D.F.: Taller Autografico, 1946)
study includes the Diary of Rivera and the route [derrotero] taken by he and his fellow travelers. In tandem, both texts proved essential to the first two chapters of the dissertation.

More recent studies of presidio life and commerce include James M. Daniel’s “Diary of Pedro José de la Fuente, Captain of the Presidio of El Paso del Norte, August – December, 1765” focuses on the lively commercial activity of the times stemming from the frequency of caravans going to and coming from Santa Fé, Chihuahua, Janos, and Oposura in Sonora. However, the article provides insight into the ethnic composition of three main characters, the Spanish-born, forty-three year old Captain de la Fuente, the thirty-five year old Lieutenant Antonio Velarde, and the “creole” Ensign José Patricio Lucero, a veteran of some thirty-four years before being commissioned as an officer. Other individual soldier identities emerge as does the merchandise conveyed across the borderlands to and from El Paso, including highly valued trade items like wine, brandy, and cattle. A military expedition led by Ensign Lucero from El Paso to the Alamogordo and Tularosa regions (in present day New Mexico) lasted from September 17 to Sept 27 1765. Corporal Antonio Valencia set out from El Paso to Janos with fifteen armed citizens, apparently merchants, who were traveling to the presidio to sell commodities produced in El Paso.40

De la Fuente’s diary is a valuable record to compare with that of Amangual in that the account of the former is written in the format of the customary monthly reports required from each presidio whereas Amangual’s was a recording of events, environment, and social interactions across a nine-month span of travel from San Antonio to Santa Fé. Captain de la Fuente’s diary deviates from the usual format in that his daily accounts from each month are unusually lengthy, with abundant information recorded far beyond the customary one or two sentence entries of most presidio company monthly reports from various archives.41 Then, too, the diary of the Lucero

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41 Ibid

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Expedition of a mere ten days is replete with skirmishes with the Apache, intermittent meetings with civilians including women and children from that nation, violent skirmishes of a scale not found in the Amangual diary of 1808. The latter is remarkable not only for its narrative of steady encounters with indigenous people but also for the decidedly lesser threat that they, the Indians, represented to the expedition than that from the soldiers themselves, whose misbehavior resulted in at least one arrest and, for another, a whipping.\textsuperscript{42}

The significance of the establishment of commercial ties between French Natchitoches and the Texas Caddo nation in present-day East Texas, kinship ties between the Canadian St. Denis and a Spanish Captain at the Presidio at San Bautista (Coahuila) and illicit trade between French merchants and Spanish collaborators forms the core of Francis Xavier Galán’s “Presidio Los Adaes: Worship, Kinship, and Commerce with the French Natchitoches on the Spanish-Franco-Caddo Borderlands, 1721-1773.”\textsuperscript{43} Since interactions with French civilians and the personnel stationed at the presidios at, both, Nacogdoches (in Texas), and Natchitoches (in Louisiana) constitute significant sections of the chapters within the present study, the Galán essay’s focus on the presidio at Los Adaes also provides insight into frontier methods of gift giving. Proactive strategies functioned as part of the larger colonial enterprise of maintaining ‘peace through purchase’ and through reciprocal interactions, as in the case of the Los Adaes presidio’s reliance upon the Caddo for their farm goods, as did the Adaeseñó civilians and related missionaries. Then, when equipment and goods from Spanish sources were delayed, the Indians would run to the French for ironware, coffee, medicine, and other necessities.\textsuperscript{44} As Galán argues, cultural links brought the Los Adaes presidio, and by extension its soldiers and religious community, into the orbit of French-Caddo commercial and social networks which, in turn, helped maintain relatively peaceful relations among the regions triad of communities.\textsuperscript{45} Intricate network confluences

\textsuperscript{42} Francisco Amangual Diary, 1808, Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid
underscore much of the work of the present study with its emphasis on the blurring of rigid codes of conduct and commerce among the military and the civilian communities across the Texas borderlands.

Lillian Estelle Fisher’s *The Intendant System in Spanish America* (New York: Gordian Press, 1969) is matched in subject matter by Luis Navarro García’s *Las Reformas Borbónicas en América, El Plan de Intendencias y su Aplicación* (Sevilla: Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, 1995), a text that from its inception provides the European context for the Intendancy system as it would be administered in the *Américas*. Renovating the Spanish colonial empire was bound to be divisive and controversial, and Fisher understood and reflected upon these reactions; Navarro García provides a response from Viceroy Revillagigedo that the author credits as absolutely clear and concise. The viceroy indicated that he considered the establishment of the intendants would be very harmful [*nocivo*] here [in the “Indies”]; so much so that he considered it more profitable in [read: applicable to] other kingdoms [*Considero que el establecimiento de intendentes sería muy nocivo aquí, tanto y más que es provechoso en esos reinos*].46 In the borderlands historiographical arena, the Fisher and Navarro García texts provide the socio-economic context for a system of administration that required modification for its intended reforms to be successfully put into practice.

Where the Fisher text includes the individual articles of the 1786 Plan, Navarro García’s provides an analysis and interpretation that explain significant parts of the overall plan, with an emphasis on those articles – described as “paragraphs” -- devoted to reformation of the administration of New Spain and its de facto implementation across the *Américas*. He apportions summaries of the Gálvez critique of the *alcaldes mayores*, the principal target of his disapproval, as well as an analysis of the financing of the project of division of the Intendancies, and the general application of the *Ordenanza* and its trajectory into the nineteenth century.47

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46 Navarro García, 33
Jesús F. de la Teja’s work on the colonial borderlands includes several articles that have proven useful to the present study, including his “Spanish Colonial Texas,” in New Views of Borderlands History, with sections devoted to settlement patterns on the Texas frontier and focusing on Los Adaes and La Bahía; a discussion of the social structure of colonial Texas, and a description by the author of the region as “an economic backwater.”48 His contribution to the Poyo-Hinojosa text Tejano Origins in Eighteenth-Century San Antonio centers on the military settlers of San Antonio. Arguing against the assumptive date of March 1731 as the formal foundation of the villa of San Fernando de Béxar by Canary Islanders, and thus the beginning of San Antonio, de la Teja instead credits the 1718 arrival of a small expedition of Mexican soldiers and artisans accompanied by women and children as the first frontier folk to settle in the region.49 Economic struggles and the military presence underscore de la Teja’s treatment of life in Bexar and the presidio “continued to act as a magnet for population” as new arrivals to San Antonio formed “one of the most successful Spanish colonial communities” in the American Southwest.50

De la Teja annotated and wrote the introduction to the remarkable document “Ramon de Murillo’s Plan for the Reform of New Spain’s Frontier Defenses” with a translation by John Wheat. Describing the northern frontier of New Spain as defiant towards Spanish efforts to bring peace, efficiency, and economy to the administration of the region, and generated a “copious volume of reports, proposals, and recommendations” issued from governors, commandant generals, and field officers. One such individual was Ramon de Murillo, described by De la Teja as a well-intentioned “meddler,” who offered up his own proposal to restore order to the Interior Provinces.51 Murillo presented twenty-four chapters devoted to the closely aligned topics of Indian

50 Ibid, 38
51 Jesús de la Teja, “Ramon de Murillo’s Plan for the Reform of New Spain’s Frontier Defenses” in Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol CVII, No. 4, (April 2004), 501-533. Professor de la Teja was kind enough to send me the article after making me aware of its existence. Since my project includes a discussion of various types of soldiers working in the colonial borderlands, I appreciate his help.
warfare; presidial troops’ response to attack; the soldiers’ uniforms and poor condition, and descriptions of their armaments, saddles, boots and spurs. He wrote on the distribution of military duties, including managing the horse herds; defensive and offensive operations in campaign detachments; and, what he deemed the “wretched” condition of the militias and the uselessness of sending missionaries to Western America.\textsuperscript{52}

Murillo’s plan was not without merit; I found much to admire in its content. Based upon the ongoing problems faced by the presidios and their personnel in the northern frontier and exacerbated by the fluctuating patterns of peace and hostility enacted by various indigenous nations, had some of his suggestions for improvement been taken seriously, change for the better may have resulted. However, Murillo sent his plan in 1804, shortly before the imminent collapse of the Spanish empire. For the purposes of my project, I value de la Teja’s discussion of the soldado de cuera and that iconic soldier’s costuming along with the inclusion of images of Murillo’s three watercolors (perhaps intended as a visual aid for the King) that accompanied his proposal. Further, since the concluding chapter of the present study positions the trajectory of the narrative’s key players in the nineteenth century, the Murillo plan is a worthwhile essay for its contemporaneous view of that period and the region in borderlands history.

The historiography of Mexico’s nineteenth century with any substantial discussion on the colonial borderlands is rare, but indeed texts emerged in monographs geared toward topics too numerous to mention in this brief space. Many of these studies include sections devoted to the Far North during the colonial period and its transition to the era of the Independence movement. In 1965, the prolific Luis Navarro García offered a region-specific incisive text \textit{Las Provincias Internas en el Siglo XIX} consisting of two chapters in its entirety. The first, “El Momento de Salcedo” is subdivided to include discussions of the development of the provinces; “la frontera en tension”; and, examinations of the incident involving Zebulon Pike, considered the human embodiment for surreptitious outsider incursion in Spain’s northern provinces; international

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, 510
conflict and its impact on the American borderlands; and, a short section describing the last division of the Commandery. The monograph is particularly suitable for the present study for its focus on Nemesio Salcedo and the years between 1802 and 1813, a period considered strictly survival [estricta supervivencia] for the Commandancia General of the Interior Provinces.\textsuperscript{53}

Salcedo’s correspondence with Amangual and his contemporaries will surface in the final chapter of this study, and the Navarro Garcia text provides contextual references to Salcedo’s psychological state during this crumbling era of the empire as well as to the force in numbers of men at various presidios and in several companies scattered throughout the borderlands.

I.4 Literature Review: A Brief Note -- The Texas Rangers and the Flying Squadrons

Though the present study does not explore the possibility of a potential link between the emergence of the colonial flying squadrons and the subsequent creation of the Texas Rangers in the nineteenth century, Amangual’s presence and that of the compañías volantes suggest common threads between the two closely related patrol units. Much of the historiography devoted to the Texas Rangers consists of broad histories written by scholars of Texas and reminiscences from former Rangers and their relatives. However, most of the texts associated with the group make no mention of the Tejano flying squadrons with the notable exception of three relatively recent works.

Thomas Knowles’s \textit{They Rode for the Lone Star, The Saga of the Texas Rangers} (Dallas: Taylor Publishing Company, 1999) devotes two full pages to the Segunda Compañía Volante de San Carlos del Álamo de Parras in a section of the text subtitled “A Light at the Edge of the World.” Knowles describes the company as being composed of one hundred colonial mounted lancers, acknowledges that Amangual headed this particular troop, and that the lanceros were posted as scouts and support for the garrison of San Antonio.\textsuperscript{54} Before their arrival, San Antonio de Béxar’s only protection came from a small group of soldiers garrisoned at the local presidio. The

\textsuperscript{53} Luis Navarro García, \textit{Las Provincias Internas en el Siglo XIX} (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1965). 1

detachment of the Álamo de Parras company was one of several reinforcement efforts. As seasoned veterans, the men provided increased protection from Indians, thereby significantly reducing the theft of livestock and the smuggling of other goods. As a mounted contingent, they served at times as couriers and escorts to the Spanish governor. In place of the company's long name a shortened one, La Compañía del Álamo, or simply, El Álamo, became commonly used. Through this association, Mission Valero came to be identified and thus remembered as the Álamo.55

Knowles uses the term ‘lancer’ to not only emphasize the patrols’ skill with the lance, but also their dependence upon a fresh supply of horses intended for the protracted pursuit of borderlands lawbreakers and “American freebooters.” It seems that the latter were collectively viewed as illegal settlers, slave traders, and outlaws.56 Knowles argues that the mixed volunteer and professional mounted force drawn from the Tejano community “set the stage” for Stephen F. Austin’s later creation of early ranging companies described by the author as “the predecessors of the Texas Rangers.”57 From a slightly different perspective, Mike Cox’s The Texas Rangers, Wearing the Cinco Peso, 1821-1900 (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 2008) offers a more recent appraisal of the Rangers by acknowledging revisionist attempts to deride the force as “racist practitioners of genocide.” However, Cox acquiesces to an ongoing belief about the Rangers in their capability as lifesavers and outlaw chasers whom ultimately had but one goal: making Texas a “safer place to live and raise a family” (14-16). According to Cox, between the two extremes of legend and slander, the truth about the Texas Rangers lies somewhere in “the middle.”58 The book’s slight mention of the compañías volantes highlights the geographic locale and potential identity of several companies by providing site-specific names: a San Antonio based unit under the leadership of Salvador Flores and Juan Seguin; the Tlascalan (Mexico) Compañía Volante de San Carlos de Parras; the Guardia Victoriana under Carlos de la Garza; the San Fernando Rangers

55 Knowles, Thomas W. They Rode for the Lone Star (Dallas: Taylor Publishing Company, 1999). 5-7
56 Ibid
57 Ibid, 5
under Mariano Rodríquez; and, the Nacogdoches company of Vicente Cordova. All of these units in their unique regional locales amounted to ranger-like forces.\textsuperscript{59}

Finally, Gary Anderson’s \textit{The Conquest of Texas, Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land, 1820-1875} (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005) asserts that the “Anglo-Texas strategy” of chronic warfare with indigenous communities became the “longest continuous struggle of its kind in American history,” and was, at heart, a “deliberate ethnic cleansing of a host of people, especially people of color.” While Anderson’s text focuses on the gradual “ethnic cleansing” perpetrated upon indigenous peoples by Texans, the author makes it clear that the political apparatuses in place during the early to mid-nineteenth century supported Texas Ranger units as the agents of racially infused violence.\textsuperscript{60} For their part, Mexicans, working as shepherders and often kidnapped by indigenous groups, were then treated humanely by their Comanche captors and thus fared quite well in captivity. These unlikely ethnic alliances incensed Anglo Texans and even Mexican officials. Anderson provides a glimpse into the early formations of the flying squadrons by Rafael Gonzáles, then commandant general of Coahuila-Texas and Nuevo León, making cavalry officer Mateo Ahumada responsible for organizing a \textit{compañía volante} in 1824. Anderson indicates that some companies, composed of “rancheros,” were patrolling the lands between the Rio Grande and San Antonio by the late 1820s. These same “rancheros” [a word used interchangeably, if often incorrectly, with “charro,” “chinaco,” and “vaquero” in borderlands historiography and in art history, both, in Spanish and English] became “an object lesson for the famous Texas Rangers, who would soon take on a similar role.” Following this most overt assertion of the flying squadron’s identity as an earlier version of the Texas Rangers, Anderson states that the early Texas had no experience with “cavalry tactics and closely observed how the Mexicans performed.”\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid 24.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, 50. Anderson indicates in his notes that “The leaders of these Tejano ‘flying companies’ have seldom been identified in most of the Anglo-centric historiography of the period. They included Carlos de la Garza at Victoria,
I.5 RESEARCH METHODS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

It will come as no surprise that my fundamental approach to constructing a narrative intertwining the lives of Francisco Amangual with that of other key protagonists in the orbit of the borderlands presidio complex – garrison, mission, indigenous ranchería, and the open spaces of the despoblado – lies in the time-honored scholastic tradition of archival research. Such an approach assumes the validity and, by extension, the value of empirical research and its potential for achieving and, then, maintaining cohesion throughout the account. The path to success in this endeavor presumes a careful weaving together of reliable sources attentive to exhuming the past by borrowing the ‘voices’ from a range of time periods and experiences for the purpose of achieving historical credibility.

The project can be described as a micro-history that contributes to, or, minimally expands upon the prevailing metadiscourse of borderlands history, or, to use its other well-worn descriptor, frontier studies. However, that type of description will not make this study unique, nor a singular achievement, or a departure from its antecedents in the field (except in one rather significant way). Nor is it likely that the present study will be ascribed to the realm of revisionist scholarship except where it concerns the emergence of individual military men whose literal, if often abridged, ‘voices’ emerge from within written texts involving episodes of conflict, resolution, and continuity amid the everyday tasks underscoring soldierly life. Scholars of the Spanish colonial borderlands have ‘heard’ some of these voices before, in other contexts, and similar narratives consistently emerge from stories of contention and crisis, resistance and acquiescence, and usually occurring between settlers, citizens, adventurers, Indians, soldiers and their commanders (Yetman (2012), de la Teja (2004), Poyo and Hinojosa (1991), Frank (2000), Barr (2007), Tijerina (1994), Faulk (1987); passim).

The present study offers more than a scholastic inlay for preexisting, historical fault lines rendered over the years by academic disinterest or the presumed scarcity of research material.

Mariano Rodríguez at San Antonio, and, of course, Juan N. Seguín, Salvador Flores, and Vicente Córdova, the latter responsible for the revolt at Nacogdoches.” 386.
Given that the scripted testimonies interwoven throughout this study for the most part evince an apparently compulsory process of documentation -- requiring the substantiation of even the most seemingly innocuous action taken at the presidio, and usually at the local level by individual companies -- I recognize that a plethora of primary sources from multiple archives represent the decontextualized fragments of a once complex and interrelated administrative environment. Lacking other means of communication, other than oral disclosure (testimonies that have found their way into the textual record), the available data preserves a kind of historical authenticity articulated from the vantage point of those who had the power to memorialize and transcribe. Testimonials recovered from various locations and among a relatively narrow range of participants reflect the customary groupings of frontier protagonists – soldiers, commanders, governors, and other provincial administrators, Indian chiefs and their followers – within the spatial boundaries of an often unforgiving territory.

Into these outposts and onto this intellectual platform European adventurers and intruders surface, bringing with them cultural practices and economic objectives that usually triggered a fluctuating array of dynamics into a complex social arena. Into this cultural admixture are several names (Vial, Croix, Cordero, Nolan, and de Mezieres) that will be familiar to scholars engaged in studies about the American West, and its geographical antecedent, the Ibero-Franco-Anglo-Indian borderlands. Moreover, their participation in some events will be the customary reference points for thinking about the Far North and its place in U.S. – Mexico relations.

This study effectively fits into postcolonial studies and its conventional methodological approaches in that, one dimension of my approach to the study of the compañía volante takes its cue from the work of Wolfgang Iser, a specialist in comparative literature and the founding theorist of reception theory.62 First, I assert that no such thing as postcolonial ‘theory’ exists; persuaded by both Iser and Slemon, I, too, prescribe instead to the notion of a postcolonial discourse, intended, as is all discourse, to map a territory and determine the features of what it charts, and

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62 Wolfgang Iser, How to Do Theory (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 175, 184-185
subsequently project a domain to be lived in.\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, at its heart, discourse is a notion that, “considers social subjects [and] social consciousness to be formed not through ideologies that have their base in economic or class relations but through a form of power that circulates in and around the social fabric.”\textsuperscript{64} I would argue that this “form of power” stems from economic, class, and ethnic relations that stand not apart from the social fabric but indeed form the warp and weft of that fabric.

Imperialism, and the attitudes, references, and experiences formed by its presence, stems from the notion of culture, rooted empathically as it is by the socio-politically infused hegemonic forces propelled by a “metropolitan center.” Historian Mark Thurner posits the notion of a “manifesto americano,” stating in part: “the array of historical trajectories and lived critical predicaments suggests that colonialism and its after are not everywhere and at all times the same.” Moreover, it stands to reason that, “no ‘postcolonial theory’ adequately accounts for colonial and postcolonial American histories” and, further, that kind of theorizing “suffers from the same universalizing impulse that is ascribes to the West.”\textsuperscript{65}

Indeed, all three of the aforementioned theorists concur that these developments evolve in tandem with the relationships created in the pages of \textit{literature} (itself a form of imperial discourse) that similarly segregate spaces - social, ideological, political, to name but a few - between the presumed center and its periphery. Thus, the process of discourse frames its subjects through strategies of “regulation and exclusion, and constructing forms of ‘knowledge’ which make possible that which can be said and that which cannot.”\textsuperscript{66} I contend that regulation and exclusion in actuality and from an ideological stance permeated the social fabric of the borderlands and its military installations. Moreover, the presidio, as a socially dynamic hub of sorts with its perpetual flow of humanity into and out of its walls, served as the locus for its documentarists to construct a

\textsuperscript{63} Iser argues that post-colonial discourse is primarily an attempt to remap the world charted by imperialism. Iser cites the work of post-colonial theorist Stephen Slemon, who cautioned that the field of postcolonial studies is “riven with disciplinary self-doubt and mutual suspicion.” See further Stephen Slemon, “Post-Colonial Critical Theories,” in Gregory Castle, ed., \textit{Postcolonial Discourses: An Anthology} (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) 172, 185
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid, 172-173
\textsuperscript{65} Mark Thurner and Andrés Guerrero, eds. \textit{After Spanish Rule} (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 13-14
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, 103.
distinct type of literature. Military service records, monthly company reports, and correspondence between commanders, subordinate officers, and provincial administrators had the power to accomplish two opposing but closely related goals: cohering disparate communities as well as creating cleavages among individuals and like-minded groups co-habiting common and segregated spaces alike. In the *hispano-indio* borderlands, official discourse indeed set out to delineate a kind of communal territory. In doing so, it fixed the parameters of well-defined social spaces that functioned to legitimize an ideological climate initiated by the military presence.

From the vantage point of postcolonial discourse, then, my study reorients the understanding of borderlands patrol and defense with the emergence of the *compañía volante* as one specialized unit employed within a colonial apparatus that sought to control an often chaotic territory. Since some of the secondary source historiography of the presidio soldiers is rooted in a fabled past that minimizes their less-than-virtuous presence, in certain ways this study will be a deviation from earlier prototypes with the exception of exposing key facets of the content within the primary sources. Moreover, given that entrenched ways of imagining the frontier pervade some aspects of the historiography, i.e. its projection of colonial troops occupying the Far North amid hostile working conditions, resistant civilians and native peoples, one particular challenge remained.

My earliest attempts at making sense of the documents by mapping my own subjectivities onto the existing historiography surfaced from just such a framework of *historical imaginings*, ruminations, and long held belief systems that almost succeeded in distorting – if not, ignoring -- the actual lived experiences, more often than not prosaic and time-consuming, of the protagonists (of varied rank and status) themselves. The most recent scholarship on the presidio acknowledges the leveling goals of a small number of revisionist scholars while at the same time maintaining long-standing beliefs about the presidio, its inhabitants, and various visitors that appear to unravel with each new publication. As a consequence of releasing, once and for all, the notion that I would find examples of audacious acts of heroism and bravery across the hallowed frontiers of earlier studies, I yielded to the process of reinserting the more mundane facets of presidial life and
administration through a careful exhumation of sources. That endeavor involved one paymaster’s
documenting the business of performing inventories; preparing monthly company reports and, his
(and others’) perpetual counting of expenditures for the Indians. It was these types of routine
activities that defined the boundaries of my research and structured the main thrust of my
argument. That the inclusion of the flying squadrons’ operations across the borderlands has
rhythmic parallels to the trajectory of Amangual’s career, and even forms a sub-category of
analysis in this study, follows the discursive framework set largely by the extant documents from
multiple archives.

I am keenly aware of the processes involved in the production of meaning through a failure,
or, the determined effort, to interrogate – by dismantling - the often taken-for-granted language
deployed in many areas of borderlands studies. This study commits to the goals of creating new
and long-overdue paradigms for making sense out of textual and visual representations of ‘history,’
and further embraces the challenge of making investigative forays into certain institutionalized
modes of understanding. The theoretical framework presented here underscores a methodological
approach proposed by Leopold von Ranke and synthesized by Simon Gunn in that, this study
prioritizes textual sources from prescribed empirical approaches. This methodology has a multi-
pronged approach, in that it 1) privileges the archival setting as a repository of more, or less,
‘reliable’ documents intended to divulge historical knowledge; 2) asserts the necessity of rigorous
scrutiny of archival documents in order to ascertain the historical ‘facts’ about events, and thus
presents the conventionally interpreted narrative of the event; and, 3) strives to understand that
every period possesses its own unique essence and character.67 The latter characteristic chiefly
stems from a chief preoccupation of most historians; that is, the customary dependence upon
periodization, a component of the cognitive framework intended (however misguided as is often
the case), to achieve understanding and assess context-relatedness.

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67 Simon Gunn, History and Cultural Theory (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2006), 5-6
I share that same preoccupation and admit to the very same reliance upon time frames of sequential years in order to tell the story of the events that follow. However, this study follows a line of thinking in suggesting that chronological parameters are heuristic devices, intended from the beginning to serve as a tentative point of departure. Further, I argue that periodization is infused with academically oriented imaginings of strict linearity especially as these considerations apply to the passage of time and, further, that the process tentatively ascribes to all epochs finite beginnings and endings. Such an approach effectively diminishes non-Western understandings of time, especially those knowledge systems rooted in the notion of ‘cyclical time,’ which, in one way or another, have the potential to, paradoxically, satisfy Western historians’ preoccupations with ‘change over time.’ Essentially, this study does not deviate from that concept nor does it pretend to fabricate a theoretical vehicle for atypical configurations of time and space. In the ensuing chapters, periodization fluctuates throughout the narrative in an effort to explore processual relations between an earlier event and one in a later period, and both within the context of a series of historical moments.

I.6 Overview of Chapters

Chapter 1 takes as its point of departure the internal activities of the compañías volantes emerge from their initial development as part of a larger scheme of exerting military control over chronically problematic regions of the empire such as its peripheral zones. Transformative elements impacted the development of various military units of the presidio-mission complex, and these changes often blurred the site specific purpose and function of the borderlands squadrons. Personnel within the ranks of all of these groups negotiated the intricate complexities of their fundamental obligations to administrative mandates while adhering (with more or less success) to the overarching goals of service to the community where they were located. Then, I examine the military career of Francisco Amangual and chart his ascension within the ranks of the Iberian army followed by his travel overseas to Nueva España; military service records and documents from
1779 -- 1793 trace his assignments in the colonial borderlands including his role as *habilitado*, or, paymaster of the Béjar unit.

*Chapter 2* includes a brief discussion of the presidio system’s marking out of borders and its effect of maintaining social cohesion. The practice was informed by the Royal Regulations of 1772, which had a decisive impact upon the lives of soldiers on the borderlands. A section of the chapter considers the offensive and defensive maneuvers utilized in strategizing campaigns to enhance control and subordination, efforts that had necessarily to rely on the willingness of company commanders to follow orders from and comply with superior directives. In some cases, on the ground realities forced presidio captains’ refusal to comply with orders from above, and often their intimate knowledge of frontier terrain took precedence over mandates from officials unfamiliar with local conditions. Some aspects of soldier identity emerge from examining the military service records of a few soldiers; the formatting itself of the service record suggests a type of literature having multi-dimensional aspects that say much about origin, class, status, and ethnicity in the military ranks. Maintaining cohesion across the borderlands had its challenges as it did similarly within in the presidial companies; one example involved two veteran officers, Rubio and Ripperdá, whose conflictive interactions evinced the sensitive nature of relationships forged from the official business of running the military and contending with less than exemplary job performances on the part of certain functionaries in the colonial system. Conversely, the animosity between two soldiers from the rank-and-file of the Bexar presidio force, Sergeant Manuel Rodríguez and Lieutenant and paymaster Francisco Amanguard, erupted in a 1792 lawsuit involving other key members of the presidio. The testimony included in this chapter has never been published in any form, and is enlightening given its presentation of a variety of the original ‘voices’ from the period. Soldier and civilian depositions from this entanglement tell us as much about the moral character of and obligation to duty of certain individuals in particular as it does about military legal proceedings in general.

*Chapter 3* presents the conclusion to the Amanguard – Rodríguez slander case and then moves into a discussion of attributes desired by the colonial military for their soldiers, and how
intra-presidio conflicts were mitigated by disciplinary efforts intended to curb misbehavior among the troop rank and file. Documentation of established procedural endeavors found expression in the Gálvez *Instrucción* of 1786, but the focus in this chapter turns to the Apaches and their fluctuating relationship with the borderlanders and the military establishment during the 1790s. Further, Manuel de Escandón emerges as a key powerbroker in the role of Governor of Nuevo Santander in the south valley of Texas prior to his eventual promotion as interim Governor of Texas. The narrative returns to the suspicions cast yet again upon the Accountant Amangual in a case involving questionable balances against the *Habilitación* Fund of the presidio at San Antonio de Béxar; however, this episode was particularly daunting in that Amangual will now have to answer to the Superior Accounting Office of the Royal Tribunal of Accounts in Mexico City. The chapter brings together the entrepreneurial Governor Escandón, the gutsy Captain Juan Cortés of the La Bahía presidio, and the beleaguered paymaster Amangual in a proceeding targeting contraband charges that involved several other soldiers traveling from Natchitoches in Louisiana and Nacogdoches, Texas in the summer of 1792.

**Chapter 4** Accommodating Native American visitors to the presidio through the colonial mechanism of ‘peace by purchase’ brings together representatives from the Taguacana, Taguaya, Tancague, Guichita, the Lipan and Comanche nations and the omnipresent Frenchman and *soldado distinguido* Andrés Benito Courbiere, an individual who appears throughout this study in a variety of contexts. Another inventory was in store for Amangual, this one of the goods brought by Toribio Duran from Nacogdoches to San Antonio; like the other lists of commodities that have emerged within the previous chapters, the material goods provide an excellent reference for the variety of items demonstrating the buying preferences of individuals within the socio-economic spaces of the colonial borderlands. The same could be said for the property belonging to French residents and passersby of the presidial environs. Census and biographical data of ‘foreigners’ within these spaces provides a focal point in the chapter for achieving understanding of the mixed demographic of the borderlands during the early 1790s.
Chapter 5 presents the response of Amangual to the charges of questionable balances made by the Superior Accounting Office in Mexico City. Tracking foreigners continues to be a concern for viceregal authorities and now Anglo Americans are brought into the sphere of suspicion. However, the unending necessity for maintaining peace with the indigenous nations proved to be a policy that required constant reiteration, from commanders to seasoned presidial leaders. Similarly, the chapter shows that soldiers endured punishment, promotion, and as money management necessitated measures to ensure its preservation, substantive documentation of expenditures for “friendly” Indian nations continued unabated. The compañías volantes emerge again through the activities of soldiers, some living and some deceased, and their relatives, and Amangual’s ascension to the rank of Captain and leader of the flying squadron of San Carlos de Parras marks a significant milestone in his military career. A discussion of the privileges of the controversial ‘fuero militar’ ensues that describes yet another policy implemented by colonial administrators that ensured the exponential development of the militarization of the borderlands.

Chapter 6 closely examines the 1808 expedition led by Amangual who was directed to locate a more direct route from San Antonio de Béjar to Santa Fé. Amangual kept one of the most complete, detail oriented diaries of the nine-month long journey and portions of his narrative are summarized and explained in order to shed new light on significant aspects of the topography, interactions with indigenous people along the way, and how the many animals – and humans – in the expedition team fared over often hazardous, dangerous environmental conditions. The expedition diaries of the Frenchman Pedro Vial and the retired corporal José Mares, who traversed the same route, in multiple trips between 1786 and 1793, have served as points of comparison for the 1808 diary kept by Amangual, but here, the content of two translations, that of Mattie Hatcher who translated the Amangual Diary in 1934 for the Bexar Archives and the Loomis and Nasatir translation that appears in its entirety within their 1967 Pedro Vial and the Roads to Santa Fé will provide a method for discerning corresponding elements within the various texts that functioned as required formatting, i.e. direction of movement, leagues traveled, and topographical features, based upon viceregal mandates for charting expeditions. There are slight differences in the two
translations and therefore tell us as much about the interpretations of scholars working on colonial texts as they do about the sequence of events and key players within the narrative as viewed from the perspective of researchers. From their travels and daily activities across the borderlands, it will be possible to observe the social interactions stemming from a select groups of individuals within the squadrons and those groups they came in contact with along the way. Groups representing a wide array of communities, including Indians, foreigners, Mexicans, Anglo Americans, appear among the troops in the latter’s prescribed role of creating new routes between these two frontier outposts. Derived from New Mexican archival material about the Amangual expedition’s approach to Santa Fé, the chapter includes original source documents that have never been included in other texts mentioning the journey.
Chapter One

On March 30, 1808, Captain Francisco Amangual (1739-1812) left San Antonio de Béxar with an expedition of two hundred men and traveled for nine months to Santa Fé, New Mexico. Amangual headed the Segunda Compañía Volante de San Carlos de Parras at La Bahía. The so-called ‘flying squadrons’ of the Mexican borderlands were the creation of the Conde de Galve who proclaimed the necessity of groups of military units charged with patrolling the desplobado.68 The responsibility of the two-fold exercise of patrol and protection fell to soldiers on horseback, a cavalry unit spawned in the 1540s from a military experiment intended to not only secure the roads and communities of the far northern reaches of the Spanish empire but also to quell retaliatory raids and hit-and-run tactics from nomadic peoples forced into labor at Mexico’s silver mines.69 The goals of the one thousand mile expedition of some two and a half centuries later were to establish a safe passage between two extreme frontier outposts of the Spanish colonial borderlands; to visit the indigenous communities of the area; explore the Red River as well as the Oscura Blanca and El Sacramento mountain ranges; and, return to Texas.

The compañías volantes – referred to as ‘cuerpos volantes,’ ‘mobile troops/tropas volantes,’ and, simply ‘volantes’ – evolved in tandem with the development of the presidio system and served as a mounted military squadron charged with defending the Provincias Internas. Garrisoned forts to protect established towns and even new communities of armed civilians began to be established at strategic positions in more remote locales, distant from population strongholds.70 Ongoing Spanish incursion onto indigenous ancestral lands fueled a series of

68 Moorhead, Max. The Presidio, Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975). 23. Some confusion exists as to the precise chronological origin of the emergence of the compañías volantes, which I discuss below. However, the first mention of a type of “roving company” in the secondary sources for the Spanish colonial borderlands appears in Moorhead’s discussion of the origins and early development of the presidio; the author elaborates only on the function of the unit, described as “a single company – a captain with thirty troops” that was but a remnant of the drastic reduction of the number of garrisons serving as strategic outposts for military personnel. The roving company was ordered not to seek out and destroy the indigenous nations comprising the so-called Gran Chichimeca, but, instead to attract them to peace by offering them material assistance; such a process of pacification would continue to form the ideological substrate of controlling the resistant native populations for the next three hundred years. 12-13.
69 ibid, 8-11.
70 ibid.
rebellions carried out by groups like the Xixime, Acaxee, Tepehuan, Tarahumara, Concho, Chiso, Suma, Manso, Jano, Toboso, and Julime nations that presaged the punitive responses by the Pueblo nations of New Mexico. From 1599 – 1700, intermittent revolts surfaced with the goal of severing Iberian control of the central corridor of the northern frontier.\textsuperscript{71} These reactive events prompted Iberian reassessment of the treatment of indigenous peoples and a new policy of frontier defense.\textsuperscript{72}

One of the first implementations of the Bourbon Reforms targeting the presumed inadequacy of the presidial system -- believed to be a major factor responsible for the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 -- was the need for supplementary protection. The call for a series of “flying squadrons,” or flying companies of highly mobile mounted troops had clear intent: to provide the flexibility to respond quickly and efficiently as events required.\textsuperscript{73} Discrepancies in the chronology of the squadrons’ emergence in military history come to light. Andrés Tijerina indicates that this unique type of military squadron structure originated in 1713 when Viceroy Duque de Linares ordered landowners in the \textit{frontera} to organize “flying companies” to thwart indigenous incursions on a moment’s notice. In 1749, Antonio Ladrón de Guevara, commander of one of the Jose de Escandón’s expeditionary forces, founded the villa of Nuevo Santander and, after surveying the region of the Bahía de Santander, formed a \textit{compañía volante} for the protection of settlements and roads in the new colony.\textsuperscript{74} By the 1770s a more formalized organization comprised of local volunteers, mostly \textit{Tejanos}, and trained by professional officers, emerged in Tejas, a part of the \textit{provincia} of Coahuila y Tejas.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{71} As Hadley and Taylor describe it, the central corridor of the colonial borderlands constituted territory contained within a single, gigantic province, Nueva Vizcaya. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the province included territory now located in the contemporary Mexican states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and portions of Durango. Immensely rich with mineral resources, the region was populated with indigenous groups who, from the conquerors’ perspective, could provide an important labor pool for the mines. Viceregal officials were determined to protect the major trade routes that passed through the province with its attendant elements of communication and supply, all of which traversed some portion of Nueva Vizcaya. Diana Hadley, Thomas H. Naylor, and Mardith K. Schuetz-Miller, \textit{The Presidio and the Militia on the Northern Frontier of New Spain, A Documentary History, Vol. 2, Part 2, The Central Corridor and the Texas Corridor, 1700-1765} (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1997) 3

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid 11-13.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid

\textsuperscript{74} Andrés Tijerina, \textit{Tejanos and Texas Under the Mexican Flag, 1821-1836} (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1994) 79-80

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid
Compañía Volante de San Carlos de Parras (Álamo de Parras), a company of 100 Spanish lancers that arrived in Texas in January 1803. The men came from the pueblo of San José y Santiago del Álamo, near Parras in southern Coahuila. Under the jurisdiction of the curacy of the Villa de San Fernando and the Bishop of Nuevo León, they occupied the secularized mission of San Antonio de Valero.

For several reasons related to the economic and political climate of the period, the viceregal government considered the volantes’ presence as a variation of the regular presido soldier essential to preserving order during the twilight years of the Spanish colonial empire. Indian raids, cattle rustling, and smuggling plagued the Texas province. Spain's return of the Louisiana territory to France in 1800 gave rise to a threat of an American invasion. San Antonio de Béxar’s only protection came from a small group of soldiers garrisoned at the local presidio. The detachment from the Álamo de Parras company was one of several reinforcement efforts. After the secularization of the mission at San Antonio de Valero, the walled enclosure and a factory (perhaps an obraje for the production of woolen goods for the indigenous locals) that had been constructed were subsequently abandoned. Then, in 1801 when the compañía volante de Álamo de Parras reoccupied its location, they remained until 1813. As seasoned veterans, the men provided increased protection from Indians, thereby significantly reducing the theft of livestock and the smuggling of other goods. As a mounted contingent, they served at times as couriers and escorts to the Spanish governor. In place of the company's long name a shortened one, La Compañía del Álamo, or simply, El Álamo, became commonly used. Through this association, Mission Valero came to be identified, and thus, remembered as the Álamo. The Segunda Compañía Volante de San Carlos de Parras garners attention in several works mentioned earlier in this study that briefly acknowledge their contributions to Texas history. However, it will be during the final years of

77 Regino F. Ramón, _Historia General del Estado de Coahuila_ (Saltillo: Leonor Ramón de Garza, 1990). After the Wars of Independence, the Álamo de Parras detachment withdrew and left abandoned, for the second time, the buildings and wall enclosures of the Valero mission.
78 Knowles 5
Francisco Amangual’s military career that the San Carlos company’s association with the veteran soldier and paymaster will more sharply come into focus.

1.2 **COMPANÍAS VOLANTES: EARLY HISTORY AND TRANSFORMATION**

It is possible to confuse military units and their prescribed functions. Whether a presidial unit eventually transformed into a flying squadron, or, just the opposite, as in the case of the garrison of San Juan Bautista de Río Grande, established in 1701 among a cluster of missions, is difficult to ascertain. Originally, a *compañía volante* post, San Juan Bautista became a presidio two years later on the south bank of the Rio Grande.⁷⁹ In a July 1700 letter, José Antonio de Espinosa conveyed his concerns to Viceroy, José Sarmiento y Valladares, Conde de Moctezuma. His chief complaint centered upon the establishment of the San Juan Bautista presidio and its two-fold importance: first, the necessity of ensuring the safety of the Rio Grande missions; and, second, but equally important, quelling the encroachment of French settlers, as incursions were rumored to have occurred above the Bay of Espíritu Santo. This latter piece of information stemmed from indigenous informants intimate with Friar Marcos Guerena.⁸⁰ Robert Weddle indicates that the Viceroy’s response on March 28, 1701 was precise: he ordered the creation and formation of a “flying company” without station or form (like that of a presidio), and that the place where it would be established was to be designated by the missionaries and an officer. The company would consist of thirty men and the officer, Captain Diego Ramón, and that its initial task would be to assist the mission of San Juan Bautista del Río Grande del Norte, in Coahuila, in order to “free the missionaries and inhabitants from the invasions of the barbarians.”⁸¹ Thus far two historians’ arguments for the initial appearance of the *companías volantes* in the borderlands place their inception, alternately, as 1701 and 1713.

The Viceroy emphasized the need for the soldiers of the presidio of Coahuila to assist the *compaña volante* and that from this company three squads of ten men each were to be formed.

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79 Moorhead 29.
81 Ibid
Two of these squads, along with the *presidiales* from Coahuila, were to “travel continually over all the land,” conducting a manifold surveillance activity with an emphasis on protecting the religious personnel and their missionizing agenda. Moreover, the *volantes* were charged with maintaining vigilance on the activities and maneuverings of the French, especially where it concerned French settlements and behavior. The remaining company of ten men was directed by the Viceroy to be “maintained always in company” with the missionaries, and “without losing them from sight,” with the goal of defending them against hostile indigenous groups. On May 4, 1701 Ramon, stationed at the presidio of San Francisco de Coahuila, received orders to form the *compañía volante* of the Río Grande del Norte and toward the end of July in the same year, he left with his company to establish headquarters for the flying squadron at San Juan Bautista. However, after only a short time, the squadron gave way to a formal presidio, still with Diego Ramón in charge.

As we shall see, the element of transformation, structured conceptually by changes within military directives that demanded from the squadrons, both, sporadic movement and permanence, is recurring in the history of the flying squadrons. Such vacillations serve as a key point of departure for thinking about the military units of the presidio/mission complex. Were the defining elements that differentiated the units so distinct that there was no blurring of the intended function of each of the units, and thus their relationship to the civilian community? Moreover, was it possible that much overlap, in the administrative arenas of purpose and function, existed between, and among, the various military companies and especially within the geographic space of the borderlands? Long-standing jurisdictional fluidity in these ‘frontier’ spaces served as an impetus for, both, 1) the most opportunistic among colonial inhabitants to manipulate the regulations and expectations as they applied across several spheres of borderlands communities, and for 2) the inevitable socio-political interactions that may have allowed for the cross-positioning of tasks – prescribed or otherwise -- among the military. On the other side of the spectrum, opportunities

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82 Ibid
83 Ibid
existed, as well, for those task-driven individuals keen on carrying out the orders of superiors operating out of Mexico City or, perhaps, from military commanders in closer proximity to the northern provinces. Another question that emerges within the context of the soldiers’ stakes in the frontier community, with its separate but closely aligned colonial apparatuses of ecclesiastical and presidial obligations: was the devotion to duty, especially as it was prescribed by the ongoing ‘reglamentos,’ not enough of a powerful motivator that strict devotion could be usurped by the harsh realities of life on the frontier? Did it become apparent to even the most conscientious-minded military men that the advantages of negotiation, accommodation, and perhaps even a deliberate bending of the rules might be necessary to ensure survival?84

Again, certain inconsistencies emerge in the historiography as it pertains to the inception of the compañías volantes and, more specifically, to their development. In his 1724-1728 inspection tour of the presidios of the provincias internas, Brigadier General Pedro de Rivera (1664?-1744) indicated in his report, or, proyecto85 that the aforementioned Conde de Moctezuma, viceroy from 1696 to 1701, had in fact created a flying company in 1698 at the insistence of then governor of Coahuila, Francisco Cuervo y Valdés, and the missionary fathers.86 Rivera stated that the company was established with a captain and thirty-two soldiers; its function was to defend the missions along the Río Grande. The missionaries were to decide where the company was to be stationed, which they did. A barracks was built so close to the mission of San Juan Bautista that

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84 This study will consider the Reglamentos of 1729 and 1772 and compare these sets of regulations with that of the Instrucciones of 1786 in order to ascertain the key differences and subtle changes that emerged from the deployment of viceregal edicts among the colonial inhabitants and the military personnel affected by their content.

85 Naylor and Polzer indicate that Rivera entitled the compilation of his three-and-a-half year inspection tour of the provincial presidios, Año de 1728 Proyecto, which in Spanish law had the connotation of a preliminary report or provisional policy that set down the circumstances of a contract or treaty. The Proyecto is composed of three estados, or, statuses; the first, conveys the status of the presidios as Rivera found them. The second is a brief account of immediate reforms implemented by Rivera at each presidio, and the third essentially summarizes his recommendations for reform and conveys his expectations for each presidio’s future existence. Compiled thus, the Proyecto inspired the thinking of Viceroy Juan de Acuña, Marques de Casafuertes and its content – especially that contained in the third estado – would underpin his eventual Reglamento de 1729 that was the expected result from the Rivera inspection. These regulations differed from the earlier 1719 Reglamento de Habana in that the ordinances that governed military life in the Caribbean could not be so easily rewritten to suit the needs of the mainland frontier. Rivera knew the territory by firsthand experience. Thomas H. Naylor and Charles W. Polzer, S.J., Pedro Rivera and the Military Regulations for Northern New Spain, 1724-1729. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1988.

86 Rivera, Informe y proyecto, tercer estado, artículo cincuenta
the soldiers could hear the Indians praying.\textsuperscript{87} Foreshadowing the destitution experienced by presidial soldiers and, in this case, \textit{volante} troops throughout the colonial frontier at various times, the barracks constituted the entirety of what the flying company could call their own since the missionaries denied them both land and water from the nearest stream. The missionaries indicated that both belonged to the Indians and their deprivations fueled the indignation of the soldiers who then presented their case in a memorandum to Inspector Rivera. However, he took no action since the company was the responsibility of the missionaries, and thus Rivera indicated to Viceroy Moctezuma that he should resolve the matter.\textsuperscript{88}

In three separate articles of the Third Status [\textit{estado}] of his \textit{Proyecto}, Rivera describes the conditions that led to the creation of the flying squadrons, and highlights the disparities between what these units actually engaged in during day-to-day activities and what their assigned tasks were at the time of their emergence in the borderlands. For instance, in Article 51, Rivera states that

\textit{Al tiempo que se creó la citada compañía, se hallaba el real erario con algunas estrecheces, por lo que se discurrió que en todos los presidios que entonces existían, se prorratease la cantidad que a cada uno de los soldados de ellos tocase, hasta la concurrente a los fondos que para la manutención de dicha nueva compañía se necesitase a razón de 300 pesos cada soldado y 500 pesos al capitán al año, de cuyo modo y con el dicho sueldo se han mantenido y mantienen sin que les falte cosa alguna de las que necesitan para su ministerio; cuya circunstancia agregada a la de haber sido los religiosos misioneros quienes señalaron el paraje para su asistencia, ha persuadido a la vulgaridad, que el rey cedió el derecho de dicha compañía en los religiosos por haberse abrogado algunos la propiedad de ella [..]}\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid \textit{“[...] creó el señor conde de Moctezuma el año de 1698 [...] una compañía nombrada volante [...] a fin de defender las misiones que inmediatas al río Grande del Norte se pusieron, mandando que dichos religiosos misioneros señalsen el sitio donde habían de habitar aquellos soldados [...] dándoselo tan inmediato a la misión de San Juan Baptista [sic], que del cuartel más distante se oye el rezo de las indias de ella.”}

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid

\textsuperscript{89} At the time that the flying company was created, the royal treasury had some shortages by what they came up with in all the presidios that existed then; the wages of each one of the soldiers, up until the current ones, stationed at all the presidios were divided proportionately so that the necessary funds were available to pay each soldier of the flying company 300 pesos and its captain 500 pesos. In this way, members of the company have maintained and continue to maintain themselves and they lack not one thing for their necessities. These circumstances, along with that [circumstance, situation], of it having been the missionaries whom indicated the spot for their assistance, have
The descriptor “flying [volante]” proved dissatisfying for Rivera and, in one of the most remarkable entries in the Proyecto, he provided compelling reasons for the inappropriateness of the term. Further, Rivera suggested several ways to ameliorate the problems that such nomenclature produced in the compañía. He was especially focused on usage of the land and the ways in which the soldiers charged with protecting the territory could beneficially manifest the king’s instructions and thus facilitate governance of the presidio system. Consequently, Article 52 stressed the significance of land as the locus for control and social cohesion among the frontier’s inhabitants; as a mechanism for maintaining order, it had the potential to redirect the efforts of the soldiers towards carrying out the wishes of the King. Rivera indicates that

_A dicha compañía de que trato, la titulen ‘volante,’ porque fuera de que la impropiedad de este nombre deslustra aquellas armas, ha hecho tanta fuerza que para que al referido nombre corresponda el ejercicio, quieren que aquellos soldados incesantemente anden vagando, para que no teniendo lugar destinado en qué hacer mansión, se verifique lo ‘volante’ de dicha compañía, y siendo esto, opuesto al fin con que se erigió, que fue el de defender aquellas misiones y pacificar la tierra, libertándola de los indios enemigos que la insultaban, discurría yo, convenir mucho el que vuestra excelencia [Viceroy Casafuertes] mandase no se titular en lo de adelante con el referido nombre de ‘volante’ dicha compañía, sino ‘presidio’ como los demás de aquella naturaleza; hacienda público, en utilidad de aquellos soldados, que los caudales de que se pagan sus sueldos son de la real hacienda y que no se mantienen de ruego y encargo, como muchos piensan [my single quotation marks throughout] ⁹⁰

In Article 52 of the Proyecto, Rivera called attention to the literal waywardness of the flying company – incessantly wandering about, with the connotation of being directionless – and, he also divulged the lack of discipline of its members. However, even if the volantes’ behavior was unintentional, he suggested what he perceived to be the confused state of the unit as they attempted to reconcile the demands of the missionaries who oversaw their activities with their purported assigned duties. Apparently, since the captain of the volante company gave Rivera a report addressing these very issues, it may have seemed appropriate for the soldiers to simply appease

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⁹⁰ Rivera, _Informe y proyecto, tercer estado, artículo cincuenta y dos_
the missionaries in the meantime, even though it meant failing to adhere to their assigned duties as enumerated in an as yet unknown original order from the Viceroy. These obligations included protecting the missions (and, as we shall see, the missionaries abused this responsibility by requiring the soldiers to do much more than guard duty); pacifying the land; and, finally, ridding the area of the enemy Indians who infested it. Rivera stated that the company lacked nothing in the way of necessities and, though landless, lived off their subsidy.91

Rivera goes so far as to suggest to Viceroy Casafuertes that it would be a good idea, from that moment forward, that the name ‘volante’ not be applied to the company, but instead ‘presidio’, like the rest of the other garrisons. Moreover, in terms of its soldiers, Rivera advised widely publicizing that their salaries were paid by the royal treasury, not by request or commission as so many thought.92 Rivera took his argument one step further by indicating to Casafuertes that if the Viceroy ordered the governor of Coahuila to appoint a qualified person to mark the boundaries of the missions on their eastern borders – because of a surplus of land under ecclesiastical control there – the soldiers could then be assigned the lands to the west and north of the river, to include the water from the aforementioned spring without causing any prejudicial loss to the missions. Stressing the element of land holdings, Rivera reasoned that because the missionaries had ample land and water from Nogales that supplied their needs, the soldiers would similarly have land and water to supply their needs. Moreover, Rivera’s final comment on this issue, acknowledging the quandary faced by the troops of the compañía volante in this particular locale, reasserted the fact that the land of the company belonged to the king and no one else.93

91 Ibid
92 Ibid
93 […] y si pareciere justo a vuestra excelencia, se podría mandar así mismo, que el gobernador de […] Coahuila pasara a aquel paraje e hiciera medir, por persona inteligente, las tierras que por el rumbo opuesto pertenecen a aquellas misiones, que siendo come es, por el del este tienen muchas mas de las que necesitan, con lo cual se pudieran apropiar a dichos soldados todas las que están a la parte del oeste y al norte de aquel río […] por que con esto tuvieran el alivio de gozar tierra y agua propia para sus menesteres, que en ello no se hiciera agravio ni daño a las misiones, pues tienen muchas tierras y el agua de los Nogales que es competentísima para sus menesteres, y se conociera, dando esta providencia, que la propiedad de aquella compañía y de las tierras la tiene el rey y no otra persona. Rivera, Informe y proyecto, tercer estado, artículo cincuenta y dos
Economic realities underscored the often contentious relationships between the military and the missionaries with limited farming opportunities contributing to their interactions. As de la Teja has stated, what little market economy existed in Colonial Texas relied heavily on meeting the needs of the presidio. Soon after the Canary Islanders arrived at San Antonio de Béjar in 1731, they complained to the Viceroy that the presidio commanders and missionaries were conspiring to prevent the sale of Isleño corn to the garrisons. Thereafter, a viceregal order forced the presidios to purchase the Islanders’ crops in preference to that of the missions; in turn, the missionaries were successful at preventing the settlers (a group that included many former soldiers) from gaining access to indigenous labor.94 Civilian ranchers also complained that the missions had not only appropriated excessive amounts of land -- in order to prevent settlers from establishing viable ranches -- but that they had laid claim to the descendants of animals originally brought to the province by the colonists.95

In two additional articles of his Proyecto, Rivera notes that each of the four missions, including the two at San Antonio, employed two soldiers of the flying company as overseers [mayordomos de las labranzas]. Since this type of work was not appropriate for soldiers [así por ser aquella ocupación ajena de su ministerio] and because the king should not pay soldiers not in his service, Rivera encouraged the Viceroy to correct the abuse. Furthermore, Rivera affirmed that sufficient Indians remained at the missions who could perform the same task, and if the missionaries complained about the loss of the soldiers – fearing that their absence would result in the loss of control of the neophytes and thus the missions – the Viceroy should pay no attention to their rumblings. Indeed, Rivera was certain that any of the many people in the area could work as overseers if given a piece of land on which to plant their crops [pudiera ejecutar cualquier hombre pobre, de los muchos que por aquellas inmediaciones asisten, de lo que no se eximirán dándoles un pedazo de tierra para sembrar su milpa]. 96

95 Ibid
96 Rivera, Informe y proyecto, tercer estado, artículo cincuenta y tres
Anticipating that a rebuff was forthcoming from the missionaries, Rivera devotes Articles 54 and 55 to responses directly aimed at the abuses of the flying companies by the religious orders. Ever conciliatory, at least to a point, Rivera acknowledged that the *padres* might argue that the four missions should have two soldiers apiece, as did those at Adaes and Texas. Further, he responded that the latter two missions were isolated and that no Indians lived there and thus the missionaries should be accompanied and protected by two soldiers. However, he did not extend the same privilege to the two missions near the presidio of San Antonio since the *volantes* up to the time of the inspection served the *padres* as overseers, violating their duty to the Crown and, perhaps more seriously, to the army. Clearly the most compelling reasons for his advice to the Viceroy were to ensure that the soldiers were fulfilling their true assignment [*pues con esto cumplirán con los efectos de su destino*]. The notion of military units honoring their duties in the service of the Spanish crown may have only recently emerged in the forefront of Rivera’s thinking after his inspection of the presidios; he was certainly familiar with the *Reglamento de Habana* of 1719 and the King’s opening statement that expressed dissatisfaction with the garrison’s preparation for action, and the lack of the proper order required for its military discipline [*la guarnición de la Habana no esté reglada en el pie y buen orden que se requiere para su disciplina militar*]. Indeed, in its first twenty-five articles, the 1719 regulations mention not a word regarding soldiers’ conduct and personal behavior on, or off, the battlefield.

In Article 55 of his *Proyecto*, Rivera continued to insist that the eight soldiers employed at the four missions under scrutiny should rejoin the flying company, which assignment would fill out the ranks of a troop that had only thirty-two men. Rivera reiterates that their transfer would also have the soldiers carrying out their duties and not forget the service and obedience they owed to their officers [*con lo cual se impusieran los soldados en lo que es de su obligación y no olvidarán por las distancia de sus oficiales el servicio y la obediencia que deben observar*].

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97 Rivera, *Informe y proyecto, tercer estado, artículo cincuenta y cuatro*
98 Ibid
99 Rivera, *Informe y proyecto, tercer estado, artículo cincuenta y cinco*
While he conducted his inspection, he noticed that one of its soldiers spent a year and a half at the mission of Punta de Lampazos, located in Nuevo León, fifty leagues from the Rio Grande; for Brigadier Rivera, this was yet another reason which this mission should not have been assigned two soldiers. He took special note of the fact that the missions of La Candela (located 44 miles east of Monclova) and Santiago (28 miles southeast of Monterey) had no soldiers to assist them, yet they survived without them being necessary [no tienen soldados que las asistan y se conservan sin que les sean necesarios].

The presidial company was a colonial entity comprised of troops whom were neither Iberian regular soldiers, nor members of a colonial militia, or, civilians occasionally mobilized for military service. The *presidiales* were most often stationed at a strategically situated fort in hostile territory and, as Moorhead indicates, were largely enlisted from the frontier region itself for one or more terms of ten years; they had arms, equipment and followed regulations separate from the *ordenanzas* governing the so-called regular army. But even that criteria needed to be judiciously deployed since various other military groups on the frontier – *compañías veteranas* (regular army companies), *compañías volantes* (“flying” companies), and *compañías milicianas* (militia companies) – often performed the same types of services. Moreover, the *compañía presidial* was distinct from the *compañía volante* in that the former garrisoned a fixed, fortified, and strategic position and did perform surveillance duty, but only directed at the adjacent terrain and with the sole purpose of intercepting invading groups or individuals. In both cases, in the northern frontier presidial soldiers were required to preserve the tranquility of the region and were deemed capable of resisting the invasion of a tribe of Indians. Performing their assigned tasks, the men of these companies were expected to be daring and display physical fortitude -- more than fighting effort -- in order to defeat the intermittent and unexpected attacks by native communities. These expectations were often met by those soldiers capable of adapting to the rigorous demands of

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100 Ibid [my translation and the author’s]
101 Moorhead 179
presidial life and the unique challenges presented by an often inhospitable terrain. Just as often, colonial borderlands military men failed to meet the requirements of life on the frontier and escaped lives of deprivations and debt through misbehavior, desertion, and, sometimes, death.

Where it concerned the presidios at both, La Bahía del Espíritu Santo and San Antonio de Béxar, attacks by hostile Indians were frequent enough, and of such regularity that it was necessary to draw reinforcements from the soldier populations at other nearby presidios. In one instance, the governor of Téjas, the municipal judge, and council members of the villa of San Fernando and its presidio at San Antonio expressed their fears to the commandante general of the Apache incursions upon their horse herds and their mission. Because the Apache rancherías were “warlike and numerous,” the community’s leaders argued that the garrison of the presidio was not sufficient to repel their attacks. The auditor of war Oliván Rebolledo agreed with the governor and suggested that the San Antonio garrison, which consisted of only 43 soldiers, needed to increase its force by twenty-five men, possibly recruited from the presidio at La Bahía (del Espíritu Santo); or, that reinforcements be augmented by soldiers from the Presidio of Los Adaes, with its 60 men serving only as a barrier force against the French in nearby Louisiana.103

As we shall see, this necessity for an increased force augmented from nearby and distant garrisons would be a recurring dilemma for the borderlands presidios. These types of increases often met with resistance from commanders only too eager to convey their disapproval to higher authorities of the chronic brokering and borrowing of valuable soldiers. Stopgap measures surfaced: Captain Joseph [sic] Urrutia, extremely familiar with the Apaches and their lifeways, was dispatched to serve as captain of the San Antonio presidio and, because of his seven years of experience living among the nation, to seek a peace treaty with the belligerent Apaches.104 In the case of the compañías volantes, these units were headquartered at a village or town behind the

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103 Rebolledo’s opinion […] attack by Apaches, […] Casafuerte’s order to Urrutia […], BA July 18, 1733. Viceroy Casafuertes made it clear that once the “engagement and duties for which [Captain Urrutia] […] were accomplished,” Urrutia was to order the auxiliary soldiers to return to their own presidios without delay. Moreover, this provision was reiterated twice in the same letter suggesting that Casafuertes may have supposed that the recalcitrant Apaches would be quickly and efficiently brought under control.

104 Casafuerte decree via Áviles, BA July 24, 1733.
presidial line, they patrolled the roads, and more aggressively pursued those hostiles who managed to penetrate the first line of defense. But, the likelihood of transfers drawn from their number remained a possibility, too.

1.3 The Reglamento of 1729 – Rivera Inspects the Compañías Volantes

In 1728, when Brigadier Pedro de Rivera had completed his three year tour of the presidios in the Provincias Internas, he produced a lengthy report on its conditions and provided recommendations for their improvement. The report was divided into three sections, or, estados; the first, dealt with the state in which the presidios existed before the visit; the second, the changes put into place after Rivera’s visit; and, finally, the state in which the presidios and its occupants were to remain so that, in the service of the King, the most effective role of the military could be carried out. The earliest report by Rivera of a flying company occurs in the primer estado of the 1729 reglamento; after nearly two months spent on the inspection of the presidio at Nayarit, the Rivera entourage returned to Zacatecas for five weeks before continuing on to Durango. This report provides compelling insight into the performance of the soldiers of this type of squadron which consisted of fifteen soldiers that had been detached from the squadron in Valle de San Bartolomé, located to the north near Parral. They were there for the security and protection of Durango, governed by the capitulares [members of the Durango cabildo, or town council]; and since the detachment had the name/title of ‘flying squadron’ and was without a determined place for its assignment, the soldiers wandered/went about always dispersed, except when the

Para guardia y custodia de aquella ciudad, gobernada por los capitulares de ella; y como tenía el título de escuadra volante, sin lugar destinado para su asistencia, andaban siempre dispersos los soldados, menos cuando los capitulares los empleaban en efectos de sus intereses, necesidad los impelía, que entonces de cumplimiento lo ejecutaban, sin que jamás lograsen favorable acción contra los enemigos […]
This same squadron was then transferred to the presidio at Mapimí and placed under the direct authority of Sergeant Major José de Berroterán; since there was no corporal to command the soldiers, each did as he pleased. They wasted their salaries, their debts grew since they were charged the required goods at inflated prices; and they were victimized by profiteers. Rivera described the absence of someone to care for the soldiers’ weapons and other equipment needed to defend the presidio; that was the “unhappy” condition in which he found the Durango squadron, and since his time was spent separating the unit from the control of Mapimí and relocating it to a new site near the city, he remained in Durango until October 8, 1725.

The aforementioned soldiers detached from San Bartolomé came from the flying company based there and known by that name. In early 1726, after the disappointing visit to Durango, Rivera and his group made their way to San Bartolomé where he encountered thirty soldiers, commanded by the captain of its presidio, all charged with guarding the passes in its vicinity. All of these volante men lived dispersed, but unlike the soldiers at Durango, the Bartolomé unit housed themselves throughout the settlement of more than 200 people. Most of these members of the flying squadron worked as carriers of documents that the governor dispatched to his correspondents in order to pay back the many debts they had previously contracted with him. Thus, just as the prices rose for the goods of their necessities, so did the level of vices pursued in that region. Furthermore, for years the compañía volante functioned only to provide escorts from their presidio to that of Cerrogordo.

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capitulares employed them for their own interests, lest the soldiers waste their time in personal affairs. The soldiers spent little time on their assigned jobs unless necessity impelled them to discharge their duties; then, when they did, they never gained favorable action against the enemy and therefore they retreated with shameful disgrace. Rivera, Informe y proyecto, primer estado, artículo dos [Translation: mine and authors]

110 Ibid
111 Ibid 74
112 Rivera, Informe y proyecto, primer estado, artículo siete
By the time Rivera had finished his inspection of all the presidios and was at the third stage of his comprehensive report, he was prepared to offer suggestions for the future and ongoing status of each locale. Having witnessed the disarray of the San Bartolomé flying squadron, he indicated in no uncertain terms that its soldiers were unaccustomed to military service, unlike the soldiers of the other presidios, and their laziness encouraged them to indulge in vices [no están acostumbrados a hacer el servicio, como los soldados de los demás presidios, se entretienen en ociosidades que más les ayudan a entregarse en vicios]. The fact that the squadron was established not to protect the town but, rather, to reconnoiter and patrol the surrounding area did not diminish the reality of the company not fulfilling its assigned mission; indeed, when the company was kept outside the town, the area was not subject to harassment by Indians. Rivera noted that the flying company’s status and its disregard of its responsibilities over the previous fifteen years – such was the length of its dysfunction – could be remedied. 113 He recommended disbanding the company and using its members to found a presidio at Atotonilco, located about fourteen leagues from San Bartolomé. The site was well suited, not only because of its abundant pasture for herds, but also for blocking enemy invasions. Rather than allow the governors of the provincias to appoint and dismiss captains as they saw fit, Rivera recommended that a captain named by the viceroy and confirmed by the king be installed to command the presidio, as had been done at other presidios. 114

In another episode mentioning the borderlands flying squadrons, Rivera reported that when the compañía volante was created, and ten of its soldiers were sent to assist the missions of San Juan Bautista, San Bernardo, del Peyote, and Punta de Lampazos, it was because he discovered that the missionaries lived in total solitude; that situation changed only when many Indians arrived

113 Rivera, Informe y proyecto, tercer estado, artículo trece
114 Ibid
to accompany them. Rivera does not indicate which indigenous communities represented the most recent arrivals, or, whether they sought peace, but he does reveal the small number of soldiers comprising the compañía volante – thirty two – and thus the importance of their necessary return to their company rather than remaining with the missionaries. Moreover, Rivera was quick to point out that it was important for the volante soldiers to remember their obligations, and to never forget their service and obedience, to their military duties which had to be observed even if their commanding officers were at some distance.

1.4 FRANCISCO AMANGUAL: FROM THE IBERIAN PENINSULA TO COLONIAL MEXICO

Ordered to head the 1808 expedition by Commandante General Nemesio Salcedo, Amangual received the instructions for the expedition from Governor Antonio Cordero y Bustamante of Texas who, in the previous month, suggested a reconnaissance of soldiers through the territory along the Texas-New Mexico boundary. At sixty-nine, Amangual was apparently considered essential to leading the journey and capable of enduring the rough terrain of the wilderness and across the llano. Title Thirteen and its eight articles of the Royal Regulations of 1772 explicitly stated the duties of the presidial captain. Where it concerned filling the ranks of the presidios, these officers were to give the closest attention to the recruits, denying entry into military service to sickly or weak individuals, and to not excuse the most minute fault in the health, hardiness, and resolution of each soldier. However, it is important to understand Amangual’s

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115 “[...] cuando el motive que concurrió para que en la creación de dicha Compañía Volante, se asistieran a las referidas cuatro misiones con diez soldados de ella, fue el de que hiciesen compañía a aquellos religiosos que se hallaban en total soledad, la que al presente ha cesado por tener las citadas cuatro misiones muchos indios que a los padres acompañen; [...] razón que me persuade sería conveniente el que los soldados que les asisten, se retirasen al cuerpo de la referida Compañía Volante, que le serán muy del caso por el corto número de treinta y dos que la compone;” Rivera, Informe y proyecto, tercer estado, artículo 55

116 Ibid


118 Ibid.

119 Reglamento...1772, Título trece, artículo cinco.
previous military experience in order to shed light upon his significance in relation to the emergence of a distinct type of identity forged from the escapades of the frontier flying squadrons. The *volantes* enhanced the patrol of the large open spaces of the *tejano/nuevo mexicano/coahuilense* geographic configuration, and their engagement -- on many levels -- with the local populations and their methods at restructuring authority within the ranks of the company’s members foregrounds their status as a borderlands management unit. Analyzing his interchanges with indigenous communities, earlier historians indicate that Amangual was “no novice around Indians,” since he recognized the signs of their presence: stampedes, strange riders on hilltops, strange visitors in camp for no particular reason.\(^{120}\) A precautionary approach underscored his behavior in the field, he used his scouts effectively since he understood the value of Indian guides, and his leadership skills extended towards members of his squadron by having troops inspect their firearms, and, by reminding his soldiers of the laws and penalties for infractions. It is helpful to think of Francisco Amangual as a loyal defender of the colonial regime even as that imperial apparatus began to erode during its twilight years.

Francisco Amangual was born on the island of Majorca in 1739 and entered the army of Carlos Borbón III in 1762, towards the conclusion of the Seven Years War (1756-1763), and then served in the rank of private and corporal for eleven years, five months, and twenty-seven days. Fragments of his military service are well known to earlier scholars of borderlands military history. He served for two years in the Batavian Regiment of Dragoons, attained the rank of sergeant on May 30, 1774, and then served the remaining fourteen years, eight months, and 26 days in the Spanish Regiment of Dragoons. He distinguished himself in a cavalry company in the Sonora Expedition of 1767-71, which preceded his transfer to the far northeast frontier. In September of

\(^{120}\) Loomis and Nasatir, 509
1779, as a second lieutenant (alférez), he was stationed at the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, and in 1784 assumed the responsibility of paymaster of the Béxar Company.\footnote{C.E. Castañeda, \textit{Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-1936}, v.4. (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones Company, 1942); Muñoz, military service records of Francisco Amangual, BA December, 1793} Traveling from Coahuila to Texas to begin their new assignment, Amangual and the recently appointed Policarpo Prada, a former sergeant from the dragoon regiment in Spain\footnote{Croix to Cabello, […] arrival of Francisco Amangual [and Prada, Urena, and Borra to] Béxar, BA Sept 16, 1779}, were accompanied by Mariano Ureña, also a former member of the same dragoon regiment. Prada would later become the second alférez of the \textit{tropa ligera}\footnote{Moorhead provides the best description of the soldiers comprising this newly created military unit. The \textit{tropa ligera} or “light troops” emerged from Croix’s disbanding of the Catalanian company of musketeers (Compañía de Voluntarios de Cataluña) and two \textit{compañías volantes} from Sonora which Bucareli had recruited and thereafter distributed as personnel among the presidios located in Sonora, New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Coahuila. The troop differed from the traditional, heavily armed \textit{soldados de cuera} (the so-called ‘soldiers of leather,’ named for a particular type of leather-padded jacket worn to thwart arrow penetration) in that they were armed with only a musket, two pistols, and a short sword, forsaking the lance and leather armor and shield which the \textit{Reglamento} of 1772 had specified. The light troopers needed only three horses instead of the regulation seven, and in order to save these for battle he would perform their long marches on muleback; in rugged terrain, and now minus the lance, they would dismount and fight on foot. Moorhead, 82-83.} at present-day Goliad’s La Bahía del Espíritu Santo\footnote{Roster of the cavalry company of the Royal Presidio of La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, BA December 1, 1780} whereas Ureña became first sergeant at Béxar under Amangual.\footnote{Croix to Cabello, […] arrival of Francisco Amangual [and Prada, Urena, and Borra to] Béxar, BA Sept 16, 1779} On September 16, 1779 Prada and Ureña were joined by Francisco Borra, and Felipe Ferrero, the latter – a native of Turin, in what is today Italy -- appointed second corporal (\textit{cabo}), to the presidio at Béxar.\footnote{Ibid} All of the troops, Amangual included, experienced increased debt due to poor governance, continued hardship, and a decrease in assistance in spite of an apparent ready and abundant supply of provisions available in the province.\footnote{Croix to Cabello, […] accounts [of] Amangual, Prada, Ureña, Borra, and Ferrero, Dec 26, 1779} Privations in many areas of military life were an aspect of the life of all soldiers, irrespective of their particular unit designation, and it appears that the ‘frontier’ offered no quick remedy to chronically harsh conditions.
At one point, in Nov 11 1779, deductions from Amangual’s pay were necessary but the reasons for the withholdings – most likely for repayment of debts owed -- were not overtly indicated when compared to those applied to the salaries of two other company members, Third Sergeant Mariano Verena, charged with fifty-five pesos; and, Corporal Felipe Ferrero, eighty-three pesos, four reales. However, a December 26 letter written by Croix to Domingo Cabello indicates the reasons for the incursion of the debts; the *commandante general* cites the “state of bad government” under which he found the troops, noting their “continued hardship and by the proportional decrease in assistance,” as compared to the “abundance of provisions in the province” under Cabello’s command.128 Amangual, Verena, and Ferrero had arrived on Oct 30 and then, on the following day, they were assigned to their respective positions as delineated in articles three, four, and five of *tratado dos, título* 25, Book 1 of the Royal Regulations. The company’s captain indicated that he was “astonished at the obligations of these men”; while specific reasons for deductions to Amangual’s pay do not emerge, those of the other two men are carefully noted.129

In a 1779 letter to Croix, Captain Domingo Cabello indicates that it was “necessary to furnish Sergeant Verena a coat, trousers, and hat to complete the uniform worn by these troops.” Apparently, it was also necessary to “furnish Verena a sword, for he had none, not even a saber.”130 For his part, the forty-one year old Italian sword cutler Ferrero had signed his affiliation papers, and effectively documented his understanding of the requirements and penalties associated with his duties and agreed to be bound by its terms.131 The Royal Regulations of 1772 mandated presidial soldier costuming, a uniform that consisted of a short jacket of blue woolen cloth with a small cuff, red collar, underwear of blue wool [tripe], a cloth cap of the same color, a cartridge

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128 Ibid
129 Cabello to Croix, [...] instructions for handling accounts [of] Amangual [...], November 1, 1779
130 Ibid
131 Ibid
pouch, and a leather jacket. Significantly, each soldier was to wear a bandoleer of chamois embroidered with the name of the presidio in order to distinguish one from the other, a back kerchief, sombrero, shoes, and leggings. The regulations of 1772 required the captain to hold regular inspections of the soldiers’ costuming and, furthermore, it was his responsibility to provide soldiers with any articles of clothing should the need arise. The paymaster, a role that Amangual would soon assume, was in charge of having a sufficient reserve of “every type of item,” and the paymaster was to ensure its confirmation to the aforementioned specifications. According to Title Four of the Royal Regulations, where it concerned armament and mounts, the weapons of the presidial soldier consisted of a broad sword, lance, shield, musket, and pistols. The sword, described as “the same size and style as that used by other mounted men of the king’s armies,” had a lance head measuring 32.48 centimeters in length [thirteen and a half inches] and an inch and a half wide. The shield was not to vary from those that were used at that time and the musket and pistols were reserved for “horsemen,” and were to include “Spanish-style locks”; both weapons were to be .66 calibre with the mechanisms for the locks of the “best temper” in order to resist the heat, or, intensity [violencia] of the sun.

1.5 Horses and Soldier-Equestrians

Both Verena and Ferrero needed mules as well, and section five of the Regulations indicated that each soldier was to have six “serviceable” horses to include one colt, and one mule for a total of seven animals. In order to ensure the serviceability of all horses, it was the captain’s responsibility to disallow any animal into service that was incapable of enduring the greatest fatigue. In other regional spaces of the late eighteenth century borderlands, similar approaches

132 Reglamento de 1772, Título tercero, vestuario
133 Ibid, Título catorce, Obligaciones y nombramiento del habilitado
134 Ibid, Título cuarto, Armamento y montura
135 Ibid
to the use of horses existed. One historian has indicated that the typical Californio would make certain to take several horses on a journey in order to ensure that a fresh mount was available for distance travel and therefore neither horses nor food were ever lacking on any journey. Similarly, the Californio ranchero could train a horse to stay with its own group of horses, known as a caballada, and that their number could be further separated by color. Contemporaneous observers witnessed vaqueros spending much of the workday rounding up wild horses to replenish their own strings of saddle stock. These animals were specifically selected for two distinct types of labor: ranch work, as well as the vaquero’s own personal herds. The roundups, conducted in groups of eight to twelve men, included skillful maneuvers with reatas and lassoes, and often involved a measure of harsh treatment towards the animals.136 Since the compañías volantes were composed of equestrians and given that the physical toughness and stamina of many of the troops who populated the frontier presidios was acknowledged by unit commanders, some of these soldiers may have come from lives involved with ranching and cattle herding. If so, the men were “neither elite troops nor raw recruits, but hard bitten, home-grown vaqueros who were at ease in the saddle,” and capable of a life in the open range. Moreover, they were accustomed to the tactical maneuvers of their equals on horseback, the equestrian-warriors of hostile indigenous groups.137

During the fall of 1777, Commandante Inspector José de Rubio became aware of the trading and selling of horses by the soldiers – in the presidios and the flying companies – among themselves and with the civilians. In a pointed directive to Governor Ripperdá, he ordered officers under his command to be vigilant about unauthorized transactions and to immediately end them.

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136 Ramirez 76
137 Moorhead actually states, “accustomed to the cruel and unconventional tactics of Indian warfare.” He does not define precisely what those tactics are and, in any event, documentary evidence points to the comparable talents of the Comanche and Apache horsemen and Spanish and mestizo riders; therefore, my rewording. Moorhead 178
Horses involved in these activities could be seized and two months worth of bonuses would be rescinded.\textsuperscript{138} 

In 1785, Commandante General José Antonio Rengel suggested to Governor Domingo Cabello that, in view of the scarcity of horses for remounts in Nuevo Santander and Nuevo León, the next most feasible source for augmenting horses for Texas were troops that could be dispatched to capture mustangs on the expansive plains of the region.\textsuperscript{139} Rengel encouraged the governor (who also served as captain of his presidio) to put the plan into practice by provisioning the number of men ready to make the roundups \textit{corridas} and, as salaried tamers \textit{domadores}, to work with the animals until they were prepared enough for use by the troops. The General issued very specific instructions concerning which type of horses were to be chosen – new and useful horses only, leaving in the field old and ‘irreducible’ animals, mares of all ages, and colts running at their feet. Those horses were to remain wild in order to ensure the continued propagation of the herds. The value of these remnant horses was reiterated by Rengel since his orders to Cabello included the stipulation that private citizens were not to destroy the animals and only \textit{hacendados} and rancheros could take young horses from the field when they attempted to form droves.

Service to the King and the interests of the public good served as the guiding principle underscoring the roundup of horses and their taming; violators were to be jailed with the result that any mustangs caught were forfeited and that number would be applied to the mustang allotment. For the expenses incurred in paying riders, tamers, and others involved in the roundup, credit and compensation for the value of the horses came from the Mesteñas Fund. Rengel encouraged frequent roundups with an emphasis on the taming of wild horses, with their subsequent incorporation into the herds at Béjar or in the immediate vicinity. Under no circumstances were

\textsuperscript{138} Rubio to Ripperdá, BA October 14, 1777; (copy certified by Ripperdá, January 15, 1778).

\textsuperscript{139} Rengel to Cabello, […] mounts for Texas soldiers […] horses are scarce in Santander […], BA August 17, 1785
the capturing and taming of mustangs to supersede the primary duties and responsibilities of the soldiers.\textsuperscript{140}

However, in the colonial borderlands, the practicality (at least, from the soldier’s perspective) of having a sufficient allotment of horses might be questioned by administrators for the viceroy and, subsequently, official inquiry required a critically informed, but, respectful response by presidio captains. Five years earlier, in November of 1780, Colonel Domingo Cabello, governor of Tejas, scrutinized the twenty articles of a new plan developed by Teodor de Croix which outlined the system of maintaining allotments of horses in the field for the frontier troops. In it, Croix proposed a system for coralling horses and mules at the presidio’s stables. At this time, the fifth and six articles of Title Four of the \textit{Reglamentos} of 1772 were still in place where it concerned mounts and their maintenance.\textsuperscript{141} Commandant General Croix had sent an official letter on April 3 of that same year, a document that did not demand adherence but asked only that Cabello be impartial in his response. Cabello, assuming the utmost, if not exaggerated, deference to his superior, asserted his failure to comprehend so important a matter and that his limited talents disallowed for his response to carry any force with the General since, as he indicates in self-effacing prose, he lacked the method necessary for his opinion to prevail. However, Cabello indicated to Croix his awareness of the General’s desire to know whether all presidios could be governed by general or specific rules for the greatest economy, and effectiveness, where it concerned their internal management.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{140}Ibid
\textsuperscript{141}Reglamentos…1772, Título cuarto, armamento y montura, artículo cinco: Cada soldado ha de tener existentes seis caballos, un potro, y una mula, no permitiendo el capitán que se conserve ninguno que no pueda resistir la mayor fatiga. Artículo seis: Cada soldado de los existentes en la guarnición ha de tener uno de sus caballos de día y noche atado, mantenido con foriage, y ensillado, y de esta observancia hago especialmente responsable al capitán y demás oficiales de la compañía, por la importancia de acudir prontamente la tropa a cualquiera salida intempestiva, rebato de enemigos, ó urgente socorro.
\textsuperscript{142}Cabello to Croix, Report on plan to reduce army mounts […] stables inside the presidio, BA November 1, 1780
By expressing his appreciation and respect for the discretion demonstrated by Croix in adhering to system-wide regulations extant at the presidios of La Bahía del Espíritu Santo and San Antonio de Béjar, Cabello thus felt emboldened enough – or, at least, felt he had deferred sufficiently enough to his supervisor -- to offer his opinion on the changes to the horse maintenance system suggested by the Commandante General. Croix had offered but two alternatives to Cabello: the first, was that all troops continue to be allowed to retain seven horses and one mule; the second, whether two horses and one mule should be kept at the presidios’ stables. Cabello argued that with the continuation of the former method, the provincia would survive for years, while the alternative option – by which the soldier would only have two horses and one mule at his disposal – would result in the total collapse of the presidio. The governor reasoned that too many hostile indigenous groups perpetually menaced the frontier and only the complete extermination of the hostiles would allow for a system by which the troops would need only two horses and one mule. Barring that approach, he contended that depleted herds would leave the citizens entirely exposed and that their land, cattle, sheep, horse and mules would be totally helpless in the face of enemy predations.

Arguing his point further, Governor Cabello deemed inadequate such a small allotment of animals needed by each soldier to alleviate the fatigue caused by defending the territories of the province. In his response, Cabello disclosed that astonishing numeric figure of horse allotments associated with the military and civilian population; in fact, he wondered if the same attacks and wholesale slaughter of provincial citizens could be perpetrated upon troops all along the presidial line. Moreover, Cabello had previous experience with scarcities among his troops and

143 Ibid
144 Ibid
145 Ibid
especially so where it concerned having the necessary weapons for defense of the co-mingled community. In late 1778, Croix became aware that the tropas ligeras at two of the Téjas presidios, La Bahía and Béjar, lacked the necessary armaments and made a request to the King, but in the interim requested that Cabello locate the guns in good condition; if serviceable guns were not available, Croix indicated that he would move forward with presumably another plan to acquire the weapons. The commandante general divulged that in the storehouses of the San Luis Potosí, new pistols awaited the troops of Coahuila. He told Cabello this information so that, thus informed, the governor’s disbursing officers [paymasters] of both presidios could, while collecting the funds for their respective presidios, find the decrees in the hands of the treasury officials who could then supply the officers with the necessary new guns.\textsuperscript{146}

Those troops numbered two thousand, two hundred and sixty-six men defending the line throughout, and this count was shown on Croix’s plan and regulation at the end of the sixth article out of the thirty five in the new project. Cabello asserted that the lack of people is what allowed the Indians to make what progress they attained by predations. Moreover, he argued that if the population increased at the presidios by twofold, then provisions for three horses and no mules could be put into effect, thus avoiding the incursions by the hostiles and, from a fiscal perspective, negating the triple cost expenditure required for the purchase of mules. Cabello’s letter indicates that the number of riding beasts at the San Antonio de Béjar presidio was 568, but that 1,742 were counted in the allotment, from the month of July 1780 until the date of his letter, since the citizens had included the animals kept on their ranches.\textsuperscript{147} So depleted was the availability of horses by February 1785, that Commandante General Rengel would have to intervene on Cabello’s behalf in order to acquire fresh remounts. Apparently, the governors of Nuevo León and Santander had

\textsuperscript{146} Croix to Cabello, distribution of arms to Béjar and La Bahía troops, BA December 18, 1778
\textsuperscript{147} Cabello to Croix, BA November 1, 1780
obstructed the completion of both, the Coahuila, and Texas, companies’ desperate need for horses so that war operations might continue.148

1.6 AMANGUAL’S TRANSFORMATION: CADET TO PAYMASTER

On March 18, 1780 while on detached service at Fort Cíbolo in present day Big Spring, Texas, Amangual and a party of timber cutters under his command discovered a substantial cache of tobacco. Rather than distributing this precious find to his fellow soldiers, he made inquiry to Domingo Cabello, Commandant General of the Croix Cavalry, as to what was to be done with the commodity. Weighing the package in order to ascertain its value proved a challenge since Amangual had no scale.149 Apparently, Amangual was not willing to deviate from the regulations dictating precise measurements of quantities of goods, a fact that may suggest Amangual’s honest character and moral rectitude. As it turns out, since the contraband tobacco consisted of eleven manojos and was found on the shore of the arroyo of El Cleto -- and given its perishable nature -- Croix directed Cabello to instruct Amangual to deliver the cache of tobacco to the revenue branch [Tobacco Department] dedicated to consumer goods and, more specifically, to its tobacco inspectors.150 Moreover, its “consumable quality” and salability was to be determined by qualified persons in the estanco; in this context, the estanco can be understood as a borderlands monopoly goods store. The store experts were to determine its value as an item for sale, and then the proceeds were to be subsequently distributed among all of the soldiers. Ultimately, Amangual was to be included in the proceeds of the sale, priced at two and one-fourth reales per pound.151

In 1786, upon the retirement of first alférez Marcelo Valdes, Domingo Cabello recommended Francisco Amangual to succeed Valdes citing Amangual’s “most senior” status and his “good qualifications” among the presidial soldiers at both Coahuila and Texas.152 As the “most

148 Rengel to Cabello, BA February 5, 1785
149 Cabello to Croix, requesting instructions […] contraband goods confiscated by […] Amangual (Amangual to Cabello), BA March 18, 1780
150 de Croix to Cabello, BA June 9, 1780
151 Ibid
152 Cabello to Ugarte y Loyola, transmitting […] Valdés’ […] retire from service […] Amangual to succeed Valdés, BA August 24,1786
senior” of the presidial officers of the Béxar company (a designation fulfilled by Amangual in the equivalent company in Coahuila) upon the retirement of Marcelo Valdés, Amangual, as a forty-seven year old second lieutenant, was in the most qualified position to move upward in rank.153 A 1785 letter from Commandante General José Rengel to Governor (of Texas) Domingo Cabello reminded commanders of a royal order of three years prior (May 21, 1782) indicating an alternative method to be observed in the promotions of officers of the volante companies as compared with those of presidios. If a captain of a flying squadron was a veteran, like others in the army, they were to be preferred in proposals for presidial companies over lieutenants of the same status; that is, veterans. Furthermore, volante lieutenants were privileged for career advancement for lieutenancies of presidios over first alferezes. However, first alferezes -- whether presidial, or, volante -- were to be considered without distinction, among the two types, according to their ability and qualifications for presidial and volante lieutenancies. Second alferezes in both classes were to succeed to the rank of first alferez – much as Amangual did in August 1786, upon the retirement of Marcelo Valdés154 – within their own companies and without the necessity of a nomination or dispatch.

The caveat to this latter vertical movement in rank was that it was understood that the second alferezes would have the most seniority in their class – presidial or volante—and within the province in which they were serving. However, this type of ascension in rank could not be made without an order from the Commandant General on prior notice and, in addition, second alferezes who by their greater seniority went to the first alferez position in other companies would have to obtain their dispatches in other vacancies. The purpose of this positioning of career advancement was to facilitate the nominating of subalterns for the rank of officer in order to serve in the provinces. Moreover, when vacancies occurred, the Governor of each province was directed

153 Ibid
154 Cabello to Ugarte, BA August 26, 1786
to send the respective company commander the scale of seniorities and the statement of merits of the officers chosen as candidates for the vacancy.  

There were certainly incentives for doing so. In August 1781, Carlos III decreed that all soldiers who had earned the pay of ninety reales de vellón, [made of billón, less than half silver; in other words, not a *real de plata*] per month and had served twenty-five years in the infantry, or, thirty in the cavalry and dragoons; or, who had received one hundred thirty-five reales at the rank of officer and had completed thirty-five years in total, according the royal decrees of Oct 4, 1776 and that of January 20, 1767; and, who had the ability to continue serving in the same units, preferring service to retirement, would enjoy the pay for which they qualified, but also be considered for an increase in the pay in the posts in which they served. Continuation of service constituted a high priority for imperial officials and commanding officers were encouraged to not only submit the respective qualifications but to, also, certify these merits – as were the soldiers themselves required to petition for these rewards – for issuance of the pay increases. Ironically, however, the king offered the same pay for retirement as for continuing in service. Moreover, pay increments were to cease when three conditions existed; as soon as soldiers obtained promotions to more highly paid posts in the regiments; on becoming officers actually in service in those regiments; or, on entering the royal infantry guard at the rank and benefits appointed for the most senior sergeants for their particular honor. In these cases, soldiers were not to go into retirement with a lesser salary than the increment that they had obtained.

155 Rengel to Cabello, BA September 15, 1785.
156 Neve to Cabello, transmitting royal order concerning merit raise for soldiers, BA December 19, 1783
157 Ibid. Neve’s letter conveying the Gálvez order of the king’s decree includes a brief discussion of what today we might refer to as health insurance benefits, indicating that during hospitalization, the soldiers would “have two-thirds of their entire benefits discounted to them, being assisted as is appropriate to [their] designation [rank] which shall be at least that of sergeant.” The king did not ignore the army’s regimental musicians either: drummers, kettledrummers, fifers, and trumpeters were never to achieve the rank of officers, even if they had served thirty-five years. But, they would be paid one hundred thirty-five *reales* a month having the rank of sergeant. The king did not abolish the favors he had previously conceded to this class according to the royal orders of December 19, 1779 and February 17, 1780.
1.7 The Royal Regulations of 1772 – Making an Army, the Presidio, and its Paymaster

The Royal Regulations of 1772 stated in Title Two, regarding “Footing, Pay, and Gratuities of the Presidial Companies,” that each of the presidios would consist of a captain, lieutenant, ensign, chaplain, and forty-three soldiers including a sergeant and two corporals, plus ten Indian scouts, from which one was to be chosen as corporal. 158 During this time period, the presidios of both, San Antonio de Béjar, and Sante Fé in New Mexico, were not included in the line of defense; the end of the Seven Years’ War transformed the borders across North America and further established the northern provinces of New Spain as an independent administrative – but still highly militarized – entity, the Provincias Internas. Governance came under the responsibility of a commandant general reporting directly to the Council of the Indies in Seville. 159 Therefore, key personnel in New Mexico and Texas included a captain (who, at both presidios, was also to be the Governor of either province), two lieutenants, an ensign, a chaplain, and, in Texas at the presidio of San Antonio de Bejar, seventy-seven soldiers. However, New Mexico’s unit included seventy-six soldiers (one less than in Texas), but both provinces had two sergeants and six corporals. 160 Title Two indicates that each of the fourteen presidios forming the corridor of the frontier (except that of La Bahía del Espíritu Santo), and the flying company (compañía volante) of the colony of Nuevo Santander -- today called Tamaulipas -- would remain in the same configuration, that is, on the same level as other units and, with the same privileges that it had always enjoyed. 161 However, the main difference described in the 1772 Reglamento that emerged between the presidios in Texas and New Mexico concerned the captain of the flying company at Nuevo Santander; he remained there with the same salary but now performed in the capacity of first lieutenant, and the Governor of that province was now to be its captain. 162

158 Reglamento... de 1772, título dos
159 Poyo, 4
160 Reglamento... de 1772, Título segundo, Pie, paga y gratificación de las compañías de presidios
161 Ibid, artículo cuatro
162 Ibid
The role of the paymaster was an important one and constituted the entire content of the final Title of the *Reglamento*. Indeed, the first obligation of each potential candidate was “to be worthy of the confidence placed in him by the company in the management of its interests.” Moreover, that individual had to be capable of carrying out this assignment with the “integrity and honor inseparable from his profession.” Title Fourteen of the *Reglamento* indicates that the presidio soldiers’ presumed esteem of the captain-as-paymaster would [be their recognition of] his “honest[y] and zeal.”163 In 1788, Amangual became the paymaster of the Company at Béjar and was responsible for keeping the general accounts of debits and credits and ensuring their accuracy; this was especially important since the payroll and expenses would be examined and approved by the captain and other officers, as well as the *comandante inspector*. The paymaster administered the individual accounts of each soldier and was responsible for admonishing spendthrift members of the unit to restrict their expenditures to absolute necessities; this suggests that the forty-five year old Amangual performed competently as his company’s paymaster and the skillful execution of his duties may have enhanced his reputation as a conscientious, detail-oriented leader.

At this point in his military career, bureaucratic efficacy probably had more impact in maintaining cohesion and reducing friction among his underlings than had his military exploits. Indebtedness so eroded military morale that all parties, from the highest authorities to the individual soldier, suffered from the incessant privations worsened by a life on the frontier. However, even in this regard Amangual’s dedication to his responsibilities was impacted by on-the-ground conditions especially where it concerned the pay system. Historically, the presidial payroll neither stimulated the frontier economy nor solved the soldier’s ongoing reductions to his pay, the multitude of deductions and extortions that almost never covered both his service and personal expenses.164

163 *Reglamento...1772, Título catorce, Obligaciones y nombramiento del habilitado*, 45
164 Moorhead 201; see Chapter 2 of this study for a discussion of the economic challenges to soldiers’ pay and their ongoing debt, conforming to the regulations that impacted presidial life, and contentious episodes that pitted one soldier against another and necessitated lengthy investigations that coalesced various individuals representing the military hierarchy across the colonial borderlands.
In certain ways, the social and economic milieu of San Antonio de Béjar during this period did not deviate from other military installations especially where it concerned form and function. Identifying Francisco Amangual’s position within that type of community projects the military man’s role as a mindful navigator of the unique dynamics of the borderlands. As mentioned earlier, colonial Mexican presidial companies were not regular army units; filling their ranks depended on inhabitants of the frontier who, in return for their willingness to defend the presidio outposts, sought the opportunity to participate in the establishment of a permanent settlement. 165 Soldiers took families to their new posts and if those young soldiers who arrived as bachelors remained in a particular company for some time, the likelihood existed of marrying into a socially prominent, economically secure family in the neighboring civilian settlement. 166 Even before the arrival of women and children to the presidios, locations such as El Gallo, Cerrogordo, Conchos, and Casas Grandes had been re-developed as civilian communities not long after their use as military outposts. By 1760, all but one of the twenty-three garrisons in several frontier provincias had civilian settlements which averaged 37 civilian vecinos to each company of 50 officers and men. If the family of the troops were included in statistical data, the non-military population was even larger. 167

Civilian settlement was encouraged by the viceregal government and specifically addressed in Title 11, “Political Government” in the Royal Regulations of 1772. Deploying somewhat vague descriptors for the civilian populations, the viceroy insisted that people of “good reputations and habits” could not be dissuaded from entering and settling within the vicinity of the presidio. 168 In fact, families entering the presidio proper were to be accommodated and if the complex itself was not large enough to contain the incoming families, one section of the site was to be expanded with the work done as a communal effort since, ostensibly, it would benefit all

166 Ibid 30
167 Moorhead 224
168 Brinckerhoff 35, Reglamento... de 1772, Titulo once, gobierno politico
inhabitants. The Regulations instructed captains to distribute and assign lands and town lots to those that requested these properties and, in turn, the assignees were obligated to cultivate them. Furthermore, they were to keep horses, arms, and munitions for use in expeditions against enemies when necessity demanded it. However, preference for land distributions was to be given to the soldiers that had served their ten-year enlistments and to those who had retired because of old age or illness as well as to the families of those now deceased.\textsuperscript{169}

Recruitment and sustenance for both soldier and citizen had its challenges. In a letter to Viceroy Augustín Ahumada y Villalón, Marqués de las Amarillas, the Governor of Tejas, Martos y Navarette, responded with practical suggestions for the viceroy’s proposal that soldiers at the presidio of San Agustín de Ahumada willing to serve for six years would remain as ‘vecinos’ and lands and water would be distributed to them, as well as to the fifty vecinos [civilians] who would establish a villa;\textsuperscript{170} this never materialized but, presumably if it had, the villa would have been given the pre-established name of the presidio and mission complex, Orcoquisac.\textsuperscript{171} The Governor indicated to the Viceroy that should the soldiers remain citizens, as well as the fifty civilians, and even though they would receive a subsidy from the Royal Treasury (as ordered by the Viceroy in a March 30, 1756 dispatch), there would still be an increase in production and abundant harvests. While this would appear to be an advantageous result, Martos y Navarette reminded the Viceroy that the villa’s citizens would have no market for their products. Furthermore, he doubted whether the community could maintain themselves in the region without the additional and necessary income to be acquired by selling to the governors and captain of the presidio. Martos indicated that there were no other purchasers because the distance was so great between presidios, in this region of the borderlands where such a small number of inhabitants could support themselves.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid
\textsuperscript{170} Martos y Navarette to Marqués de las Amarillas, BA December 16, 1759.
\textsuperscript{171} Situated on the lower reaches of the Trinity River, Orcoquisac had been established in 1756 with a thirty-soldier garrison to protect the missions for the Orcoquisa Indians. Moorhead, 53.
\textsuperscript{172} Martos y Navarette to Marqués de las Amarillas, BA December 16, 1759.
At the time of the original order in 1757, Jacinto de Barrios y Jáuregi was the governor and he had been instructed to send a qualified individual to recruit the twenty-five “Spanish” families and the twenty-five “Tlascalan” families, to purchase the livestock, and to supply the fifty families with the ration assigned to them. However, in a telling statement, Governor Martos declared that he had no one whom he considered qualified for this important commission. Martos added that, in the event that the villa was ordered to be established by the Viceroy, he requested that Amarillas absolve him of the aforementioned responsibility and confer the duty upon someone else for its fulfillment. Martos stated that he could not entrust the duty to anyone else, and, in particular, to any of his immediate underlings, fearing that their ineptitude would give a bad impression of him to the Viceroy. However, Governor Martos did agree to make the entire distribution after the livestock and the merchandise arrived in order to prevent any discord.¹⁷³

1.8 AMANGUAL: THE ABLE ABILITADO

While fear of the ineptitude of others was enough to cause concern for one’s own reputation even at the highest levels of borderlands administration, social tensions arose when military personnel became embroiled in disputes with the civilian citizenry. This was especially so when intermutual disagreements stemmed from economic malfeasance and the subsequent lawsuits petitioned by individuals representing merchant interests and the supplying of the presidio’s soldiers. In one particularly contentious episode that will shortly emerge, José Macario Zambrano accused Francisco Amangual of unilaterally breaching a contract for the sale of corn to feed the soldiers.¹⁷⁴ The Royal Regulations of 1772 expressly forbade the molesting of merchants selling goods and other non-prohibited provisions nor were they to be impeded in their establishments, sales, or transient labors. However, the captain, as chief and governor of the settlement, was held responsible for these communal matters.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Ibid
¹⁷⁴ José Macario Zambrano to Ramon de Castro, BA, July 30, 1791 to September 6, 1792; see page 95 - 97 of this chapter for the Zambrano-Amangual episode.
¹⁷⁵ Ibid
For example, in 1788 Amangual carried supplies to the Béjar presidio consisting of several pieces of cloth and textiles along with cords and thread, presumably to construct clothing; indeed, the 3 1/3 varas [1 vara = 33 1/3 inches (846.67 mm), or, 1 yard = 1.08 vara] of hemp cloth was intended for “overcoats.” He also brought the following items: “75 hats” and 12 ½ arrobas [1 arroba=25 lbs] of “iron plates”, and the rest of the inventory consisting of six reams of paper along with the boxes, nails, and leather pouches [por los caxones, clabos (sic), y cueros en q(u)e vino guardado el dinero] used to carry the money.176

More specifically, thirteen items of duties and obligations entrusted to the presidio’s paymaster appear in Title Fourteen of the Regulations, including the necessity of the paymaster to have sufficient store of provisions for the distribution of rations and for supplying the troops with clothing and equipment. However, the paymaster held the right to collect from the captain, officers, chaplain, sergeants, and soldiers a commission of 2% for the “services and expenses” occasioned by his office.177 In order to ascertain the differences between and among the several presidios in the borderlands, one point of departure is to compare the annual appropriation for the presidios of both San Antonio de Béjar and for the presidio of Santa Fé in New Mexico. The Royal Regulations of 1772 indicate that the sum was almost precisely the same: an annual salary of four thousand pesos for the governor of each presidio serving in that capacity as well as that of captain of the company; one thousand four hundred pesos total for the presidio’s two lieutenants, or, seven hundred pesos to each individual; to the ensign [alférez], five hundred pesos; to the chaplain, four hundred eighty pesos; to each one of the six corporals, three hundred pesos; and, finally, to each one of the sixty-nine soldiers, two hundred ninety pesos. Where one discrepancy exists is the difference in salary of the lieutenant governor of the pueblo of El Paso per year, which was one thousand pesos, and, to each one of the thirty civilian auxiliaries who reinforced the detachment

176 Rafael Martínez Pacheco, copy of Amangual’s receipts for goods brought to the presidio at Béjar, BA April 14, 1788
177 Reglamento de 1772, título secundo, pie, paga y gratificación de las compañías de presidios.
of Robledo, one hundred eighty pesos; thus, an annual combined total of presidio salary expenditures for Santa Fé and El Paso of 35,680 pesos.\footnote{178}

In November of 1788, Rafael Martínez Pacheco reported to General Juan de Ugalde that \textit{habilitado} Amangual had satisfactorily returned to San Antonio with a corporal and five privates whom he took as escort to transport the payroll from San Luis Potosí for the provision of his company. The assets were received without discrepancies.\footnote{179} Distance and discretion prompted Amangual’s due diligence; the trip covered over five hundred miles and despite privations, the indication is strong that Amangual and his cohorts did not tamper with the funds. However, only one month later on December 24, Martínez Pacheco answered the \textit{cabildo} of San Fernando (Béjar) regarding a complaint filed by Joaquín Menchaca against Amangual. It is uncertain what were the circumstances surrounding the conflict between the two men, but it did demonstrate that Amangual was capable of committing an “oversight” that required correction so that “it might serve as a guide in the future” both, to Amangual, and to his company.\footnote{180}

However, that conflict may not have been so severe as to hinder Francisco Amangual’s successful election – only week later, on December 30 – to the post of paymaster. His colleagues at the presidio of San Antonio de Béjar apparently considered him as “the individual […] most appropriate for the handling of the [financial] interests” of all the soldiers of every rank in his company.\footnote{181} Amangual’s initial tenure was to last from 1788 to 1792. This event, which further invested Amangual with power of attorney, was memorialized in a letter signed by the interim military and political governor of the province (and captain of the cavalry in the royal armies), Rafael Martínez Pacheco, and involved several other witnesses. These included first lieutenant Bernardo Fernández; second alférez José Xavier Menchaca; and, sergeant Andrés del Valle, the latter representing the troops of the Béjar presidio. Prudencio Rodríguez, commander of the horse

\footnote{178} Ibid 19
\footnote{179} Matínez Pacheco to Ugalde, reporting the return of Amangual […], BA November 9, 1788
\footnote{180} Martínez Pacheco to the \textit{Cabildo} [of San Fernando], discussing complaint filed against Amangual, BA Dec 24, 1788
\footnote{181} Reports on election of Francisco Amangual as paymaster of Béxar, BA December 30, 1788
herd (*caballada*), and Amangual himself (the first alférez) were present. Two witnesses, Vizente [sic] de la Cuesta and José Melchor Yámez appeared as witnesses to the occasion.\(^{182}\) Since at this time the posts of the chaplain and the second lieutenant were vacant, those soldiers, naturally, were absent.

As a “truly elected” [*verdaderamente electo*] *habilitado*, Amangual’s responsibilities included appearing before the lord administrators [*los señores ministros*] of the main treasury in San Luis Potosí to collect the soldiers’ salaries; he was to adjust and liquidate the accounts for the aforementioned three year period and those left pending from 1788, receiving the balances from, both, the former and the latter; and, he was to pay the debts which the company might have incurred during that same time frame.\(^{183}\) Moreover, Amangual was responsible for receiving, collecting, paying, and issuing receipts, letters of payment, quittances, concessions of rights, and waivers of the laws of non-delivery; all of these responsibilities would have come as no surprise to Amangual since they replicated the duties described for the presidio paymaster in the Royal Regulations of 1772. However, what emerges in the correspondence of the period is the company’s trust in Amangual, who was, by this time, fifty years of age and a seasoned military man. Title Eight of the Regulations clarified -- albeit using generalized language subject to wide interpretation -- those qualities deemed necessary attributes for the selection of officers. Evidence of highly valued characteristics was expected from those men targeted for the positions of captains of presidios, upon whose effectiveness depended, in large part, the attainment of the objectives of the presidial complex.\(^{184}\)

Thus, the qualities of “known valor,” military wisdom, ability, and honor constitute the primary characteristics delineated in Title Eight. Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, the characteristic of ‘valor’ emerges as one of five descriptors used to describe individual soldier performance on the military service record forms compiled for each member of the *compañías*

\(^{182}\) Ibid
\(^{183}\) Ibid
\(^{184}\) *Reglamento... de 1772, Título octavo, provisión de empleos*
volantes as well as for other detachments. Good conduct prevailed as the single most desirable attribute for all vacancies among the several ranks of the military assignment of duties, with valor being a highly desirable personal trait; soldiers born in the country where they would serve were not to be excluded from attaining the rank of lieutenants, ensigns, and even, chaplains. That combination of conduct and valor, along with the ability to read and write, were considered absolutely essential for filling the vacancy left by a sergeant. In all of these situations, it was necessary to receive the approval of the commandant-inspector before the final selections could take place.185

By March 14, 1789 Amangual received his promotion from first alférez to second lieutenant after the retirement of José Antonio Muzquiz.186 Subsequently, power of attorney was conferred upon Amangual only one month later on April 11, 1789.187 With the imminent arrival of Juan de la Cerda approaching, Amangual received instructions concerning the incoming soldier’s lack of outfitting forwarded to him by Raphael Martínez Pacheco from the Commander General Juan de Ugalde. The instructions include very specific items including “defensive and offensive arms, eight horses, a good saddle, three changes of linens” necessary for Cerda to be able to rendezvous with the rest of the company at the presidio of Rio Grande, or, the Paso de Longoria on July 31, 1789. Where it concerned the transfer of funds, in December 1790 Pedro de Nava made arrangements so that seventy pesos could be delivered by Governor Manuel Muñoz and the alcaldes of the villa of San Fernando, Pedro Flórez and Francisco de Arocha, to Amangual from the Mesteñas fund188 in order for Amangual to send them to Juan Cortéz. The latter had

185 Ibid
186 Ugalde to Martínez Pacheco, reporting the Viceroy’s appointment of Amangual as second lieutenant, BA March 14, 1789
187 Ugalde to Martínez Pacheco, […] power of attorney […] signed over to Amangual […], BA April 11, 1789
188 According to a January 11, 1778 proclamation by de Croix, the Mesteñas fund had its origins in the wild, unbranded cattle and horses found in the provincia of Tejas and taken or destroyed by certain “vagabonds [vagamundos]” among the citizenry of the presidios. Their lawless acts encouraged discord among families and instilled a lack of subordination to and respect for the governors and other officials whose duties included the administration of justice. These “vagabonds,” that lived off the goods, wealth, and cattle of more respectable citizens [buenos y honrados (sic) vasallos], are not specifically named, and it can be assumed that they were part of, both, the civilian and military population. Croix made it clear that a contributing factor to their dishonorable behavior was the liberty with which many had authorized for themselves to build corrals and stockades, then round up, enclose, and take possession of wild and unbranded cattle and horses. The viceroy pronounced the animals, both
supplied them as payment for shipping the gifts, consisting of 28 cargas of goods, destined for the peace-abiding Indigenous groups of that province.\footnote{Muñoz’s certification of receipts for payments of transportation fees to Amangual, BA December 14, 1790}

**1.9 AMANGUAL: SHOW ME THE MONEY!**

Transfers of money constituted a key aspect of Amangual’s work as paymaster especially where it concerned payments for expeditions as in those undertaken by José Mares and Pedro Vial in their journeys in 1788 from Santa Fé, in Nuevo México, to Natchitoches, and then back to San Antonio before returning to Santa Fé. These funds were to be carefully accounted for, since Amangual was expected to receive one thousand ninety-seven \textit{pesos}, five \textit{reales}, seven \textit{granos} and, further, to see that Pedro Vial and his companions were also to receive 491 \textit{pesos}, 2 \textit{reales} by the commander of the Nachitoches post, so that they might continue their journey from that post back to Santa Fé.\footnote{Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz; Muñoz to Amangual, BA December 14, 1790} Apart from those expeditions, when the presidio at San Antonio de Béjar received 12,841 pesos for the “Friendly Nations of the North” – comprised of individual communities not specifically identified -- and the Lipan Indians, who had entered the presidio in peace from December 3, 1786 until August 15 1790, (and, presumably, in order to accept congregation there), Amangual was expected to cover their expenses once he had received financial remunerations.\footnote{Ibid} On February 7, 1791, Amangual acknowledged to Governor Manuel Muñoz not only his receipt of the reimbursement from the royal treasury in San Luis Potosí but, also, that the funds were to be used only to reimburse the indigenous communities and nothing else. He complied with the order.\footnote{Amangual to Muñoz, acknowledging receipt [...] refunding Indian expenses [...], BA February 7, 1791}

Given the circumstances of a soldier’s life on the ‘frontier,’ one might assume that Amangual would have had compelling reasons to misappropriate funds from the \textit{Mesteñas} loan. Francisco Amangual’s military service and life in the Spanish colonial frontier can be viewed

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\footnote{Croix to Ripperdá, [...] establishment and management of mesteñas fund, BA, January 11, 1778.}
through the prism of his having served as a soldier in Europe and as a presidio soldier in the *Américas*. Having spent over a decade in the Spanish army on the Iberian peninsula, he was in a position to contrast that life with his new one, and that of his subordinates, on the Ibero-American frontier. Cash was hard to come by; indeed, presidial salaries by the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth were paid in cash but only after substantial deductions and service charges – often illegal or greatly inflated -- cut into the net amount a soldier took home. On April 20, 1791 Amangual wrote to Governor Muñoz, yet again, but this time the request was not to reimburse acquiescent Indians but, instead, to provide for the soldiers under his command. He requested a sum of two thousand pesos from the Mesteñas Fund; he had requested another two thousand somewhere between the time of the “Friendly Nations” arrival and the April request in order to acquire remounts for the company. In his request he indicated that he would reimburse the total of four thousand pesos upon his return from San Luis Potosí on his trip that was planned for July 1791. Later in the year, the *alcaldes ordinarios* of the villa of San Fernando, Francisco Arocha and Pedro Flores, indicate their receipt of two hundred *pesos* as payment towards this obligation; whether or not Amangual had made other payments or whether this December remittance was the first on the original July loan is unclear. Driven by a desire to prepare for every possibility, it is apparent that he was forthright in his repayment obligations.\(^{193}\)

However, when those obligations stemmed from an Amangual superior, the chain of correspondence indicates that complications could quickly arise. On July 23, 1791 Amangual requested reimbursement from Governor Manuel Muñoz for seven hundred thirty-nine *pesos*, seven *reales*, and five and three-eighths *granos* from the Mesteñas Fund that was owed to his *abilitazion* [paymaster, or, payroll office] by the Brigadier Commandant General Juan de Ugalde. While Muñoz acknowledged receipt of the accounts sent to him by the Adjutant Inspector de la Cueva in an official letter of May 23 of that same year, the Governor indicated to Amangual that Commandant General Pedro de Nava had instructed him, Muñoz, that the Mesteñas Fund was the

\(^{193}\) Amangual to Muñoz, asking for a loan […] to pay troop salaries, BA, April 20, 1791
source for food provisions for the Friendly Nations (more or less subdued Indians). Therefore, Muñoz reasoned, he could not reimburse Amangual since a prior order from either the *commandante general* Ramon de Castro or the Viceroy Revilla Gigedo was not only necessary, but doing otherwise would constitute Muñoz’s failure to obey their orders. Moreover, when Muñoz explained the situation to Captain Martínez Pacheco, who was the recipient of the provisions paid for by the loan, Muñoz indicated that Pacheco should have applied for reimbursement from the royal coffers (in San Luis Potosí), or, that orders from royal administrators should have been issued indicating what fund was to have provided the monies, in the meantime.

Ultimately, Muñoz informed Amangual that, indeed, Pacheco had not only ignored a call to action regarding his obligation to pay back the loan, but, had also disregarded the order that Muñoz had sent him – along with the request that had Amangual originally placed, and the copies of the accounts of the provisions that had been delivered by the Béjar presidio.  

1.10 TROUBLE IN THE BORDERLANDS: NEGOTIATING BAD BEHAVIOR AND UNSCRUPULOUS DEEDS

Francisco Amangual often took testimony from his subordinates in an effort to exercise control over troublemakers within the company. While the results of his adherence to his duties in the capacity of company paymaster may have come under surveillance, his reports to his commanders demonstrate a remarkable humility that suggest his moral rectitude. In one particularly telling episode, two soldiers raised suspicions about a fellow company member to Amangual. Soldiers Andrés Benito Courbiere, an interpreter for the so-called Friendly Nations of the North, and the interpreter for the Comanche and Taguayaz, Francisco Xavier Chávez,

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194 Correspondence between Francisco Amangual and Muñoz, […] sum owed by Ugalde, BA July 23, 1791
195 According to his own account, Andrés Benito Courbiere was a native of León, France and came to Louisiana seeking his fortune. He enlisted in the militia company of the Natchitos presidio, but then transferred to the Béjar presidio as part of a picket from the same company that was assigned to escort Lieutenant Colonel Atanacio de Mezieres. Croix assigned Courbiere to be an interpreter for those indigenous communities that frequented the Béjar presidio in the practice of peace. According to his own account, he attained the rank of “soldado distinguido” and subsequently desired to continue in the service of the Crown. Courbiere to the Governor of Texas Manuel Muñoz, BA May 12, 1792
indicated that alférez Manuel de Urrutia\textsuperscript{196} had developed and then maintained a very close relationship with two young Comanche braves among the residents of the presidio of San Antonio de Béjar. Insofar as that interaction was not unusual, the soldiers’ concern arose since Urrutia cohabited with a Ute Indian woman in an uneasy relationship that, apparently, included violence since Urrutia faced jail sentences several times. The suspicion was that Urrutia’s relationship with the two young Indian men evolved as a method to prevent the woman’s pending departure, fueled by her bad relationship with Urrutia.\textsuperscript{197}

One late afternoon, while the Comanche Chief Ojos Azules and the Ute woman sat in the plaza of the presidio, the soldier-translator Chávez, acting upon the orders of the Governor, told the Chief that he should return to his lodging and take the Ute woman there as well. Urrutia, witnessing the trio’s interaction, attempted to detain Chávez in order to interpret some things to the Indian Chief. However, the interpreter recognized the drunken state of Urrutia, did not obey him, and quickly instructed the Chief to avoid saying a word to Urrutia since the latter was too drunk to even comprehend what he was saying.\textsuperscript{198}

At this moment, a private under the direction of Amangual physically attempted to take the inebriated Urrutia away, but the drunken officer then told interpreter Chávez to tell the Ute woman how ungrateful she was and how much it had cost him to rescue her. Chávez did not comply and the Comanche chief took the woman to his lodgings where, Amangual indicates, he had treated her like a sister. Then, during the night, the Chief came to Chávez’s house with his weapons and his wife, his sister and the Ute woman in tow, fleeing from Urrutia who was going about with a bow and arrows in his hand. With that, Chávez told the chief to take shelter in his own house and

\textsuperscript{196} While he was First Sergeant at the Béjar presidio, Urrutia suffered a fall on the night of November 29, 1795 that caused considerable and recurring injury to his right shoulder. After multiple procedures to put the shoulder back in place, Urrutia lost the use of his right arm, causing him to be discharged. At that time, he had been suggested for the rank of Second Alférez of the cavalry company at La Bahía, based upon his “merits and good service.” However, since his injury prevented his assuming the post, Governor Cabello recommended that Urrutia be granted the status of “ymbálido,” with the rank of alférez in order for him to receive the corresponding compensation. Cabello to Rengel, [...] Urrutia’s discharge from service [...] , BA February 5, 1786

\textsuperscript{197} Amangual to Governor of Texas, [...] incidents [...] Manuel de Urrutia, BA June 11, 1791

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid
not to worry; he assured the refugees that if Urrutia were to arrive at his house, he would send him away with threats of punishment from the governor. Furthermore, Chávez told the sentinel on the presidio walls that in case he should encounter the drunken Urrutia in the plazas, he should tell him to leave and that the governor had become well aware of his behavior.¹⁹⁹

However, on the day before, June 10, Urrutia’s nephew Clemente Arocha reported to Amangual that on the previous evening of June 9, Urrutia had circled the Chief’s house with a quiver and arrows -- and the confiscated saber of Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez -- issuing threats, yet again, as a way of coercing the Ute woman out of the house. Arocha encouraged Amangual to apprehend the drunken Urrutia so as to avert a potentially deadly situation and so that his mother should not have to suffer the shame of his violent behavior.²⁰⁰ At this point, Amangual made the unwise decision to put the erratic Urrutia in charge of the guardhouse and further made him responsible for the dispatch of the patrols at the proper time. Amangual then secured a promise from Urrutia that the latter would not abandon his post. In fact, Urrutia disobeyed the order and for the remainder of the evening he went wherever he wanted, apparently still under the influence of alcohol. Francisco Amangual admitted to both of his superiors, the Governor of Texas Manuel Muñoz and the Commandant General of the Eastern Provinces Juan de Ugalde, that had he recognized the inebriated state of Urrutia, he would never have assigned him to the sensitive post of supervising the guardhouse and dispatching patrols.²⁰¹

With this episode of presidial misconduct, it appears that Amangual was as capable of misidentifying the outward characteristics of a troublesome soldier – identifiers that surely would have precluded that particular individual from assuming tasks and responsibilities of grave importance – as he was of choosing the right individual, the unnamed Private, to intervene on his behalf. This aspect of his misjudgment of character flaws (even as he preserved the commitment to his soldierly duties and paymaster obligations) make clear his unswerving dedication to tasks

¹⁹⁹ Ibid
²⁰⁰ Ibid
²⁰¹ Ibid
accomplished for the benefit of his company and the presidio where he served. The Urrutia debacle was an embarrassment for Amangual even as he sought methods to encourage the good will of not only his fellow presidiales, but also the garrison’s adjacent communities.

His troubles were not so quickly diminished since there unfolded yet another interpersonal conflict in the summer of 1791. Only one month after the drunken Urrutia subverted the better judgement of Francisco Amangual, the merchant Macario Zambrano, having identified himself as a thirty year-long citizen of the villa of San Fernando and a soldier of the royal presidio of San Antonio de Béjar, indicated that Amangual had appeared before the alcalde de primer voto Francisco Arocha and demanded a sum of three hundred pesos. Zambrano acknowledged the debt but questioned the receipt of information that he provided regarding the payment that the abilitado was seeking as well as the setbacks from and losses of his plantings that resulted from the suit. Apparently, he had been told that his petition had no validity, and he should repay Amangual. Otherwise, he was to be jailed for non-compliance.202

When Zambrano verified his petition’s content, and presented it to the cabildo so that they might certify the document as true and enter it as an official proceeding, the members of the cabildo could not comply since they would be prevented from doing so and threatened with severe punishment by the Governor if they performed official acts on any other day than Thursdays. Further, Zambrano indicated that there was a strict condition that at least one day notice beforehand was required so that the Governor should preside over the cabildo. Clearly, Zambrano was mistrustful of the Governor since he believed that everything that had happened to him was done with his approval and direction. Thus Zambrano took to contacting the Commander General himself, Ramon de Castro, in the hope of finding justice, and buttressed his argument and demand for fair treatment by his assertion that Amangual and he had agreed upon a certain price for his grain. Moreover, he argued that there existed a viceregal order that decreed that citizens receive

202 Translation of proceedings in the proceedings in the case of […] Zambrano vs. […] Amangual for breach of contract, BA July 30, 1791
preference over the missions for the preferred price of three hundred pesos \[ay\ en\ aquel\ archivo en q(u)e\ se\ manda\ seamos\ preferidos\ los\ vecinos\ a\ las\ misiones\ (sic)\ por\ igual\ (?)\ precio]\.$^{203}$

Zambrano’s deposition was riddled with inaccuracies, or so it appeared from the response that his petition received from Governor Muñoz. Muñoz indicated that he had given no orders to the cabildo that would have prevented it from holding their assemblies at the times and on the days that they found best, and thus Zambranos’ statement about that issue was incorrect. Further, no members of the cabildo were prevented or threatened with penalties for holding official proceedings on any other day than Thursday or, for that matter, with the strict condition that the Governor be notified the day beforehand in order to preside over the meetings. And, the *alcalde de primer voto* Arocha had not asked for direction from the governor, nor did the latter see Zambrano’s petition that was presented in his court regarding the claim for the three hundred pesos made by Amangual.$^{204}$ In fact, Arocha was willing to certify the latter and thus demonstrate that Zambrano was not telling the truth.

At the point in the deposition, Zambrano’s relationship with a future litigant against Amangual emerges. The merchant stated that in order to pay the three hundred pesos to Amangual, he had in his storage at the beginning of the harvest fifty *fanegas* of good quality corn to take to the presidio at La Bahía to sell; his wife went to seek a permit from the governor who refused to grant it. However, the governor had just taken office and had not issued any permits at all for the export of grains until he could get a report on the amounts produced by the harvest for supplying the citizens and the presidial company and then ascertain what was left over for the presidio at La Bahía. However, the governor had taken these measures mindful of the scarcities that the region had suffered up to that time. But, no permits had been withheld for the export of grains after verifying sufficient stores of grain and if Zambrano, or a representative of his had requested it, there would have been no reason to withhold it from him.

$^{203}$ Ibid
$^{204}$ Ibid
This is where the report became interesting: apparently, the presidio had received thirty-two fanegas of corn from Zambrano’s son-in-law, Mariano Rodríguez, the soldier who would emerge the following year to lodge a formal complaint against Francisco Amangual, accusing the paymaster of misappropriating funds. Rodríguez’s corn was part of that which his wife had wanted to send to La Bahía, and he was paid three pesos, four reales for it in September of 1790, and its value was intended to pay Juan Martin Amondarayn. Zambrano claimed that his agreement with Amangual was founded in the latter’s having asked him how many fanegas of corn he could sell him. Moreover, Governor Muñoz knew that Amangual did the same thing with all the other farmers because they had put out the word that the harvest was going to be very small. As the presidio’s paymaster, Amangual would have made the inquiry in order to find out who would sell him the corn most cheaply.\(^\text{205}\) Without further information it is unknown how arbiters in the corn deal resolved the matter. What becomes evident at some level is that Amangual, as an agent for his company’s interests, made efforts to become well informed of current market prices for the necessary commodities of his office. Even when his patience was tested, he responded with apparently business-minded acuity and in doing so managed to enhance his relationship with some in the merchant community while alienating others in the military establishment.

Official correspondence with key borderlands personnel document Amangual’s ongoing efforts at maintaining productive relationships with the local indigenous communities; this would be as necessary in the San Antonio de Béjar environs as it would be during the long expedition that he led from Texas to New Mexico in 1808. For example, on March 27, 1792 Francisco Amangual ordered that four pesos of cigars be delivered to the Comanche captains Sojas and Soquina; in turn, Governor Muñoz ordered Amangual to note the expenditure on the account for the native leaders as a means of documenting their sustenance provided by the presidio.\(^\text{206}\) One month later, on April 26, Muñoz again ordered the delivery of four more pesos of cigars, but this gift was intended for the Tancahue Nation and thus noted on the account of the expenditures

\(^{205}\) Ibid
\(^{206}\) Promissory note of Muñoz to Amangual […] Soquina and Sojas, BA March 27, 1792
created for the group. The very next day, ten men from the Comanche Nation were departing from the presidio and thus it was necessary to charge the account of the expenditures for these same Indians since they were being sent off with one peso of cigars.

This was a significant accounting date for Amangual since he produced a ledger, or, spreadsheet, to provide essential information to the Governor of Tejas Manuel Muñoz regarding the royal presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, but with a date of March 18, 1792. Amangual indicated that the account showed the funds that he had received, in the role of paymaster, at the royal treasury at San Luis Potosí for the payment and salaries of officers and other individuals of the company that garrisoned the presidio through December 1791. He also indicated the amount introduced in tobacco, with an inventory of the latter up to the date of this specific account – 1792 – and the supplies of goods and other provisions for the troops corresponding to the category of the post office (for charges related to mail), with details on what was contained in each of the funds and quantities on hand in coffers and in payment orders issued within the first semester of 1792. The charges against the account included thirty-five thousand pesos set down by the royal officials of the treasury in San Luis Potosí for the salaries of the officers, sergeants, corporals, privates, and other individuals of the company for the year 1791. The next entry, which also constituted the next highest charge – four thousand nine hundred ninety nine pesos – was for the tobacco sold during the entire previous year of 1791. Amangual issued a payment order that required fulfillment when the first semester of the present year was to be collected. After these two highest charges, the next items indicated in the ledger show much smaller amounts; for instance, two thousand pesos were on hand in the form of deposits for the construction of the fortress of El Cíbolo, and another three thousand eight hundred pesos (provided by the Mesteñas fund) to gather horses, provisions, and supplies for the troops. Amangual further indicated that the sums be reimbursed once the first semester of the current year 1792 was collected.

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207 Muñoz to Amangual […] visiting Tancague, BA April 26, 1792
208 Promissory note of Muñoz to Amangual […] Comanche Indians, BA April 27, 1792
209 Accounting records of the company of Bexar, by Francisco de Amangual, paymaster, BA April 27, 1792
210 Ibid
Two thousand thirty one pesos intended for the Mesteñas Fund arrived from the paymasters of the presidios of the Eastern Provinces [Coahuila y Téjas, Nuevo Santander, and Nuevo León] which were subsequently expended on the urgent needs of Amangual’s company. This document, signed by Amangual on April 27, 1792, was witnessed by several people including – and, this is significant – the Sergeant of the company at the San Antonio presidio, Mariano Rodríguez. All the troops, including Rodríguez, indicated that the amount received by their havilitado was complete, without there being any withdrawal whatsoever [hallamos que el caudel que ha recibido de (?) Teniente Hav(ilita)do Fran(is)co Amangual está completo, sin haver extraccion (sic) alguna, de lo quedó convencido así la tropa]. Sergeant Rodríguez will emerge shortly as a slanderer against Amangual, accusing the paymaster of misappropriation of funds, a serious charge that had the potential to deleteriously impact a paymaster’s career.

1.11 Paying the Presidio: The Mesteñas Fund and Correcting the Accounts

The Mesteñas Fund was apparently the primary source for the San Antonio de Béxar presidio’s accounts receivable and payable. Further explanation is necessary to understand its ramifications for the colonial borderlands. In 1778, Croix developed a five-point plan for the fund that was intended to avoid the complete destruction of the unbranded horses and cattle and the potential liabilities that might be visited upon individuals like farmers and ranchers in the vicinity of the Béxar presidio. He voiced his concern over branded animals that had been killed and left to rot in the fields, by owners or unscrupulous types, with nothing utilized but their fat stores, valuable for its use in the manufacture of soap. Croix ordered that no person of whatever quality or condition could go out, round up, kill, or take wild or unbranded animals in the entire district [paraje] of Texas and its frontiers. These unlawful acts would result in the loss of the animal(s) taken, the payment of a four peso fine for each head of cattle, or, two pesos for horses, and an eight day

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211 Ibid
212 Ibid
213 See fn 185 above.
imprisonment in the public jail on the first offense; double the fine and term of imprisonment for the second; and, for the third, the same doubled fine plus exile for four years of hard labor, for rations only and without salary, to whatever royal or public works that the offender might be assigned. For the imposition of these penalties, no other proof would be necessary other than that of apprehending the animals in the offender’s possession.214

The Croix proclamation further prohibited any citizen or cattle-grower of whatever class from taking from the province any herd of cattle or horses, even if domestic, branded, and of the citizen’s own breeding stock without first obtaining a license from the magistrate. The license was issued in writing free of charge, without carrying any other duties other than those of sealed (official) paper or, in its absence, other qualified paper. Licensing was intended to show the number of head and breed of animals to be removed, by which persons, and their respective territories and owners. Those who disobeyed the license restrictions were subject to penalties that included: for the first offense, the loss of the branded animals removed; for the second, the loss of the animals and payment of a four peso fine for each head of cattle and two for each horse; and, the third offense would result in the aforementioned penalties plus a two year exile at hard labor, in the same capacity and reimbursement [rations only, no salary] as the first point of the proclamation.215

However, five years earlier, citizens of the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar were ordered to remove certain of their horses from the caballada [horse herd] maintained at the presidio. In 1773 then-Governor of Texas, and Colonel of the Cavalry, Barón de Ripperdá circulated an edict that the allowance [cituado/sic] of the horse herd had increased to one thousand one hundred animals, often more on certain occasions, stemming from the arrival of the citizens and troops from the recently closed presidio at Los Adaes.216 Injury to the individual horses had resulted from

214 Croix to Ripperdá, [...] establishment and management of mesteñas fund, BA January 11, 1778
215 Ibid
216 Los Adaes was established in 1721 by the Marqués de Aguayo in extreme northeast Texas, opposite the French post of Natchitoches in Louisiana. It was the residence of the provincial governor until 1770, and lasted as a presidio for another 3 years. When the presidio was ordered abandoned, its inhabitants were moved to Béxar. However, many wanted to return to East Texas and eventually founded Nacogdoches very near to their old presidio location. See further Moorehead (1975) and Poyo and Hinojosa (1991).
the young animals bruising one another in the sorting rooms and relays, and that behavior had also stirred up the entire caballada. Owners were given fifteen days to withdraw the animals, or, faced the possibility of mares and colts being separated from the herd without their owners’ knowledge, and the “intact horses [caballos enteros]” being gelded. During the same year, in a much different scenario involving a neighboring community, issues concerning horses emerged and were dispensed with in a more accommodating fashion. Ripperdá received a response to his September 28 message to Viceroy Bucareli that citizens of the presidio of Béjar had been working at a mine some thirty leagues away and found some horses and mares which they recognized as belonging to four Lipan Apaches; they followed the Indians’ tracks but did not encounter them. Bucareli directed the Governor to tell the first Lipan individual that might appear to come for the horses.

In July 1792 Amangual received, from the Governor and the alcaldes ordinarios of San Antonio de Béjar, the sum of two hundred forty-five pesos, eleven and four-eighths granos, an amount that these officials had withdrawn in order to pay the individuals who had furnished the supplies of support specifically created for the “Friendly Indians of the North.” These groups, probably Tancahue, entered peacefully into the garrison from May 22 to July 5, 1792. One month later, on August 14, Amangual issued yet another receipt for the sum of one thousand eleven pesos, seven reales, nine granos that the same aforementioned officials expended for the same reasons, but for the extended period since the previous July 5. By December of the following year, Amangual sent a letter to the Governor of Coahuila y Téjas Manuel Muñoz answering a directive from Brigadier Commandante General Pedro de Nava as to whether a deposit of two thousand, eight hundred forty-two pesos, received by Captain Rafael Martínez Pacheco, had appeared in the Mesteñas Fund.

As a response, Amangual sent certified copies of payment orders amounting to two thousand thirty-one pesos, five reales, eleven and five-eighths granos given to him by the adjutant

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217 Juan María de Ripperdá, decree to citizens of the presidio de San Antonio de Béjar, BA October 10, 1773.
218 Bucareli to Ripperdá, ordering the election of the paymaster, BA December 8, 1773.
219 Amangual’s receipt […] payment for items supplied to visiting Indians, BA, July 6, 1792.
220 Amangual receipt […] mesteñas fund of expenditures […] visiting Indians, BA August 14 1792.
inspector (as proxy for Ugalde) Juan Gutiérrez de la Cueva. It appears that Amangual, as habilitado, had put these payments into the supporting funds of his office, an entry previously balanced on July 26, 1793. Further, Amangual informed Muñoz that he had in his possession seventy pesos, two reales, six granos which had been delivered to him by alférez Thomás González Huerta with the two entries combined totaling two thousand one hundred two pesos, five and five-eighths granos. He made certain to inform Muñoz that he had gathered this information so that if the Governor wished to inform Nava of the amounts received, Muñoz could do so. Amangual’s copies indicate that de la Cueva tallied up the receipts – some involving flying squadron troops – and outlined the payments in the following way:

- One payment order against the alférez of the compañía volante of La Punta de Lampazos, Don Thomás Gonzales Huerta: 520 pesos, 5 reales, 1 5/8 granos
- Another against alférez Don Francisco Vásquez, abilitado of La Bahía del Espíritu Santo: 156 pesos, 5 reales, 9 granos
- Another against alférez Don Joaquín Vidal, abilitado of the third compañía volante of La Colonia, in Laredo: 596 pesos, 1 real, 3 7/8 granos
- Another against Vidal, that he received from the first compañía volante of La Colonia: 156 pesos, 2 reales, 3 granos
- Another against alférez José de Rávago, abilitado of the company of La Bahía: 307 pesos, 4 reales, 3 granos
- Another against alférez José Miguel del Moral: 138 pesos, 3 reales, 3/8 granos
- One receipt from Lieutenant Francisco Amangual: 156 pesos, 2 reales, 9 granos
- And, finally, what was delivered by the abilitado Alférez Thomás Gonzales Huerta: 70 pesos, 5 5/8 granos.

Juan Gutiérrez de la Cueva originally compiled this account on September 20, 1791. Since Amangual includes this information in his December 18, 1793 letter to Muñoz, presumably in order to document the Fund’s accounts receivable, he may very well have been following best practices to ensure that his reputation as [h]abilitado (paymaster) remained beyond reproach. Too, he had already had to answer for two accusations made against his character over the previous five

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221 Certified copy of Amangual’s report to Muñoz, on Ugalde’s account during military campaigns, BA December 18, 1793 [– December 22, 1793].
222 Gutiérrez de la Cueva to Amangual, BA September 20, 1791
years. However, as we shall soon see, Amangual had very good reason to anticipate that his accounting procedures might very well be questioned by a colleague in the borderlands or beyond.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, attempts were made to improve an erratic system of paying the soldiers that too often resulted in substantially defrauding them of their salaries; charging exorbitant prices for any commodities that they might acquire; and, that ultimately benefitted the captains of the presidios. These practices emerged at the expense of the presidials’ salaries, very often with large amounts illegally deducted from the soldiers’ already very low pay. The pervasiveness of that demoralizing activity had become almost institutionalized by 1723, but by 1724 Juan de Acuña y Bejarano -- Viceroy Casafuerte -- instructed Brigadier Pedro de Rivera, his inspector of presidios, to investigate these pernicious practices. The Rivera recommendations for improving the state of the presidios resulted in the Reglamento of 1729 (discussed above), a uniform code intended to, among other goals, restore salaries to cash payouts; make the purchase of clothing an option for the presidiales (since heretofore half of their salaries had been paid in clothing); and, to establish maximum prices for commodities at the provision stores of the presidios.223

Excessive profiteering and price gouging by presidial captains continued unabated even after the king himself became aware of these practices. Thereafter, he enacted severe and public procedures intended to punish those already guilty of fraud and likely to perpetuate the same prohibited activities in the future. Even so, Fray Juan Sanz de Lezaun described the absurd cost of poor quality clothing that troops in Santa Fé were forced to pay in addition to being double charged the local price for local produce.224 Inferior commodities, including horses and clothing for family members, continued to form the basis of supplies intended for the troops. Some captains even went so far as to appropriate the best horses for their own use while selling the worst to their men at regulation prices even when some of these superior animals had been part of each soldier’s herd.

223 Moorhead 202-205.
224 Ibid 206
Some unscrupulous captains charged the soldiers inflated prices for food, including corn and beef, and even minor items like soap, cigars, and blankets presented another opportunity for captains to raise prices by as much as ten-fold. By July 1767, the Marqués de Rubí’s sought to alleviate the gross irregularities within the presidios by ordering captains to issue soldiers corn, beef, beans, chili, brown sugar, and even shoes at prices prescribed in the 1729 regulations.

Sometimes fines levied against perpetrators in the borderlands made their way into the company’s financial registers. One such case involved contraband tobacco belonging to a Francisco Ardila, who was required (along with other individuals involved in the illegal act) to pay back four hundred fifteen pesos by way of deposit. On October 31, 1792 José Ramón de Bustamante informed Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Muñoz, later Governor of Coahuila y Téjas, that he had received from Lieutenant Colonel Miguel de Cuellar one hundred sixty-seven pesos that were in his possession; this amount pertained to the Ardila contraband and was subsequently delivered to Amangual.

1.12 AMANGUAL: THE ACCUSED

At other times, Francisco Amangual’s performance and, indeed, his character as the company’s habilitado came under scrutiny where it concerned the expenditures of funds. In early 1793, Amangual wrote to the Governor of Coahuila y Tejas, Manuel Muñoz, requesting a more appropriate punishment for the sergeant of the same company, Mariano Rodríguez, who in the previous year had slandered Amangual for misappropriation of the financial interests under his charge. While Amangual acknowledged that the proceedings conducted in the administrative examination of the funds in question resulted in his full exoneration of any mismanagement on his part – an investigation pursued by Amangual himself, who continuously reasserted his lawful conduct with the funds under his charge -- he conveyed his indignation at Rodríguez’s lack of jail

225 Ibid 207
226 El par de zapatos de cordobán [Cordovan (Spanish), or, possibly goatskin leather], de hombre y mujer, de todos puntos, á ocho reales. El par de zapatos de vaqueta [tanned cowhide], á seis reales. Rivera, Reglamento de 1729, precios que se han de observer en los presidios […] in Alessio Robles, 232; Moorhead, 207-208
227 Díaz de Bustamante to Muñoz, BA, October 31, 1792
time. Indeed, Amangual appears particularly annoyed that his accuser was not assessed any other penalties and that the information was not immediately brought to his attention [por no considerarla bastante a vindicar el honor del empleo, con que la piedad del Rey se ha dignado distinguirme, me ha sido sensible el ver á dicho sargento fuera de su arresto, sin que haia (sic) llegado a mi noticia se le haia (sic) aplicado otra pena]. Moreover, Amangual expressed a deep concern that such leniency towards Rodríguez would result in the sergeant’s future abuses of the law.

What is most telling in the letter to Governor Muñoz was Amangual’s couching of his concerns about Rodríguez’s dishonorable conduct by revealing his long experience with the “rowdy character” of the sergeant [tengo larga experiencia del bullicioso genio de este individuo]. Conveying his awareness of military protocol, second alférez Amangual argued that the honor of the military superiors, presumably self-evident to the lower rank soldiers, was principally based upon the upper ranked officers’ collective greater service to the King, and, the unswerving discipline of all the troops in common. Amangual was especially concerned over the message that the Rodríguez incident -- and the perpetrator’s subsequent freedom from punishment -- might convey to the troops.

In response, Governor Muñoz indicated that he had received an order on January 26 of the past year, from the Commandant General Ramón de Castro y Gutiérrez that the latter not be informed of the case and, therefore, had not been inclined to relay this information to Amangual. This news may very well have irked Amangual; indeed, correspondence between he and Muñoz suggests a civil, if somewhat, strained relationship between the habilitado and the Governor of the province. In the earliest part of the same year, Amangual acknowledged to his superior that he had received a certified copy of the instrucción of principles concerning various points of discipline that had been sent by Commandante General de Castro. Amangual’s closing sentence indicates

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228 Amangual requesting punishment […], BA February 10, 1793
229 Ibid
230 Ibid
his intention of observing the Instruction scrupulously, following Munoz’s order that he do so.231
As we shall see in Chapter 2, the particulars of a lawsuit that pitted Francisco Amangual against
Mariano Rodríguez in a case that involved slander and deception directly involved Munoz. His
response to a two-month long investigation of the accusations provides a glimpse into military
relationships and internecine conflict between superiors and subordinates.

231 [Amangual’s] receipt of instructions concerning military discipline, BA January 7, 1792; “[…] la que observaré
escrupulozamente [sic] como me lo ordena.”
Chapter Two

*Al rey le cuenta sumas muy crecidas el estado militar en las provincias, y las paga en concepto de que la Gente es útil para el desempeño de su real servicio.*

In January of 1772, the Royal Regulations established the so-called Interior Provinces – consisting of Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, Sinaloa, California, Texas, New Mexico, Chihuahua, Coahuila and Texas (formally united as one large state in 1824), Nuevo León, and Nuevo Santander. The reglamentos reales sought to emphasize the northern Mexican frontier’s shift from a religious-based effort to a military one. Extensive revisions of the presidio system enacted by the Croix administration provided the basis for the evolution of the presidio as a two-prong borderlands apparatus for controlling its civilian and military populations; in the first objective, the presidio took on new significance as not only a base for military offensives directed at hostile indigenous communities, including the Apaches; in the second, the presidio was imagined as a sanctuary for the increasing number of native people who sought peace. To suggest that the 1772 Reglamento did not draw heavily upon its antecedent, the Reglamento of 1729, is misguided; as Thomas Naylor and Charles Naylor remind colonial historians, while the 1772 regulations were significant and influential, these reforms set the character of military history for only the last half century of Spanish presence in northern New Spain, the so-called Provincias Internas. Half a century before the issuance of this reform, royal concern for military and economic reforms had

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232 *It costs the King increasing sums of money to support the military in the provinces, and he pays it with the idea that the people [military personnel] are useful for carrying out the royal service.* Rubio to Ripperdá, ordering circulation [of instructions] on management of presidial troops, BA August 16, 1777

233 In 1689–90 Alonso de León, governor of the Spanish province of Coahuila, extended his authority to include Texas. Early in 1691 he was succeeded by Domingo Terán de los Ríos, who was appointed governor of Coahuila and Texas. In 1693, however, Spain withdrew the Catholic missions from East Texas, and it was not until 1716 that Martín de Alarcón, who had been appointed governor of Coahuila in 1702, re-extended his control over Texas. Alarcón was succeeded by the Marqués de Aguayo, whose activities resulted in the separation of the two provinces around 1726, during the time of his successor, Fernando Pérez de Almazán. The provinces were governed separately, with the capital of Texas at Los Adaes and that of Coahuila at Monclova. By the Constitution of 1824, the Mexican provinces of Nuevo León, Coahuila, and Texas were united as one state. Nuevo León was detached on May 7, 1824. Vito Alessio Robles, *Coahuila y Texas en la época colonial* (Mexico City: Editorial Cultura, 1938; 2d ed., Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1978).

234 Brinckerhoff and Faulk 6-7

235 Moorhead 95
already been made manifest when Felipe V ordered an inspection of the presidios in the Northern provinces.236

The opening statement by Carlos III of the 1772 Regulations left no question about the goals he hoped to achieve in his September 10 cédula stating, in part

como los presidios internos de mi reino de Nueva España se erigieron, y mantienen á tanta costa con el importante objeto de defender en aquellas fronteras las vidas y haciendas de mis vasallos, de los insultos de las naciones bárbaras, ya sea conteniéndolas y alejándolas con el escarmiento, ó ya consiguiendo por este medio y el del buen trato con los prisioneros ó rendidos, reducirlos a sociedad, y atraerlos al conocimiento de la verdadera religión; y como la experiencia (mayormente en estos últimos tiempos) acredita que lejos de lograrse tan piadosos fines, crece cada día el número y la osadía de los indios enemigos, y se multiplican los estragos de aquellas provincias [...] como también crear el empleo de inspector comandante de ellos, con el objeto de que dirija y combine sus expediciones y servicio, y de que mantenga y cele la uniformidad y más puntual observancia de lo que ordeno en los títulos siguientes.237

Upon the departure of Croix as commandant general in 1783, Felipe de Neve, the commandant inspector of the Provincias Internas, ascended to his new role and, having complete confidence in his predecessor’s policies of reform, assumed the same authority that Croix had exercised.238

Where it concerned the military, Neve had apparently been especially impressed with the discipline of the troops, officers’ instruction and training, and demonstrated efficiency in the availability of supplies.239 Nonetheless, on October 1, 1783, Neve transmitted a royal order from the Viceroy Matías de Gálvez that may well have reflected the stability of the presidial state of affairs and his deep-rooted loyalty to Croix and his efficient maintenance of the soldiers and citizenry of New Spain’s frontier. Gálvez indicated that King Carlos, having recognized that

237 Brinckerhoff and Faulk 12-13
238 Moorhead 95-98
239 However, it should be noted that on October 28, 1783 Neve issued instructions to commanders throughout the provinces that one particular activity among the presidial troops was to be outlawed. He considered card playing to have the “consistent effect of distracting them [the soldiers] from duties to which their entire attention should be applied [giving] them cause to alienate their horses, uniforms, and riding equipment and to become involved in other bad practices which out to be prevented,”. He further admonished the commanders to “set an example” for their subordinates on the assumption that they would be held “strictly responsible for any permissiveness, tolerance, or disorder” that might result from this practice. Neve to Cabello, BA, October 28, 1783
hostilities had ceased and peace had been established in his overseas domains, ordered a cessation of the one-time contribution – of one peso, from both “free” and “other” status people \( \text{[asi libres como de las otras castas]} \), and two pesos from Spaniards and nobles, including “any distinguished persons \( \text{[quantos sugetos distinguidos]} \)” – required for the maintenance of the defense of the crown against assaults by the enemy \( \text{[en defensa de la Corona contra los ynsultos de los enemigos]} \).\textsuperscript{240}

The royal cedula was issued on Agusut 17, 1780 and since communications could be sluggish, Neve directed Governor Cabello to collect any incoming contributions and send them to the royal treasury in San Luís Potosí, rather than the royal coffers in Spain.\textsuperscript{241}

\textbf{2.2 STRATEGIZING IN THE BORDERLANDS: OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MANEUVERS}

Offensive operations against the Apaches across the borderlands had ramifications for the compañías volantes, as well. A royal order of June 27, 1782 obligated Croix, and now, Neve, to renew incessant campaigns each month against the enemy, further requiring troops to rotate their offensive and defensive strategies so that, at any one time, a third of the frontier force was in constant pursuit. On November 26, 1783 Neve arranged for Lieutenant José Menchaca of the presidio at San Juan Bautista del Río Grande to be promoted to the role of commander of the presidio at Aguaverde, even though Neve’s predecessor, the Marqués de Croix, had pre-arranged for Lieutenant Pedro López to fulfill the same duties at Aguaverde. Menchaca’s vacancy was then filled by Juan Antonio de Arce, formerly of the presidio at the confluence of the Río del Norte and the Conchos River, due to the death of its captain Juan Antonio Serrano.\textsuperscript{242} What becomes clear is that Felipe de Neve had intimate knowledge of specific soldiers, perhaps based upon his careful review of military service records across the years, and thus was capable of repositioning those deemed sufficiently talented to fulfill specific appointments at installations across the borderlands. In his role as comandante general, Neve’s opinion of a soldier’s worth in this specific instance was held in higher regard and, therefore, could override even a provincial governor’s distaste for

\textsuperscript{240} Neve to Cabello, […] contributions for maintenance of war, BA October 1, 1783
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid
\textsuperscript{242} Neve to Cabello, giving instructions for the fulfillment of lieutenant’s position at Béxar, BA November 26, 1783
the same soldier. On other occasions, a pro-active soldier might directly petition the commander general as a method for career stability.

For example, in November 1783, Captain Luis Cazorla appealed to Neve in order to continue service in the borderlands in spite of a negative critique of his military performance. The disparaging remarks stemmed from an inspection review of the presidio at La Bahía del Espíritu Santo made by Governor Domingo Cabello earlier that year. As further evidence of Neve’s powerful sway, the decision to transfer Cazorla back to his captaincy at La Bahía was made after the King himself had already awarded the captain a detachment to the dragoon regiment in the district of the viceroyalty, that is, Mexico City. In an effort to appease Cabello in what may have appeared to be a dismissal of his charges against Cazorla, the Commander General assured the Governor that the reinstated Captain would make honorable satisfaction to Cabello the way he apparently stated that he would do [que a su transito dé a usted una satisfacción honorífica por el modo en que extendió la respectiva a cargos que le hizo usted]. These types of logistical maneuvers were instrumental to mitigating disruptions to intra-military relations and, by extension, asserting colonial authority in New Spain’s often contentious frontier.

The strategy of deploying incessant campaigns against the hostile indigenous groups demanded the well-planned partitioning of the soldiers where they were most needed and in a manner that was expeditious and productive. In 1782, Neve grouped the presidial companies and the flying squadrons into divisions, each consisting of one-third of the soldiers from two or more companies; Sonora had four such divisions with a total campaign force of 268 troops; Nueva Vizcaya had four, also, with 328 troops; there were two in Coahuila with 170; and, one division in Texas with fifty-six. But, by late 1784, comandante general José Antonio Rengel noticed that, in general, soldiers on campaign returned to the presidios (or places from where they made their exit), as soon as they had dealt any blow to the enemy, even after only seeing four, six, or eight

243 Neve to Cabello, announcing the return of Luis Cazorla to La Bahía, BA November 27, 1783
244 Moorhead 96-97
days in action. Though the Reglamento of 1772 required active and incessant war against the hostile Indians, nowhere in its content was a required duration of engagement in campaigns directed against the enemy indicated for their subjugation by the troops. Thus Rengel found it necessary to remind the Governor of Texas of provisions that had previously been communicated for soldiers to remain on campaigns for a month, more or less [un mes poco más, o menos], being suitable to the best service to the King [al mejor servicio del Rey]. Rengel suggested to Cabello the flaw detected in the prevailing belief that, since the troops had been spotted by the enemy, it was impossible to deal them a second blow. Further, in order to overcome this hesitation on the part of the soldiers, and, more practically, to obscure from the enemy the track taken by the presidiales, Rengel stated to Cabello that commanders of those detachments on maneuvers had the option of choosing the direction that appeared most practical. Built into Rengel’s strategizing of campaign outcomes was the idea of sending back the spoils of conflict with some of the troops, and when they were near a populated area, informing the men of the site where they might rejoin the rest of the company.

However, on February 16, 1785, Cabello presented compelling reasons for the extreme difficulty that his Texas companies would encounter by leaving the presidios for a month or more per Rengel’s orders. Prefacing his explanation to his commander, Cabello reminded Rengel that the latter’s predecessor, Felipe de Neve, was well informed as comandante inspector when he visited Béxar in May and June of 1783; apparently, the matter was discussed at length [en que tratamos bien prolixamente sobre este asunto]. The conclusion reached at that time was that Neve left to Cabello the latter’s discretion at making sorties and sweeps [las salidas y cortadas]; these maneuvers continued on the same terms that had existed up to the period of Rengel’s observations, and which were still in place. Emphasizing his opinion, Cabello explained to

245 Rengel to Cabello, regulating duration of military campaigns against the enemy, BA December 9, 1784
246 Reglamento...1772, Título decimo, artículo uno
247 Rengel to Cabello, regulating duration of military campaigns against the enemy, BA December 9, 1784
248 Cabello to Rengel, discussing difficulties in following orders concerning duration of campaigns by Texas troops, BA February 16, 1785
Rengel that it was not possible for troops from the presidios at Bahía and at Béxar to leave on campaigns and remain for the period of one month or more because of 1) the small number of troops that would then remain at the presidio, thus increasing the fort’s vulnerability to attack and, 2) when it was necessary to go out on any general sorties [salidas generales], it became essential to make use of the citizenry and Indians from the missions of both presidios. These groups could not defray the costs of being away from their homes for a month [los que no pueden sufragar el mantenerse un mes fuera de sus casas] and it was difficult and costly for them to equip themselves with supplies and horses necessary for that length of time.\textsuperscript{249} Further, Cabello explained that it was impossible to make sorties with the troops alone, because of the slight number of them [por lo diminuta de ella (la tropa)], Thus, in making the customary sweeps [las cortadas que se acostumbran], success was feasible only during those times when the company was enlarged and reinforced with those residents and mission Indians considered most fitting [aparentes] for military exercises.\textsuperscript{250}

However, even with extensive preparation, Cabello indicated that the increased participants in punitive campaigns could never exceed one hundred troops. In pursuit of various hostiles, campaigns were generally unsuccessful since the indigenous enemies, and specifically the Comanche, arriving in small parties, would divide, usually into two entities, and subsequently head for the hilly areas where virtually all of the presidials’ horses stumbled.\textsuperscript{251} After committing hostilities, the Karankawas, a group that established themselves on the northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico, escaped in a sufficient number of small boats and returned to their settlements. On one occasion, Cabello indicated that when the troops came to the beach and witnessed the mode of transportation at the Karankawas’ disposal, they were unable to continue their pursuit.\textsuperscript{252}

Given such challenges to successful military performance, Cabello did not hesitate to convey these examples from an on-the-ground perspective to his commander. Indeed, the most

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid
\textsuperscript{250} Ibid
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid
compelling part of Cabello’s argument in defense of the short-term campaigns of his Texas *presidiales* was his assertion that, rather than planning campaigns in advance, it was more appropriate for his men to perform the maneuver of sweeping around the outskirts [*hacer la operación de cortar sus circunferencias* (sic)] of the immediate locale. His rationale was practical: with few remaining troops left at the presidio, there would be no soldiers available to relieve the guard or the horse herd detachment, let alone men with which to form the escort for the mail pouch. The lack of neighboring settlements at both Béxar and La Bahía put the troops, and their ability to provide even the slightest assistance to one by the other, at great disadvantage. Indeed, the presidio at San Juan de Bautista del Río Grande presented the greatest challenge for the Texas troops’ facility in providing immediate assistance, given not only its distance but its being under the command of a different governor.\(^{253}\)

### 2.3 FINDING THE VOLANTES

Though the flying squadrons are not specifically mentioned in the Cabello-Rengel document, the notion of the *volantes*’ peregrinations between presidios and along the defensive corridor in the Spanish colonial frontier emerges in one telling comment by Governor Cabello. Here was a soldier who clearly had no hesitation about conveying to his superior the crux of his argument about each of the presidios under his command. He recommended that the presidios at, both, Béxar and La Bahía should be manned with three hundred soldiers each since, as he stated, each one by itself should be operated along the distance intervening between one and the next [*debe operar cada uno de ellos por la distancia que intermedia del uno al otro*].\(^{254}\)

In the previous chapter, a tally from the de la Cueva account of September 1791 in the bookkeeping records disclosed the presence of soldiers from the *compañías volantes*. The emergence of the flying squadrons warrants further discussion since the periodization of their appearance in the borderlands remains ambiguous. The initial formation of two new *compañías*

\(^{253}\) Ibid

\(^{254}\) Cabello to Rengel, discussing difficulties in following orders concerning duration of campaigns by Texas troops, BA February 16, 1785
volantes from Nueva Vizcaya was a major accomplishment for Teodor de Croix, who collected soldiers at Saltillo on August 1, 1783, a few days before he left office. However, the formation of the second of the two companies, stationed at Parras, was completed by Neve on February 1, 1784; the principal function of both was to protect the nearby region from invading Apaches and, in their emerging role as an offensive force, to expel invaders from the Bolsón de Mapimí, the internal drainage shared by the present day Mexican states of Durango, Chihuahua, and Coahuila.255 Expulsion proved to be a challenge since many raiding indigenous groups used the Bolsón as a staging area for attacks against frontier settlements occupied by pacified native communities and Spaniards. When military forces engaged in punitive campaigns, unconquered Indians sought refuge in the most desolate areas of the bolsón, a huge dry sink of scarce pasture and water; their strategy proved an effective method for ambush when thirsty and weakened horses and soldiers entered the area.256 Whether the Parras and Nueva Vizcaya companies were effective and, therefore, necessary became a key issue of concern for the taxpayers who supported them.257 Despite the squadrons’ presence, like-minded groups in the borderlands complained of suffering from repeated Indian attacks. Above all, they expressed concerns that the two new companies were ineffective to the degree that the communities indicated that they themselves could better provide for their own defense.258 However, more significant changes affecting the geography itself of the colonial frontier would impact the strategic positioning of military establishments across the territory.

255 Moorhead, 98.
256 Hadley and Naylor, 18-19.
257 Assessing the Rubí Expedition of 1766-1768, Jack Jackson suggests that the problems of defending vulnerable settlements existed long before Rubí arrived in the Coahuila y Téjas borderlands; indeed, by the time Croix reached Monclova to begin his role as Commandant General, he called for a council of war in December of 1777 to assess the defensive needs of the frontier. Other juntas convened at Béjar in January 1778 and Chihuahua in July of the same year. However, at Monclova it became clear that powerful property owners like the Aguayo family wanted the troops pulled back to protect their herds of livestock, functioning more like private security guards rather than patrol units operating on many levels ranging from protection to rescue and interception. When Croix levied taxes to raise militia units to satisfy the desires and thus quell the complaints of the Aguayos and other hacendados, those landowners were as quick to denounce the new commandant general just as they had Rubí. Jack Jackson. Imaginary Kingdom, Texas as Seen by the Rivera and Rubí Military Expeditions, 1727 and 1767 (Austin: Texas Historical Association, 1995), 218-219.
258 See Chapter 4.1 for a discussion of both of these units and their significance within the Instrucción of 1786.
In December 1786, Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez divided the Provincias Internas into two commandencies, Eastern and Western, an idea that, ironically, had been recommended by Croix a decade earlier. Juan de Ugalde was named commanding general of the Provincias Internas de Oriente, composed of Coahuila y Téjas, Nuevo León, and Nuevo Santander. The Provincias Internas del Poniente – sometimes referred to as Oeste – included the Californias, Sonora, New Mexico, and Nueva Vizcaya; these areas were put under the authority of Jacobo de Ugarte y Loyola. Both officers remained subordinate to the viceroy, but, in most areas of decision making, authority rested in their best judgment.259

Where it concerned the flying squadrons, Viceroy Gálvez’s directives appear to suggest the cessation of certain responsibilities to which they had become accustomed; in article twenty-one of the Instrucción of 1786, Gálvez states that

> in order to facilitate the offensive operations of this incessant [Apache] warfare and of the defense of each province, you and the chief assistants [Ugalde, Rengel, and Ugarte; the latter was commander general at the time Gálvez wrote the instructions260] should distribute the troops of your respective commands in the most advantageous posts […] They should be excused […] from useless escort duty, inappropriate courier service […].261

Article 91 of the Instrucciones indicates that his commanders

> should immediately prepare to eliminate the unfit men from presidial companies, flying companies [compañías volantes, my emphasis], dragoons and volunteers, replacing them with those more suitable for warfare.262

The Gálvez instrucciones broadly defined the personal characteristics required for service among the military’s borderlanders. Article 95 articulated the qualities esteemed by the Viceroy as those characteristics evinced, both, the commanders’ ability to discern promising soldiers fit for ascension in the ranks; but, also, those found in the soldiers themselves. When elevating soldiers to the position of officers, the content of this article reveals the social dimensions potentially

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259 Bernardo de Gálvez, Donald E. Worcester, ed. Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces of New Spain, 1786 by Bernardo de Gálvez (Berkeley: The Quivira Society, 1951), 218-219; hereafter Gálvez, Instrucciones…1786
260 Gálvez, Instrucciones, artículos veinte uno.
261 Ibid
262 Ibid, artículo noventa y uno
impacting the decisions in selecting men for these vacant posts and that recommendations were to be made

with the zeal, excellence, and spirit of justice which his majesty decrees, neither dark color nor circumstances of birth being obstacles to the sergeant or officer who has merit, courage, wisdom, experience, aptitude for warfare, and who is capable of taking command.\textsuperscript{263}

In some instances, preferential treatment of soldiers may have occurred as a result of the notoriety, or, military standing of their parental lineage. Earlier, in December 1783, Felipe de Neve directed Texas governor Domingo Cabello to place the two sons of Lieutenant Colonel Athanase de Méziéres, previously stationed at Natchitoches, in any vacant post of alférez, and the other as a cadet in either of Cabellos’ two companies.\textsuperscript{264} Neve’s predecessor, Teodor de Croix had earlier encouraged Cabello to attend to the French colonel because his rank, distinguished service, and especially his knowledge, experience and acceptance among the native inhabitants of the provinces rendered him deserving of appreciation by the new Texas governor.\textsuperscript{265}

Alternately, assigning troops to offensive campaigns had the potential to place commanders in tenuous positions when it involved making decisions that would ensure troop safety and presidio security, while at the same time accommodating a superior’s orders. This became evident in the tense Cabello-Rengel discussion of the duration of campaigns by the Texas troops. Apart from the established hierarchy of the army’s ranking system, conflictive episodes allowed presidio commanders to invoke their military acumen in order to determine what was best for the local environment and still effectuate strategies to acquiesce to, or refute, orders from above. Much of this situational strategizing among military personnel proved necessary for

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid, \textit{artículo noventa y cinco}

\textsuperscript{264} BA, Neve to Cabello, concerning military appointments of De Méziéres’ sons, BA Dec 18, 1783. Athanase de Méziéres began his military career in Louisiana as an ensign at Natchitoches and later became the largest slave owner and tobacco producer in the region. As a result of his impressive network of allies among the Texas native peoples, developed through years of mutually beneficial trading, Méziéres often served as an arbiter between the Spaniards and the Indians. By 1778, Commandant General Croix enlisted the expertise of Méziéres after a council of war recommended that the Frenchman travel to Texas for a unified campaign by the Spanish and \textit{norteños} (Kichai, Tawakoni, Taovayas, and Comanche) against the Lipan Apaches. See also F. Todd Smith, “Athanase de Méziéres and the French in Texas, 1750-1803” in \textit{The French in Texas}, Francois Lagarde, ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003) 46-55.

\textsuperscript{265} Croix to Cabello, BA October 4, 1778
presidio captains, especially in Texas, and involved maintaining respect for a superior’s rank and seniority. One scenario emerged in August 1791 when Captain Juan Cortés declared that he would have no personal responsibility for the anticipated disastrous results that might come to pass at his presidio, La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, as a result of a directive received from the Governor of Téjas, Manuel Muñoz. The order was to detach twenty-five troops, from the Bahía company, to the Paso de los Caballos. It seems doubtful that this detachment was a pre-existing compañía volante. In response, Cortés was appropriately respectful towards Muñoz, crediting the wisdom of the governor’s strategy; moreover, Cortés acknowledged that he understood Muñoz’s order as one aimed at providing the best service to the king and to the welfare of the king’s subjects.266

Nevertheless, like Cabello in the earlier exchange with his commander General Rengel, Cortés did not waver in his desire to demonstrate to his superior that fulfilling the governor’s order would jeopardize the force left to protect the Bahía presidio. Cortés requested that Governor Muñoz indicate what strength in numbers the horse-herd detachment would have; how many troops should be in the security guard of the presidio; and, whether or not the company would carry out commands for multiple incidents likely to occur after the departure for Paso de los Caballos. Cortés was unequivocal in stating that the loss of twenty-five troops, even if only temporary, could have potentially disastrous results. Ultimately, Cortés made it clear that his troops could not be effective at their current numbers and that the detachment could not depart until Governor Muñoz detailed the assignments for the Bahía presidio.267

In contesting his superior’s directive by indicating his trepidation about fulfilling the request, Captain Cortés conveyed his lack of confidence in Governor Muñoz’s proposed detachment of Bahía troops for a maneuver that, in essence, took away one part to place it in another, leaving a void that could potentially invite disaster. In the end, Cortés’ response achieved its goal. The governor offered a response that upheld his plan’s “reasonable aim” of reinforcing

266 Cortés to Muñoz, […] danger in leaving the presidio unguarded by sending troops on expedition against Indians, BA August 12, 1791
267 Ibid
the troops in a campaign and other operations that he considered indispensable against the enemies who sought to attack the communities of his jurisdiction. However, acknowledging the validity of potential problems that Cortés imagined were forthcoming, Muñoz cancelled his order of the Bahía detachment, and made other plans to punish the indigenous troublemakers in their own territory and rancherías.\textsuperscript{268} The Cortés-Muñoz exchange provides yet another glimpse into the relationships forged in the borderlands presidios during times of conflict and in an atmosphere of apprehension about an often hostile environment. An interpretive effort to explore who these soldiers were and how their individual personalities shaped life on the frontier is critical to understanding the social milieu of the presidio and its environs.

2.4 Military Service Records: Formatting the Borderlands Soldier

Much of what scholars understand about the identities of colonial borderlands military personnel stems from the individual service records of each soldier within a larger unit in the form of a company or squadron. The formatting of the one-page, often pre-printed document that functions as a soldier’s military service record\textsuperscript{269}, gives the individual’s name, age, their ‘\textit{pais},’ that is, their place of birth; their ‘\textit{calidad},’ or, rank but often intended to suggest their social status, irrespective of their ethnic composition; and, the condition of their health, or, ‘\textit{salud};’ with rare exception, indicated as ‘\textit{robusta}.’ Then, the heading of each template indicates the ‘services and circumstances’ [\textit{sus servicios y circunstancias los que expresa}] of each soldier, a formatting that includes: documenting the precise date of the beginning of the soldier’s service and his job [\textit{empleo}], or, rank when he first enlisted. What follows is a chronological trajectory of service indicated by the precise years, months, and days of each soldier’s tenure while in the various ranks held that demonstrate, in most cases, a rise in rank. Each soldier’s service record then culminates

\textsuperscript{268} Ibid
\textsuperscript{269} The documents used as reference materials are originals of military service records housed in microfilm depositories at the Bexar Archives in Austin, Texas, the Center for Southwest Research at the University of New Mexico’s Zimmerman Library, and the New Mexico State Records and Archives in Santa Fé.

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in a running total of time served in the military up to the end of the year profiled; in this case, always December.270

Directly beneath the tally of each soldier’s service, the form then indicates the regiment and company in which the soldier served, and then records the campaigns and military operations, or, acts of war [acciones de guerra] of each soldier. This section of the service record provides the most obvious shift in the template’s strict formatting of vital information. What emerges are the documents’ more personalized aspect, presenting individualized, albeit truncated and narrowly focused, biographies by shedding light on each soldier’s accomplishments on the battlefield. Those aspects of the service record overtly place an emphasis on engagements with various indigenous groups. Since the commandante inspector had established an offensive strategy for the maintenance of the presidial line’s impenetrability, the soldiers of the companies came into frequent contact with Apaches; thus, under orders from various officials, the killing and capturing of Apaches and the recovery of horses is made plain. Finally, indicated in the lower right hand corner of the template, the one-word handwritten notes of the captain reveal personal characteristics too often absent in service records. The importance of substantiating military personnel job performance within the confines of a one-page official instrument from colonial army protocol cannot be overstated. Their inclusion on authorized registers provide further insight into individual soldiers’ identities, behavioral tendencies, and social statuses.

2.5 SOLDIERS: STATUS, HEALTH, AND SERVICE IN THE MILITARY RECORDS

The military service record of Cadet Santiago Abreu, thirty-eight years old, from Barcelona, lists his status as ‘noble’ and his health as ‘robust.’ Abreu served as a cadet from July

270 There were times when such records were unavailable and it becomes clear that a conscientious soldier with the responsibility of just such recordkeeping might have to make inquiry of others, often his superiors, in order to secure such documents. It is no surprise that Captain Juan Cortés was one such officer. In Dec 1791, he notified Governor Muñoz that the service records of the officers, cadet, and sergeants of the Bahia presidio troops were not in that company’s archive. He required those that were sent to the previous Governor, Martinez Pacheco so that he could make copies of each one and then return the cache to the government. Muñoz responded with an enclosure of the service records of all the soldiers so requested by Cortés and for the past years, presumably 1791 and 1790, and up until December of each year. […] Cortés to Muñoz, concerning format for military service reports, BA December 10 [-11], 1791
10, 1789 for five years and six months, and then as second alférez from January 10, 1795 for two years, for a total of seven years, six months served. As a cadet, he was stationed with the northern Presidio [presidial, perhaps Texas, more than likely El Paso del Norte] and the first [compañía] volante de Nueva Vizcaya. After that, he was stationed at the Presidio of Santa Fé, as the second lieutenant. Following the orders of the Governor of the Province of New Mexico, he put together a campaign in which he killed Indians, captured others, and took the beasts that remained. His supervisor described his valor in this way: “se le supone,” [it is assumed]; and, aplicación [the soldier’s dedication to task] “regular”; capacidad [ability]: “lo mismo [the same, i.e. ‘regular’]”; conducta: “Buena”; estado: “casado”.271

By the end of 1795, Second Alférez José Ronquillo had completed nineteen campaigns under the orders of various captains and other officers of the provinces and, in those, he either killed or apprehended twenty-one Apaches, the rescue of more than eight thousand beasts, and had distinguished himself with good performance in an engagement with the enemies on the big hill [cerro grande] of San Buena Ventura.272

One of the older soldiers, already discussed in this study, First Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez, fifty-seven years old, had his country of origin listed as the presidio de Béxar, his status as ‘honrrada [sic],’ his health is described as good, and his service is thus noted: he served in the cavalry company of the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar for thirty-three years and had also served in the compañía volante (the numerical unit of the company is not indicated) up until December 1797, and in sixteen of the duties of the Béxar presidio’s cavalry company, in engagements which cost forty-two Comanches their lives, with two taken by Rodríguez himself, and the capture of one hundred nineteen horses, without many dead animals left [despojos]. However, under the notes of the inspector, whose name is not indicated, the following sentence is written: ‘debes correjirse y si no se le separarás’ [You need to correct yourself and if not, you will be leaving]. In describing

271 Military service record of Santiago Abreu, December 1796, Center for Southwest Research, Inventory of the Spanish Archives II, 1621-1821; hereafter CSWR, SAII.
272 Military service record of José Ronquillo, December 1795, CSWR, SAII.
his valor, only one word is written: *tiene* [he has it]; and, perhaps suggesting the reason behind the directive given to Rodríguez in the inspector’s notes, his conduct is described as bad [*mala*].

It seems doubtful that Rodríguez, after thirty-three years as a cavalryman with one of the flying squadrons and, more significantly, as a first sergeant, would have not been familiar with the duties of a soldier of his rank. Indeed, the royal regulations of 1772 prescribe the obligations of his office as indicated in Title 13, number 10:

*Debe el sargento saber de memoria todas las obligaciones del soldado y cabo, y las leyes penales para enseñarlas y hacerlas cumplir en su compañía, no disimular cualquier desorden, conversación prohibida, ó especie que pueda tener trascendencia contra la subordinación, contener y remediar por sí lo que en el instante pueda, y dar parte después á su inmediato gefe [sic], haciéndose respetar del soldado por su buena conducta y observancia, y por el respeto y subordinación que le noten hacia sus oficiales.*

As we shall see, events in February of 1792 suggest that Rodríguez’s history as a career soldier entailed conflict among his colleagues that involved damaging testimony from Francisco Amangual.

Another veteran soldier, Second Lieutenant Don Manuel Menchaca, forty-two years old, from Monclova, whose status is listed as ‘honrrada[sic],’ and his health described as ‘robust,’ served for twenty-five years, seven months, and was a member of the “[Compañía]Volante de Santiago del [sic] Saltillo.” Menchaca was stationed at the presidio of Monclova and, subsequently, at San Antonio de Béjar, where he continued his service, was elected paymaster, and eventually promoted to First Alférez. He participated in seven campaigns, the last one on the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Miguel José de Emparar, Governor of Coahuila, where he participated in five engagements [*funciones*] with the enemies and various ‘mariscadas’ in their pursuit [*persecución*].

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273 Military service record of Mariano Rodríguez, December 1796, CSWR, SAI.
274 *Reglamentos ... 1772, Título trece, artículo diez, Funciones y facultades del capitán y demás oficiales, sargentos, cabos, soldados y capellán.*
275 Military service record of Manuel Menchaca, December 1796, CSWR, SAI.
First Alférez José Gonvacio de Silva, forty-seven years old, from Querétaro, who shared the same status – *honradda* – as Second Lieutenant Menchaca, and served twenty-six years in the provincial cavalry of Querétaro, and in the *compañía volante* of Nuevo Reyno de León as a sergeant. Thereafter, he continued with the flying squadron of San Juan Bautista de Lampasos [sic], until he was promoted to alférez of the presidio de San Antonio de Béjar where he served four years, four months. He participated in various pursuits of enemy Indians, capturing two and retrieving ten sheep. His valor is described as ‘it shows [lo manifiesta],’ and, under the notes of the Inspector, de Silva is described as a ‘regular official of the company’.276

Second Lieutenant, Juan de Urrutia, twenty-six years old, from Sevilla, has his status listed as “hidalgo”277 with his health described as robust. He served as a cadet for six years, from July 25, 1789 for six years, nine months, and nineteen days; and, then as second lieutenant for only twenty-one days, that is, from Dec 10, 1795 to the end of that year, for a total of six years, ten months, and ten days. Urrutia served in the company of the cavalry of the Presidio of the Prince [Presidio del Príncipe, active 1778 to 1804278] as a cadet, and in the fourth flying squadron as a second lieutenant. He performed in nine campaigns, and six *correrías* [forays] in which he killed sixteen Indian males, two Indian females, took prisoners and horses, and accomplished all of this with ‘valor.’279

The military service record of Lieutenant Miguel Mena, whose country is listed as ‘the town of Babonoyaba [Chihuahua]’ with his status indicated as ‘Spanish’ and his health ‘robust,’ was forty-five years old with twenty-five years of service. He began his career on August 1, 1770 as a “soldier,” steadily ascending in the ranks as a corporal, sergeant, second Second Lieutenant,

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276 Military service record of José Gonvacio de Silva, December 1796, CSWR, SAI1.
277 The term ‘hidalgo’ usually indicated a title of nobility with origins dating to the Iberian Reconquest. In 1575, King Felipe II ordered that all those Spaniards who participated in the “pacification of the American Indies” would receive the title of *hijo daígo* (a contraction of *hijo de algo*), literally translated as ‘son of someone or something.’ Nieto-Phillips further states that such recipients of the title would enjoy the honors and privileges that corresponded to the customs and laws of Spain. John Nieto-Phillips, *The Language of Blood: The Making of Spanish-American Identity in New Mexico, 1880s – 1930s* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008), 24 - 25.
279 Military service record of Juan de Urrutia by Marcos Reañe, December 1795, CSWR, SAI1.
and then, first Second lieutenant and, finally, as a Lieutenant. Throughout his military career, he served in the Second and Fourth flying squadrons and in campaigns and various *corredurías*\(^{280}\) in which he captured several prisoners and took three captives from the enemies, many beasts and horses: he had distinguished combat performance, sustaining an attack with twenty men against sixty of the enemies, presumably Indians, killing one of them.\(^{281}\)

The second Second Lieutenant\(^{282}\), forty-four year old Juan Truxillo served for twenty-three years, six months, and twenty-seven days in capacities ranging from soldier, to corporal, to sergeant, to second lieutenant. During that time, he served in the flying squadrons – apparently several, though no specific units are identified – of the Army of Nueva Vizcaya. In eight campaigns and various *corredurías*, he had killed, with his hands, four *gandules*\(^{283}\) and one woman, and his squadron had captured quite a few *piezas*. The service record indicates that the second lieutenant was successful three times in combat with weapons. Apparently, Truxillo was quite the warrior and distinguished himself as a fighting man; curiously, however, under the section of the service record template “*informe del*” ['report of the'] is the handwritten sentence: *poco se puede esperar de este oficial* [little can be expected from this officer]. Since the captain of the company Alberto Maynez indicated that Truxillo’s bravery was ‘regular,’ his dedication, ‘the same,’ his capacity as ‘medium, and his conduct as ‘good,’ the statement on the report of the low estimation of what could be expected from Officer Truxillo is perplexing. Without any further information that might illuminate such a seemingly incongruous opinion about this soldier, especially as it appears on the

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\(^{280}\) The word ‘*correduría*’ may be a substitution for the word ‘*correría,*’ a term used to describe raids, forays, short trips, or excursions. The author is grateful for the insight of John Wheat, long-time translator of Spanish colonial documents at the Center for American History housed on the campus of the University of Texas in Austin, Texas.

\(^{281}\) Military service record of Miguel Mena by Marcos Reañe, December 1796, CSWR, SAI.

\(^{282}\) In the ranks of Spanish colonial military personnel, there could be two second lieutenants: one, the first Second lieutenant; and the next, the second Second lieutenant. Then, the next rank above was, simply, Second Lieutenant. It is interesting to note that, similarly, there can be two First Sergeants.

\(^{283}\) In one colonial text, ‘*gandules*’ are described as indigenous males, age fifteen or older, ‘braves,’ agile and able to escape. De la Teja indicates that the term stemmed from the Arabic *gandür*, dandy or braggart, in medieval Spain, and was also used for a member of a Moorish militia. By the eighteenth century, the term could also describe someone who was a rogue, rascal, or, a vagabond. On the Mexican colonial frontier, the term came to refer to an indigenous warrior. Jesús de la Teja and John Wheat, “Ramón de Murillo’s Plan for the Reform of New Spain’s Frontier Defenses,” *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, v.7, n.4 (April 2004), 501-533.
service record – with one section praising the accomplishments while another section seems to disparage even the possibility that Truxillo would achieve future success — then, we must assume that his commanding officer may have been conveying the hope that Officer Truxillo would retire from the force.\textsuperscript{284}

Retirement afforded an avenue out of military life. With the passage of time, borderlands soldiers might see their careers cut short by physical incapacity; in July of 1777, \textit{comandante inspector} Rubio advised Governor Ripperdá that, in a circular sent to the presidio at La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, the King would not support soldiers incapable of performing their military service. Rubio included twelve blank licenses in order to have them filled out by the individuals of Ripperdá’s company at the presidio of San Antonio de Béjar, and those of La Bahía who might have become so disabled as to not follow a military career. In a poignant last line of the letter, Rubio advises Ripperdá to: ‘always keep in mind [:] do not let your strength decline.’\textsuperscript{285} Months later, in December of the same year, Ripperdá responded that he informed the captain at La Bahía of the King’s order, and that one of the enclosed licenses had been filled out by a soldier stationed at that presidio; though the disability is not mentioned, continuing a military career was not possible for this unnamed soldier. Moreover, one soldier from Ripperdá’s company at Béjar also filled out a license for incapacity. In both scenarios, replacements were to be immediately available.\textsuperscript{286}

Second Alférez Andrés Mateos from Mogrovejo, Calabria (Spain) had “honored” status, robust health, and by December 1795, at thirty-eight years of age, he had served in the military for nineteen years, three months, and nine days. He was a soldier and corporal in the Regiment of the King’s Dragoons for thirteen years, and served from February 20, 1792 in the Third Flying Company [\textit{compañía volante}] as an alférez. Remarking on his military service on the Iberian peninsula, his captain Juan Francisco Granado indicates that he fought in the field at Buena Vista,
in front of Gibraltar\textsuperscript{287} from the 26 of May until the suspension of arms in 1782.\textsuperscript{288} First Sergeant \textit{graduado}, Don Juan de Dios Peña, forty-nine years old, has his country described as “Santa Fé de Nuevo México”, with “noble” status and robust health, and as having always served in the royal presidio there. He participated in nineteen campaigns against the Comanches and Apaches, and he was distinguished by his valor and knowledge.\textsuperscript{289} 

2.6 \textbf{COMMANDING THE SOLDIERS: RUBIO, RIPPERDÁ, AND MILITARY COHESION} 

The social dimensions of the soldiers’ lives prior to enlisting into the King’s army accompanied them as they began their military obligations. As we have already seen, the military records allowed commanders to make commentary on each individual soldier’s behavior and attitudes toward their service. The Regulations of 1729 and 1772 specifically addressed soldier discipline and training in, especially \textit{numeros} 27 – 72 of 1729,\textsuperscript{290} and also Title Seven, Article 1 (1772) but, in the 1772 regulation this type of training was indicated only to the extent that each soldier acquire the utmost skill and accuracy in shooting. Success at intimidating the enemy hinged upon such marksmanship. Three pounds of gunpowder constituted the presidio soldier’s yearly allotment, to be distributed in cartridges with bullets. Target practice was to be conducted in the presence of the company’s captain, with officers and others of the company included, but not at the expense of leaving the presidio and its environs unguarded.\textsuperscript{291} In June 1777, \textit{comandante general} José de Rubio found it necessary to remind Governor of Texas Juan de Ripperdá of the useful effect of shooting in the functions of war and that consummate skill depended on the soldiers being well-instructed in loading and aiming their weapons with rapidity and accuracy. Apparently, the inclusion of target practice at two Texas presidios had been ignored as had the stipulation in

\textsuperscript{287} Most likely, the record referred to Mateos’s service at the Buena Vista artillery battery located near the barracks of the same name. 
\textsuperscript{288} Military service record of Andrés Mateo, by Juan Francisco Granado, December 1796, CSWR, SAII. 
\textsuperscript{289} Military service record of Juan de Dios Peña, by Juan Francisco Granado, December 1796, CSWR, SAII. 
\textsuperscript{291} \textit{Reglamento…1772, título séptimo, artículo uno}
the *Reglamento* of 1772 pertaining to its importance and its value to the defenders of the borderlands. Rubio further advised Ripperdá that the portion of gun powder that was annually apportioned for each military post and its auxiliaries was to be used for the purpose of practice so that the “advancement” of the troops might continue.\(^\text{292}\)

Apparently, not long after this first letter, Rubio felt compelled to contact Governor Ripperdá, yet again, on June 8 as a reminder to exercise the troops in target practice. Moreover, the *comandante general* instructed Ripperdá to inform the soldiers at the presidio at La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, as well. The second letter is striking in two remarkable ways. The first, is that Rubio adopted a far more solicitous tone with Ripperdá, assuring the governor that his admonitions of enforcing target practice are not reflections of Ripperdá’s efficacy as a presidio captain, and that Rubio’s future communications would not be expressed in the same manner as the first letter’s rather presumptive approach. Second, Rubio makes clear that he values Ripperdá, presumably as a military leader, but also, that he wants to prove that his “affection and sincere friendship [“*buen afecto y sincera amistad*”] is genuine. Indeed, the General alludes to not only a mutual respect between the two men but also that, what he, Ripperdá, already has – his dedication to duty – Rubio honors.\(^\text{293}\)

That dedication to military obligations extended to the certainty that Rubio must have felt when he codified the methods for ensuring the best interests of the presidial and flying companies. Only two months after the nuanced exchange between the *Comandante Inspector* and the Governor, the importance of target practice and the specific goals to be achieved by repetitive practice emerged in a twelve page instruction that included remarks on the “school of marksmanship [*escuela o enseñanza de tirar al blanco*].” Soldiers were reminded to direct their aim to the middle of the target or object shot so that the impulse of the bullet, forced by the gunpowder, up or down the line of trajectory, could hit in the right place. To that end, the troops were to always be careful and become familiar with the sound of the fire so as to prevent any

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\(^{292}\) Rubio to Ripperdá, enforcing target practice by soldiers, BA, June 1777 [day of the month not indicated]

\(^{293}\) Rubio to Ripperdá, BA, ordering target practice by soldiers, June 8, 1777
suspicious perceptions [*aprehensiones recelosas*] that might induce them to turn their heads and alter their firing position.  

Rubio admonished the troops under his command that anxiety might cause them to not realize that a bullet always moved forward and its trajectory was impossible to change.  

In some of his official correspondence, Rubio projected a paternal demeanor, enumerating the key points of his orders as a caring father or uncle might towards adolescents in need of guidance, and this same protective approach emerges in his exchanges with captains and other officers of the presidios.

The importance of the interpersonal aspects of military life demanded adherence to regimentation and the neglect of essential military imperatives had severe consequences and especially so for commanders. On February 28, 1776, Viceroy Bucareli scolded Governor Ripperdá because of the lack of discipline among the troops of Texas, the proof of which was evinced by an event that cost the lives of several soldiers at the hands of an Indian attack. Bucareli, who had received a report from *comandante general* de Croix, was aware that the troops had not performed their duty with the necessary precautions and lacked discipline because they had not obeyed the aforementioned regulations. What made the event and its aftermath even more appalling was the stark reality that the Indians had fewer fighters than the presidials, and that there was great loss among the Spanish forces. Bucareli believed that two reasons contributed to this debacle: the first, the troops had not been trained properly and lacked discipline. The second, the Indians had Spanish weapons, thus causing the Viceroy to reiterate that many orders had been issued to prevent trading with the victorious Indians and those of Louisiana. If those orders had been fulfilled punctually, Bucareli argued, and if the peaceful Indians had not been admitted to the presidio, the Comanche might have been defeated. During the attack, the Comanche were successful at forcing back the presidio’s troops. He warned Ripperdá that all responsibility for new defeats caused by the

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294 Rubio to Ripperdá, […] instructions on management of presidial troops, BA August 16, 1777
295 Ibid; […] “dominen las aprehenciones recelosas, que les induce a menear o ‘torcer’ la cabeza, descomponer la mas firme posición haciendo movimientos estráños, concebiendo el temor de que les suceda alguna desgracia”.
aforementioned reasons would fall upon him.296 However, even one year later, Ripperdá made
known that his soldiers still lacked useful weapons and also the lack of replacement arms in the
supply of provisions in the Béxar presidio’s depository.297

Not surprisingly, one year after Bucareli’s reprimand, even the Commander Inspector José
de Rubio found it necessary to scold Ripperdá for the soldiers’ dismal collective efforts in battle.
Rubio placed the blame for these misfortunes squarely on the disorder with which the troops had
executed their maneuvers in full view of the enemy. Rubio reasoned that, often, mistakes occurred
when a more spirited soldier [el soldado mas alentado] moved out ahead of the rest of the company
in order to assail the enemy, and other soldiers scattered in great confusion; in their haste, troops
did not wait for orders from the officers, sergeants, and corporals in command. Rubio cited the
wholesale slaughter of the party led by Captain Antonio Cassimiro [sic] de Esparza; the Indians
took advantage of the presidial’s lack of cohesion and proceeded to kill the soldiers one by one.
Indeed, according to the reports, the bodies were found at considerable distance from each other.298

Rubio’s solution was to issue an order on April 24, 1778 to all the commanders of the
presidios at San Eleazario [sic], Príncipe, Norte, San Carlos, San Sabbas [sic], Babia, Monclova,
Agua Verde, Río Grande, Béxar, and Bahía del Espíritu Santo, locations that he listed in the margin
of his order. Commanders were to prohibit the disorderly practice as evinced in the Esparza
debacle. Further, they were ordered to inform all the troops that if any sergeant, corporal, or soldier
not in command should advance without orders from a superior to whom he should be subject, that
individual was to be punished for serious insubordination. Blind obedience to superiors, dictated
in the Royal Regulations by the King himself, was to be followed in all instances of presidial life
and in engagements with the enemy in the field. Captain Ripperdá certified his receipt and thus his
knowledge of Rubio’s order on June 26, 1778, and presumably his were the last hands to receive

296 Bucareli y Ursua to Ripperdá, reproaching lack of discipline and training of Béxar troops, BA February 28, 1776
297 Rubio to Ripperdá, discussing replacement of firearms at Béxar, BA May 12, 1777
298 Rubio to Ripperdá, […] instructions enforcing order and discipline among soldiers, BA April 24, 1778
acknowledgement from all other commanders, and so he would have then forwarded the final comprehensive document to the comandante inspector.299

Blind obedience was not an option for the insolent soldier who saw flight as a better choice overall. As a rule, mass desertions were not common among the borderland presidios’ troops. In at least two episodes of this type of insubordination, a lack of substantive evidence resulted in leniency extended to the presumed perpetrator. In April 1779, the military inspector of Béxar and Coahuila, Luis Cazorla, requested clemency for one of his soldiers. While taking refuge in the church located at the Presidio de la Bahía del Espíritu Santo, Manuel Méndez had been summoned to come out of the church by the then commander Lieutenant José Menchaca, and later, by the subsequent commander Eugenio Fernandez.300 Since August 1778, Méndez had alternated between imprisonment and asylum, the latter by order of the Commander at that time. Having heard a rumor that a replacement was being sought to complete his term of enlistment and that the resultant credit for his service thus far was to be rescinded, Méndez felt compelled to emerge and acknowledge his offense. He stated that the misdeed attributed to him was insubordination. 301 Apparently, an acting corporal who had authority over Méndez, inflicted bodily injury in the form of cuts to Méndez with a sword; Méndez thought the acting corporal was joking since the two were friends and, later, the two even sat down to have dinner together [y creía el agraviado que estaba chanceandose por ser amigos (come lo prueba él según dice después de sucedido el hecho se pusieron a comer juntos)]. Nevertheless, Méndez felt compelled to flee from what he perceived to be a punishment stemming from the actions of the corporal. The latter must have decided to further assert his self-anointed authority over the wounded soldier and declared Méndez a prisoner. He then sent word to the Bahía presidio, which sent for Méndez and then put him in shackles.302

299 Ibid, [Ripperdá to Rubio, June 26, 1778]
300 A royal order of September 10, 1776 indicated that military offenders [reos militares] that took asylum in the churches should be removed from such buildings with caution [se les extraiga de ella (iglesia) con cautión]. The Governor of Texas was allowed to direct the district under his command of the punishment due through orders passed on to the Commander General. The Governor was to order a detailed reason from ecclesiastical jurisdiction for all of the causes involving such soldiers. Rubio to Ripperdá, BA October 14, 1777.
301 Cazorla to Croix, recommending clemency for soldiers of La Bahía charged with desertion, BA April 7,1779
302 Ibid
Inspector Cazorla was advised of these matters by Lieutenant Menchaca and by the Alférez José Aguilar, both of whom verified that Méndez had in fact been imprisoned for insubordination towards the acting corporal in the mission. However, Cazorla expressed incredulity to comandante general Croix that Méndez endured such severe punishment *[no creí le echavan toda la ley de ordenanza]*; further, Inspector Cazorla believed that there was no justification for “one who commands [*uno que manda con otro subordinado*]” -- the acting corporal -- to be horse-playing with a subordinate nor to impose punishment at the first word that was disagreeable. In fact, he asserted to Croix that during his tenure as captain he had maintained the highest degree of discipline in the Bahía company, an atmosphere that was gradually deteriorating due to the lack of discretion perceived by Cazorla of those who commanded the presidio. Cazorla, as former captain of the Bahía presidio, expressed regret for the dramatic increase of the presidial troops’ backsliding since he had expended so much effort to bring the company up to an excellent standard at the time of his departure [*lo que me causa dolor por haverme costado tanto afan para ponerlo en el sobresaliente pie en que lo dexé*].

At the time of his petition to Croix, he revealed that the abused soldier was now in his care, and that he was keeping him at his own expense and out of pure charity [*mantendiendolo a mi costa por pura caridad*]. Cazorla’s ultimate request to the comandante inspector was for Croix to pardon the soldier in his charge and order him back into service; he believed that action would be to the benefit of the royal service. Without any further information, then, we must assume that Cazorla’s request met with favor from Croix and that the soldier Manuel Méndez returned to fulfill his enlistment requirement. Further, as a result of Cazorla’s magnanimity, Méndez may have been successful at acquiring a certain amount of emotional stability that had for some time eluded him in his job performance.

The regulations of 1772 encouraged subaltern officers to assist the presidio’s captain in maintaining order and control, stating

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303 Ibid
304 Ibid
Sentada la principal de la subordinación a sus superiores, y de la exactitud y observancia de cuanto previenen mis Ordenanzas y le manden sus gefes, es también de la obligación de estos oficiales contribuir en cuanto este de su parte al completo de las del capitán, y en su ausencia cuidar de la compañía que quede a su mando, con la misma responsabilidad y celo; además, deben saber de memoria lo prevenido en este reglamento, y las leyes penales para observarlas y hacerlas cumplir con puntualidad.305

Stringent adherence to military governance had palpable benefits for borderlands soldiers. In Texas, comandante inspector José de Rubio, who succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Hugh O’Conor,306 mandated policies to award military men for bravery and patriotism in documents to Governor Ripperdá, while acknowledging the latter’s expertise in warfare. Rubio had fair intentions [justo mira] by indicating to the officers and troops of the Provincias Internas that their acceptance and willingness to comply with their respective obligations might result in being offered favorable opportunities during their service. By observing the rules of subordination called for in the King’s ordenanzas for the army, Rubio hoped that by projecting his own additional reflections on rules ordered by the King, those musings – intended as they were not to function as mere suggestions, but, instead to evolve as mandates -- would become publicly known among military personnel in the Spanish borderlands. Moreover, Rubio made an overt reference to overseas military forces, suggesting that the presidial inhabitants, and especially the subalterns, soldiers, and the corps of the flying squadrons [cuerpo volante], honorably emulate the acquisition of glory that had made famous the armies of Europe.307

305 Reglamento ... 1772, Título trece, artículo nueve, Funciones y facultades del capitán y demás oficiales, sargentos, cabos, soldados y capellán.
306 Hugh O’Conor, an Irishman in Spain’s royal army, had served in the Regiment of Volunteers of Aragon and served in Cuba under his first cousin Marshall Alejandro O’Reilly. After a special inspection assignment to Texas in 1765, he was made provisional governor of Texas from 1767 to 1770 and eventually replaced Bernardo de Gálvez as commander of the armies in Nueva Vizcaya from 1772-1772, followed by his stint as comandante inspector of all the frontier provinces. Moorhead, 68-69. In 1773, O’Conor was the subject of a mass distribution of information between the presidios following this illustrious promotion. Viceroy Bucareli ordered Governor Ripperdá to inform the officers and troops of his presidio at Los Adaes, under his command, and those stationed at La Bahía of O’Conor’s ascension into that new role. Bucareli to Ripperdá, O’Conor’s appointment as [Commander Inspector] all interior presidios of New Spain, BA January 20, 1773.
307 Rubio to Ripperdá, enclosing regulations to award military men for bravery and patriotism, BA May 28, 1777
Thus officers were encouraged to impress upon their corporals, subalterns, and soldiers the qualities of respect and subordination coupled with strict adherence to the regulations of the frontier presidios; military men were to employ perseverance, blind obedience, and “unimpeachable honor” in their behavior, whether in command or commanded by others of higher rank. Rubio explained that an illustrious military career induced those who professed it to look for glory alongside noble, ambitious men. He felt that those qualities could be demonstrated in no better place than the public operations of a campaign, where valor, used with and abetted by talent and skill, was necessary to guide the duties of engaging the enemy and where avoidance of all confusion was recommended. 308 Given his own lengthy career in the army, Rubio likely had a keen sense of the soldiers’ occasional immaturity and inclination to gossip. He must have been aware of some soldiers' disenchantment with military life since he admonished Ripperdá to discourage conversations among the troops that in any way discredited the militia, whose numbers included veteran soldiers endowed with credit and honor [blasozón]. 309 By upholding the personal qualities of confidence and valor, frontier troops and officers would gain the attention of the Commander Inspector -- Rubio himself. In turn, he would then recommend select soldiers to the comandante general de Croix, a military man “supremely fond of justice, equity, and good men” who would subsequently pass on the information to the King who had the ultimate authority to potentially designate rewards to the troops. 310

2.7 REVIEWING THE COMPañíAS VOLANTES, AND THE THIRD FLYING SQUADRON

The Royal Regulations mandated annual reviews of the presidios to be conducted either personally, by the comandante inspector, or through one of the two assistants that were assigned to him, dividing the frontier posts with them, or, between them. The Inspector was to focus his

308 Ibid
309 Ibid. The precise wording in the original document is “crédito y blozonz [sic]”; the latter word can be translated to be, either ‘honor,’ or, ‘glory.’
310 Ibid
review on the conduct and reputation of the officers and report to the viceroy. He was to take note not only of the companies in their entirety but, more especially, of the quality and aptitude of the soldiers [calidad y aptitud], of the good condition of their weapons, their conservation of gunpowder, and the dexterity [destreza] of the soldiers and Indian auxiliaries in the handling of their arms and horses. In June 1777, Commandant Inspector Rubio passed inspection on the Third Flying Squadron [tercera compañía del cuerpo volante], noting that various soldiers had accrued large balances, but had suitable funds sufficient so as to be paid to them in cash [reales efectivos]. He indicated that unless the greater number of men had truly excessive debts -- discovered by computations that were formalized through the end of December of the previous year -- and if the greater part of the troop had excessive balances of accounts from the previous year, their pay was to be docked by a small percentage every month so that the accumulated interest could be quickly repaid [consiga intregar].³¹¹ However, Rubio was quick to add that the comandante insisted on the indisputable proof that soldiers who managed their accounts with good conduct could still not endure whatever charges they had accumulated with just their salaries.

These monies, which they were supplied with and provided the means to care for their families with ease but also, came with anxiety [desasosiego], given the ongoing issues that occurred by serving in the Royal [military] service. Rubio suggested that his plan might put the individuals of the company in an equitable state [igual estado] by these steps which were based on efficient [gobierno económico] governance, enthusiasm, reputation [crédito] of the officers. Rubio demanded punctual observance of these steps, encouraging Ripperdá to take prudent measures so that when he passed inspection again, the Inspector would find the soldiers well maintained [bien entretenidos] and free of debts that could not be repaid.³¹² Indeed, the crux of the August 1777

³¹¹ Rubio to Ripperdá, suggesting plan for keeping soldiers from running into debt, BA June 14, 1777
³¹² Ibid
instructions was to suggest methods to improve the ‘internal management [manejo interior]’ of all presidial and flying companies. Rubio expected Ripperdá to distribute certified copies to each and every one of his subaltern officers with the result that the Governor-Captain would experience better and more exact compliance from his subordinates. Moreover, Rubio insisted that in order to obtain the best possible result from the instructions, Ripperdá was expected to immediately put these instructions into practice and to effect due diligence in order to confirm the troops’ strict adherence to the new policies. Those soldiers who failed to comply were to receive serious reprimands for their disregard of the instructions.\textsuperscript{313}

However, the use of arms and the deployment of innovative battlefield techniques was not the first point enumerated by the \textit{comandante inspector} in his instructions. Rubio made it clear that in order for the troops to receive the best result from a company inspection by his office, the troops had to be informed of the Royal services that they performed with special attention paid to the economic government [\textit{la más eficaz vigilancia al gobierno económico}] and its interests, always bearing in mind the prevention of any cause that might disrupt the precautions taken by the paymaster who administers the duties most closely related to presidial economic activities.\textsuperscript{314} Soldiers who distinguished themselves in the performance of their duties and obligations could ascend the military ranking system, thus achieving promotion, provided that all of their other duties were strictly followed as stated in the instructions. This was precisely the same point that Rubio had made only a month before, in July 1777, regarding promotions and career advancement for the troops.

Where it concerned the costuming of the King’s soldiers, Rubio issued an order addressing the required uniform of the presidial companies and its strict adherence as prescribed by Title

\textsuperscript{313} Rubio to Ripperdá, […] instructions on management of presidial troops, BA August 16, 1777
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid
Three of the *Reglamento* of 1772. The only deviation from the required dress was the application to the attire of a gold button, presumably on the jacket or coat. However, more specificity was applied to the uniform of the officers; it was to be comprised of a blue, double-breasted upper coat, with small cuffs and a red collar affixed to the coat. The collar could bear two musket-like braids made of five threads of gold*[dos galoncitos mosqueteros de oro de zinco (sic) hilos]*; this ornamentation of muskets were to overlap at a point equal in distance from each other and at the stock end of the musket design. Soldier trousers were to be blue in color with a strip of gold material along the sides each pant leg.315

On November 3, 1783 Captain Domingo Cabello generated the monthly review of his presidial regiment as required by Title 9 of the Royal Regulations of 1772. Each captain was to produce a summary giving the names of the officers, sergeants, corporals, soldiers, and chaplain. He was to mark individuals present for their position with the letter “P” in the margin of the document, and offices or posts that were vacant were indicated with a “V.”316 Cabello, holding the rank of officer as well as that of Governor and commandant of arms of the province of *Tejas*, indicated his presence as well as that of his first alférez, Marcelo Valdes and second alférez Francisco Amangual. The company's first and second lieutenant, José Menchaca and Bernardo Fernández, respectively, were both marked as ‘destacado,’ [detached duty, i.e. on assignment elsewhere], the former in Coahuila and the latter, as presidio paymaster, in San Luis Potosí [for the presidio’s allowance].317 The thirty-seven year old Fernández had served in the Regiment of Dragoons of Sahagunto [Sagunto]318 before being promoted to Lieutenant in the cavalry company

315 Rubio letter circulated to all presidios from San Eleazario to La Bahía, July 21, 1777
316 *Reglamentos...1772, Título novena, revistas mensuales.*
317 Roster of the cavalry division of presidio at Béxar, BA November 3, 1783
318 An original drawing by the artist Felix Xunci of a ‘dragon del regimiento de Sagunto’ can be found in José Maria Bueno’s *Uniformes Militares Españoles*, Malaga: 1982, at the address listed: [http://www.pedresdegirona.com/guerra_frances/diari_girona_6_7_11_9.htm](http://www.pedresdegirona.com/guerra_frances/diari_girona_6_7_11_9.htm)
of the Béxar presidio. Twelve years after having served as the presidio’s paymaster, Fernández must have continued to excel as an officer; in his military service record under the section devoted to personal evaluations made by the presidio captain, or, ‘informe del’, the captain wrote “es acrehedor [sic] de ascensión [he is worthy of promotion]”.

Accompanying habilitado Fernández on his journey to collect the payroll, soldier Domingo Peres and Corporal Andrés del Valle, carbineer Martin de Castro and cadets Facundo Manzolo, Fernando Arocha, José Fariás, Manuel Ramón, Manuel de Castro, Pedro Flores, Pedro Hernández, Bonifacio Hernández, Juan José Cordoba, Ygnacio Pérez, Marcelo Borrego, Francisco Menchaca, José Manuel Galvan, José María Hernández, Juan José Bueno, and José Manuel Granados, all marked as “destacado [detached duty, on assignment elsewhere]”. The rest of the company remained with the horse herd, and eight soldiers were classified as ‘ymbálidos [inválidos]’ or, invalids. However, these troops were all marked ‘present.’

319 Military service record of Bernardo Fernández by Marcos Reañe, December 1795, CSWR, SAI.
320 Roster of the cavalry division of Béxar (Cabello, Amangual, and Valdéz), BA, November 3, 1783
321 In the third part of his Oficiales y soldados…, Chapter 8 ‘Soldados, reclutas y población militar’, Marchena Fernández lists the ‘ymbálidos’ as the corporals and soldiers that had completed their time and had their retirement pay, or, had suffered a physical usefulness for service. Such men remained assigned to the post that they wanted, both in America and in Spain, with a modest stipend from the Royal Treasury [Los cabos y soldados que hubieran cumplido su tiempo y tuvieran Premio de años o bien sufrieran inutilidad física para el servicio, recibían el título de invalido y quedaban adscritos a la Plaza que ellos desearan, tanto en América como en España, con un módico estipendio de la Real Hacienda]. Juan Marchena Fernandez, Oficiales y soldados en el ejército de América (Sevilla: Escuela de estudios hispano-americanos de Sevilla, 1983) 268. Further, the Reglamento of Habana of 1719 contained a specific notation regarding “Ymbálidos,” indicating that Felipe V had ordered all positions made under the title of “Invalid or Retired” be abolished. The King stipulated that only those sergeants and soldiers who were totally disabled could be granted the salary of an invalid or retiree; those qualified had to have completed at least fifteen years of service in the regular troops unless they had been wounded in battle such that they could not continue in the royal service. In that case, they would be paid the salary of the wounded even though they might not have served the designated time. Such a salary would be only half of that assigned for sergeants and soldiers on active duty. If certain invalids had an official position or some other way to “live decently” the salaries assigned to them were to cease. Reglamento de Habana, “Impedidos,” artículos 33-36
322 Roster of the cavalry division of Béxar (Cabello, Amangual, and Valdéz), BA, November 3, 1783. These soldiers included the captain Luis Antonio Menchaca, the two Alferezces Juan José Ydalgo and Balthazar Peres, Sergeant Pedro Granados, and, finally, four Privates; Pedro Miñón, Bartholomé Rosales, José Miguel Gámez, and Lorenzo Flores. I have retained the original spelling of all of the soldiers’ names, which is duplicated in the translated manuscript.
A little more than a week later, on November 12, 1783 Captain Cabello received word from his superior comandante general Felipe de Neve that he was to continue in the same capacity in rank and duty as he was originally authorized by Neve’s predecessor, Teodoro de Croix. Cabello was to continue inspecting the presidio’s troops and complying with all orders and instructions pertaining to inspections until a comandante inspector arrived.323 He was further instructed to compile and send the general review reports to Neve so that those could be remitted to the office of the Royal Treasury.324

Rewards for outstanding service and particularly for bravery in action remained powerful incentives for many frontier soldiers. Inspector José Rubio relayed a message from King Carlos III to the Governor of Texas Ripperdá confirming honors granted to Alférez Narciso de Tapia and his Third Compañía Volante for their successful engagement against enemies at the ranch [estancia] de Las Bezerras in April of 1776. Tapia received the rank of lieutenant of the infantry and its corresponding salary, and each of the thirty-one individual flying squadron soldiers who survived the skirmish were to be recompensed with fifty pesos, and the widows of those who died received eight pesos a month.325 At the same time, the King granted Manuel de Villa his retirement with the salary of three hundred pesos a year and the rank of captain in the army’s cavalry.326 Some retired military men, identified by Governor Ripperdá as worthy of those promotions, could look

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323 The commandant inspector differed from the commandant general in that the former came under the supervision of the latter as described in Título doce, artículo uno of the Reglamento of 1772; if a general commandancy was not established, the Inspector would have remained under the direct orders of the viceroy. The Inspector would not govern a province at the same time, nor could he be captain of a presidio since he was always to oversee the operations and management of the governors and captains, and he was required to change his residence if necessary. He was expected to hold annual reviews of the presidios and was, in the most general sense, expected to be vigilant about the military personnel’s strict obedience to the requirements of the Regulation. Reglamento de 1772, Título doce

324 Neve to Cabello, BA November 12, 1783

325 Rubio to Ripperdá, confirming honors granted to Narciso de Tapia and his soldiers for bravery in action, BA June 18, 1777.

326 Ibid
forward to judicial posts, and even their children and relatives might ascend to honorary positions. The Governor was responsible for recommending those individuals whom he felt were most deserving of highly valued positions in their post-military careers. By October 1777, several veteran soldiers had reached the time of retirement and were rewarded with its corresponding salary and for some, honors conferred by the King; Vicente Rodríguez, captain of the presidio at San Juan Bautista, and Manuel de Villaverde, captain of San Carlos; all received an annuity of fifteen hundred pesetas as did Francisco Vellido, captain of the presidio at San Eleceario [sic] and Joséf Camilo, lieutenant at Monclova. Bernardo de Urrea, captain at Altar retired with the same salary as the aforementioned soldiers but with the added prestige of retiring with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel whereas Joséf Castilla ascended to the rank of captain upon his retirement with half of his active duty salary.

2.8 MONEY MANAGEMENT AND THE SOLDIERS

The methods for administering the interests of the presidial and flying companies outlined in the August 16, 1777 instructions by José Rubio were intended to be observed exactly as they were enumerated in the document. But, by the second point of the new instructions – apparently intended to underscore the provisions outlined in the Royal Regulations of 1772 – Rubio returned to the fiscal concerns of the presidial and flying companies and their respective paymasters. He indicated that the settling of the accounts of the troops was to occur at the end of every three, four-month period (although there appears to be a discrepancy in his indicating that the “full settling of the accounts [will take place] in four quarters”) with all matters concerning the interests of the

327 Croix to Ripperdá, transmitting orders concerning employment of retired military men, BA March 30, 1778
328 Rubio’s list of frontier military men retiring with pay and honors conferred by the King, BA October 14, 1777.
329 Rubio to Ripperdá, [...] instructions on management of presidial troops, BA August 16, 1777. Point #9 states that ‘Integro el fondo en los ajustes, quatrimestres la resulta [sic] de alcances a favor del soldado [...]’
troops made public so that the soldiers would be well instructed as to their allowances and duties; the potential benefit to the paymasters was that soldiers would be less likely to allege doubt or oppose such information \[para que bien instruidos no alegen duda o rrepunancia (sic)\].\(^{330}\)

As we shall see in the career of Francisco Amangual, allegations did indeed emerge often with alarming frequency, and point to the inherent vulnerability of the soldiers who fulfilled the duties of handling their presidio’s funds while simultaneously carrying out their non-fiduciary military obligations. In settling the accounts of the transactions that included seeds and provisions comprising the food allowance \[la rraicion (sic) para el alimento\], Rubio directed that care be given to see that the quality was good and the prices reasonable. Scrupulous dedication to the task by the paymaster would, to Rubio’s mind, make it possible to supply the troop without preferential treatment given to a particular house, shop, or known individual because they had to be sought out where they might find them with equal expediency \[por que se han de solicitar donde se encuentren con proporcionada conveniencia\].\(^{331}\)

As provided for in the \textit{Reglamento} of 1772, Rubio’s amplification of the regulations extended to the duties of the paymaster; as it has already been noted, this officer was responsible for the gathering of necessary supplies and the provisions requested by the company. Assisting the paymaster were a sergeant, or, a corporal, and two soldiers. Collectively, all four soldiers were to examine and make certain that the transactions that took place were carried out with integrity and unselfishness \[desinterés\]. This procedure was expedited to ensure the satisfaction of all the soldiers and even those absent with full disclosure so that when they return from their duties, all will be convinced of the faithful conduct \[la fiel conducta\] with which they have managed the

\(^{330}\) Ibid
\(^{331}\) Ibid
company’s assets. The paymaster and his three assistants were to receive from the seller a copy of the bill of sale, officiated by a responsible supervisor present at the time of the transactions.332

These duties were not without challenges. The intricacies of fulfilling the paymaster’s duties as described in the Reglamento of 1772 also required the added skill of effecting the judicious negotiation of meeting soldiers’ needs while maintaining fiscal accountability. Withholding a substantive amount for those soldiers in debt constituted a significant point in presidial economic affairs that had to be unalterably observed [se had de observer inalterablemente]; however, soldiers were allowed to retain amounts needed to pay for daily use. Rubio made it clear in his instructions that the reserve fund was supposed to reach the sum of one hundred pesos: each month six pesos would be withheld in the reserve, the remaining five pesos was to given to each soldier to be used for his personal affairs and the procedure was to continue until the sum of one hundred pesos – for the soldiers of the presidio – was accumulated; in the case of those serving in the flying companies, the amount necessary was fifty pesos.333

The accounting books with its various transactions were to be presented cleanly, without blots or amended items [limpios, sin borrones ni partidas enmendadas], with illustrations of entries consisting of brief and comprehensive explanation to prevent any doubt, or any type of contradiction or complaint.334 Full settling of the accounts was to take place in four quarters and the money that each soldier received in his hand [en propia mano] would be the balance of his due wage after the payments on his debts were settled. These cash amounts were the soldiers’ to employ at their discretion for the well-being of their wives and family. In at least two cases, monetary care was extended to children who became the custody of their fathers, personnel

332 Rubio to Ripperdá, […] instructions on management of presidial troops, BA August 16, 1777
333 Ibid
334 Ibid
stationed at various presidios. Acting on a directive from Croix, the Governor of Texas Ripperdá ordered Juan Agustín Bueno to abstain from attending prohibited games – most likely a reference to gambling – once his children were returned to him. Further, he was to give them a good education and set a good example; otherwise, Bueno was to be severely punished.\footnote{Croix to Ripperdá, granting custody of children to Juan Agustín Bueno, BA January 13, 1778} That same day, following the orders of his commander, Ripperdá was to admonish Christoval [sic] de Casías that, once they were returned to him, he was to raise his children protectively and with a love for his labor, setting a good example for them. Neglect of these instructions would similarly result in punishment.\footnote{Croix to Ripperdá, granting custody of children to Cristóbal de Casías, BA January 13, 1778} Croix must have had children in mind on this particular day since he sent yet another order to Ripperdá. He was to immediately arrange to have María Juliana, a child held in custody, returned to her parents Matheo [sic] Rodríguez Mederos and his wife. The couple was instructed to give her a good upbringing and to set a Christian example for her as they were obligated to do as parents \textit{[procure darle la buena crianza y cristiano ejemplo á que como padres están obligados]}. Furthermore, Croix expected to receive word of Rodríguez’s compliance with the order.\footnote{Croix to Ripperdá, granting custody of child to Mateo Rodríguez and wife, BA January 13, 1778}

However, by April of the following year, Rubio found it necessary, again, to issue a new order to Ripperdá, this time directed at the captains and commanders -- of the same presidios in need of soldier discipline and re-training -- in an effort to ensure the correct rendering of their fiscal accounts since the enactment of the Royal Regulations of 1772. These officers were instructed not to charge any other amounts other than those included in his attachment, a document which contained fixed rules; Rubio’s instructions indicated that there were no reasons to charge foreign expenses, and that all expenses which had depleted the presidial fund were to be reinstated,
charging those expenditures to the company expenses or to whoever ought to have paid them.\textsuperscript{338}

Rubio limited the expenses that could be charged against the gratuity fund \textit{[fondo de gratificación]}\textsuperscript{339} of the presidios in the following manner:

- repairs of walls and balustrades, but not those of churches and houses; the latter expenses were to be met by each concerned party, and the former by the common troops and citizens by way of a work detail
- Wine for mass, wax for church, and flour for the host
- Ornaments, sacred vessels, adornments for the altar, missals, and the holy oil
- Paper for cartridges, lead for bullets, and flint
- Debts of the deceased or deserters, those of the latter to be restored should they present themselves or be apprehended
- Prisoners’ rations and gifts to Friendly Indians; of this latter expense, however, an account shall be kept so that the amount may be restored to the fund by the treasury to which it corresponds
- The light which the guard corps have to have.
- The cost of the safe \textit{[caja]} in which the fund is kept, as well as the freight costs of everything carried and charged thereto.

And, in a section called “Notes”,

- The anticipated cost of equipping recruits is not expressed, because of the nature of reinstatement.
- The freight cost of powder should be supplied by the agency, or administration from which it comes.\textsuperscript{340}

As was customary, each captain was to extract a certified copy of Rubio’s order and his attachment, and the paymasters at each presidio (which would have included Francisco Amangual as the \textit{habilitado} of San Antonio de Béxar), were directed to comply with its instructions.\textsuperscript{341}

From such an onslaught of correspondence, Governor Ripperdá had every reason to feel the sting of apparently distressing assaults on his character and service to the king. These seemingly endless notices to Ripperdá from, both, the Commander General Croix, and the

\textsuperscript{338} Certified copy of Rubio’s instructions concerning presidial accounts, BA, April 14, 1778
\textsuperscript{339} The so-called ‘common’ fund of the presidio, from which payment of the general expenses occur; it was also used to anticipate the cost of the rations of Indian prisoners, or of those that presented themselves to discuss treaties, etc., and to take care of the outfitting of recruits, an expense potentially recouped by gradual and prudent discounts. The money in the common fund was to be kept in a chest with three keys, of which one was to be carried by each of the officers in the company. \textit{Reglamento…1772, Título quinto, artículo cinco.}
\textsuperscript{340} Certified copy of Rubio’s instructions concerning presidial accounts, BA, April 14, 1778
\textsuperscript{341} Ibid
Commander Inspector Rubio appear to be a calculated effort to spotlight every occurrence of misfortune during his tenure in the dual role of Governor and presidio captain. One might wonder whether his magnanimity at the inception of his governorship was still intact after this much negative critique and almost nine years on the job. In October 1769, he made it known to the leading officials at Villa of San Fernando that the appointment as Governor of the provincia of Texas gave him satisfaction and that he hoped to attain accomplishments— which he does not specify – for the benefit and public good, to whom I hope to prove this truth [a quienes espero acreditar esta verdad], of the villa during his tenure.\footnote{Ripperdá to the Señor de Justicia y Regimiento de San Fernando, BA October 12, 1769}

2.9 DEALING WITH THE INDIANS: GIFTS AND WARFARE AND ESCORTS

In June of 1772, Croix’s successor in the role of Viceroy, Antonio Maria de Bucareli y Ursua advised Governor Ripperdá to carefully ascertain the degree of threat that hostile Indians might present to the frontier. While waiting at the post of Los Adaes for the arrival of the lieutenant governor from Nachitoches Atanasio de Mezieres, who was bringing Indians from multiple tribes that had pledged peace, Ripperdá expressed concern about potential Apache depredations. Bucareli suggested that since the Governor of Texas was closest to Coahuila, the region where the Apaches were committing ongoing depredations, certain outcomes could be expected by their treachery and barbarism [su perfidia y barbarie]. The Viceroy warned Ripperdá that when it became necessary to wage war against the Apaches – who infested the province of Coahuila – he must do so as if to achieve teaching them a lesson [debe ejecutarlo por si se lograr escarmentarles]. Bucareli acknowledged the Texas Governor’s prudence and knowledge of the country in utilizing every discretion to achieve the desired effect -- the Apaches would leave the province in peace [dejen en tranquilidad, para cuyo efecto es preciso usar de cuanto arbitrios le sugiera á Usted su prudencia, y el conocimiento del país].\footnote{Bucareli to Ripperdá, […] De Mézières and giving further suggestions on Indian relations, BA June 30, 1772}

During the spring of 1773, a state of tranquility apparently reigned over the province of Texas. Viceroy Bucareli received word from Governor Ripperdá to that effect but Bucareli
apparently found it necessary to admonish the governor to practice vigilance. Inasmuch as favorable reports streamed into the Viceroy’s offices to the degree that relationships with the indigenous communities continued without incident, Bucareli cautioned that if residents of the region’s settlements and missions insisted on going out to chop wood and hunt bison, Ripperdá was to grant them escorts [escobas]. However, these soldiers were to be spared only if they could do so without leaving the presidios and territories under-guarded. The Viceroy was fairly certain that there was no need to fear the escape of the Karankawas, since he considered the group weak and cowardly by nature. Indeed, Bucareli viewed Ripperdá’s measures to apprehend the indigenous ringleaders [cabecillas] as wise; however, he encouraged the Governor to attempt to draw the others into the fold of the mission/presidio complex with leniency and cleverness, with the help of the religious orders, and without the use of force. If troop strength was necessary, punitive tactics were to be used only as a last resort.\footnote{Bucareli y Ursua to Ripperdá, exhorting vigilance against surprise attacks by Indians, BA April 14, 1773.}

The Regulations of 1729 forbade the governors and commanders from waging war against those \textit{indios gentiles} [Christianized Indians] maintained in friendship, nor against the neutral communities. The native inhabitants were not to be agitated but, instead, were to be attracted to that friendship with ‘pleasure and in a good way [\textit{con agrado y buen modo}]’ so that the love [from agents of the Spanish empire] that showed itself to the Indians was a means for their settlement [\textit{reducción}].\footnote{Reglamentos...1729, Ordenanzas [...] para el mejor gobierno [...], número 41.} However, by 1778, any belief that the Karankawa were a particularly docile group incapable of committing hostilities of any sort quickly diminished. Luís Cazorla, the soldier who would eventually appeal to Pedro de Neve to resuscitate his military career and thus earn the rank of captain of the presidio of La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, advised \textit{Comandante} General Croix that the Karankawa had become aggressive; his troops had made unsuccessful reconnaissance expeditions; and, the Indians from the El Rosario mission had run off, leaving women and children, unable to accompany the fugitives, to have to re-locate to the mission in San Antonio.\footnote{Croix to Ripperdá, [...] control of Karankawa, Ocoquiza, and Coco Indians, BA September 15, 1778; this communication begins with an acknowledgement of the five letters of March 27, April 7, June 11, and July 22 and...}
Remarkably, Croix commanded Ripperdá to arrange to have the scouting expeditions continued by the soldiers of the Bahía presidio; further, while General Croix was aware that the Karankawa may very well have sought safety on the Texas coast – perhaps, La Culebra Island – he believed that the planned course of action, that is, to retrieve the fugitive tribe members, could be carried out successfully with the additional troop force composed of the inhabitants of La Bahía, the villas of Bucareli and San Fernando, and the presidio of Béxar. Once subdued, Croix instructed Ripperdá to advise him as to the best location to settle the escapees and their families; reunited with the woman and children at the San Antonio Mission or removed completely from the province to distant sites since, once reduced, and then set free from San Antonio, the Karankawa would likely return to the coast.

In the meantime, Croix encouraged Ripperdá to undo the new alliances forged by the Karankawas with the Orcoquizas, and the Cocos, through skill and caution [con maña y prudencia], but, for the latter, with gentle means [por medios suaves]. Conversely, the Apaches and the Comanches represented a far greater challenge to Texas presidio personnel. Croix had a very different approach to the stealthy aggressions of these two groups. A particularly deceptive tactic – at least in the eyes of the Spanish – utilized by the Comanches was to make retreats through certain sites in an attempt to fool their pursuers and thus suggest their identity as Lipanes, a practice long in use. Upon receiving word of the death of Cayetano Trabieso [sic], attributed to the Apache, Croix discovered that the Comanches actually had caused it and this was according to official communications received from the French trader and entrepreneur Athanasio de Mezieres. Croix’s advice in regard to these indigenous groups followed Ripperdá’s lead that was directed at containing and chastising the hostility of the Comanches: preventing a coalition between the

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29, 1778 written by Cazorla and sent to Croix. None of these original documents written by Cazorla are part of the Béxar Archives online holdings.

347 Today called Snake Island, in Galveston County, Texas

348 Croix to Ripperdá, […] control of Karankawa, Ocoquiza, and Coco Indians, BA September 15, 1778

349 Ibid

350 Ibid

351 Croix to Ripperdá, giving instructions on management of Comanche, Apache, Tejas and Bidai Indians, BA September 15, 1778
Apaches, the *Tejas*, and *Vidais* [Bidais], and, aiding the town of Bucareli with troops and munitions.352

Providing gifts to the Indians was a tactic used by the administrators of the various provinces in maintaining productive, if often, strained relationships with the various Indian groups. The *Reglamento* of 1729 is replete with references to the complex interactions between *presidiales* and their indigenous cohabitants. When Rivera made his inspection of the presidio of Texas, he denounced the garrison as deserving no such title since it consisted of only a few huts of sticks and grass, and very poorly constructed at that. Rivera condemned the soldiers there as being so convinced of the Indians’ docility that they posted no guards or sentinels, and had done nothing but assisted the three nearby missions.353 Once he reached the presidio at La Bahía, Rivera noted that the surrounding Indians – Cocos, Cancaraquases, Coapites, Cujanes, and Copanes – were so few in number and thus posed little threat to the forty soldiers stationed there. He also believed that fifty soldiers were excessive for the Bahía presidio since the Tacame, Araname, Mayaye, Pampopa, Pastia and other Indian nations of the area lived in isolated Rancherias; Rivera stated that these groups were so cowardly that they posed no real threat; forty soldiers was sufficient to garrison La Bahía.354 However, by the time the Regulations of 1772 were issued, the presidios at La Bahía del Espíritu Santo and San Antonio de Béjar housed detachments that were expected to provide mutual aid. Since both presidios were located more than one degree of latitude outside the proposed line of define, Croix designated the Béjar garrison as the place most exposed in actuality to the invasions and raids of various tribes of warlike Indians to the north while pursuing their hated enemies, the Lipan Apaches [*siendo el paraje mas expuesto en la actualidad a las invasions y correrias de varias naciones de indios guerreros del Norte […] con el motivo de perseguir los Apaches Lipanes, que son sus aborrecidos enemigos*]355

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352 Ibid
353 *Reglamento de 1729, Tercer estado, artículo cuarenta.*
354 *Reglamento de 1729, Tercer estado, artículo cuarenta y dos*
355 *Reglamento de 1772, cordon de presidios, articulos diecinueve, y viente*
From September 1786 to October 1787, a number of presents had been made to the Indians at the Presidio of San Antonio de Béxar. For instance, the Comanches had received 542 awls, 655 shaving blades, 542 knives, 53 hoes, 106 axes and hatchets, 94 pounds of wire, 37 pounds of vermilion, 53 pounds of beans, 284 pounds of bullets, 142 pounds of powder, 34 rifles, 10 staves, 7 pairs of trousers and an equal amount of coats. The Comanches also received hundreds of varas of cloth, including indiana, wool, and cotton, combs, mirrors, and worms (for cleaning the barrels of guns). The Lipanes also received a good number of gifts – but not the large amounts received by the Comanche, only about half as many items, and sometimes even less, often only a quarter percent of the Comanche; these included clothing, tools, and dyestuffs. Eventually, other groups, including the Tahuacanes, Tahuaias, Guichitas [Wichitas], Orcoquizas, and the Vidais, would also receive gifts at different times of the year.

On September 18, 1789 José Antonio Bustillos and Andrés Benito Courbiere purchased items from the habilitación of the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar where Francisco Amangual was serving as paymaster. Most of the items consisted of cloth and costume accessories, including four varas of ribbon; a quarter ounce of silk; one-third vara of scalet chalona; sixteen varas of rayadillo; twelve varas of queretano cloth; eight and a quarter varas of bayeta, bought from a Luiz Menchaca; three pairs of spurs at twelve reales; and, a bridle and a set of saddle tools. Certainly the indigenous communities had among their number individuals capable of performing the work of turning lengths of cloth into usable forms like clothing or bedding. However, upon entrance into the presidial environs with the intention of suing for peace, certain services were made available to Indians willing or needing to reshape key aspects of their ways of life. For example, Juan

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356 Report of Indian presents made during 1786, BA September 20, 1787
357 According to Nora Fisher, the term ‘indiana’ is used to describe chintz, painted Indian cotton fabric of the Coromandel Coast and one of the most common cloths imported into New Mexico. ‘Indianillas’ is synonymous with ‘indianas,’ a fabric mentioned in New Mexican church inventories of the period, and used for altar frontals. Nora Fisher, “Colcha Embroidery,” in *Rio Grande Textiles, Spanish Textile Traditions of New Mexico and Colorado* (1979) Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1994. 125
358 Report of Indian presents made during 1786, BA September 20, 1787
359 List of goods purchased at paymaster’s store and independent merchants at the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, BA September 18, 1789 to August 13, 1790
Antonio Romero, the master tailor [sastre] of the Béjar presidial company, performed work for indigenous folk from March 2-16, 1789, making two suits, eight waistcoats and added some ruffles to one of them, and making nine shirts; he charged a total of twenty-nine pesos, one real for his customers. Later that same year, Romero made four coats, fourteen waistcoats, and fourteen shirts, charging thirty-nine pesos, four reales. For the remainder of the year and into February 1790, the tailor continued to construct clothing for the peace-abiding Indians, making trousers and lapels, and even adorning hats when requested by his customers.

Transactions could get complicated, especially where transfers from multiple accounts were required in order to ensure the provisioning of the troops. In Sonora, on March 23, 1785 Antonio Cordero ordered the merchant Joachim de Amezqueta to deliver to Leonardo María de Calo, representative of the Alférez José Manuel de Ochoa of the Fourth Company (most likely also a unit of the flying squadrons), one thousand pesos from the fondo de gratificación of men from the Third Compañía Volante. Further, Amezqueta was to provide to the strongbox [caxa] of the company the order with its corresponding receipt, while for the fund of the Fourth Company to whom this supplement was made by the higher order of the comandante general of February 22, said amount was to be reimbursed to the Third Company. From a March 21 list of the troops constituting the First Compañía Volante in Guajoquilla that were set to leave on campaign on April 1, and that had been provisioned by the merchant Joaquin de Ugarte, we learn that the position of sergeant was filled by Nicolas Tarín, those of the rank of Corporal by, both, Juan Saucedo and Joaquin Soto; the carbineer Tiburcio de la O; and, the soldiers included José Cisneros, Joaquín Hernández, Tadeo Urbina, Juan López, Miguel de la Paz, Sixto Montes, Juan Andrez, Juan de Arroyo, Francisco Henríquez, Fernando Dominguez, Felipe Durán, Juan Subia, Juan Rodallega, José de Villa, Patricio Gonzales, and Juan Hevares. Though it is not included in the roster, the

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360 Accounts for garments made for friendly Indians, BA March 16, 1789 [– February 21, 1790]
361 Ibid
362 Cordero to Amezqueta, UA March 23, 1785; El Archivo de Hidalgo del Parral, 1631-1821, (pg 37/284)
363 Moorhead mentions Ugarte in the context of a deposition by the merchant guild of Chihuahua in a 1786 list of the six merchants that received contracts in 1783. Moorhead, 216
company was led by a *Teniente* “Rodallegas.” Merchants maintained close associations with the presidial troops and often communicated among themselves about the soldiers. José Rafael Sarracino discussed with Amezqueta a payment required from Eugenio Fernandes; the amount of thirty-eight pesos and four reales had been used for sick soldiers of the district.

Meanwhile, in August 1790, Amangual had a sum of 3,438 pesos, 3 reales, and 5 6/8 granos from the Mesteñas Fund from which to deduct allowances for the maintenance of and gift giving to various indigenous communities. For example, 222 pesos, 9 granos was spent on the maintenance of 225 Comanche, Tancague, Guichita (Wichita), and Lipan Indians from August 14 1790 to December 31 of 1792; this amount had originated from the *Gratificación* Fund and was then repaid from the Mesteñas Fund on orders from the Commandante General Ramón de Castro. The following year, in a document encompassing the dates of January 6, 1791 to April of that same year, 289 pesos, 3 granos was disbursed for the maintenance of 43 Guichita, Tancague, Comanche, and Lipan Indians along with a shipment of goods destined for the gift to the Friendly Indians of the North from the [Presidio de Santísimo Sacramento del] Valle de Santa Rosa in Coahuila to the Béjar presidio. Then, one year later, on January 13, 1792 Amangual generated a report on goods that were furnished to Governor Manuel Muñoz as provisions needed to clothe the Indians of the mission of El Rozario. However, Amangual made it clear that these items, representing a wide array of finished products and yardage of cloth, could not be found in the stores of San Antonio. He supplied

- 1 bolt of blue cloth in 37 ½ varas
- 6 pieces of *rayadillo*, because *bayeta* could not be found in these same stores
- 20 narrow pieces of *manta de Puebla*
- 36 pairs of calf’skin shoes for men
- 12 hats [style not specified]

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364 The ‘list’ contains information regarding the provisioning of the troops of a flying squadron; corn, flour, salt, *piloncillo*, cigarettes, meat, and lard in the month of April 1785. Rodallegas roster of troops in 1st compañía volante, and provisioning by Ugarte, UA March 21, 1785; El Archivo de Hidalgo del Parral, 1631-1821 (pg 43/284)
365 Ibid (49/284).
366 Index of document concerning expenditures incurred supporting Indian visitors, BA December 31, 1792
367 Certified detail of expenses incurred entertaining Indians, BA April 18, 1791
• 75 varas of rope strands, which Xabier [sic] Galan sold
• 2 gross of similar buttons
• 3 rolls of blue *pita* [fiber thread] “that they call ‘girl’s’ [thread]”
• 2 *conga* blankets
• 5 loads of burlap [*guancoche*] bags in which the goods are wrapped
• 7 lassos

The grand total of the merchandise was 352 *pesos*, 7 *reales*, 10 4/8 *granos*.

On February 26, 1792, eighty Comanches appeared at the San Antonio presidio under the command of Chiefs Shojaís (Sojas), Soquina, and Ojos Azules, requiring 348 pesos for their maintenance, and then this group left on April 9 of the same year. Thus over the course of two years, 1,544 Indians had been maintained by funds within the large payment received by Amangual while he was paymaster at the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar. The aforementioned Bustillo received 54 pesos from the Mesteñas Fund for providing the crate to hold the gifts intended for the “friendly” Indians; later, Bustillo was assigned the role of storehouse guard of the Béxar presidio, and received an honorarium of one hundred fifty pesos for his services. Luis Mariano Menchaca, a citizen and merchant from Béxar, on orders from Governor Muñoz, handed over to Amangual two hundred fifty pesos for one hundred varas of ‘*indianilla de Provenza*’ so that the latter would credit the amount to the account of expenditures.

In January of 1792, forty-three Comanche and fifteen *Taguacana* appeared at the presidio seeking gifts and Menchaca provided twelve cattle, bought at 4 pesos apiece, and salt at 3 pesos, four reales. Similarly, Antonio Rodríguez Baca sold corn and other provisions for this same group of Indians and was paid by Amangual for his services. Both of these merchants represented frontier residents who fulfilled the role of provisioning the presidios with a view towards promoting the regional economy. Croix had introduced changes to offset the depressed condition of the mining industry and shore up frontier commerce insofar as it impacted the presidio

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368 Ibid
369 Muñoz, López, Amangual, Menchaca, et al, BA August 14, 1790 to December 31, 1792
370 Bustillo’s invoice, BA January 2-10, 1792
371 Amangual’s inventory/receipt for items purchased for gift giving, BA January 13, 1792 (in Aug 1785 doc)
372 Report of expenses incurred supporting Indian visitors, BA February 26, 1792
and its military and civilian populations. Croix’s well-intended aims never actually developed; as it worked out, four mercantile houses in Chihuahua came to monopolize all of the business of provisioning every presidio in Nueva Vizcaya. By 1786, not much had changed under the direction of Viceroy Gálvez and his Commander General Ugarte; renegotiating the contracts of the merchant contractors for the Nueva Vizcaya and Nuevo México companies resulted in a unanimously negative reception, with contractors refusing to furnish their commodities at lower prices.

All told, Amangual, as lieutenant and abilitado of the cavalry company of the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar received from the storehouse guard, José Antonio de Bustillo y Cevallos, the sum of three hundred forty-eight pesos, seven-eighths granos, which he received from the Mesteñas Fund to repay the individual merchants who supplied the provisions in the expenditure for maintaining the Friendly Indians of the North who entered in peace from February 26 until April 9, 1792.

In late 1790, when habilitado Francisco Amangual asked the Governor of Texas Manuel Muñoz which fund was to be utilized for the maintenance of the ‘Friendly’ Indians recently arrived at the presidio of La Bahía, the comandante general Pedro de Nava issued the final word: the Mesteñas Fund was to bear any and all costs associated with the provisions supplied to them. Nava further indicated that Indian provisioning was to be done with the greatest possible economy [la mayor economía] and that the groups were to be accommodated for the least possible number of days. Then, they were to be sent on their way, with skill and good manners [con arte y buen modo], as soon as their business was concluded. Gifts, unspecified in this episode, had already been

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373 Moorhead, 214-216
374 Ibid
375 Ibid
376 Accounting records of the company of Bexar, by Francisco de Amangual, paymaster, BA April 27, 1792
377 It is not clear why Amangual was responsible for the provisioning - as habilitado of the Béxar presidio - of the Bahia complex; Lieutenant Manuel de Espadas was the paymaster of the presidial company at La Bahia del Espiritu Santo during August 1792. He conducted a transaction with Amangual of seventy-two pesos for the purchase of forty-eight blankets that were given to the Indians of the mission associated with the presidio. Courbiere’s list of expenditures incurred supporting Indian visitors, BA August 15, 1792
378 Nava to Muñoz, BA December 14, 1790 to January 28, 1791
consigned for one year. Moreover, Nava ordered Muñoz to distribute these items -- in all probability of the same type as those listed above -- while emphasizing the Mesteñas Fund as the source for provisioning the visiting Indians, and not the presidio company’s fund.379

An official letter of January 25 arrived ordering Second Lieutenant Amangual to cease issuing orders for payment from funds due to be received in the first semester of 1792, and to stop paying drafts that he had issued up to that time without a prior review and visto bueno [approval] from Muñoz. Apparently, during this time period an examination was being carried out of the funds in the Tobacco department and Amangual swore his prompt obedience to these commands. The document conveys, both, Amangual’s sense of urgency, and strict obedience, to his commanders when he notes that since he is responsible for accounting for a “few cigars” placed in the store [puestos en el estanquilla], upon their sale and receipt of payment for them, he will proceed to furnish the security mentioned in an earlier letter: without departing [sin variar] from a single point called for in the official letter.380 Further, Amangual set as a task [pondré por obra] to immediately retire all the promissory notes that he issued and charge them to the troops in their year-end accounts in order to clarify the good or bad state of the debts under his responsibility, again, in fulfillment of the orders he had received. All of these instructions to Amangual had been left by comandante general Nava after his review inspection and thus Amangual was fulfilling the order of both the governor and lieutenant colonel and the most superior military commander of the provincia.381

As lieutenant and habilitado of the cavalry company of the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, Amangual continued in his regular duties of receiving reimbursements from borrowers who had extracted funds from the Mesteñas Fund in order to supply provisions for sustenance for the “Friendly Indians of the North” who entered in the practice of peace from January through

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379 Ibid
380 Amangual to Muñoz, […] financial management details of the company, BA January 26, 1792
381 Ibid
February 26, 1792. Amangual must have felt a sense of relief at having been reimbursed and as we have already seen, the Mesteñas Fund was the resource of choice for those needing monies for all of the associated expenditures of the presidio and its supplicants. Only two days earlier, on February 24, the paymaster of the Bahía presidio contacted Governor Muñoz – on orders from his captain, Juan Cortez – to request five hundred pesos from the Mesteñas fund in order to settle the accounts of five privates who, as a result of the review inspection, were discharged. Paymaster Manuel de Espadas asked the Governor to deliver the urgently needed funds to Corporal Hermenegildo Gómez, who carried the mail pouch and could – with a substantial escort for safe traveling – bring the funds to the Bahia presidio. However, on March 2 Muñoz replied that the Mesteñas Fund was totally without funds because the sums that it had supplied to the Bexar presidio had not been reimbursed. Thus Muñoz was unable to fulfill Espadas’ request in order to relieve their shortage since his own presidio was in the same condition.

2.10 “SIENDO ESTA CALUMNIA TAN DENIGRATIVA Á MI HONOR Y EMPLEO…” AMANGUAL VS. RODRÍGUEZ

Among the many duties that Manuel Muñoz fulfilled was that of Governor, lieutenant colonel of cavalry in the royal armies of Carlos III, sub-delegate of the royal treasury and ministry of war of Texas, and captain of the cavalry company of Béxar presidio. Over and above these army-related tasks, he served as presiding judge of expedientes [records] brought from civilians as well as military personnel. One case involved Francisco Amangual, lieutenant and paymaster of the Béxar company, against Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez in February 1792. Amangual accused Rodríguez of defaming his character in an action that involved, both, a merchant from the area and the master tailor of the company. Apparently, Rodríguez had conveyed to the soldiers of the guard that Amangual had extracted loads of clothing and gone to the house of the merchant Ángel

382 Amangual’s acknowledgement of receipt of funds repaid to mesteñas fund, BA February 26, 1792; on this day, he noted that the Mesteñas Fund had been reimbursed for the sum of one hundred pesos, four reales, and nine granos from the governor and alcaldes ordinarios [municipal magistrates] of San Antonio, and this amount is written in the margin, as well.
383 Ibid
384 Espadas to Muñoz, concerning loan from mesteñas fund, BA February 24 [– March 2], 1792
Navarro and that this information was overheard by Alférez Manuel Urrutia and the master tailor José Riola. On the 6th of March, Urrutia was questioned regarding from whom he had heard it said that *tercios* [loads or packs] of goods had been taken from the *habilitación* of the Béxar company. Urrutia gave the following testimony:

One morning in […] February when it was raining, [when Urrutia] was warming himself at the fireplace in the guardhouse, Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez was there and told him […] ‘I am amazed at having seen the store of the merchant Don Ángel Navarro looking rich this morning when it was poor last night,” and that on the previous day he had seen that it had no more goods than two bolts of blue and crimson chintz [and] calico and that he had just seen many *bretaña*, cambric, scarves, [and] stockings, and all the other fabrics that correspond to a good stock.

Asked whether he knew or had heard it said from where the aforesaid goods came to Don Ángel Navarro, Urrutia replied: that the same Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez told the deponent that he had asked Navarro where he had gotten the materials, and that [Navarro] told him he had brought them from the mission of San José. Further, he still had other *tercios* [that he had] not opened, that what [Rodríguez] was seeing was nothing, which the sergeant said he had not believed; what he did believe was that the aforesaid goods were from the *avilittación* [sic] because they told him that during the night Sergeant Andrés del Valle had extracted the goods in bundles and taken them to the house of Corporal Jossé [sic] Manuel Granados, and that from the latter’s house they were sent to that of Don Ángel Navarro.

As asked who was present when Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez have him the report on what he has declared, Urrutia replied: when Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez made the report that he related, the master tailor José Arreola was present, to whom Urrutia said that the very thing the sergeant had just said, he [my emphasis] had already heard him say two days before. Asked whether he had anything else to say regarding the matter on which he was questioned, he replied: that nothing else occurred to him to say or add to what he had declared, but that when he asked the sergeant from where they had extracted the goods, [Rodríguez] answered with these words: he was astonished.

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385 *(Expediente of) Francisco Amangual vs. Mariano Rodríguez, for slander, February 29, 1792*
386 Ibid, *(Deposition of Alférez Manuel Urrutia, March 6)*
387 Ibid
that [Urrutia] would ask him, when he knew that behind the *avilittacion* [sic] it was no problem to extract the goods. This was the truth under the oath that he has made, and affirmed and ratified it when this, his deposition, was read to him. Urrutia said he was more than fifty years old [...].

Subsequently, when master tailor José Arreola was questioned after having been read the *expediente* presented by Amangual, Arreola answered:

> On the morning of the nineteenth of [...] February, when he was with Alférez Don Manuel de Urrutia in the guard, seated on one of the stone seats, Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez arrived, and the aforesaid alférez said these words: “Maestro, is it true that the stores of the *avilittación* are now depleted?” to which the aforesaid sergeant replied: “It is true that the goods in the *avilittación* are all gone, because they have all been taken to the house of Don Ángel Navarro,” and that for the same reason he had not seen in any year such a well-stocked store; that he knew quite well what the aforesaid Navarro had brought in this year, because, [since Navarro] had brought no more than two bolts of chintz – one blue, the other crimson—and other items of little value, he [Rodríguez] was seeing that [Navarro] had become rich the next morning with many *bretañas*, knitted cloth [*pontibies*], girls’ scarves, and other fabrics that he did not have before; and that he knew the persons who had taken them from behind the *avilittación* and taken them to the house of the aforesaid Navarro. Asked if he heard the aforesaid sergeant say which individuals had taken the aforesaid goods form the *avilittación* and carried them to the house of Don Ángel Navarro, he replied: That the aforesaid Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez said that Sergeant Andres del Valle and Corporal José Manuel Grandados were the ones who had taken the goods from the *avilittación* and carried them to the house of Don Ángel Navarro, and that this was carried out by the *avilitado* [Amangual] because the prices that the senor commandant general had set in the rates were very low, and In order not to suffer so much loss he had moved [the goods] to the house of the aforementioned Don Ángel. Asked whether he had anything else to say beyond what he had declared, he replied: No, and that in everything he has confessed he had told the truth, under the oath [...]. He said he was thirty-one years old, more or less [...].

These statements from Arreola were conflated with those of Urrutia in the original documents filed by captain Amangual and were relayed to Sergeant Andrés del Valle who was then questioned regarding the bundles of materials taken from the back of the *avilittacion*. Sergeant del Valle was asked on what day and in the company of which individual he took the bundles of materials from

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388 Ibid
389 Ibid, (Deposition of master tailor José Arreola, March 6)
the back of the *habilitación* [paymaster’s office], and where he took them, and on whose orders.

He replied:

> [I] did not see, nor [did I] extract any materials from any place in the circumference of the storehouse to take to any house whatsoever, with the exception of those materials that [I] bought from it for the use of [my] family, and that they cannot prove otherwise against [me].

Del Valle affirmed and ratified his disposition, indicating that he was fifty years old, “more or less,” affirming his testimony by signing his name and spelling his last name as “Balle.”

The foregoing testimony, of Amangual, Urrutia, and Arreola was repeated for Corporal José Manuel Granados, who subsequently was questioned regarding whether he had gone with Sergeant Andres del Valle – or had heard of such an episode – to take bundles of materials from the paymaster’s office by the rear door, or wall, and carry them to his own house, and from there to that of Navarro, or to the house of Arreola. Granados replied:

> At no time or any occasion whatsoever did [I] see or accompany Sergeant Andres del Valle, or any other person, to take materials from the *avilización* [sic], whether they were taken from the front or the back of it, to the house of [any] citizen, nor any other particular, with the exception of those [materials] that [I] purchased for [myself] and [my] family. And nothing contrary to what [I have] said can be proved against [me], but [I have] heard it said by the soldiers that Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez was telling them the same thing contained in the question regarding whether the [I] had participated in removing and taking the aforesaid materials to the house of Don Ángel Navarro, which act [i.e., allegation] had been hurtful to [me] because it impugned [my] honest ways and good name with a highly denigrating defect.

Asked if he had anything else to say about the content of the question, Granados replied: he could think of nothing to add to what [he had] declared [and] that this was the truth under the oath that he had made. He indicated his age at thirty years […], more or less […].

The *autos* that Amangual requested were indeed fulfilled; Urrutia, Arreola, del Valle, and Granados were all summoned to appear before Muñoz on March 6 to provide testimony about the charges. However, Amangual’s chief concern was that Navarro and Rodríguez be summoned in

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390 Ibid, [Deposition of Sergeant Andrés del Valle, March 6]
391 Ibid, [Deposition of Corporal José Manuel Granados, March 6]
order to “let [them] prove what [they] accused me of [se le tome ynforme y al sargento que me justifique lo que me acomula (sic)]”. Further, Amangual’s reputation among his troops and superiors at the presidio and beyond the borderlands was, naturally, important to him; the notion of Rodríguez accusing him of theft of presidial property was “so denigrating to my honor and position [y siendo esta calumnia tan denegrativa [sic] á mi honor y empleo, acomulandome [sic] el que los llevé á Don Angel Navarro á quien siendo del agrado de Ud]” that he was eager to have all of the individuals whom had knowledge of this tawdry episode or participated in slanderous behavior brought in as deponents. If cleared of all charges and freed of the slander that he endured, Amangual prevailed upon Governor Muñoz to punish the perpetrator Rodríguez according to army regulations. Hoping to avoid the possibility of Rodríguez agitating the company with lies and provoking them into sedition, Amangual encouraged Muñoz to remove his accuser from the post that he held, as a means of demonstrating an example of punishment for future episodes of this type [Suplico a Ud. rendidamente justicia mediante que al Sargento calumniante para que no ande alborotando esta compañía con falzadases como provocandola á sedición, se le castigue arreglado á la ordenanza del ejército, y se despida de la plaza que ocupa que esto sirva de escarmiento en lo successivo [sic] por tanto].

Muñoz agreed to Amangual’s request. Mariano Rodríguez was summoned and was expected to support with evidence the charge that resulted from his having damaged the good reputation and lawfulness necessary to manage the affairs of the company [y satisfaga con justificacion el cargo que le resulta sobre haber lastimado la buena opinion y legalidad que corresponde á el manejo de yntereses de esta compañia que maneja el Theniente [sic] Don Francisco Amangual como avilitado nombrado por ella], a responsibility held by Amangual as the truly elected paymaster of the company. Moreover, the summons appeared to have a built-in verdict since the deposition indicated that justice might be satisfied, and it might serve as an

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392 Ibid, [Amangual to Muñoz, March 6]
393 As it has already been noted, Título catorce of the Reglamento of 1772 spelled out the election procedures for each presidio’s choice for paymaster; indeed, the entire content of Title 14 is devoted to the duties, and selection, of the soldier for this position.
example to the other individuals in the troops, [that] they might desist from conversations detrimental to the honor of their officers [se contengan de conversaciones indecorosas a el honor de sus oficiales, como que en los sargentos es de maior gravedad por exponer a sus subordinados a la inobediencia [sic], y otras alteraciones contra el Real Servicio].

Muñoz’s summons more generally referenced the rank of sergeant since he further admonished all soldiers of Rodríguez’s rank that disreputable behavior among sergeants, that the latter was accused of, was even more serious because it exposed their subordinates to disobedience and other disruptions to the royal service.

Rodríguez’s response followed. After having been made aware of Amangual’s deposition and Muñoz’s auto, both documents having been issued on the same date, Rodríguez said

That it is true that while [I] was at the stone benches of the guardhouse, [I] reported to alférez Don Manuel de Urrutia that [I] had been told by a truthful individual that [I] was wearing a blindfold if [I] did not know that the materials from the paymaster’s office had been removed to the house of Don Angel Navarro, but that [my] statement was motivated by the fact that the señor priest of this villa, Don Francisco Gómez Moreno [had] informed [me] of this in clear and understandable language at the time that [I] went to make payment for the burial of [my] father-in-law, Don José Macario Sambrano, and it was in the following terms: “You people are wearing blindfolds, because I know that the goods from the avilittación [sic] have been removed to the house of Don Angel Navarro, and if they ask me I will prove it.”

At this point, Sergeant Rodríguez was asked whether he told alférez Urrutia from where they had taken the goods from the habilitación, and which individuals had taken them, as well as [whether] he had seen the store of Angel Navarro ‘poor’ at nightfall, but ‘rich’ the next morning. He replied: that he said nothing contained in the question to alférez Urrutia. Asked who was with the Urrutia when he said what he had declared, he replied: while he was talking with the aforesaid Urrutia, the master tailor of the company, José Arreola arrived, and that he continued talking about the removal

394 Ibid, [Muñoz’s summons to Rodríguez, March 6]
395 Ibid
396 Ibid
of the materials from the paymaster’s office to Navarro’s house, but without mentioning the aforesaid senor priest.\(^{397}\)

Having seen all of the statements from Urrutia, Arreola, del Valle, Granados, and the consequent response by Rodríguez – a reply that did not absolve Amangual of the charge made against him, nor proved what had appeared in the statements Rodríguez made in the presence of Urrutia and Arreola—Muñoz summoned Rodríguez to appear on March 15, 1792 for a face-to-face session of questioning. Rodríguez was asked whether everything that was written and set down in his March 6 response was the truth; he denied having informed Urrutia that del Valle had taken the materials from the paymaster’s office to the house of Granados, and from there to that of Navarro. He denied that he told Urrutia that he was “astonished” at the amount of merchandise in Navarro’s store in the morning of February 19, 1792 when it had been empty the night before. Asked whether he had told Urrutia that the store had no more than two bolts of blue and crimson chintz and calico on that night but that he had seen many bretañas (linen), cambric, scarves, and stockings and other materials by the next day, he denied having made the statement.\(^{398}\) When Rodríguez was asked whether Navarro had told him from where he had brought the materials, he himself having asked him, and why he asked him that question, Rodríguez replied:

When [I] went to find some white ribbon at the store of Ángel Navarro for the coffin of his father-in-law, José Macario Sambrano, (which he did not have) he asked [Navarro] for a vara of pontiví,\(^{399}\) and because [Navarro] asked seven r[eales]s for it, [and I] replied to Navarro, asking him why he previously offered it for five and six r[eale]s and now wanted seven. To this Navarro replied that he was asking seven r[eales]s because for that quality he had no supplier, and that among the goods that he had [on hand], their quality did not match that of what others had brought, and at that moment [I] told Navarro that the p[adre] of [San] José would have the charity to give him these goods in order to earn those greater profits. To this Navarro replied, saying that he did not need friars to obtain what he had. But none of this did [I] say to [Urrutia], and thus he responded to the content of the question.\(^{400}\)

\(^{397}\) Ibid
\(^{398}\) Ibid, [Muñoz’s summons to Rodríguez, March 15]
\(^{399}\) A type of French cotton fabric
\(^{400}\) Francisco Amangual vs. Mariano Rodríguez, for slander, February 29, 1792 [Muñoz’s summons to Rodríguez, March 15]
At this juncture in the interview, Rodríguez was asked why he denied having informed Urrutia that the materials had been removed from the paymaster’s office to the house of Navarro, especially since in his earlier response to the summons he had confessed to having done so, and Rodríguez replied:

[I wanted] to avoid exposing the senor priest, Don Francisco Gómez Moreno, who was the one who gave the information to [me], until the present situation emerged, because [I] told [Urrutia] that a truthful individual had told [me] that they were living with blindfolds on and that [I] knew clearly that they had moved the materials from the paymaster’s office to the house of Don Ángel Navarro.

Asked whether in regard to the removal of the materials to Navarro’s house he had said anything to the officers, sergeants, corporals, privates or citizens, Rodríguez replied that he said nothing at all to anyone except Urrutia. Then, when he was questioned whether he knew that he was obliged to substantiate the slander uttered against the paymaster Amangual regarding these events, Rodríguez replied:

[I] know that [I] am obligated to substantiate the slander uttered against the lieutenant [and paymaster], but since his informant was the [priest], [I] will seek from [him] a document to substantiate [the charge], as requested by [Amangual].

After the transcript of his deposition was read back to him, Rodríguez declared its content as the truth, that he had nothing at all to delete or to add, and gave his age as forty-three years, more or less.401

On this same date, Urrutia and the master tailor of the company José Arreola were summoned to be questioned in person by Muñoz. Rodríguez was retained from his individual interview for the purposes of this proceeding; all three men swore to the oath of stating the truth. First, the witness Arreola was asked to withdraw so that the Alférez Urrutia could counter the allegations set down by Sergeant Rodríguez in his response and deposition on March 6 and the 15th, contradicting what appeared in the deposition given on the same day, March 6, by Urrutia. When this testimony was taken, Rodríguez was asked to respond with everything that might be helpful to the charge that resulted against him, and he replied:

401 Ibid
[It] is true what Alférez Don Manuel de Urrutia states in his deposition, inasmuch as [I] might have told [Urrutia] that a truthful individual had told [me] that they were all wearing blindfolds, because he [the individual] knew clearly that they had removed the materials from the [paymaster’s office] and had taken them to the house of Navarro.  

Alférez Urrutia, asked whether the report given to him by the sergeant was in agreement with his foregoing reply, said

[The] sergeant’s reply is in agreement, except for his having mentioned or cited the truthful individual that he states in his reply.

At this point, the two began to argue with one another. Sergeant Rodríguez, instructed to offer proof to the denial of the Alférez, replied

[I] have no one with whom to prove what [I] have declared and [my] word.

Asked whether he had anything to say and respond regarding the other points mentioned by Urrutia in his deposition, Rodríguez replied

[Everything] that [Urrutia] states about [my] having removed the materials from the habilitación and their being taken by Sergeant Andres del Valle to the house of Corporal José Manuel Granandos, and from there to the house of [Navarro, and the] transfer of the materials from San José by [Navarro], is untrue.  

At that moment, Urrutia replied to Rodríguez that he (Rodríguez) had not said to him, when he told Urrutia about the removal of the materials from the paymaster’s office, that he had been told that by the truthful individual that he now cited, but that everything else was true and was told to him by Sergeant Rodríguez. At this point in the testimony, Urrutia was ordered to withdraw and Arreola was called into the room and his deposition was read in the presence of Rodríguez, who then replied

what is contained in the deposition of Master José Arreola [is] true only that [I] told [Urrutia], with [Arreola] present, about the removal of the materials from the habilitación to the house of [Navarro] because he had been told by a truthful person,

402 Ibid
403 Ibid
and not that they had been taken by Sergeant [del Valle] to the house of Corporal Jose Manuel Granados.

When Arreola was asked what he had to say in view of the objections made by Rodríguez to his deposition, he replied

Although [Rodríguez] may make objection and corrections [to his deposition], [I] cannot change it, because everything that [I] stated in it is the truth, and furthermore, [I] heard [Rodríguez] say the same thing that [Urrutia] declared, and [I] did not hear [Rodríguez] say that he had heard it from a truthful individual.

Moreover, in proof that everything stated in his deposition was the truth, Arreola pointed out to Rodríguez that he had said to Urrutia, in the presence of Arreola, that he knew which individuals had removed the materials and from [where] they had come; that a private had told him about Corporal Granados having a stock of chintz fabric; and, during one of the dark snowy nights was when the materials were removed from the paymaster’s office. Then, Rodríguez was asked what he had to say in view of what Arreola had declared. He replied that everything that Arreola said about the removal of the materials on the snowy night was said by Urrutia and not by him. In turn, Arreola was asked what he had to say about Rodríguez’s statements; he indicated that he did not hear Urrutia say the things that Rodríguez claimed, because the only thing that Urrutia said was to ask Rodríguez what persons had been the ones who had removed the materials from the habilitación.404

Arreola stated that Rodríguez responded to this question by indicating that it was Del Valle and Granados, with all the rest that appeared in his foregoing responses. Rodríguez was then asked what he had to say in view of the ratification by Arreola of Rodríguez’s statement; he stated that the same thing that Arreola stated was what Urrutia had said. At this moment, Arreola replied to Rodríguez, saying that the same thing that he had declared he heard from the mouth of Rodríguez and not from that of Urrutia, and that what he had declared was nothing more than the truth, and

404 Ibid
if Rodríguez denied that, then he would deny that what is in our vision is light [no es mas de la verdad, y de negarlo el Sargento que está presente negará que no es luz la que está a la vista].

As the face to face confrontation of the proceeding drew to a close, Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez was asked to state with clarity and unequivocal language [preguntado al Sargento ... que expusiese con claridad, y con palabras terminantes] what he had to say against was declared by Arreola; he stated that he had nothing more to say than what he had already declared. Then, the presiding judge Muñoz who had taken testimony from Urrutia and Arreola, both of whom argued and replied each on his own part with Rodríguez, indicated that Rodríguez did not convince the witnesses – Arreola and Urrutia -- but rather made objections that appeared in his replies in their individual face-to-face exchanges. Moreover, Muñoz ordered that the recorded proceedings be read to all three men. Upon its completion, Rodríguez stated that from what had just been read to him, he was convinced that he had told the two witnesses who were present that the materials had been removed from the paymaster’s office and taken to the house of Angel Navarro, as he had been informed by a ‘man of truth [un hombre de verdad],’ and that his other statements were true. However, Urrutia and Arreola both refuted Rodríguez’s testimony, denying that he had learned the news from the ‘truthful individual’ and that they had nothing more to say than what they had already declared. Muñoz asked Rodriguez for his response to the two men’s parallel declarations; he indicated that he had nothing at all to add.

Rodríguez was required to substantiate his accusations against Amangual within a period of four days, and on March 17 Governor Muñoz further ordered that while he was doing that, the coffer of the company needed to be opened [corte de caxa] and the accounts needed to be balanced; both activities conducted in the presence of officers, one sergeant, one corporal, and one private that the company would appoint as its agent. In the presence of Lieutenant Bernardo Fernández, Alférez Urrutia, Sergeant Prudencio Rodríguez, Squad Corporal Juan Antonio Urrutia, and Private José Alexandor de la Garza, as the agent representing the soldiers in the company, the Governor

405 Ibid
406 Ibid
proceeded to balance the accounts and examine the goods and supplies that were on hand for the use of the troops. For his part, Amangual was ordered to put all of these items -- including the account books, active and inactive debts, to funds of private citizens -- on display in order to discern their legitimate statuses [los pusiese de presente con inclusión de quentas, deudas activas y pasivas de fondos, y vecinos particulares, para venir en conocimiento de su lexitimo estado].

What followed during the inventory inspection is a fascinating log of the material wealth held at the presidio; indeed, the international origin of some of the items reinforces the notion of the presidio and its storehouse as a showcase for the influx of imports from across the world with a heavy emphasis on cloth, utensils, and hides. Historian Juan Marchena has noted the collateral reforms of the Bourbon reorganization were destined for the maintenance of the military aspect of the Spanish empire. Carlos III liberated the policies of commerce in order to stimulate trade between the American colonies by means of a series of deregulatory steps. That began in 1765 and reached a climax in 1778 with the Reglamento de Comercio Libre. These measures stimulated the legal trade and widened the entry of taxes derived from the same procedures.

The first items listed in the Béxar presidio’s storehouse included fabric from Castilla, yardage of cloth arrived like blue serge from England [sargas azules de Ynglaterra] and twelve bolts of ‘royal Silesian linen’ amounting to 494 pesos. Linen, chintz, calico, eight bolts of mother-of-pearl and green ribbon of Genoa [liston nacar y verde de Genova]; 35 silk handkerchiefs with a sun design in all colors [mascadas de la marca del sol de todos colores]; buttons for dress coats, including five gross of gilded buttons de asa for uniforms; three dozen pairs of fine scissors, and one thousand needles. From Mexico, six pounds of twisted ‘Misteca’ [Mixtec] silk in all colors and one bolt of Querétaro cloth, red; thirty rebozos and four bolts of striped cotton duck from Puebla; eighteen hats from San Luis (Potosí); and, other equally interesting items including eleven pairs of ‘first class stockings of bright-red chancheo [once pares de medias de primera de

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407 Ibid, (Muñoz’s order to Amangual for the examination of the storehouse of the havilitación [sic])
408 Allan J. Kuethe and Juan Marchena Fernández, eds. Soldados del rey, el ejército borbónico en América colonial en visperas de la independencia, (Seville: Universitat Jaume, 2005). 26
chancheo]; almost two pounds of musketeer’s braid with five strands; one hair net; four reams of superfine paper; five bolts of Chinese burlap. The sum of this extraordinary array of items amounted to two thousand, seventy-two pesos.409

The last section of the inventory lists items that appear to be specifically intended for the soldiers and this merchandise divulges some of the costuming elements of the *presidiales* and members of its cavalry force. The inventory devoted to soldier uniform pieces along with horse riding gear included

- Thirteen short coats, red of Queretaro cloth, 42 pesos
- One blue uniform coat, 7 pesos
- Thirteen ounces of blue twisted agave thread, 1 real 5 granos
- Seventeen blank booklets for the soldiers [??], 5 pesos, 2 reales, 6 granos
- Fourteen plain leather shields, 24 pesos, 4 reales
- Two bridles, 3 pesos, 4 reales
- Eight pairs of saddle irons, 12 pesos
- Six pairs of spurs, 9 pesos
- Thirty-seven cordon for sabers, 12 pesos, 2 reales, 8 granos
- Thirty-three sword scabbards, 41 pesos, 2 reales
- Seven [sets of] saddle trappings, consisting of saddle covering, saddlebag, skirts [armas], skirt holders, rear housing [anquera], and lariats, 49 pesos, 3 reales, 6 granos
- Twelve separate anqueras [rear housings], 7 pesos, 4 reales,
- Three saddle covers [corazas], 9 pesos
- Two pairs of saddlebags, 4 pesos, 7 reales, four granos
- Eleven sets of cowhide stirrup leathers [arciones], 2 pesos, 6 reales
- Thirty-six rawhide harnesses equipped with their corresponding cinches, twenty-four headstalls, and twenty-four packsaddle covers, 220 pesos, 2 reales
- Eighteen muskets, 208 pesos, 1 real
- Thirteen and a half pairs of pistols, 156 pesos, 6 granos
- One lance blade, 1 peso, 6 reales

The inspection committee could not continue with their work until the next day, but described that day’s duties as having included and listed in the greatest detail the measuring, counting, and weighing [*con la mayor prolixidad* (sic), *havindolos medido y contado y pesado a toda*]

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409 Francisco Amangual vs. Mariano Rodríguez, for slander, February 29, 1792 (Inventory of the paymaster’s office, March 17)
Few contemporaneous images in the form of paintings or etchings show the costuming of the frontier military personnel. Title Three of the Reglamento of 1772 contained two articles, the first describing the presidial soldier’s uniform. It was to be the same for all and where it concerned Francisco Amanguard, it was his responsibility to ensure that a sufficient reserve of every type of item was available; the paymaster was to see to it that the soldiers never lacked anything, but the uniforms were never to be given wholesale to the company. Instead, individual items were to be distributed to soldiers as the articles were needed. Title Six of the Regulation mandated how the supply of articles of clothing and other necessities were to be distributed for the maintenance of the troops and their families. Each soldier was to provide to his captain a signed list of the clothes and other effects that he needed or wanted for himself, his wife, children, and the rest of his family, with the total cost not to exceed the balance due him. The list was then directed to the paymaster, who placed the orders as requested so that the soldier would accept the goods unless the captain found that any complaints by the soldier, if concerns existed, were justified. If so, the paymaster assumed charge of the rejected merchandise; he would then make an adjustment with his supplier.

The inspection staff, consisting of Governor/Captain Muñoz, Lieutenant Bernardo Fernández, Alférez Manuel de Urrutia, Squad Corporal Juan Antonio Urrutia, Sergeant 

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410 Ibid
411 See Chapter One in this study for the Reglamento’s description of the presidial uniform.
412 The Reglamento de 1729 dictated this same requirement with all the soldiers ordered to be uniformly dressed in the customary uniform of the same color, this latter specific indication not precisely described. Further, at this time the Captain of each presidio was responsible for compliance with the clothing directive and the regulation does not make the same demands of the presidio’s paymasters in supplying the troops. Reglamento de 1729, artículo sesenta y cuatro
413 Reglamento de 1772, Título tercero, artículo dos
414 Reglamento de 1772, Título sexto [sic], artículo uno
415 Urrutia’s presence at the inventory is questionable; General Castro had issued a note to Muñoz on this same day from Santa Rosa, ordering Urrutia to be set free from his arrest. Castro added that Muñoz was to make certain that Urrutia knew “how displeasing [is] the report that obliged [Muñoz] to have him arrested, and that if [Urrutia did] not mend his ways, a serious measure” would be taken. Castro’s note was answered by Muñoz on March 24, 1792, probably the day it was received. Castro to Muñoz, BA March 18, 1792.
Prudencio Rodríguez, and Private Alexandro [sic] de la Garza, having written down all the goods that have been listed in the greatest detail, and having measured, counted, and weighed them to complete satisfaction, the men noted the goods as being the same items that were on hand in the paymaster’s office and so entered these findings into the proceedings.416 The next issue that required further investigation was the inspection and recording of the goods held in the possession of the master tailor Arreola. This took place on March 18, and included inventory one might expect to find associated with a tailor:

- Four and two-thirds dozen large buttons for a dress coat, gilded, 1 pesos
- Seventeen dozen small buttons, for the troops’ uniforms, 4 pesos 2 reales
- Six pairs of metal buckles, with their straps, 4 pesos, 4 reales

However, Arreola’s inventory also included items like blanketing, *morinillos* for beating chocolate, copper bowls and kettles, a weight scale, a Mexican brass weight standard, corn, beans, and cash – seven hundred pesos that were inspected and counted in the coffer with three keys of the *fondo de gratificación*. The combined grand total of the goods and other accessories, counted and measured to the complete satisfaction by the officers, sergeant, corporal, and the private representing the company amounted to five thousand, six hundred forty-seven pesos, two reales, and five and two-eighths granos.417

The inventory conducted at Amangual’s office must have been a time-consuming, tedious endeavor. Indeed, the official record of the event indicates that, during the late afternoon, the process of counting and measuring all of the merchandise held in stock had become an exhausting chore that necessitated a reprieve for all involved. However, the itemizing was instrumental to the essential nature of the slander suit instigated by Mariano Rodríguez against the paymaster of his company. Moreover, in his duties as paymaster, Amangual was obligated to ensure the strict maintenance of the general accounts of debits and credits with the greatest clarity and justification [*con la mayor claridad y justificación*] in order for his records to be examined and approved by

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416 Francisco Amangual vs. Mariano Rodríguez, for slander, February 29, 1792 (Inventory of the paymaster’s office, March 17)
417 Ibid, (Inventory of the master tailor’s goods, March 18, 1792)
the captain and other officers, including the *comandante inspector*, at the end of the year.\(^{418}\) Whether he successfully accomplished this most significant component of his duties as the presidio’s *habilitado* and whether his culpability was definitively established in the slander suit will be discussed in the next chapter.

\(^{418}\) *Reglamento de 1772, Título catorce, artículos uno, dos, y tres*
Chapter Three

And in particular I need [another general joint report from Colonel Don Juan Ugalde] for that which concerns the four provinces under his military command, upon the delicate matter of managing the business affairs of the troops [...] which up to now has not been found in the paymasters, who have incurred numerous bankruptcies [...] Article 90, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces

A month would pass before any other documentation surfaced regarding the slander case brought on by Rodríguez against Amangual. Then on April 19, Francisco Amangual presented a statement signed on March 18 stating that the goods distributed among the officers and other individuals of the Béxar company totaled eight thousand, six hundred, twenty-eight pesos, five reales, six and seven-eighths granos which corresponded to the funds for the company. These monies were delivered to him as salaries from the royal treasury in San Luis Potosí during the second semester (second half) of 1791 and which he received in August, according to the account recorded by the treasurer of the Royal Treasury. Further, these funds purchased the inventory reported and examined by Muñoz and his team, for which purpose Sergeant Rodríguez and Private Pérez – both arrested – took part in with the others and to whom the entries of items were read.

All of the individuals present indicated their satisfaction with the goods received that appeared on their accounts, with the exception of Rodríguez. He indicated that he had not received a bolt of wide bretaña, ten varas of pontivi, one peso of soap, but that their value of fifteen pesos, seven reales, and two granos were credited to him in the company ledger in which they were charged. And, a private, Francisco Antonio del Río demanded three varas of jerga fabric that were paid to him in cash [del Río reclamó tres varas de jerga que se le pagaron en reales]. Even the soldiers that were sick likewise acknowledged their respective accounts, for which purpose the inspection committee went to their lodgings so that verification could be made. As a final piece of evidence, Amangual was ordered to submit a general account showing the funds in the accounts under his management; these included the salaries of the troops, general stores, post office, debts

419 Gálvez, Instrucciones, 1786
420 Francisco Amangual vs. Mariano Rodríguez, for slander, BA February 29, 1792 [Inventory of goods and supplies for the troops of Béxar presidio]
421 Ibid
owed by the paymaster’s office, the Cibolo fund, deposit for contraband, and gratificación funds for the men.422

The total value of the examined goods on hand in the storehouse of the Béxar habilitación, consisting of what was provided to the troops from November 15 through December 31, 1791; and, from January 1 through March 18, 1792 amounted to fourteen thousand seven hundred twenty-seven pesos, four reales, seven and five-eighths granos. This total appeared in the ninth and tenth entries of the general account signed by the inspection committee members423 – headed by the Governor and Captain, Manuel Muñoz -- with a corresponding explanation. The conclusion reached on April 27, 1792 was that the funds received at the royal treasury by the presidio’s paymaster, Lieutenant Francisco Amangual, were complete, and that there was no removal of the goods that was alleged by Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez. Of this, Rodríguez was convinced and satisfied with and expressed as much in the presence of the committee; at which point he then asked for forgiveness from Amangual, saying that if he had made the allegation it was because the priest Francisco Gómez Moreno had told him so, a contention Rodríguez had asserted throughout his testimony and in all of his depositions. However, knowing that the priest was mistaken in his report, Rodríguez asked for a pardon. Amangual was then asked if he was satisfied, and he replied that he was not. Further, the paymaster indicated that Rodríguez had to appear wherever it might suit Amangual.424

At about 3:15pm on that same day, Private Alexandro [sic] de la Garza appeared in front of Governor Muñoz as the representative of the sergeants, corporals, and privates of the Béxar company. He indicated that, in fulfillment of what Sergeant Rodríguez had promised in the previous proceeding, the sergeant had spoken to the officers Lieutenant Bernardo Fernández, First

422 Ibid
423 The inspection committee, besides Muñoz, was comprised of Bernardo Fernández, Manuel de Urrutia, José Xavier Menchaca, Prudencio Rodríguez, Juan Antonio Urrutia, Alejandro de la Garza, with the attesting witnesses Vicente de la Cuesta and José de Jesus Mansolo.
424 Francisco Amangual vs. Mariano Rodríguez, for slander, BA February 29, 1792
Alférez Manuel de Urrutia, and the second, José Xavier Menchaca and the lower ranking soldiers and said

Señores, I have come to retract what I said about the señor havilitado, Lieutenant Don Francisco Amangual [vengo adesdecirme de lo que havia dicho del S(en)or Then(ien)te Havilitado Don Fran(cis)co Amangual]

He said this because, as he had insisted all along, his having made the accusation in the first place was due to having been given misinformation from the priest Francisco Gómez Moreno.425 Governor Muñoz’s response reveals his conciliatory nature while at the same time suggesting the apparently tepid relationship between himself and Amangual. The Governor acknowledged the satisfaction given by Sergeant Rodríguez to Amangual – in the form of having asked for forgiveness from the paymaster – and his having expressed to the members of the company that his allegation was based on the report given by padre Gómez Moreno. Muñoz made it known that the additional indignity suffered by Rodríguez was his month and eighteen days of confinement in the presidio’s guardhouse, from the day of his arrest until April 27.426

Sympathy played no part in Muñoz conveying the grievances of Mariano Rodríguez. For his part, the sergeant may have expected a different result after all of the testimony in the slander suit had been taken and following the interviews with the multiple witnesses, some of whom he faced during depositions where his veracity was openly contradicted in the presence of his commander Muñoz. On April 26, the day before Muñoz reached his final conclusion, Rodríguez appealed to the commander to set him free from confinement. In his document he indicated that

Since the fifth of [March…], I have been in public confinement, exposed to insults and disgraces that I have not [before] experienced, for no more cause or reason than [it came] after the slander that I am accused of having raised against my lieutenant and paymaster, Don Francisco Amangual, was discussed openly in such a way that the public attorney [procurador] of the illustrious town council [ayuntamiento] of this villa divulged it in the presence of the guardhouse squad of this royal district [real cuartel] long before my arrest, what had not been witnessed before the integrity of Your Lordship, with regard to my having been deprived of all dealings

425 Ibid
426 Ibid
y comunicación con otras personas [respecto a averseme privado el trato, y comunicación con las gentes], y de la misma manera a pesar de las circunstancias que me ocasiona el tratamiento que a la fecha estoy recibiendo, así como el desprecio que mi dicho lugarteniente ha vuelto a mí con su consulta – llamándome mentiroso, calumniador, y enredador, cuando nunca he tenido causa para que me aparezca en tal acusación, como lo demuestran las autenticas certificaciones que tengo en mi poder, ya que es evidente que toda vez que fuese cierto, nunca me habrían dado estas [certificaciones] por mi superior – pidiendo a Vuestra Señoría la benéfica misericordia para que, por favor, me ordene que me dejen en libertad y encaminamiento para poder hacer una justa defensa de lo que dije, diciendo que en público ha corrido, con la misma justicia que se me dé en ello, ella mediante. 

Rodríguez pidió a Muñoz lo que le pidió, porque sirvió sus derechos [Suplico el digne mandan hazer (sic) como llevo (sic) pedido, que assi (sic) cómiente (sic) a mi derechos], y pidiendo al Gobernador que aceptara su consulta en el papel que habló porque el tipo apropiado [admitiéndome esta representación (sic) en el presente papel] no se usó en este distrito de la frontera [por no usarse del correspondiente en el distrito de esta frontera]. 

La información anterior es particularmente interesante en vista de la inventario exhaustivo que ocurrió en el curso de varios días; con su inventario de bienes representando el comercio internacional y el comercio, no es difícil imaginar que este “tipo” de papel para documentos oficiales no estaba disponible en la Béxar habilitación. 

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427 Defensa presentada por Mariano Rodríguez para la liberación de prisión, BA de abril 26, 1792
428 Ibid
429 Aparentemente este tipo de papel se había de un cierto tipo para documentos oficiales y su escasez era general en el Sureste. En mayo del año 1792 en la ciudad de Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Nagüedoches [sic], el lugarteniente interino del municipio, Juan Cortés, que también era el capitán del presidio en la Bahía del Espíritu Santo, formuló quejas contra el acusado Juan José Pena y presentó la sumaria en ‘papel común,’ con la misma explicación dada en el caso Amangual-Rodríguez que: era el tipo de papel no apropiado en este caso [con el presente papel por no haber del que corresponde en esta provincia]. Juan Cortés procesando contra Juan José Pena, BA, Mayo 27 de 1792. Por lo tanto, el problema con el papel lo notificó, por casualidad [Por casualidad llegó a mi noticia [u]e en algún [u]o partidos de jurisdicciones de este Reyno se havian [sic] hecho habilitaciones de papel de un sello por otro, y del común por el sellado], al Gobernador. A través de su representante, Revilla Gigedo recordó al Gobernador interino de Texas Escandón de las disposiciones del Artículo 156 de las Ordenanzas de Intendentes, prohibiendo el uso de tal papel común para cualquier pretexto; él ordenó que el papel de timbre, por lo tanto, se cambiara por el papel común.
Muñoz’s response was immediate. Improper plain paper or not, that same day he accepted Rodríguez’s petition and asserted that it was to be taken into account when the inventory of the paymaster’s office was completed.\(^{430}\) In the final text of the forty-three page slander suit, Muñoz disclosed his approach to ending the matter.

I have decided to admonish him [Rodríguez] that henceforth he must refrain from making such allegations about the conduct of the habilitado officer, as well as the other officers and members of the company, with regard to [the fact] that he, as first sergeant, should keep his soldiers under control and admonish them to carry out their duties, restraining them from improper conversations. And should he become aware of any other defects in the management of the [company’s] business or matters of the service, he is to report it with all due subordination to the captain of the company so that he might apply the remedy that is consequent to his responsibilities.\(^{431}\)

Muñoz made Rodríguez aware of his decision, and once the Sergeant understood it, he said he would obey it and comply with the decision completely. Rodríguez apologized for having made the accusation against Amangual. At this point, Muñoz released Rodríguez from confinement and indicated that the document of complaint that Rodríguez made against the paymaster should be settled. However, Rodríguez “beseeched [suplica a el (...) gobernador]” the Governor not to settle the document because it was not the best thing for him; and, Rodríguez further asked that it be torn up or suppressed in the governor’s possession \(que no se provea el escrito que tiene presentado pues no convenirle, y suplica se rompa o le suprima en su poder\).\(^{432}\) The question remains as to how the presidial relationships continued to function past the point of the final verdict by Muñoz, and once the investigation was over and certain conclusions were reached? Several answers are possible. As we have previously seen, out of necessity and given the realities of life in the remote

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\(^{430}\) Ibid

\(^{431}\) Ibid. In truth, Muñoz’s admonition merely replicated the duties of a presidio sergeant as conveyed in the Reglamento of 1772 which required the sergeant to know from memory all the duties of the soldiers and the corporals, and the penal laws, in order to instruct the company and to see to their compliance. Sergeants were not to overlook disorders, prohibited conversations [my emphasis], or incidents that might be contrary to obedience; he [the sergeant] personally is to restrain and correct such things as quickly as possible, winning the respect of the soldiers by his good conduct and obedience and by the respect and obedience he gives to the officers. Reglamento…1772, Título trece, artículo diez

\(^{432}\) Ibid
reaches of the Spanish colonial empire, military personnel were obligated to maintaining some semblance of equilibrium within the confines of the presidios. Amangual and Rodríguez would continue to be members of the Béxar Company. The rest of the year’s rosters divulge this simple truth. Requests for transfer often led to soldiers’ departures for the general well-being of specific companies, and to mitigate hostilities that may have existed between one individual and another.

3.2 Fit to Serve, or, Not?

As it was examined in Chapter Two of this study, Article 91 of the Instructions of 1786 encouraged then Commander General Ugarte to immediately prepare to eliminate the unfit men from presidial companies, flying companies, dragoons and volunteers, replacing them with those more suitable for warfare […dispondrá V.S. que se separen de las Compañías Presidiales, Volantes, Dragones y Voluntarios los hombres inútiles, reemplazándolos con los mas á propósito para la Guerra].433 Where it concerned officers, Article 92 required Ugarte to separate them immediately, and to consult with Viceroy Gálvez about the future which these men would merit, no matter what their rank.434 As we saw in Chapter 1, after a period of six months Amangual’s agitation over the results of the investigation, especially where it concerned the punishment – or, its deficiency in its scope, at least to his mind – of Rodríguez would require further effort on his part in order to achieve a more desirable result.435 The articles that followed these concerned the selection of officers for vacant positions within the presidial hierarchy, but Articles 99 through 103 specifically addressed the qualities necessary in warfare, and more precisely for that against hostile indigenous communities.436 But the Amangual-Rodríguez dynamic was an intra-presidio conflict predicated on the expectation that its protagonists would, at least, at the official level maintain a certain decorum based upon seniority, rank, and obligation to duty first. However, that

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433 Gálvez, Instrucciones…1786, artículo 91
434 Gálvez, Instrucciones…1786, artículo 92
435 See Chapter 1, pp. 55-57
436 Gálvez, Instrucciones…1786, artículos 99 - 103
also required a disciplinary effort at once fair and impartial, and intended to curb the disobedient impulses of any recalcitrant soldier.

Often, these types of conflicts emerged from the very people entrusted with tending to the spiritual needs of the frontier population. These situations might have appeared ambiguous and thus beyond the bounds of any aggressive prosecution given the status of some of the accused. However, documentary evidence shows that one certainty remained, that a petition was drawn up and signed by several citizens in an apparent unified complaint against the original troublemaker in the Amangual-Rodríguez slander suit: Francisco Gómez Moreno. He was the parish priest who had, perhaps intentionally, supplied Sergeant Rodríguez with the misinformation about the illicit transfer of articles from the paymaster’s office. On February 27, after being apprised by the members of the ayuntamiento of San Fernando of the complaint made against the parish priest, Muñoz sent the five fojas útiles comprising the original petition to General Castro, who must have felt more than a little exasperation with the Béxar padres as we shall shortly see.437

Francisco Amangual’s performance of his duties as paymaster continued unabated throughout the Rodríguez ordeal and some of the arm’s length approach of Governor Muñoz towards the paymaster is evident in a short note addressed to Amangual on March 16, 1792. Muñoz wanted Amangual to tell Courbiere (a successful merchant discussed in the previous chapters) that he, Muñoz, had delivered to the master tailor Arreola, one of the deponents who had figured so prominently in the slander suit, one and a quarter varas of cloth and four skeins of thread for a waistcoat and trousers [chupa y calzones] for the son of Comanche Chief Soquinas. Muñoz directed Amangual to provide Arreola with the lining and buttons and to also pay for the work, all of which was to be charged to the expenditure accounts for the Indians; Muñoz acknowledged that

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437 Muñoz to Ayuntamiento […] complaint about conduct of priest […], BA April 7, 1792. By August of the same year, even the Viceroy was aware of the multitude of complaints about Gómez Moreno; Revilla Gigedo wrote to Muñoz that, in view of the “excesses” that had been substantiated against the parish priest, he and the Auditor of War had forwarded an official letter to the Bishop so that he might take proper action and then report what measures had been taken to correct Gómez Moreno’s conduct. The ayuntamiento received an exact copy of the Viceroy’s letter to Muñoz. Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz, BA August 7, 1792; Revilla Gigedo to Ayuntamiento of San Antonio de Béxar, August 7, 1792
the paymaster would be reimbursed for the total of the expenditures. A little more than a week later, Muñoz had delivered four pesos in cigars to the Comanches of Soquina and Sojas, and instructed Amangual to charge to the account for the expenditures created for the natives’ sustenance. One month later, Muñoz issued a promissory note to habilitado Amangual for two pesos of cigars for ten Comanches that had appeared at the presidio on April 11 and 15. For his part, Muñoz carried on with his obligations as, both, Governor of Texas, and, Captain of the Bejar presidio; he continued to comply with orders from above and especially so when receiving directives concerning the maintenance of productive relationships with the indigenous nations.

One week after sending his short note to Amangual regarding delivery of the tailor’s supplies, Muñoz received an order from Commander General Ramón de Castro to deliver to the same Comanche chief Soquinas, and two others, Soxaes [Sojas], and, Ojos Azules twelve of the rifles that he had sent for this purpose. The objective of this dispatch was so that the three leaders could distribute them among the individuals of their nation as they thought best [Entregará usted a los capitanes […] doce fusiles […] á fin de que los repartan á los individuos de su nación que a ellos les parezca mas conveniente]. Castro further instructed Muñoz to give them the amount of powder and bullets that the Governor considered appropriate with the understanding that he, General Castro, was recommending as he had always done up to that time [como lo he executado hasta ahora] good treatment to the Comanches and to other Friendly Nations of the North. Castro’s reasoning was unambiguous: he told Muñoz that abrasiveness and excessive economizing were not instruments to strengthen the close friendship that the Province needed to preserve and that the

438 Order issued by Muñoz for articles given to Indians, addressed to Amangual, Paymaster, BA March 16, 1792
439 Promissory note of Muñoz to Amangual, for four pesos worth of cigars for Comanche captains Soquina and Sojas BA March 27, 1792
440 Promissory note issued by Muñoz for two pesos worth of cigars for ten Comanche Indians, BA April 17, 1792
441 Two weeks prior, Sojas and Soquina had received tobacco, biscuits, and other supplies from Muñoz; the soldiers were to take these provisions to Sergeant Valle and were to be charged to the account that corresponded to expenditures for the Indians. Muñoz order to send supplies to Comanche captains […] BA March 2, 1792
King commanded at any cost [la aspereza y sobrada economía no son instrumentos para estrechar la amistad que conviene conservan y que Su Majestad manda sea a toda costa].\textsuperscript{442}

Conversely, General Castro did not extend the same magnanimity to the Apaches, and least of all the Lipanes whom he designated as the declared enemies of region and of humanity [los enemigos declarados de la religion y la humanidad]. Castro took Munoz at his word when the latter informed the General that during the previous month three Lipan Apaches had appeared at the mission of San Antonio though it was Munoz’s impression that the Indians had not come in good faith. Moreover, Munoz informed Castro that the Lipanes had not asked for peace but that Fray Jose Francisco Lopez had given them food and a manojo\textsuperscript{443} of tobacco anyway.\textsuperscript{444} Padre Lopez then failed to deliver a timely report to Munoz so that the Apaches could be apprehended consequent to superior orders most likely emanating from the Viceroy himself. A plainly exasperated Castro minced no words expressing his dissatisfaction with the entire event and even hinting at one of the missionary padres usurping his command, stating

There never fails to be someone who will shelter the declared enemies of religion and humanity at the same time that the king is employing vast sums and the power of his arms for the purpose of exterminating them [nunca falta quien abrigue á los enemigos declarados de la religion y la humanidad, al paso que el Rey emplea quantiosas sumas y el poder de sus armas con el objeto de exterminarlos]. I have said several times that under no pretext should any Indian of the Apache race be admitted into our presidios until […] that are forced to sue for peace in good faith, if that is possible in their treachery [Tengo dicho varias veces que por ningun pretexto debe admitir en (uest)ros presidios a ningún Índio de raza Apache hasta que consternados por aquellas después de haber sufridos repetidos golpes, se vean obligados á pedir la paz de buena fé si cabe en su perfidia].\textsuperscript{445}

\textsuperscript{442} Castro to Munoz, […] deliver certain arms and ammunition to Comanche captains, BA March 24, 1792; by May 8, the Viceroy Revilla Gigedo was apprised of the Castro order for provisions supplied to the two Comanche chiefs by Munoz. Revilla Gigedo to Munoz, […] aid given by Munoz to Comanche […] as ordered by Castro, BA May 8, 1792

\textsuperscript{443} In this sense, a manojo may have equated to a bundle, or, two pounds of raw tobacco.

\textsuperscript{444} Castro to Munoz, […] forbidding hospitality to Apaches, BA March 10, 1792

\textsuperscript{445} Ibid. On March 22, 1792 the paymaster and later interim commander of the Bahía presidio Manuel de Espadas acknowledged the receipt of Muñoz’s directive of March 16 conveying Castro’s superior order of non-accommodation of “any Indian of the Apache race” until their suit for peace was carried out in good faith. Espadas to Muñoz, […] orders regarding policies to follow with the Apache, BA March 22, 1792
If Castro’s disgust with the religious orders was only thinly veiled in the beginning of his letter, by his last words to Muñoz he was unequivocal.

This you will make understood for a second time in the jurisdiction under your command, and especially by the missionary address of the far-too-many missions that I think exist in the province, and express to the aforementioned [López] how unpleasant such pretenses [lo desagradables que me son tales disimulos] are to me, and that I will report it even to the king if a second complaint of this nature should come to me.446

Clearly relationships between the Spanish colonial military and the Lipan Apaches had changed over time. As I explained in the previous chapter, only a decade earlier and not long after Gálvez’s inspection of the presidios, a royal order of June 27, 1782 called upon Teodor de Croix to renew offensive operations against the Apaches. Croix’s successor, Felipe de Neve, carried out the order and grouped the presidial companies and the flying squadrons into divisions each consisting of a third of the personnel of two or more companies deployed into a relentless pursuit of the enemy in monthly campaigns.447

By the end of November 1783, Neve had completed an extensive inspection of the presidios of Sonora, Nueva Vizcaya, and Coahuila y Téjas. When Neve died unexpectedly in 1784, he was replaced by the commandant inspector José Antonio Rengel who was vested with the same powers which Croix and Neve had exercised. However, in April 1785, the autonomy of commandancy general of the Interior Provinces came to end when its management became subordinate to viceregal authority. In this, the twilight era of the Spanish colonial regime, what made the new viceroy different from those previous was that, now, the role was filled by a military man with considerable experience, knowledge, and ability in dealing with the peculiar military and political problems of the northern frontier.448 As Amangual would do for the Béxar company, Bernardo de Gálvez had served as a captain in the Chihuahua compañía volante and military commandant for both Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora from 1770 to 1771, and as a Governor of Louisiana from 1777 to

446 Ibid
447 Moorhead, 96-98
448 Moorhead, 98-99
1783. Despite the considerable military experience of the new viceroy and, as has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the modification of the Provincias Internas by its division into two distinct military districts – an eastern and a western – under two military commanders, Juan de Ugalde in the Provincias Internas de Oriente, and Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola in the Provincias Internas de Poniente, indigenous groups continued to resist the authority of Spanish agents of control.

3.3 The Gálvez Instructions of 1786

In his own words, Gálvez drew up his Instrucciones by virtue of a royal order of His Majesty and these recommendations were specifically directed to the Commander General Jacobo Ugarte, for the guidance and for the punctual observance of this senior officer and his immediate subordinates. Gálvez prefaced his two hundred and sixteen ‘points’ in the Instructions by declaring the “unhappy state” but acknowledged the efforts of his and Ugarte’s predecessors as they attempted to alleviate the evils from which the provincias suffered. The borderlands’ soldiers on the ground and their ongoing sacrifices in all of the operations of warfare in the provinces that were required, and the faithful performance of their duty were likewise recognized by Gálvez. Unlike Rivera’s regulations of 1729, however, by the third paragraph of the preamble to the Instruction, Gálvez invoked the name of ‘God’ as he shares his

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449 This plan was put into effect by the new viceroy Manuel Antonio Flores in December 1786.
450 The Interior Provinces of the East included Coahuila y Téjas, Nuevo León, and Nuevo Santander, the latter under the governorship of the aforementioned Conde de Escandón. The Interior Provinces of the West were composed of the Californias, Sonora, Nuevo México and Nueva Vizcaya.
451 Moorhead, 99-103
452 Gálvez, Instrucción … 1786
certainty that the desired pacification of the borderlands offered even greater difficulties than those that had always been experienced in the region. Gálvez suggested that these challenges to peace appeared even more insurmountable in the calamitous period of the mid-1780s. He credited divine intervention as the benefactor of the territories, the provinces having been endowed with the “fair proportions of mild climate, fertility, and wealth,” and, furthermore, that God would “use His mercy, restoring them health and abundance” while at the same time bless the Spanish military offensive in its “operations of war [pero Dios que dotó esos territorios con las bellas proporciones de benignos temperamentos, feracidad y riquezas, usará de sus misericordias, restituyendoles la salud y la abundancia, y bendiciendo nuestras operaciones de guerra].”

In the previous chapter, I discussed the Instructions of 1786 and their implications for the compañías volantes and those worthy soldiers that demonstrated a commitment to the duties of military campaigns and showed an aptitude for warfare. Since the 1786 Instructions concern the status of Spanish interactions with the indigenous communities, especially those that were fostered mostly by one directional gift giving and, at other times, ravaged by the social, economic, and cultural dynamics of the borderlands, the focus will now turn to the Apaches and their fluctuating relationship with the borderlanders and the military establishment during the 1790s. The instrucciones created by Gálvez were intended to provide an intensive set of guidelines for dealing with Indian enemies. As Worcester indicates, many bands of Apaches roamed the arid mountain and valleys along the entire frontier from Texas west to the Gila River (in present day Arizona), but they were not a united force, and frequently sparred with one another. The Mescalero lived in southern Texas, along the Rio Grande, and targeted Coahuila;

453 Ibid
454 Ibid
the Lipan and Natagé attacked the settlements of southeastern New Mexico and El Paso del Norte, while in the Mimbres mountains west of the Rio Grande the so-called mimbreños roamed. Northeast of New Mexico were the Jicarilla Apaches, and Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and New Mexico were threatened by the Gileños, an Apache group that lived near the headwaters of the Gila river.⁴⁵⁵

According to Moorhead, by 1748, Apache depredations had reached such serious proportions in Nueva Vizcaya that Viceroy Revilla Gigedo issued a formal declaration of war against the nation. Things would only get worse. During the years 1749 – 1763, the Spanish estimated that Apache warRiors had killed more than eight hundred people and destroyed approximately four million pesos worth of property, principally targeting a two hound mile radius of Chihuahua, with some raids coming dangerously close to the city itself.⁴⁵⁶

The Instructions of 1786 attempted to grapple with the ongoing threat perceived by the Spanish administrators in Monclova and Mexico City, and the borderlands military personnel in direct contact with the Apache. Article 20 of Gálvez’s instruction was direct and unequivocal; war was to be waged without intermission in all of the provinces and at all times against the Apache who declared it. Article 24 was equally unambiguous: if the Apache groups sued for peace, it was to be conceded to them immediately.⁴⁵⁷ Further, Gálvez acknowledged the martial wherewithal of the enemy Indians of the Spanish forces; he noted their ability to surprise and destroy the presidiales in the mountains and the plains; their management of their own forces with dexterity; and, their skill on horseback, equating it to that of the Spaniards and even exceeding that of the frontier cavalry. But a cessation of hostilities could be achieved. Gálvez

⁴⁵⁵ Gálvez, 1786 (Donald E. Worcester, 1951), 3-4
⁴⁵⁶ Moorhead, 44-49
⁴⁵⁷ Gálvez, Instrucción…1786, Artículo veinte, Artículo veinticuatro
noted that all of the ‘Nations of the North’ were at peace in Texas as were the Lipan in that province and in Coahuila. New Mexico’s Jicarilla, Navajo, Ute, and even the Comanche remained in peace, and Gálvez specifically cited the Apache as having achieved amity with the town of El Paso in 1771, as did the Gileño with the presidios of, both, Janos and Fronteras. Moreover, the Viceroy could attest to the Mescaleros’ pacification in Nueva Vizcaya.458

Article fifty-two of the *Instrucción* may provide the most telling of all of Gálvez’s beliefs about the Apaches, and it makes clear that he ascertained a certain vulnerability in various factions of the nation.

> No creo que la Apachería se sujete voluntariamente, Dios puede hacer este milagro, y nosotros poner los medios de atraer las distintas parcialidades de esta Nación, haciéndoles conocer las ventajas de la vida racional, que le tomen gusto, que se acostumbren al uso de nuestros alimentos, bebidas, armas y vestuario, y que entren en codicia de poseer bienes de campo. Aún no estamos en los principios conducentes á estos logros, exigen mucho tiempo; pero él nos irá poniendo en la senda del acierto para las providencias ulteriores.459

By the 1790s, conditions on the ground were such that the directives of Gálvez manifested in relationships far and wide, and found expression in the courting of Indians through gifts, diplomacy and trade. And for those, like the Apache, who refused to comply with these mechanisms of control, Galvez ordered his military representatives to wage continuous war. Far to the north, and following the death of the leader Cuerno Verde, who had insisted on unceasing war on the Spaniards, more conciliatory members of the Comanche signed a peace treaty with the Governor of New Mexico. In San Antonio, a similar treaty was signed by eastern Comanche, though that peace would never be as firm with Texas as it was with New Mexico.460 Peace by

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458 Ibid, *Artículos treinta y tres, treinta y cinco*
459 Ibid, *Artículo cincuenta y dos*; *I do not believe that the Apaches will submit voluntarily (God can work this miracle), but we may contribute to the means of attracting the different factions of this tribe, making them realize the advantages of rational life, which should please them. They should be made accustomed to the use of our foods, drinks, arms, and clothing, and they can be included in the greediness for the goods of the land. Even if in the beginning we are not successful in achieving these ends, as they require much time, this course will put us on the path to eventual success.*
purchase continued to be an indispensable tool for forging and maintaining diplomatic and personal relationships between Indians and non-Indians. Further, the Comanche agreed to help Spanish military forces defeat the Apache. During this time period, weakened Apache forces and their families sought protection at the mission-presidio complex, fleeing to established rancherías and, in time, a new era of security, growth and prosperity emerged in New Mexico and Texas.

As Brian DeLay has pointed out, the enduring peace between New Spain and indigenous communities in the borderlands represented a triumph for colonial administrators. By financing frontier defense and infrastructure, by centralizing command, and by acting respectfully toward native allies, government bureaucrats and borderlands military personnel recognized that New Spain’s preservation depended upon the security of the thinly populated northern frontier. And, that security hinged on good relations with the Apache, Navajo, Wichita, and the Comanche, described by DeLay as very much “the real masters of that vast, difficult realm.”

3.4 MANAGING DEEP SOUTH TEXAS AND THE PRESENCE OF ESCANDÓN

The pursuit of the enemy ranged far and wide, and punitive campaigns dipped far into south Texas. On March 17, 1792 Castro received a report from the Governor of La Colonia of Nuevo Santander, Manuel Escandón (often referred to as the Conde de Escandón), giving a rare, detailed narrative of a week-long episode of hostility involving soldiers, Indians and their well-known chief, and civilians across a swath of borderlands territory. Given the paucity of eyewitness accounts of these types of violence, the report is included here in its entirety and from the hand of Escandón.

On the 6th day of March, I arrived at this villa without any incident. On the 10th at midday, I received a note dated the 9th from the lieutenant of the villa of Reynosa in which he tells the lieutenant of the villa of Camargo that at the moment he was fighting in that villa with the enemy Indians [not specified], who already had killed two of his citizens and an Indian auxiliary. He [Camargo lieutenant? Reynosa lieutenant?] continued on to Mier and Rebilla [sic], whose lieutenant Don Miguel de Cuellar tells me he was getting all the citizens together and was awaiting my orders. The promptness of this report provided me the ability to take timely steps

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461 Ibid, 12-14
[oportunas providencias]. I instantly sent an order to the aforesaid lieutenant to leave the villa with competent reinforcements, cross the Rio del Norte, and await [the arrival of] Captain Don Ramón de Bustamante. I ordered the horse herd brought in to provide extra mounts for the troops, and shortly before the prayer [remudara la tropa y poco antes a la oración], I ordered the aforesaid captain to march with 30 men to join the afore-cited Lieutenant, and according to reports from the other villas, to pursue the Indians to teach them a lesson [(ha de) escarmentarlos]. On the 11th, with the aforementioned captain now joined with the citizens of Revilla, they continued their march straight to Paloblanco, where at about 7 in the morning of the 14th, they caught up with [alcanzaron] and killed one captain [and] 14 Indians, and took from them a captive, as Your Lordship will see in the report and diary that I enclose. If the dead chief is, as they say, Zapato Sax, and two of the dead his sons, this has been most fortunate because, according to what I am told, he was one of the most famous chiefs. According to what the captive says, they intended on the way back after leaving here to attack the horse herd at S[an]ta Rosa, for which [reason] the aforesaid captive is being sent to inform Your Lordship about the places where their Rancherias […] are located, as well as the intentions that he perceived from them. I am sending the head and foot of the afore-cited chief, fifteen pairs of ears, and an equal number of genitals. All the plunder listed in the report remain here at Your Lordship’s disposition and are not being sent now in order not to delay the soldiers.462

So significant an episode in borderlands warfare did Castro consider the events of March 9-14, as related to him by Escandón, that he asked – but did not order – Muñoz to circulate the report among the companies under the General’s charge. His objective was that the news might serve to glorify [para que sirva de gloria al] Captain Bustamante as well as be a stimulus to the other officers and troops. Castro considered the Bustamante company’s action to be of the greatest honor to the army of the King and of benefit to the Provincias (Internas) [considerando yo esta acción por una de las mas honrosas [sic] a las armas del soberano y de provecho a las Provincias].463

What amounted to a bonus of sorts in this achievement was the confirmation of the death of the “cruel and warlike [cruél y guerrero]” Captain Zapato Sax; this assessment about the chief was detected in the depositions taken in the lower Rio Grande valley and in Laredo from individuals who knew him, including the one who was his captive. Castro’s urgency that the news not experience the slightest delay nor that Bustamante fail to have the satisfaction of public

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462 Castro to Muñoz, transmitting Sierra Gorda’s letter of March 17, […] campaign against Indians, BA March 24, 1792
463 Ibid
recognition of his enthusiasm, spirit, and efficacy [ni el Capitan Bustamante caresea [sic\textsuperscript{464}] de la satisfacción de que se haga público su zelo, espíritu, y eficacia al servicio del Rey] in the service of the King, compelled him to send the letter to Muñoz right away in order to make known how praiseworthy he felt such glorious action to have been for the all of the provincias. Moreover, he expressed to Muñoz how highly he would recommend the Bustamante campaign to the superior authorities, presumably in Mexico City, as he would do for all those who distinguished themselves in a similar way.\textsuperscript{465}

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the parameters for the use of escorts across the northern frontier was delineated in the \textit{Reglamento} of 1729. Sixty-three years later, and in the month before the Bustamante escapade, Governor Escandón of Nuevo Santander had requested an escort from General Castro for a trip to the capital of Texas, San Antonio de Béxar, in order to deal with certain matters relating to superior orders generated by the Viceroy Conde de Revilla Gigedo. Upon his receipt of the request, Castro then ordered Governor Muñoz to ready an escort with an officer from the Béxar Company, and to include the additional fifty men requested. They were then to proceed as soon as possible to the presidio at Laredo, since by the following week the Governor would be there, ready for the journey to San Antonio.\textsuperscript{466} What is more telling in this episode is that Castro expected Muñoz to cover the absence of the troops with citizens from Laredo until that presidio’s troops forming the escort returned and resumed their duties.

Presidial troops’ function as escorts, if only occasional, often did not automatically mean traversing across long distances. As has already been noted, these duties did not extend exclusively to members of the flying squadrons. Even in times of peace, precautions needed to be taken to

\textsuperscript{464} “carenía”\textsuperscript{465} Ibid; By June 15, Manuel de Espadas contacted Escandón to inform him that, as Sergeant Rio and the troops that had escorted the Governor to Béxar were returning, they had met two Lipan Apaches along the way who alerted them to the death of Zapato Zas. This news, conveyed by the two Indians or Corporal Granados from the Béxar Company, agitated the other Apaches who made threatening gestures of war and displayed much weeping. However, the \textit{presidiales} were saved from being murdered by the intervention of a trio of Indians, “Bautista,” “Jacinto,” and “El Canoso,” who managed to contain their distraught people. Espadas to Escandón, reporting hostile reaction of Indians to murder of Zapato Zas, BA June 15, 1792\textsuperscript{466} Castro to Muñoz, ordering troops to Laredo to escort Sierra Gorda [Escandón] to Béxar, BA February 13, 1792
ensure the safety of frontier residents. The *Reglamento* of 1729 was quite specific where it concerned escorts. Because the escorts given to some private individuals outside of the assigned time were a burden and detriment to the soldiers insofar as they caused them more work, the provincial Governors and the presidial captains were admonished to refrain from providing an unnecessary service. When soldiers were employed as escorts, entering or leaving the provinces, they were to do so only at predetermined times and at assigned places so that their travel could be completed under convoy [*los que hubieren de entrar o salir en las provincias de hallarán al tiempo prefinido en el paraje señalado para que con el convoy puedan seguramente transitar los caminos*]. Various approaches to maintaining productive relationships across the borderlands often involved carrying out one activity in one place to ensure, more or less, the security of another activity, even across large swaths of territory.

One month after Castro’s order to Muñoz, the latter complied and informed Escandón that he had arranged for the party of fifty men, including Alférez José Xavier Menchaca as the commander in charge, to march to Laredo supplied with provisions for a month and with the necessary munitions. However, Muñoz indicated to the Governor that Castro’s order had not come to his hands until March 16 and that the delay that Escandón noted was not Muñoz’s fault [*el consiguiente la falta que Usted anotara sin serme culpable*]. Muñoz assured Escandón that Alférez Menchaca had been told to speed up his march so that he could arrive as soon as possible. Without further information, it is impossible to know when Menchaca and his fifty men finally arrived to escort the Governor of Nuevo Santander on to San Antonio. However, it is known that on or about the same day that Castro ordered Governor Muñoz to prepare an escort for Escandón, the Alférez Menchaca apparently suffered a lance wound to the arm from two Apaches that had been spying on the Béxar presidio’s horse herd. The content of Muñoz’s original letter of February

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467 *Rivera’s Proyecto, Tercer estado, articulo sesenta y siete*. The 1729 regulations contain fourteen articles specifically addressing the use of escorts. The articles are regional-specific, incorporate the borderlands from Sinaloa to Texas, and dictate the number of soldiers to be assigned to missionaries, recruits, and civilians.

468 Castro to Muñoz, ordering troops to Laredo to escort Sierra Gorda [Escandón] to Béxar, BA February 13, 1792
13 is known, second hand, from a short note by Viceroy Revilla Gigedo, who acknowledged receipt of the information about Menchaca; of the reasons why the troops that were accompanying him did not participate in the attack on the alférez; of the measures that Muñoz took to pursue the two Apaches, and of the problems that prevented that pursuit; and, of the precautions taken by the Governor in order to avoid the cunning and attacks of the Indians [de las precauciones que ha tomado en su consecuencia para evitar las cautelas é insultos de los bárbaros].

On April 9, the Governor of Nuevo Santander Escandón arrived at the Texas capital and was given clearance by Governor Muñoz to undertake the tasks given to him by the Viceroy. By the end of May, Escandón assumed the role of interim Governor of Texas and produced his first review of the cavalry company stationed at the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar on July 1, 1792. Muñoz generated his last review of the same company on June 1, 1792.

3.5 Amangual: Questionable Paymaster, Incorruptible Accountant

If the Béxar presidio’s habilitado thought that the aggravation that he endured for some two months and that stemmed from misinformation that was broadcast by a disgruntled soldier of the troop had come to an end, he was wrong. By May 1792, Amangual would find himself yet again having to answer for his bookkeeping based upon suspicions from above. Representing the Superior Accounting Office of the Royal Tribunal of Accounts in Mexico, José del Cavo Franco issued a document inferring “questionable balances [alcanzes (sic) dudosos]” against the habilitación fund of the presidial company of San Antonio de Béxar. The document sought a review and examination of the accounts of expenditures for gifts intended for the maintenance of peaceful relations with the Indians that had presented themselves in peace from December 3, 1786

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469 Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz, […] news of the Apaches who wounded […] Menchaca, BA April 17, 1792
470 Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz, […] arrival in Bexar of the Governor of Nuevo Santander, BA May 8, 1792
471 Espadas contacted Muñoz and acknowledged an “official letter dated […] May 27” that Escandón had assumed command of the province, a notice that Espadas indicated he had already received from Castro. Sierra Gorda’s provisional appointment as Governor of Texas, BA, June 14, 1792
472 Roster of the company of Béxar, BA July 1, 1792
473 Roster of the company of Béxar, BA June 1, 1792
through August 15, 1790, constituting a period of three years and two-hundred fifty-six days. Though Amangual is not mentioned in the Cavo Franco document, the term of the questionable balances covered corresponded to the Béxar paymaster’s tenure; he was elected to the post by his fellow presidiales on December 30, 1788 and remained so until 1793.

The document is presented in a series of numbered “notes” preceding a column of “reports”, numerically ordered but not inclusive, under the title “Questionable balances against the Havilitacion [sic] Fund.” A portion of the report’s content and formatting is duplicated here because of its significance to the subject of inventories within the scope of a presidio paymaster’s duties and the diligence required by colonial administrators in ensuring accuracy in reporting product intake and outflow. Moreover, this and the foregoing chapters treat the subject of maintaining mutually conducive relationships with the indigenous communities through the often wobbly practice of ‘peace by purchase.’

Notes

1st…The dated entries in the aforesaid accounts dealing with salaries for youth [mozos] employed in preparing food for the Indians and in attending them, and with the rental of pots and other utensils (from which came the afore-mentioned doubtful balances) lack the corresponding statement, because in general they refer to the time covered in each account, from which it results that in order to balance or examine the amount of each one of the aforesaid entries, it is necessary to do so for the days that passed during the aforesaid time to which the accounts refer. For this reason, one notes repeated errors, and some of consequence in that category.

2nd…This same repetition, and seeing that neither the servants nor the owner or owners of the pots protested such errors (because there is no evidence of such) causes one to believe fundamentally that in reality they did not exist, and that [the errors] consist of [the fact] that no explanation is made in the aforementioned entries.

3rd…It is not easy to arrive at a fixed point in discovering the cause upon which differences [of the entries] are based, which can consist in that during the time included in each report, the men would not always be employed, nor even the pots be used, and that the aforesaid servants and the owners of the aforementioned pots would be credited only for their days of service, and those [days] would be paid to them only, being the amount put in the aforesaid entries that seem to be incorrect [siendo su importe las cantidades que se ponen en las enunciadas partidas que parecen equibocas].

474 […] report on doubtful accounts of the company of Béxar […], BA May 14 [– December 19], 1792

475 In the original document, the underlined word is “advertencias,” which in this context could be translated to mean ‘forward,’ or ‘preface.’
4th…This notion is verified by the fact that in the 6th entry in the account of expenditures for maintaining the Indians that is enclosed with report No. 20, that ran from July 11 to August 13 of 1790, and includes thirty-four days, there are entered for the service of two men, only eighteen days, and it says clearly that this one time they were employed in preparing the food and attending to the Indians. And even in the other accounts in which differences are found, there is no similar expression made, the same thing could have occurred, even though they include the number of days indicated in each one, the servants would not be employed in all of them, nor [would] the pots [be] in use.

5th…For these reasons, it has been judged appropriate to deal separately in these documents with the afore-mentioned entries in which a difference is encountered in the area of questionable balances, the governor of Texas is appropriately prepared to clarify this point and to reply on what happens […]

It was on the basis of the differences encountered in the area of questionable balances that gave the Accounting Office in Mexico City cause to generate the series of reports that ran with specified dates of service and a brief summary of the discrepancies existing in the fund’s records. Report No. 1, which ran from January 8 - 30, 1787 concerns the salaries of four servants and the amount of the expenditures reported for the maintenance of the Indians; Report No. 2, from December 17, 1786 to February 23, 1787, lists the salaries of two servants and the amount of money lacking in the accounting; Reports No. 4 and 7, covering the dates January 31 to March 31, and, April 11 to June 5, 1787, respectively, covered a total of one-hundred sixteen days and indicated the same errors as did Reports numbered 8, 10, 15, 18 (which included similar errors in payments to servants but also showed discrepancies in the rent for two kettles, four ladles, and ten pots). Cavo Franco noted the same errors are evident in Reports 20 (February 19 to May 13, 1788), 22 (May 11 to June 12, 1788), 25 (July 5 to September 1, 1788), and 32 (November 19 to December 25, 1788). The grand total of days covered in these eight reports – not included the first four listed above – was three-hundred fifty days.

The latter report, No. 32, apparently combined expenditures of servant salaries and rental of utensils and so Cavo Franco inserted a note that read

[…] only nine pesos are entered, with the statement that it is for the salary of the afore-mentioned servant and for the rental of pots. It not being possible to distinguish how much corresponds to, or was paid for, the aforesaid rental, nor easy

476 […] report on doubtful accounts of the company of Béxar […], May 14 [– December 19], 1792
477 Ibid
to state the difference that exists with the aforementioned salary, nothing is entered here in the margin, and this explanation is given solely for the record.\textsuperscript{478}

At this point in Cavo Franco’s document, there appears to be a discrepancy in the numbering of the reports, or, it may be that those reports from succeeding years simply reused the same numbering sequence. However, a note on the document indicates that “up to here runs the 1\textsuperscript{st} report” that was presented by Lieutenant Bernardo Fernández, “and the second one follows, from the agent José Antonio de Bustillos y Zevallos”. The information that emerges deviates little from the content of the prior reports.\textsuperscript{479}

Account No. 9 covered the period March 24 to April 22, 1789, with discrepancies listed in the servant salaries and the rental of cooking utensils; Report No. 10 has the same information and includes the days of April 26 to August 17, 1789. Report No. 11, August 20 to September 17, 1789 concerns the same inaccuracies and for the same reasons as does Report No. 17, except for the utensils.\textsuperscript{480}

As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, Amangual’s performance as the presidio’s manager of funds had already come under scrutiny that resulted in a slander suit. However, three years will pass before we shall see his response to the Cavo Franco allegations of discrepancies in the expansive report of 1792; his predecessor as \textit{habilitado} Bernardo Fernández, would follow suit as we shall shortly see. But, in the meantime, on June 18, 1792 in an ironic twist and only two months after his own vexing interaction with an accuser – who also happened to be a comrade in arms – Amangual found himself as the caretaker and inspector of contraband (allegedly in the possession of another fellow soldier, the ever diligent Juan Cortés) that was now to be housed in his \textit{habilitación}.

3.6 SOLDIERS TESTIFY IN TEXAS: THE CORTÉS CONTRABAND CASE

As noted in Chapter One of this study, the day-to-day practices of a presidial company’s paymaster were invariably suspect; indeed, there had been many unprincipled individuals involved

\textsuperscript{478} Ibid
\textsuperscript{479} Ibid
\textsuperscript{480} Ibid
in fraudulent activities where it concerned the provisioning of soldiers. Whether elected by fellow soldiers or simply implicit in a presidio captain’s responsibilities, the frontier paymaster faced enormous challenges in his duties as the caretaker of funds for a garrison. In the summer of 1792, *comandante general* Ramón de Castro ordered the Interim Governor of Texas Manuel Escandón to conduct an investigation into the charge of contraband having been exchanged between the usually unflinching Captain Juan Cortés and others during the previous month. Escandón began the proceedings even though he had failed to arrest the accused Captain. Further, General Castro required Escandón to place in safe storage the goods under question, whether they turned out to be contraband or not; ultimately, the Viceroy would render the decision as to whether the goods were to be delivered to the interested parties.

There were antecedents for the procedural apparatuses involved in conducting these types of investigations. In January of 1780, Croix sent a certified copy of the assessor’s opinion regarding a royal cedula of 1776 that ordered the prosecution of contraband in Texas. In turn, the Governor at this time, Domingo Cabello, was then able to dispatch the corresponding *Título(s)* or formal appointments to the individuals of his choice for the purpose of watching for illegal contraband trade that might be conducted in the province. Moreover, Cabello was responsible for drawing up the instructions that he considered most pertinent for exercising and discharging these commissions.

But, first, the alleged contraband had to be inspected and recorded. The Béxar paymaster was designated with the task of itemizing all of the suspect goods for the investigation during the summer of 1792.

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481 Castro and Sierra Gorda correspondence re: regarding case against Cortés, BA July 14 – September 9, 1792
482 See: Proceedings […] to prosecute contraband in Texas, BA January 5, 1780; Croix to Cabello […] prosecution of contraband in Texas, BA January 10, 1780; Cabello to Croix […] prosecute contraband in Texas, BA March 18, 1780
483 […] case against Juan Cortés […] charged with smuggling, BA June 16, 1792. The translation of the proceedings begins with a document dated June 16, 1792. These materials will be cited hereafter as “Cortés…smuggling, BA June 16, 1792” in conjunction with the aforementioned documents referenced as BA, July 14 – September 9, 1792.
484 One month before Amangual began his inventory, then-Governor of Texas Escandón ordered Lieutenant Bernardo Fernández, himself recently held responsible for accounting inaccuracies, to go with ten privates in a secret maneuver to seize the loads and baggage of Cortés, without the slightest loss [*embargando todo sin permitir haya el menor estravio* (sic)]; this was necessary so that Escandón could order its proper inspection. Cortés […] smuggling, BA June 16, 1792 (Escandón, June 17, 1792); Twelve years earlier, in April 1780, as alférez of the
The following pages concern Amangual’s inventory of the items found in the baggage of Cortés and other individuals; the names of the accused are listed next to an itemization of those articles that they were accused of having taken illegally.

In the baggage of the aforesaid captain [Juan Cortés]
15 ½ varas of royal
7 varas of yellow silk lusurina [(sic) lustrina, silk cloth possibly from alpaca]
10 1/3 varas of scarlet polonesa [polonaise]
7 cut [pieces] of silk armadores [possibly fabric for sleeveless vests, or, cueras] 485
7 fine cotton kerchiefs
2 pairs of finished skirts, one of Indiana and the other of angaripola [calico]
2 bolts of wool sashes
10 card decks
9 glass cups
4 tin pots
6 large axes
4 dozen large buttons de asa
5 [pounds], 5 [ounces] of coffee
2 medium pots with three feet
80 [pounds] of French tobacco in bundles and pieces

Corporal Ylario Maldonado and Private Joaquín [sic] Galán
7 ½ varas of blue lusurina [sic]
7 ½ same...same scarlet
7 fine cotton kerchiefs
1 same of chambray
5 1/3 varas of fine Indiana
6 same of scarlet polonesa
5 pairs of new indianilla skirts
1 silk armador
4 card decks
1 ordinary cloth
2 French blankets
6 medium iron pots with three feet

Private Antonio Gómez
5 varas of fine Indiana

Bexar company, Amangual – on detached service at the fort at Cibolo -- had been ordered to head out for the rancho of San Francisco with a group of men in order to intercept suspected co-contrabandistas Felix Menchaca and Juan de Ysurieta and bring them to the Bexar presidio. Amangual and his men were to seize any goods and even the boys that might be accompanying them in their pack train that had originated in Louisiana. Cabello to Croix, [...] seizure of contraband goods [...] from Louisiana, BA May 9, 1780

485 The brackets of this and the two previous entries in the inventory are my insertions; all other bracketing is the original punctuation of Béxar Archives translators.
2 kerchiefs…same
1 medium pot with three feet
[MS torn] of French tobacco

Sergeant Anttonio [sic] Treviño
11 varas of guinea
5 knives
7 ¾ varas of purple silk cloth
4 cut [pieces] of silk armadores
1 [pound] of thread de numeros
2 glass cups
13 2/3 varas of wide scarlet ribbon
1 tin pot
3 dozen white buttons de asa
2 pairs of finished Indiana skirts
1 pot with 3 feet, and 3 [pounds], 2 [ounces] of French tobacco belonging to his servant
Mig[ue]l Saravia

Privates Fran[cis]co Vázq[ue]z and Xpbal. Yguera
1 pair of finished skirts
3 fine cotton kerchiefs
2 card decks

Private José Trejo
6 [pounds], 13 ½ [ounces] of French tobacco
2 pots

Privates Antt[oni]o del Río and Pedro Grande
9 fine cotton kerchiefs
1 ½ varas of blue 2nd cloth
5 varas of guinea
7 ¾ varas of blue lusurina
3 ½ varas of Indiana
1 pair of skirts made from polonesa
4 white threads, garnet-colored [de granattes]
2 varas of scarlet cloth ribbon

Private Juan José de la Garza
4 varas of fine Indiana
1 fine cotton kerchief
4 threads, garnet-colored [de granattes]

The formatted list ends here. However, Amangual added the following short paragraph to his inventory
Also found in the baggage of the aforesaid Sergeant Treviño was a package that he was carrying by order of Nicolas de Lamath [sic] to deliver to Dona Maria Concepcion Henriquez [sic], which upon being examined contained one fine silk kerchief, two contraband card decks, two ivory ahuettes, fourteen single cards for various individuals of this community, others of a similar category for Señores Don Antonio Bonilla, Don Bernardo Bonavia, and Don M [?, MS torn] Mexía, a double for the Señor commandant general of these provinces, and another single same for his secretary, Don Juan de Aguirre y Morales, all of which on today’s date I have forwarded to their respective destinations.487

Captain Juan Cortés
3 buffalo hides
2 chamois [skins] dyed the color of touchwood (tinder) [yesca]
5 same, white

Sergeant Antonio Treviño488
1 buffalo hide
4 white chamois [skin]
1 deerskins, without hair

Corporal Hilario Maldonado
1 white chamois skin
4 deerskins, without hair

Soldado Distinguido489 José de Jesús Alderete, brother-in-law of the captain
8 chamois [skins] dyed the color of touchwood
4 same, colored black
36 same, white
4 buffalo hides
1 deerskin with hair
2 small and white chamois [skins] in which were items obtained for the padres

486 Nicholas Lamath (aka Nicolás de Lamathé) was one of the 29 foreigners in Nacogdoches listed in the Muñoz census of May 1792.
487 Correspondence between Castro and Sierra Gorda, concerning case against Juan Cortés, BA July 14, 1792 [– September 9, 1792] (Amangual’s inventory, June 18, 1792)
488 Captain of the militia and lieutenant Governor Antonio Gil Ybarvo was eager to receive Sergeant Treviño’s deposition as well as those of the other soldiers listed in the inventory; he was apparently more interested in the depositions by Mariano Basques [sic] and José Basques [sic] since Ybarvo specified the following questions: upon whose order were the men acting; and, from whom came the money that they paid; as well as with what monies did they purchase the chamois and buffalo skins in the Indian nations? Since he indicated that his interest stemmed from his efforts at suggesting that “at no time will they be held responsible for anything [para en todo tiempo no a serse responsable en nada],” Ybarvo perhaps hoped that his soldiers would be found innocent. (Ybarvo, June 19, 1792) Correspondence between Castro and Sierra Gorda, concerning case against Juan Cortés, BA July 14, 1792 [– September 9, 1792]
489 En esta variable se van a incluir, solo en algunas zonas geográficas, a aquellas personas que tienen solicitado el expediente de Hidalguía, y que en general son de reconocida calidad, pero siempre mediando un título nobiliario, que or bien ya poseen o están próximos a tener. Como decimos, en varias ocasiones hemos encontrado a nobles titulados incluidos en esa clasificación, mientras en otros sólo se especifica que su titulación nobiliaria esta en trámite. Juan Marchena Fernández, Oficiales y soldados en el ejército de América (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1983). 126
Private José de la Garza
6 white chamois [skins]
2 same, dyed the color of touchwood

Private Ant[oni]o Gómez
1 buffalo hide
4 white chamois [skins]

Private Salvador de Cierra
5 white chamois [skins]

Private Juan José de la Garza
2 white chamois [skins]

Private José Trexo
1 buffalo hide
2 white chamois [skins]
1 same, dyed the color of touchwood

Private Cristobal de Higuera
5 white chamois [skins]

Private Joaquín Galán
1 buffalo hide, worn
6 white chamois [skins]

Private Antonio del Río
4 white chamois [skins]
4 deerskins, without hair
1 buffalo hide

Private Pedro Grande
4 white chamois [skins]

The formatted list ended here. However, Amangual repeated the process of notation by adding a final caveat regarding the inventory. He pointed out that Captain Juan Cortés carried with him four Negro slaves – a husband, wife, and their son, and a girl belonging to his brother-in-law, the soldado distinguido José de Jesús Alderete – as well as nine mules and horses, all belonging to the Captain of the militia Antonio Gil Ybarbo. After Amangual added his own signature, as did Antonio Treviño and Juan José Farias, the attesting witnesses, Ylario Maldonado and Andrés Benito Courbiere, applied their rubrics. One additional note was added: according to Sergeant
Treviño, hostile Indians apparently had carried off four bundles and two horses from those listed in the report.  

On this same day, when asked what items he saw introduced by the Frenchmen coming from Nachitos to Nacogdoches, Sergeant Treviño verified that he saw that they had brought tobacco, two kegs of liquor \textit{[aguardiente]}, gunpowder, bullets, large knives \textit{[veldiiquez]}, beads, vermilion, two casks of lard, and one sack of beans; the loads he saw numbered seventeen and that he knew nothing else about what else the men would have brought in the loads \textit{[que no save lo demas q(u)e trairian en d(ico)has cargas]}. Then, when asked if he knew by what order or to whom the loads were delivered, he said that they were all delivered to Nicolas de Lamate \textit{[sic]}, who received them at his home.  

Asked if he knew how the goods were paid for and who they were from, Treviño said that he only knew that his captain, Cortés, gave to the Frenchman Gaspar Friola some two hundred deerskins; he also stated that these skins were from those belonging to the seizure of Ybarbo. Questioned about the funds used to purchase the chamois skins from the Indian Nations, Treviño said that the ones in his possession were given to him by Lamate, and that the other soldiers brought them in trade for tobacco and knives; and that he did not know with what monies the skins were bought in the Indian villages.  

Immediately after the Treviño deposition, that of Corporal José Ylario Maldonado was taken. Maldonado attested to seeing that he did not learn what Luis Belame, Mariano Vásquez, and José Vázquez were carrying in their loads. He also indicated that he heard that the goods were going to end up at the home of Lamate; further, he did not learn from whom they came or how they were paid for; and, where it concerned the deerskins, he did not know that any amount

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490 Correspondence between Castro and Sierra Gorda, concerning case against Juan Cortés, BA July 14, 1792 [– September 9, 1792] (Amangual’s inventory, June 20, 1792)  
491 This was the name often used in the colonial sources for the French town and garrison of Natchitoches, located opposite from the presidio of Nuestra Señora de Pilar de Adaes, or, Los Adaes.  
492 Cortés…smuggling, BA June 16, 1792 (Deposition of Treviño, June 20, 1792)  
493 Ibid  
494 Ibid, (Deposition of Maldonado, June 20, 1792); Escandón’s spelling of the name differs from that of Ybarvo; in this and the Treviño deposition, the two ‘z’s in the last name are from the Governor’s hand.
was paid for the skins. Of the chamois skins, Maldonado responded that he bought in trade for a little tobacco from what was supplied to him – a large knife, one candonga and one bridle -- for spending [trade] by order of his captain, but that he did not know with what the skins were purchased in the villages. The Corporal stated that the Frenchman Luis Arma brought tobacco, lard, salt, corn and sugar into Nacogdoches [las comprou aferia de un poco de tavaco, del que se le suministró para su gasto, de orden de su capitan, un velduque, una candonga, y un freno que dio, y que las que se compraron en los pueblos no save con que, y que Luis Arma el Franzes, metió tavaco, manteca, sal, maiz, y azucar á Nacodoches (sic)].

The testimony by Private Antonio Gómez differed slightly from his predecessors in that he had been guarding the horse herd and thus did not see any more than three loads come in, one of them being of aguardiente. He stated that he would not have seen other loads come in once he was relieved of his guard duties; but, he surmised that if by chance others had come in, they would have been introduced by the Frenchmen he saw in Nacogdoches. However, he confirmed as did Treviño, but only suggested by Maldonado, that the goods were unloaded and placed in the house of Lamate. He could not say with what the goods were paid for or from whom they came, but that he only saw that the Frenchmen who lived in Nacogdoches exported a quantity of deerskins and buffalo tongues to Nachitos [dize que no supo de quien eran ni con que se compraron solo vio que los Franceses que viven en Nacodoches sacaron porcion [sic] de cueros de venado y lenguas de zibola [sic] para Nachitos]. Gómez said that his chamois skins were bought in trade for a cinch and a large knife, but that the ones bought in the villages were purchased by Cortés or the others.

Though Private José de Trexo [sic] did not confirm that Belanze [sic, Belame?] or either the Vázquez had introduced the alleged contraband into the Nacogdoches presidio, he stated

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495 Ibid, (Deposition of Maldonado, June 20, 1792)
496 Ibid; hereafter, I retain the original Spanish language text of the documents to avoid overuse of notation of “sic”.
497 Ibid, (Deposition of Gómez, June 20, 1792)
498 I retain the spelling of the Corporal’s last name as it appears in the margin of the original document, the location of the other individual identifiers in all of the depositions. However, within the body of the deposition his name is spelled “Trejo.”
499 The original document of Escandón’s handwritten script – or that of his scribe – has the name written the same way, and as such can be understood as, either, “Belame” or “Belanze.”
that the items that he saw brought in were fabrics for clothing, aguardiente, gunpowder, lots of bullets, a great deal of tobacco, blankets and large knives [muchas valas; vastante tavaco, fresadas, velduquez]. However, he never learned the number of loads introduced since they were brought in three parties [que no supo el numero de cargas que serian, por haverlas metido en tres partidas].

Trexo saw some of the goods unloaded in the parlor of Lamate, the first deponent to indicate a precise location of the home delivery, but could not say that he knew from whom they came or how they were paid for; of the deerskins, he could only say that he saw a number of them in the possession of the Frenchmen who traded with everyone in that community [dize que vio en poder de los Franceses porcion de cueros de venado, que compraban a todos los de aquel vecindario].

Trexo stated that since the French were trading gunpowder, bullets, tobacco, and large knives, and cloth and blankets, chamois skins were purchased by the presidiales. Trexo himself traded a bridle and some biscuit [un freno y viscocho (sic)] for his chamois but did not know what Cortés exchanged for his skins.\textsuperscript{500}

While José Antonio Rodríguez saw that loads were put into the house of Lamate, and even though he could not say with certainty the number of the loads, he confirmed that he helped open one keg of gunpowder, a sack of bullets, and two hachos [sic] of large knives; he also learned that the other loads carried tobacco. And Rodríguez was the first deponent that would confirm that he knew the goods belonged to Lamate because Lamate had sent them to Patates, to Arralde, and Abalanché – who were in Nacogdoches – to bring them to him in Natchitos.\textsuperscript{501} Since he did not know how the goods were paid for, he also testified that he did not see that anything was paid for the deerskins, except that he knew that a “Monsieur Davi” had more than two hundred of them, but Rodríguez did not know who could have given them to him [pero que no supo quien se los entregaria]. The major item of contention, the chamois, were bought by the soldiers with tobacco, large knives, and even a vest that he saw traded but he could not confirm what Cortés had traded for the one the Captain purchased. Rodríguez added that he had heard it said by an unidentified

\textsuperscript{500} Cortés…smuggling, BA June 16, 1792, (Deposition of Trexo, June 20, 1792)
\textsuperscript{501} Ibid, (Deposition of Rodríguez, June 20, 1792)
Indian that Cortés had given him half a *manojo* of tobacco for some chamois, and that Private Pedro Grande traded a three-footed pot for three chamois skins, and a poncho [*jorongo*] for another single one. Like Gómez and Trejo before him, Rodríguez did not sign his deposition because he did not know how to write.\(^{502}\) All three of these men self-identified as “Spanish,” and were in their twenties.

Summoned to the capitol on August 15, the accused Cortés informed Governor Escandón that Alférez Antonio Treviño would be travelling to San Antonio with the rest of the individuals mentioned, with the exception of José Trexo [sic], who was in San Luis Potosí, and Christobal [sic] de Yguera who was apparently already in San Antonio. However, Cortés also let the Governor know that he would not be traveling due to a ruptured swelling [*tumor reventado*] in his left arm – which injury he claimed prevented him from riding a horse – and he had much more work to do on an audit for the outgoing *habilitado*. The latter task was necessary, he explained, in order to forward the results of the audited account to the incoming paymaster, presumably since the latter would need it as a guide [*para que lo reciva en tiempo que pueda governarle*…].\(^{503}\)

From the information contained in the inventory and where it concerns Cortés’ brother-in-law Alderete, it cannot be assumed that the items that were obtained for the *padres* were necessarily requested by the missionaries in collusion with the soldiers. Without further information, we can only guess as to why Amangual included this additional descriptor for the two chamois skins, and what they contained, presumably, hidden within their folds. It would seem that devotion to duty underscored much of his behavior, and in depositions requiring ratification by his commanders, Amangual appeared to testify without little hesitation. It is likely that, by the age of fifty-three, he had achieved a certain measure of foresight, wisdom, and practical application to all

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\(^{502}\) Ibid

\(^{503}\) Cortés to Sierra Gorda, reporting departure for Bexar of soldiers charged with contraband, BA August 19, 1792. By February of the following year, the still injured Cortés wrote to Muñoz appealing to the Governor to write to *comandante general* Castro in order to grant him leave to go and receive treatment at the Valle de Santa Rosa for his arm. Apparently, there was no physician available and so Cortés indicated to his superior that there was “no hope of healing [Hallandome vastante (sic) accidentado del brazo izquierdo desde el mez (sic) de Ag(os)to ultimo (sic), y sin esperanza de sanar por falta de facultativo].” Cortés to Muñoz, BA February 4, 1793
things military to the degree that he conveyed expertise and was able to solicit trust from others. While it is true that his accounting efforts continued to be questioned from some dissatisfied quarters, there exists, also, an apparent unquestioned reliance upon Amangual’s experience, given his senior status as an officer of long tenure and consistent upward mobility on the ranking scale.

3.7 Cortés Comes to Testify

By September 10, Escandón reported that Juan Cortés was in San Antonio de Béxar and could thus be deposed. The first question to Cortés was one not asked of the other deponents: Why did he dispatch Sergeant Treviño and another soldier to go to Nachitos? Cortés replied that Treviño had asked him for permission to go to Nachitos with another soldier since the sergeant had told Cortés that he was going to collect a debt. Asked why Treviño departed again for Nachitos, and with whom, Cortés replied: Nicolas Lamatt [sic] had asked Cortés for Treviño to accompany him to Nachitos, to which Cortés replied that if Treviño wished to go, he could; if not, then he would not.\footnote{Cortés…smuggling, BA June 16, 1792, (Deposition of Cortés, September 10, 1792)} Thereafter, Cortés claimed to know about only two or three loads brought into Nacogdoches by the Frenchman Blanz [sic] but knew nothing about Mariano and José Basquez [sic]. Cortés did state that the loads he knew about went to Lamatt’s house; that the majority consisted of tobacco, scarlet and blue cloth, vermilion, glass beads, knives, mirrors, gunpowder and bullets; he alleged that all of these items were consumed in gifts to the Indian Nations that came to visit him at Nacogdoches, and specifically seven or eight distinct nations, and even more loads were consumed. Cortés asserted that all of this was in accord with the intentions of the Commander General Ramón de Castro, to whom he reported everything and in turn received approval. Perhaps showing a bit of inattention to diligence where it concerned the payments for expenditures, Cortés stated that he was unsure as to the cost of these gifts, whether it was four hundred or so, or five hundred or so [\textit{que no tiene presente lo que ymportaron si fueron quatrocientos y tantos ó quinientos y tantos, cuia cantidad se esta debiendo asta que el Senor Comandante Geñal determinó}], a sum still owed until Castro made a decision.\footnote{Ibid}
During the deposition, Escandón reminded the captain of the superior orders that had been issued repeatedly to the province of Texas and its commanders prohibiting trade of all kinds with the French [Preguntado si sabe las repetidas ordenes superiores que se han dado á esta Provincia pribando el comercio de todos generos con los Francezes (sic passim)]; the only products that could be introduced into this section of the borderlands were fabrics and goods brought in through the port of Veracruz and others authorized by the King. Cortés replied that he was unaware of orders that addressed this issue in the archives at La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, and that if the directives existed, he was similarly unaware of how he had disobeyed them.506

At this point in the interrogation, the primacy of certain objects as instruments of barter and their importance to the indigenous communities becomes clearer. Moreover, it is essential to understand the ramifications of scarce supplies of commodities across the borderlands when considering the acquisition and exchange practices deployed during the process of ‘peace by purchase.’ Cortés was asked whether he knew if other persons might have seized certain items from the loads including tobacco, playing cards, and fabrics introduced from Nachitos. He responded that he knew of no other seizures other than ten manojos of tobacco that he was taking to the Indians do the Nations of the North on his journey through the Indian villages; some of this tobacco was left over to him because he had not yet visited the village of the Taguayaces, and because of the majority of the Quiches and the Tahuacanes were out hunting buffalo. Otherwise, all of it would have been expended; Cortés added that had the rivers been high, he would have found it necessary to barter with the Indians the tobacco for corn, beans, and beef. Included in the seizure was Cortés’ tobacco, an item given to him for his own personal use because there were no cigarettes or cigars at Nacogdoches. Taken as well were four front pieces for a doublet, because although he bought five for his use, the tailor ruined some of them. Cortés had three or four decks of cards with which to play at his house and these were taken from him, because like the tobacco, there were none in store in the entire province [por no haber estanco de ellas en toda esta

506 Ibid

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Seized, also, were two kerchiefs, one bolt of chintz, and a set of buttons for a coat, all of which cost him, including the tobacco, thirty pesos or so; and, Cortés knew that, from the troops in his escort, some things were confiscated that the soldiers were taking to their families.507

When Escandón’s questioning turned to tobacco and fabric, Cortés indicated that he did not know of any other tobacco other than what he had mentioned, but that his brother-in-law’s baggage contained his own clothing, and that Alderete also brought cloth that was given to him by Padre Bernardino Balleño [sic], another relative of his, one or two cuttings of skirts for his wife, and thirty or forty chamois skins that Alderete managed to obtain at the request of Cortés. These were needed for the repair and construction of a few cueras [leather jackets], and this was the most that Alderete could obtain though his brother-in-law Cortés had asked for more. When asked what quantity of tobacco and what fabrics were brought by Sergeant Treviño and the other soldiers who had accompanied him, Cortés stated that he could not confirm what fabrics the sergeant had, but that he had been given some pieces on account for a larger amount that they owed him but the specific type of fabric was unknown to him. Finally, Cortés confirmed that none of the goods mentioned were purchased in Nachitos but rather in Nacogdoches.508

And so the testimony of Cortés, Treviño and the others was concluded by September 10. Two weeks later, Governor Manuel Muñoz issued an auto indicating that the proceedings were to be carried out – but this had previously been ordered in the September 10 auto issued by Escandón -- with a special urgency since, apparently, Captain Cortés was needed back at his presidio at La Bahía. Thus the ratification of his testimony was necessary as well as that of the other deponents in the alleged contraband case.509 After being read his September 10 testimony from beginning to end, and then asked to confirm its content as the same one that he gave on that day, Cortés indicated that he did not need to delete anything of the text of his deposition; however, he wanted to add another piece of information to his statement. Besides what was confiscated from him, he also took

507 Ibid,
508 Ibid
509 Ibid; though the original manuscript is torn, this section of the document appears to suggest that Cortés’ presence was called for by the Lipan Indians [en su Pres(idi)o mediante solicitudes de los Yndios Lipanes].
from him five chamois skins for a leather jacket (cuera), and two for some boots, a medium size [pot] with three feet for his kitchen, and a little coffee.510

Asked to ratify his testimony, Alférez Treviño stated that his testimony, read to him from beginning to end, was the same that he gave to Escandón and was the truth and valid, adding that he would ratify it once, twice, and as many times as might be necessary, having nothing at all to add or delete. The insistence by some of one’s own testimony being repeatedly validated in order to emphasize the veracity of a defense against charges of contraband may have been common practice among the soldiers in the farthest reaches of the Spanish empire. In Treviño’s case, however, there was additional testimony that he offered Governor Muñoz on the day of the ratification of his earlier account. The entries in the Amangual inventory of confiscated goods were the same ones that he was carrying in the company of Private Joaquín Galán, as well as the chamois and deerskins; and, even though he had a buffalo hide, that item was included among those of the soldado distinguido, Cortés’ brother-in-law José Alderete. Where it concerned tobacco, Treviño indicated that Luis Arman [sic] had supplied him and other assistance for his sustenance by order of Cortés.

That comment inspired Muñoz to question Treviño further; the Governor asked the sergeant how long he had been in Nacogdoches, and, what amount of tobacco he had received from Arman. Treviño recounted the timeline of the journey, and replied that he set out on February 9 from his presidio, La Bahía, with Captain Cortés, they arrived at Nacogdoches on March 6, and they returned to Béxar on June 18. During his time in Nacogdoches, he received four manojos of tobacco that he estimated weighed twenty pounds, which he testified that he consumed in smoking; some was given to his female cook who bought food with it; and the last of it was traded to the Tahuacanes for a chamois. Asked where and with what he purchased the condonga mentioned in his deposition, he stated that he won the item in a game of malilla511 in Nacogdoches from a citizen named Gavino Menchaca [sic]. As Cortés had been asked about the prohibition of imported goods

510 Ibid, (Ratification by Cortés, September 25, 1792)
511 A card game apparently played much like whist with much shuffling and trick playing.
into Texas, especially playing cards, Treviño replied that he knew tobacco and the cards were contraband, as well as the uncut cloth! Then Muñoz asked him if, in order to gloss over the contraband and attract no attention of any kind, he ordered the cutting of the skirts that were seized from him. In response, Treviño stated that he had ordered the making of the five skirts; and, when asked about what he used to purchase the twelve entries ascribed to him in the Amangual inventory, he stated that it was with some tablecloths, one shawl, a set of buttons, a silver cigarette box, and the saddle that he gave with the consent of his captain, Cortés. Did Cortés know about the purchase of the confiscated goods and their shipment? Treviño replied that his captain could not be unaware of it since he gave Treviño the saddle to sell. With that, Treviño ratified his deposition.512

Immediately following the Treviño appearance, it was Private Joaquin Galán’s turn at interrogation. However, Galán had yet to be deposed. Confirming that he had been to Nacogdoches with the party of troops that escorted Captain Cortés, he could not say with certainty how long he was there but did confirm that he was not dispatched anywhere outside of Texas. Asked for an account of what foreign goods he purchased while in Nacogdoches, Galán indicated that he bought two pairs of skirts, of silk and scarlet polonesa, others of chintz, and one silk doublet from an Englishman by the name of “Don Phelipe”; Galán confirmed that he had the permission of Cortés to make these purchases. But, other items including a dust cloth, a three-footed pot, nine chamois skins, a buffalo hide, and a deck of cards were also confiscated. When asked if he knew that these items were contraband in Texas, Galán indicated that he knew the bolts of fabric, the tobacco and the card decks were but that the used skirts were not [que save que el contravando las piezas de(?)], tabaco, y bararas, que no es contravando las naguas en cortas y usadas]. Just as he had asked Treviño, the Governor asked Galán whether, in order to protect himself from charges, he had the skirts made in order to be introduced as trade items, he stated that he purchased the skirts as newly cut and neither made nor used. However, Muñoz asked him why he said that the skirts were cut

512 Cortés...smuggling, BA June 16, 1792, (Ratification by Treviño, September 25, 1792)
from the fabric when earlier he indicated that they were fitted, and to explain this contradiction. Galán affirmed that they were fitted; then, he was asked what he used to purchase the items he was charged with carrying. He replied that he used the value of three horses (one of which he offered with permission from Cortés) while the other two he assumed the permission for, that is, granted license to, himself.513

Private Galán confirmed that, with an order from Cortés, the aforementioned Luis Arman had supplied him with one pound of tobacco and then, at the River Nechas [sic] he had received the fourth part of a *manojo* 514 given to him by Sergeant Treviño, and one amount by order of his captain. When the questioning turned to the cargo coming from Nachitos to Nacogdoches, Galán was asked the same questions that the other soldiers were obliged to answer. He heard it said [oyó decir] that there were five or six loads, he learned that they were brought by Mariano Vasquez from Nachitos, and within their content came a keg of liquor and another of gunpowder. All of these goods were unloaded at the house of Nicolas Lamathé, which Galán stated that he saw through the window of the house where Lamathé was; however, he did not know who had sent the goods or under whose order.515

The game of *malillos*, where a win had garnered a *candonga* for Treviño in Nacogdoches, this time provided the prize of chamois skins for Galán in the same town; at Bahía, he traded a peso worth of cigars for another chamois. At the village of the Tahuacanes, he traded two *candongas* to an Indian and a soldier – unnamed in this deposition – and received two chamois skins, and to another Tahuacan he gave an old waistcoat and a cloth for two more. At the ranchería of the same Indian community, another cloth and old waistcoat got him another two chamois skins, and to another resident of the Tahuacan ranchería he traded a *zarape* for a buffalo hide. Galán must have been proficient at the game of *malilla* and the environment for displaying his dexterity with the cards mattered not: at the Guadalupe River he won another chamois from Private Juan José de

513 Ibid, (Deposition by Galán, September 25, 1792)
514 A *manojo* can describe a bundle of raw tobacco with a weight of approximately two pounds; it can also mean, simply, a bunch or handful.
515 Cortés…smuggling, BA June 16, 1792 (Deposition by Galán, September 25, 1792)
la Garza. When these goods were confiscated from Galán, he lost six of his hard-won chamois skins and the buffalo hide. With the remaining ones, he paid for what he was owing before the seizure, probably debts owing on his account at the provisioning store at La Bahía. \(^{516}\) Finally, asked if he knew that tobacco and playing cards were in the baggage of the troops, he claimed no knowledge except that the both items were being brought by Captain Cortés. \(^{517}\)

Then, Galán was asked whether Cortés was coming with the aim of inspecting the confiscated goods at San Antonio; or, if Galán knew that the captain had arranged to send them to the presidio of La Bahía? Galán replied that he heard that if people were coming from San Antonio to meet them, which is what Cortés had requested, and so the captain decided that he would travel to the capital. He ordered Sergeant Treviño to take the camino real that went to La Bahía, and after that, Lieutenant Bernardo Fernández should escort the troops and the baggage to then-Governor Escandón. Galán was asked several other questions regarding the candongas, among other small items, and if he had seen gunpowder, bullets and tobacco distributed to the Indian Nations, and from whose hand. He replied that he had seen tobacco distributed, and that the number of Indians (of the Orcoquiza group) that appeared in Nacogdoches was about fifty; when Galán was with the horse herd he heard that other parties – these not specified – had arrived. Finally, asked if he had any further things to say regarding the questions he was served, he replied: when he bought fabric, the cuttings of polonesa and the silk skirts came from the Englishman “Phelipe,” and those of chintz and the doublet, from Nicolas Lamathé. \(^{518}\)

Perhaps it was Galán’s reticence at naming specific individuals in his testimony that provided the impetus for Governor Muñoz to make pointed inquiry during the ratification of Private Antonio Gómez’s deposition. On September 26, Gómez indicated that his testimony of June 20 was correct requiring nothing to delete. But the private did say that the load of liquor [aguardiente] mentioned by Cortés in his deposition was manifest in only one keg that he saw, but

\(^{516}\) Ibid
\(^{517}\) Ibid
\(^{518}\) Ibid
he never knew what was in the other keg that he brought during the trip. When Muñoz showed Gómez the June 18 inventory of confiscated goods processed by Francisco Amangual and that of the hides seized on June 20, the Governor asked the Private whether any of the goods were his; Gómez replied that the items on both lists were the ones he was transporting from Nacogdoches.519 Asked from what individual – giving his name – he purchased the goods that he declared; with what method of payment he used for the purchase; and, if Cortés knew about it; he replied that he purchased the cut skirts from Nicolas de la Mathé and the rest from citizens of Nacogdoches. Moreover, Gómez offered that he gave twelve pesos to Mathé and that there was no prior permission from his captain to make the purchase [no precedió licencia alguna de su capitán (sic) para hacer d(ic)ha compra ].520

Then, asked if he knew whether any individual troops went to Nachitos – and he was asked to give their names – and on whose orders did they go, and for what purpose, Gómez explained that the Alférez Antonio Treviño, who was a sergeant at the time, went on the orders of his captain, Cortés, to Nachitos [along with] Private Juan José de la Garza. Gómez stated that he learned from an unidentified source that Treviño was going to collect a debt – a quantity of pesos – owed to him by a Santiago de Mecie[res?] . Questioned further as to how many loads of cargo he had seen or heard introduced by the French or Spanish into Nacogdoches and shipped from Nachitos, Gómez replied that he heard it said that four loads more than the ones he had declared were introduced by the French from Nachitos and that he saw rifles, lards, and soap at the house of Luis Arman. Had he seen, did he know, or had he heard that any of the items brought from Nachitos were actually put into the house of Lamathé? Gómez stated that he saw three loads of cargo unloaded there, one load of fabrics, another of kegs, and the remaining one of coffee, mirrors, beads, and other things. Asked about the tobacco and its introduction into Nacogdoches, at whose order, and into whose hands was it received, he said that the Frenchman “Pedrito” had a quantity of tobacco that he delivered to Lamathé and Cortés to give to the Indians, and that the aforementioned Luis Arman

519 Cortés…smuggling, BA June 16, 1792 (Ratification of Gómez, September 26, 1792)
520 Ibid
was delivering to the soldiers a pound every two weeks at the orders of Captain Cortés. Gómez knew that the fabrics, tobacco, playing cards and other goods brought from Nachitos were prohibited and he was asked if he knew that the soldado distinguido Alderete, the brother-in-law of Cortés, and privates bought the goods seized by Escandón. He indicated that he knew that information, and added that these fabrics were bought from the citizens of Nacogdoches; however, Gómez also stated that he was unaware that there was prior permission from Cortés to purchase hides and other confiscated goods with bridles, scarves, used clothing, and large knives. Although, he added, he noticed that two soldiers arrived without bridles on their mounts.  

Finally, Gómez noted that he happened to observe that a quantity of tobacco, playing cards, and cloth goods were removed from the trunks of Cortés. However, did he know that his captain might have given an order that his baggage, and that of the troops, be sent to the presidio at La Bahía, to whom he gave the order; but, that his directive was not carried out and, in fact, that all the cargo came to Bexar? Gómez indicated that he knew nothing of any of that, but only that Lieutenant Fernández went out to meet them and escorted them to San Antonio and Governor Escandón. When Private Antonio del Río was asked a similar question regarding the baggage brought to San Antonio, and for what reason and by what order he inspected the goods of his captain and his fellow troops, he replied that he did not learn why the baggage had come to the capital, but that, he too, saw Fernandez accompany them to the home of Escandón. Private del Río heard from other soldiers that Lieutenant Fernández counted the cargo and ordered that none of it should disappear. Though he knew that tobacco and play cards were prohibited items, he also knew that items and fabrics brought from Louisiana and seized from Menchaca and Galán. But, Munoz asked del Rio why, if he knew that certain items were seized from Menchaca and Galán, did he and the other troops carry the same goods? The private replied that he purchased his items, convinced that they were not contraband because he had brought them from the citizens of Nacogdoches [persuadido de q(u)e no era contravando (sic), por haverlos comprador a los 

521 Ibid
vezinos (sic) de Nagcodoches]. Further, while he did not know how the other soldiers paid for their goods, the ones he bought for himself were in payment for some horses owed to him by a Nepomuzeno de la Zerda [sic]. Like Galán, he received one pound of tobacco from Luis Arman by order of Captain Cortés. And, he knew that in the baggage of Cortés were manojos of tobacco, but he was unable to confirm the pounds nor how many there were in total. Asked if he knew from where the tobacco was purchased and from where it was brought to Nacogdoches, del Río did not know the answer to either question.522

His answer apparently troubled Governor Muñoz, who then asked the deponent to restate his name, his place of birth, and what company he began his military service. At this point in the interrogation, a brief glimpse into one soldier’s early life and entry into the army emerges.

His name was Jose Antonio del Río; he was born at the abandoned presidio of Los Adaes, and began his career at the presidio of La Bahía del Espíritu Santo. Asked at what age he left Los Adaes and did he know how far that was from the Natchitos post, he replied: he left at the age of seven for the presidio of Orcoquiza, and that he did not know the distance from Los Adaes to Nachitos, although he had been there [twice before], the first time as a citizen and the other as a soldier of La Bahía. That answer prompted Muñoz to ask: Having been in Nachitos and at the other presidios, how could he not know where the seized tobacco came from? Private del Río responded: the tobacco under discussion was brought from that which was harvested by the French; as we have seen, this regional variety of the plant was the type preferred by the presidiales. That answer must have satisfied Muñoz who quickly moved on to the final questions, including what he used to purchase chamois skins; he traded a blanket and biscuits. Did he know whether other soldiers might have traded weapons, gunpowder, or bullets to the Indians for chamois? He did not see nor did he learn that his fellow troops did so. Private del Río was asked specific questions related to Sergeant Treviño: what purpose did his sergeant go to Nachitos? And, when Treviño returned to

522 Proceedings in the case against Juan Cortés, Sergeant Treviño, and others, charged with smuggling, BA June 16, 1792 (Ratification of Del Río, September 26, 1792)
Nacogdoches, did the individuals who brought the cargo into that town come with him, or later? To the first question, the private replied that Treviño went to collect a debt that he had with Atanasio de Mezieres. To the second, he affirmed that those soldiers who brought the cargo into Nacogdoches came before Treviño, and these same men left from Nacogdoches for Nachitos before Cortés and the troops arrived. Finally, del Río was asked a question not posed to any other deponent in the Cortés contraband proceeding: had he been coached by some individual with whom he might have spoken regarding the matter of the confiscated goods? He declared that he had not.523

Like Private Antonio Gómez, his predecessor in the proceedings, Antonio del Río was unable to write, and like Gómez he ratified his deposition by making the sign of the cross in testament to the truth.524

3.8 HOW THE KING DEALT WITH CONTRABANDISTAS

The Cortés contraband case says as much about the limits of state power as it does about the manipulation of royal policy by the Crown’s agents in the colonial borderlands. Investigations into French contraband trade had alarmed royal administrators and were brought to the attention of the Viceroy in early 1751, and certain contraband goods from Natchitoches had been confiscated during the mid-1760s.525 Even Ripperdá, the beleaguered Governor constantly in need of supervision by his superiors, received instructions from his overseers on how to proceed with contraband cases in the 1770s. And, as we saw in the previous chapter, Amangual had confiscated similar inventory in Texas in 1780. In 1785, the King ordered that the royal banner be flown on the ships employed for the security of the royal revenues and the suppression of contraband in order to make themselves more worthy of respect [las embarcaciones que se emplean en el

523 Ibid
524 Ibid
525 For example, see […] proceedings […] investigation of French contraband trade and advance into the interior […] BA February 10, 1750; […] apprehension of certain contraband good coming from Natchitoches, November 16, 1766; and several cases in the 1780s. See Cabello to Croix, […] contraband cases in Texas, BA May 1, 1780; Cabello to Croix, […] contraband goods introduced from Louisiana, BA May 9, 1780; Cabello to Croix, reporting on contraband cases, BA October 9, 1780; José Pereira de Castro to Martinez Pacheco […] contraband trade in cattle, BA November 13, 1788
resguardo de las r(en)tas r(eale)s y extinction (sic) del contravando (sic), usen de la vandera (sic) real, para hacerse mas dignas de respecto]. 526 The symbolic gesture may have been effective along the coastal regions – even though at the time of its issuance the King acknowledged that there were no vessels employed for that purpose – but it is doubtful that overt displays of royal authority were successful in curbing illegal trade on the ground and away from the sea. Cattle, tobacco, and cloth all constituted articles of contraband before colonial administrators conveyed their concerns to superiors on the Peninsula. Occasional episodes of unlawfulness, carried out even by mail couriers, demonstrate the limits of institutional regulation of commerce and the pervasiveness of resistance to state power by agents of all stripes in the King’s empire.

By 1791 Carlos IV had developed a criteria for the investigation of seizures of contraband; the Council of the Indies had proposed in a report of July 6, 1761 that the General Accounting Office divide cases of confiscation and their circumstances into five categories for greater clarity:

1. those involving a considerable amount with the culprits present;
2. those involving a considerable amount without the culprits present or known;
3. those involving a small amount with the culprits present and capable of bearing the costs;
4. those involving a small amount without the culprits present or known;
5. those involving a small amount with the culprits present or known, but poor or incapable of bearing the costs. 527

Then, the accounting office proposed what it thought could be practice with respect to each of these circumstances. Having seen everything that was discussed thirty years prior at the Council of the Indies itself, along with what was stated in light of it by his fiscal, the King resolved that cases of confiscation in the first three aforementioned categories should continue to be substantiated according to the method stipulated by the laws relating to this particular event, for

526 Rengel to Cabello, […] royal order […] vessels guarding against contraband trade, BA July 30, 1785
527 […] King’s decree concerning seizure of contraband goods, BA May 23, 1791; it should be noted that neither term, “considerable,” or “small” are precisely defined in the original document when such terms are applied to “amounts.”
two reasons: 1) because there was no reason to change it \[asi por que no hai (sic) motivo para que se varíe\], and 2) because its observance contributed to the correction of the corpus delecti, that is, the physical evidence of the crime, and of its author and – hearing the author’s exculpation or exoneration in the prescribed manner – to assure in this way the correctness of the judgment on one or the other, without the risk of the proceedings being argued to be null based on the pretext of defenselessness or some other substantive effect \[como por que su observancia conspira á que se rectifique el cuerpo del delito, y de su autor, y á que oyendose á este en el modo prevenido su esculpacion (sic) o descargo se afianze asi el acierto de la Providencia correspondiente á uno y otro, sin el riesgo de que se arguya de nulo el proseso (sic) con fundamento á Título de indefencion (sic), ú de otro defecto substancial\].

The King argued against anything superfluous in the proposed formula; what was to be confiscated needed to be inventoried, inspected, and guarded in the proper place in order to prevent it from being lost, and that \[lo que se haya de confiscar, se inventaríe, reconozca, y resguarde en los terminos que conviene para evitar su extravío, y que se aplique al tiempo oportuno á quien corresponda\]. With respect to the fourth category (of cases involving a small amount without the culprits present or known) and in consideration that what was ordered in Article Twenty-two of a royal cedula of July 22, 1761 (issued for matters concerned with the provincial revenues of these [Spanish] kingdoms) was based on the most persuasive indication that was made about the goods to which it referred \[expedida por lo concerniente (sic) a las Rentas Provinciales de estos reynos, se apoya en el vehementísimo indicio que contra los bienes a que se contrae…\].

Those indicators were identifiable by their abandonment, and the failure of their owners to appear to try to hand them over, which was equivalent to a formal confession of their illegal transport, or certainty of their poor quality, sufficient for the \[formulas to be applied certainly to\] the royal treasury \[…produce su abandono, y el defecto de comparecencia de sus dueños a\]

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528 Ibid
529 […] King’s decree concerning seizure of contraband goods, BA May 23, 1791
pretender se les entreguen, el qual equivale á una formal confesion (sic) de su ilegitimo transporte, o convencimiento de su mala calidad, ó fraudulento comercio, suficiente para que se apliquen desde luego á … real Fisco].

This fourth category corresponded to the “proper management and government” of tobacco revenues in the Américas. The fifth category was to serve as a springboard for the conclusions of the autos used in civil matters, without admitting any other kind of proof or further delays. Confessions from the culprits were expected to be taken, and a brief period for the preparation of a defense in cases where they had not confessed; if the guilty parties had confessed, the process was expected to render a sentence immediately and a punishment commensurate with the degree appropriate to the charge without waiting for anything else.

As we shall soon see, thirty years would pass before the next King of Spain would grant amnesty for contraband trade. Ironically, for its fulfillment across the Spanish borderlands presidios, it would become the responsibility of Captain Juan Cortés to make a copy of the royal pardon for the archive under his command at La Bahía.

The Amangual inventory of the confiscated goods seized from Cortés, Treviño and other presidio soldiers provided the essential master data for documenting the depositions and subsequent ratifications of the military personnel involved with the alleged incident between the two points of engagement at Natchitoches and Nacogdoches in the summer of 1792. Documentary sources provide a window into the necessity for the collection of data especially where it concerned the recording of evidence for legal proceedings. When Governor Escandón required finalization of certain depositions taken from soldiers among the Texas presidios, two files with summaries of the gifting intended for the indigenous communities reveal as much about the interactions of military commanders and their generosity, or not, towards an assortment of groups.

A deposition by Private Francisco Chávez indicates that gifts intended for the Nations of the North never made their way from the hands of then-governor Domingo Cabello to the Apaches whereas Captain Rafael Martínez Pacheco gave them whatever they asked for [los subministraba

530 Ibid
531 Ibid
con franqueza quanto pedían]. Alférez Manuel de Urrutia corroborated Chavez’s testimony regarding Martínez Pacheco’s generosity, and even added that the merchant and presidio storehouse manager Andrés Courbiere – who will shortly surface again in another incident of questionable activity – would take gifts out and hand them over to Urrutia, and would then take goods directly to the Apache at their own rancherías.532 Asked for his input, Francisco Amangual apparently confirmed the “economy” of Colonel Cabello where it concerned the Indians of the North, and the absence of stinginess shown by Martínez Pacheco because he gave it all generously to the Apache [en punto á regalos de Yndios del Norte, y la ninguna que tenia el Capitán D(on) Rafael Martínez Pacheco, pues todo lo dava (sic) con franqueza á los Apaches].533

Amangual then gave a deposition in which he claimed to have no knowledge that Martínez Pacheco ever took any measure to benefit the province during the time that he was governor, nor had Amangual heard that the Captain undertook any campaigns other than an expedition to the headwaters of the Medina River to meet with the comandante general Juan de Ugalde.534 The Alférez Urrutia added that Martínez Pacheco allowed some kind of devastation to be done to the cattle and horse livestock [los destrozos que (Martínez Pacheco) permitia hacer en los ganados vacunos y cavallares].535 And, by late 1792 the Viceroy had received four original letters that

532 Copy of Sierra Gorda’s letter to Muñoz, listing depositions which must be ratified, BA September 10, 1792
533 Ibid
534 While the name “Ugalde” might appear to be a mistake, it is the name written in the original document, and it is indeed preceded by the rank “Com[andante General] Brig[adier]”. This caused some confusion for this writer, since I was under the impression that “Commander General” was a title solely reserved for Ugarte during this time period. When the Provincias Internas were split into two separate commands by Viceroy Flores in 1788, Ugalde took complete command of the East and Ugarte of the West; then, in 1790 the Viceroy Revilla Gigedo reunited the Provincias, relieved Ugalde of his command, and restored full authority again to Ugarte. Moorhead, 111, 258. However, Ugalde continued to enjoy the title as well, or, perhaps it is that Sierra Gorda indeed wrote the wrong name – the two are strikingly similar and thus subject to confusion – or, Amangual was incorrect in his testimony.535 Ibid. Julianna Barr has contrasted the two governors as differing in their separate approaches to the Apaches and other indigenous groups. Cabello is cast as an administrative lackey, devoted to the official scenario of offering no quarter to the Apaches or its various bands. Barr describes Cabello as duplicitous, promising Spanish military support and trade to the Lipan but insisting on “rituals of humiliation” – surrender or military defeat – as proof of peace from their leaders. This tactic only exasperated Lipan chiefs, appalled as they were by Cabello’s lack of respect towards them. Barr presents Martínez Pacheco as a conciliatory governor, agreeing with the vision of the Apaches that the mission-presidio complex at San Antonio could serve as the locus for building a Spanish-Apache alliance. The coalition that Martínez Pacheco and Lipan leaders sought to create was intended to curtail horse and cattle raiding on which Apache subsistence rested. According to Barr, even the Comanche leaders eyed the potential alliance as beneficial, promising not to attack Apaches so long as they found their enemies settled in permanent
Ugalde sent to Martínez Pacheco, disapproving of his dealings with the Indians [*desaprovándole su manejo con los indios*], official documents that had been forward by Muñoz as being relevant to the case that was filed against his predecessor.\(^{536}\)

Where it concerned the goods from the Cortés proceedings, Amangual was charged with coordinating a public auction at the presidio for the sale of the contraband. When Viceroy Revilla Gigedo acknowledged the decision by Escandón to sell the confiscated tobacco at the estanco of the presidio, he also agreed that Amangual was to retain the rest of the goods. Moreover, the Viceroy credited Amangual with the foresight to understand that the chamois and hides, which constituted the bulk of the contraband inventory, were commonly traded and used in the Provincias Internas, and should be returned to the owners except for those belonging to Cortés and his brother-in-law Alderete. Revilla Gigedo placed full responsibility on these two, because they were the “culprits in this contraband [*por ser los reos en este contravando (sic)*].”\(^{537}\) However, the Viceroy implicated one other individual in the unsettling affair; Nicolas de Lamate [variously spelled Lamath, Lamathé] had been charged with receiving some of the contraband into his own house. Revilla Gigedo ordered Muñoz to have the Frenchman leave Nacogdoches and head to San Antonio, or, some other location less likely to harbor ill-gotten goods [*ó á otra parte menos ocasionada á abrigar estas introduciones (sic)*], and that the Governor was to remain vigilant about Lamath’s conduct.\(^{538}\)

The Viceroy’s final instructions to Muñoz, subsequently conveyed to Amangual, was that the paymaster was to take charge of the proceeds, all which were to be handed over to him, and which were then to be sent to Muñoz for certification of the sum raised from the auction and then submitted to San Luis Potosí. The entirety of this documentation was to be sent there in order for the Intendant to deduct it from the allocation corresponding [*situado correspondiente*] to the Béxar towns with the Spanish. Julianna Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

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\(^{536}\) Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz, […] Ugalde’s letters to Martínez Pacheco disapproving of his Indian policies, BA October 10, 1792

\(^{537}\) Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz, concerning contraband trade of Juan Cortés, BA September 26, 1792

\(^{538}\) Ibid
presidio. Thereafter, the sum would be entered in the records of the royal treasury and then forwarded to the central treasury so that it might be distributed according to the guidelines of confiscated materials [á fin de que se distribuya con arreglo á la pauta].

The Cortés contraband proceedings, and the Amangular-Rodríguez lawsuit, represented the commingling of presidio soldiers and merchants in troublesome episodes of misadventure, charges and counter-charges, and dishonorable behavior with serious implications for the military community. Incidents of contraband and its confiscation had a long history in the colonial borderlands as did occurrences of soldiers accusing one another of misdeeds, or the suspicion thereof, and were to continue over the course of time and involve other players from the same socio-economic arena. Amid this flurry of less than beneficial activities, other communities entered into the military garrison’s sphere of accommodation and accusation, a dynamic that presumed compliance and cohesion through a narrowing of spatial relations. When native populations made forays into the presidio complex, or, when soldiers penetrated indigenous domains, their meanderings were defined by reciprocal efforts that were intended to seal loyalties, if often permeable and uncertain, among presumed ‘friends.’ The business of maintaining such shaky alliances was ongoing; formal treaties of peace were but one method to promote adherence to prescribed modes of behavior in the best interest of all parties, but other endeavors involving the usual actors involved as much diligence, and documentation, as we shall see in the next chapter.

539 Ibid.
Chapter Four

En estos reinos, Señor, es difícil estimular a la noblez y familias de mayor comodidad y jerarquía a que solíciten y admitan empleos en las tropas provinciales al ejemplar de las de España. No miran las armas como carrera que guía al heroismo: son naturalmente [sic] delicados, entregados al ocio, al vicio, hijo de su natural desidia. No están elevados por los padres a ideas más superiores que a las de la propia conservación. Son vanos, librando sobre su riqueza, y el que no la tiene blasonando de ser descendientes de españoles conquistadores; pero esto no estimula a la conservación del honor que adquirieron con bizarros hechos los que ellos quieren como protectores de su fantástico modo de pensar. Pruébalo el que son raros los que se han presentado para obtener empleos militares. El que tiene bienes de fortuna piensa en disfrutarlos sin riesgos ni incomodidad alguna. El que no los tiene, pregunta por el sueldo, y desengañado de que no le goza sino en los casos en que V.M. tiene por conveniente librarle, no dirige instancias, y estoy bien cierto de que si con el deseo de honrarles se les llenara un despacho, habría muchos que solicitarían el devolverlo. 540

4.1 MERCHANTS AND INDIANS: ACCOMMODATING VISITORS TO THE PRESIDIO, OR, ‘PEACE BY PURCHASE’

As we have already seen, Muñoz maintained an active relationship with the aforementioned merchant Andrés Benito Courbiere and, occasionally, Amangual was privy to their interactions especially where it concerned indigenous visitors to the presidio. In accord with payment orders generated by Colonel Muñoz, the omnipresent Courbiere produced an account of his expenditures for the maintenance of the Taguacanas, Taguayas, Tancagues, Guichita, and Comanches. For accommodating one hundred Indians from these nations and of both sexes, Courbiere spent one-hundred six pesos, two reales, six granos and this amount reflected expenses that resulted from their appearance at the garrison of San Antonio de Béxar from May 22 until July 4, 1792. 541 The expenses covered included:

- For 18 cattle, at 4 pesos 72 pesos
- For 8 ¾ fanegas of corn, at 2 pesos 17 pesos, 4 reales
- For 6 almudes of beans, at 4 reales 4 reales
- For 13 cartloads of firewood, at 1 peso 13 pesos
- For 6 ½ reales of salt 6 reales, 6 granos

540 Juan Marchena Fernández, La vida de guarnicion en las ciudades americanas de la ilustracion (Sevilla: Ministerio de Defensa, 1992). 140-141
541 Courbiere’s account of expenses incurred for maintenance of visiting Indians, BA May 22, 1792
The report shows that Courbiere provided corn – and pilonzillos -- to the presidio of La Bahía for the Indians of the Rosario Mission and only corn to the Carancaguazes [sic] on the coast. It cost twenty-one pesos to transport the sugar loaves and the corn from San Antonio to the presidio at La Bahía. Courbiere provided cigars, gunpowder and bullets to those Indians who arrived with rifles, blankets given to the Taguacanos “Menchaca” and “El Mudo,” and cloth for a waistcoat for the Indian “Jasinto [sic].” Buttons, silk, and a hat that was given to Chief Cojo of the Comanches and one pair of spurs brought Courbiere’s total to two hundred three pesos, three granos.542

The names of other individual Indians are known from Courbiere’s accounting log of items presented during the time period. Chief Sordo of the Comanche received a portion of the six doublets of queretano cloth that also were given to the two nephews of Chief Ciscat of the Taguacanos, to the son of Chief de la Malla of the Comanche, and two that were given to the Tancagues on May 30, with all of the doublets lined and sewn. The final items consisted of buttons that went into the doublets; four almudes of biscuits given in provisions; payment to a “Master Pobevano” for the repair of three bridles and seven rifles of the Indians; and, cloth, silk, thread, and buttons used in the making of a waistcoat and a pair of trousers for Chief Cojo of the Comanche. The grand total for Courbiere’s accounting report was two hundred forty-five pesos, eleven and five-eighths granos.543

Courbiere wrote his report on May 22. In a peculiar twist of events, Lieutenant Espadas reported only three days later that about forty-two Comanche had accosted the people rounding up cattle [juntando ganado] for the herd of Padre José Camarena at a place called La Tortuga near the Guadalupe River. All twenty-five of the vaqueros – most likely, civilians – had been provoked to fight, but the men tolerated the Comanche insults and saw the situation as being dire enough for Espadas to have a report of the Indians’ misdeeds [y se han visto precisados a darme parte de sus fechorías (sic)]. In his report to Governor Muñoz, Espadas conveyed his desperation, saying that he did not know what to do since the Comanche had not declared war, despite the robberies that

542 Ibid
543 Ibid
the Bahía personnel were expecting from them and even noted that they had stolen two horses from that presidio.544 Espadas was particularly apprehensive since his garrison was short of men, and the horse herd detachment had only twenty-two men; as he indicated to Muñoz, he suspected that one of the ten “gandules” that had remained at the presidio after a visit of almost a week – for which reason Espada could not explain – was there only to observe which animals he could take.545

Muñoz’s response came the next day. When he received Espadas’ report, he had a party of twenty-one men set out for Tortugas [sic] so that, once arrived and informed of the antagonistic encounter between the vaqueros and the Comanche, the soldiers could respond in ways so as not to project resentment towards the Indians who were the friends of the military. Muñoz sent Manuel de Urrutia, one of the deponents in the Amangual-Rodríguez suit from the month before, with instructions for Espadas to dispatch a private from his company, at La Bahía, and one from that at Béxar, and then to assume responsibility for repairing the damage and guarding against the potential damage that whichever of the Indians might attempt to cause [tomará por sí la mas adaptable, para redimir el daño, y precaver los que intenten ejecutar los Yndios que sean].546

Muñoz surmised that the antagonists could have been Comanche, since thirty-six individuals had departed from the Béxar presidio for the purpose of finding the Apaches [con el fin de buscar a los Apaches], and after the discovery of tracks had been reported to him, Urrutia set out as far as the site of Los Olmos and discovered that indeed it was from the same Comanche avengers.547 Nevertheless, he cautioned Espadas to exercise the greatest care since all Indians were inconstant and of little maintenance where it concerned loyalty [por cuanto todo Indio es voluble y de poca subsistencia en la fidelidad]. Muñoz added that Spaniards had to overlook their imperfections because they were a nation that contained the other nations [debemos disimular (?) sus ymperfecciones por ser nación que contiene a las demás], and it was necessary for Espadas to

544 Correspondence between Espadas and Muñoz, concerning Comanche depredations, BA May 25, 1792
545 Ibid
546 Ibid (Muñoz to Espadas, May 26)
547 Ibid
convince the non-indigenous population to look upon them with favor [se hace preciso que usted encargue de las gentes que los miren con agrado].

When Muñoz sent the instructions with Urrutia containing the aforementioned advice to Espadas, the private from the Bahía company, along with Private Antonio Aldape from the Béxar company and the rest of the men were to continue on to Las Tortugas, the site of the roundup of cattle for Padre Camarena. Muñoz indicated that Urrutia was to receive from Lieutenant Espadas the orders conducive to proceeding appropriately in order to carry out all damage [y procederá según convenga y a fin de ejecutar todo perjuicio]. Moreover, Muñoz prevailed upon Urrutia to avoid provoking the Friendly Nations, and to conduct himself with the greatest prudence and endeavor to determine the causes for the conflict that existed between whatever Indians were involved and the civilized people [gente de razón]. Since it was Urruita that had detected the tracks at Los Olmos, Muñoz conveyed to Urrutia the same supposition as to the identity of the Indians that he had to Espadas – it was quite possibly the ones who had departed in search of the Apaches, and thus Urrutia was to judiciously avoid creating resentments.

At the moment that Espadas received Muñoz’s official letter, he sent the two privates to Las Tortugas where they met Alférez Urrutia. The privates had an instruction from Espadas about what was to be done with the Indians, whether they were friendly, or hostile, so as to prevent any further discord in relationships between the military and civilian settlement, and the Comanche. In either case, Espadas had no doubts that they were Comanche, based upon the reports given by the vaqueros working for Padre Camarena [según las noticias que dan los que andan corriendo torada]. Further, he was certain that it was Chief Ojos Azules accompanied by his people; Espadas was aware that the Chief had angrily departed from the Bahía presidio but he was unaware as to the reason for his dissatisfaction. Nothing of what could have been provided to him and his people was denied [pues nada de lo que aquí se puede hacer se le escaseó]. But, Espadas indicated that until the Comanche were given everything they asked for, they were not satisfied. Nonetheless,

548 Ibid
549 Ibid
the Lieutenant asserted that unreasonable demands could not be met in the way that the Indians desired.\textsuperscript{550}

By June 1792, if Espadas was left feeling helpless about conflictive Indian interactions – during the preceding month, the outgoing governor Muñoz distanced himself from Espadas and expected the Bahía commander to fend for himself and his troops – he only needed to contact the new Governor of the province: Manuel de Escandón, the Conde de Sierra Gorda. On the evening of June 2, Espadas received a report that a citizen of La Bahía had been sent by Chief Canoso with a message for the First Alférez of the Bahía presidio, Francisco Vásquez, to meet with him, alone, at the place where the \textit{vaqueros} were rounding up cattle for Padre Camarena. Chief Canoso claimed that his people meant to do no harm, but instead sought peace. Indeed, because of their numeric superiority, the Indians could have already finished off the cowboys but their restraint ostensibly proved their desire for conciliation. However, Espadas did not consider combat with the Indians a remote possibility, and he had been informed that the vaqueros had remained at the site of conflict as if they were hostages until the Alférez Urrutia had arrived.

Again, mindful of his lesser rank and perhaps hopeful for intercession from on high, Espadas declared that it was not his decision to permit Vásquez to go to the meeting. However, he did inform his superior Escandón that he had suspicions that there might be others in Canoso’s group capable of committing atrocities against the Camarena party and the soldiers present. Espadas reminded Governor Escandón that the Bahía garrison had no more than eighteen men to guard the horse herd, and the attached citizens [\textit{del vecindario agrado}] were few and lacked weapons. For all of these reasons, Espadas thus explained his inaction in making some determination as to how to best approach Canoso’s prickly request.\textsuperscript{551}

Several events occurred that may have eased Espadas’ trepidation in dealing with all things Indian and one such welcome piece of news arrived the same day as the aforementioned Canoso request. On June 2, the Viceroy informed the Governor of Texas that a November 12, 1791 order

\begin{footnotes}
\item[550] Espadas to Muñoz, concerning policies toward the Comanche […], BA May 31, 1792
\item[551] Espadas to Sierra Gorda, reporting request of Canoso for a conference of peace, BA June 2, 1792
\end{footnotes}
of one hundred seventeen muskets had been fulfilled, was sent to San Luis Potosí, and was now ready to be transferred to San Antonio for its poorly armed citizenry. Of those inhabitants, only seventy-four could afford to pay for them upon immediate receipt; the remaining forty-three were to be paid off within two months of delivery.\textsuperscript{552} Governor Escandón most likely knew that the news would shore up the spirits of Lieutenant Espadas, and since the Viceroy’s decision was conveyed by \textit{comandante general} Castro (the military official in closest contact with the presidios and their commanders), we can assume that Espadas felt an even greater sense of relief. Escandón had even more news for the jittery Lieutenant, although it may not have been information that would have allayed his fears.

On June 16, General Castro wrote to Governor Escandón that he had received Espada’s copy of the report regarding Canoso’s solicitation for peace – which Castro pronounced “deceitful, as always [\textit{dolosa como siempre}]
” -- and that of the instruction given by Escandón to the lieutenant of the Béxar presidio, Bernardo Fernández. Castro approved the Governor’s decisions of the proposal Fernández was to make to Chief Canoso, although he reminded Escandón that the peace offer made by the recently murdered Zapato Sax – who only recently had raided in Nuevo Santander but whose efforts were spoiled [\textit{quedó desecha}] by the captain at Laredo – came from the Lipanes. These same Apaches had menaced Reynosa and one of their group was killed and the other taken prisoner by the citizens of that villa and that of Camargo. Moreover, Castro indicated that continual attacks, which were never suspended during times of peace, were occurring at the

\textsuperscript{552} Castro to Sierra Gorda, transmitting Revilla Gigedo’s letter of February 1, confirming shipment of guns for Bexar citizens, BA June 2, 1792; however, since the government in Texas had not responded to his repeated requests for information, by March 1793 Castro had to demand reimbursement from Governor Muñoz in the amount of eight hundred eighty-six pesos, one and a half reales for the cost of the one hundred seventeen muskets. There was an additional one hundred one pesos, six reales that also had to be repaid to the two \textit{habilitados}, Leandro Pacheco and Pedro de Alva, who had supplied them at their shipping rates. Castro to Muñoz […] to Amangual, […] distribution of guns sent from San Luis Potosí for citizens of Béxar, BA March 15, 1793. It would be another six weeks before Muñoz contacted Amangual (indicating that Castro’s order had just arrived in that day’s mail) to send a report on the muskets that had been distributed to the citizens, and were paid for, of the one hundred seventeen muskets that were deposited in the paymaster’s office by then-governor Sierra Gorda. Muñoz also asked Amangual for a list of the individuals who had not received them in order to decide the best way to proceed with Castro’s request. Ibid, (Muñoz to Amangual, April 26, 1793)
time of this letter according to the commander of the Rio Grande presidio; that officer reported to
the General that on June 12 the Lipanes had stolen horses.553

Castro acknowledged Escandón’s assertion that the borderlands military had never
experienced loyalty or good faith from them [nunca hemos experimentado lealtad ni buena fé en ellos] and the General added that at the present time they were least behaving in good faith. Since
Viceroy Revilla Gigedo’s resolution on the matter constituted the final decision and would
therefore circumscribe any relations with the indigenous warriors, Castro instructed Escandón to
entertain Canoso until the Viceroy’s disclosed his recommendations, but without allowing the
Chief to enter any presidios, since that would create great displeasure among the Comanche and
other Nations of the North. Castro’s final words to the Governor are revealing:

Their friendship is very useful and important to us, and we must preserve it at all costs,
because without their help we can achieve nothing […] cuya amistad nos es mui util é interesante
y debemos conservarla á toda costa porque sin su auxilio nada podríamos conseguir].554

553 Castro to Sierra Gorda, approving dispositions to Captain Canoso […], BA June 16, 1792; by September, the
reinstated Governor Muñoz received the same information – the Lipan were to be treated with great skill and
cunning [de que procurará tratarlos con mucha maña y astucia á fin de que por n(uest)ra parte no tengan el más
levé motivo para hacer ninguna hostilidad] – from the Commander General. However, Castro alerted Muñoz that
the Lipan known as Juan Bautista might return, like others from his nation, to seek peace and in these instances the
Governor was to immediately notify the General. This order was sent on the same day as the instructions for the care
of the escaped Lipan woman. Castro to Muñoz, ordering him to let a Christian Lipan girl stay in San Antonio de
Valero Mission, BA September 29, 1792

554 Ibid. If Castro seemed a hard-hearted military man, an order to Muñoz only three months later would suggest
differently; a Lipan woman sought refuge in the San Antonio mission (Valero) since, according to the previous
governor’s account, she had escaped from her companions because they wanted to kill her. Because of her plight,
and since she was a Christian, Castro ordered Muñoz to allow her to remain but the governor was to maintain
vigilance over her companions, to watch their movements so that they themselves would make it clear whether or
not what the woman had said was true [No obstante esto, procurará Vm. siempre tenerles la vista encima,
observandoles sus movimientos (sic) para que ellos mismos den á conocer si es ó no cierto lo que á (sic) contado].
Castro to Muñoz, ordering him to let a Christian Lipan girl stay […], BA September 29, 1792. Similarly, the spirited
Captain Juan Cortés of La Bahía informed Muñoz that a “captive woman” of thirty-four years had escaped from a
ranchería of the upper Lipanes, a group headed to the Bahía presidio to join the afore-cited ‘El Canoso.’ According
to Cortés’ account, she had wandered lost for eleven days on foot and was so sick by the time she reached the
presidio that she had already confessed. She was able to describe her story of escape and survival; she was taken
prisoner by the militant Zapato Sas[x] in 1791 at the Rancho de Palmitos along with two of her children who were
subsequently killed, as well as the one that she bore on the road. She did not know if her husband had met the same
fate. Cortés was attending to her and he indicated that she was being well kept in his care. Cortés to Muñoz, […]
arrival of a woman, captive of the Indians, […] escaped […] Lipan camp, BA October 3, 1792. One week later, the
woman had recovered well enough to identify the ranchería as that of Chief Chiquito from which she had escaped.
There they had kept twelve women captives and three men, all of them taken at El Vallecillo, Revilla, and other
ranchos of those jurisdictions at the same time as she. Encouraged by another Lipan, she took flight. However, she
A visit by two Lipanes on the afternoon of June 18 was enough to send Espadas running back to his inkwell in order to inform Escandón that the Indians had inquired about Alférez Francisco Vásquez having not appeared as they had requested two weeks earlier, on June 2. Espadas indicated that his personnel were awaiting an order from the Governor, assuring the visiting Lipanes that travel would commence once Vásquez and his party were allowed to go. Insomuch as his message to Escandón had just been sent three days earlier and not having received a reply, Espadas was pro-active in his approach to the Indians in that he decided of his own volition to send the Indians away under the pretext of concern for their well-being, but one of the two reasons for his doing so were covert: he told Governor Escandón that he made this decision to dismiss the Lipan pair so that they would not become suspicious and, as he told them, in order to ensure their safety so that they might not be harmed by their enemies ([bajo los pretextos de seguridad (para que no se hagan sospechosos) de que se hace así porque no recivan daño de sus enemigos]555

By July, little had changed in the ongoing suspicions between the presidiales and the Lipan Apaches. On July 4, the Lipan “Jacinto” came to the Bahía presidio under the banner of peace, accompanied by two gandules from the same nation. They were curious to know what results emerged from their request for peace; in this episode, the recently accused Captain Juan Cortés could give no other reply other than the swollen Rio Grande had made it impossible to allow the crossing of the soldiers. This troop carried the recommendation that Governor Escandón would make to General Castro about the Lipan overtures for peace. Cortés gave the trio a few boxes of cigars and they departed for their ranchería, located at the Old Mission on the Guadalupe River.556

Before the recent investigation of his alleged wrongdoing, Captain Juan Cortés is remembered in this study for his unswerving commitment to the safety and well-being of the troops

did indicate that Chiquito did not go out on raids or do any harm when he was with Zapato Sas. She confirmed the death of the latter and of others in his company, as well as a skirmish between the Tahuayases and the Lipanes of her ranchería. Cortés to Muñoz, with additional information on captive woman, BA October 10, 1792

555 Espadas to Escandón, BA June 18, 1792
556 Cortés to Escandón, BA July 5, 1792
under his command and to the maintenance of the security of the presidio of La Bahía del Espíritu Santo and its environs. Up to that point in his career, he showed himself to be a soldier of a completely different stripe than the indecisive Espadas, especially where it concerned the type of situational strategizing necessary when coping with absentee superiors. In many cases, army officers had not the lived experience of actual conditions on the ground in spaces across the borderlands. However, his participation in a contraband allegation made him a controversial figure. In summary, Cortés had been, apparently, a leader of great military acumen. Nevertheless, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, his is yet another example of a personality flaw allowed to fester and, then, overcome obedience to duty.

Only the year before, in the summer of 1791, when then-Governor Muñoz ordered a detachment of troops from La Bahía, Cortés absolved himself of any responsibility that such a loss of soldier power would potentially weaken his garrison and invite disastrous results. Balancing respect for his commander with an itemization of plausible scenarios that might befall his command and jeopardize the force left to protect the Bahía presidio, Cortés had asserted his thoroughgoing understanding of his particular local environment and the constraints that such realities imposed on a commander’s strict compliance with authority.

Now, five days after the appearance of Jacinto and two young warriors at the presidio seeking peace, Cortés was able to convey to Governor Escandón the satisfaction experienced by Chief Canoso for the good treatment – feigned, according to Cortés – given to Jacinto on July 7, 1792. This time, and with the same purpose as his two colleagues, Canoso arrived with a slightly

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557 Cortés to Muñoz, discussing exploration trip by Espadas […], BA Sept 9, 1791 (- September 11, 1791). Perhaps Espadas was just unlucky. Sent to reconnoiter the Guadalupe River, Lieutenant Espadas withdrew on September 4 without having managed to get any further than the Arroyo de las Animas due to the impassability of heavy rains that had inundated the terrain [sin poder hacer otra cosa que lugar hasta el Arroyo (…) por los intransitable al campo con las muchas llubias (sic)]. Muñoz replied that he had in front of him a Lipan Indian prisoner, described as more than seventy years old, who gave a report of the headwaters of the Frio River, and the area between the hill country and the San Sába canyon. At that place were gathered the Chiefs Zapatosas, Canoso, Chiquito, Josse [sic] Lombraña, and El Pinto [tengo preso a un Yndio Lipan de mas de 70 a(nos) y da la not(ici)a q(u)e en las cavezeras (sic) de Rio Frio entre la lomeria, y canon q(e) llaman de S(a)n Saba, en el q(u)e estan juntos los Capitanes (…)]. However, Muñoz doubted the report since the Nava sent him word that Captain José Tobar had killed, both, Canoso and Lombraña.

558 For a more detailed account of this event, and another, suggesting the no-nonsense character of Cortés, see Chapter 2 of this study, pp 112-114.
larger party: one hundred forty-eight *gandules* and women of the Lipan nation. In view of the entirety of the recent overtures made by the *Lipanes* for the maintenance of peace, Cortés indicated to Escandón that, having no rules to guide him in the particular [*en vista a todo y no teniendo reglas algunas que me governasen en el particular*], he told Canoso how pleased he was with his offers, and let him know how satisfying such conciliatory efforts would be to the Governor as long as the Chief fulfilled what he promised.\(^{559}\) Having earned the approval of Governor Muñoz for his actions regarding an episode between the Xaranames and the Lipan, Cortés got a bit of wind in his sails and indicated that he would continue to employ every means necessary to achieve having all the nations declare themselves openly to be enemies of the Lipan, and have the latter return the favor. According to Cortés, ongoing incidents between the Vidaes, the Orcoquizacs, the Carancahuazes, and the Lipan ensured the effective maintenance of hatred between these groups and the Lipan. He assured Muñoz that he would make it known to El Canoso that slaughtering the cattle located at the Guadalupe River was contrary to the peace that his people had promised and that there would be repercussions for such an act [*estar matando el Ganado que tienen los Españoles en el Rio de Guadalupe con las pazes, que tienen prometidas, y que se verá Vm obligado a dar cuenta de ello, y por consiguiente no lograrán (sic) lo que desean*].\(^{560}\)

Communication concerning the Lipan Apaches had been ongoing as we have seen in the previous chapters of this study. In the summer of 1792, that trend continued. Viceroy Revilla Gigedo sent a short note to interim Governor Escandón asking whether the expenditure still persisted for the maintenance of the Lipanes that had been sheltered since 1786 at the mission San Antonio Valero. Further, he was curious to know why they had not been put to work in agriculture after being congregated for so long at the mission; the Viceroy’s reasoning was, as ever, to remove unnecessary demands on the royal treasury. Specifically, he wanted to know why the Lipanes could not subsist by the fruits of their harvest with some cattle raising included? [*para que de este...*]

\(^{559}\) Cortés to Sierra Gorda, […] visit of Captain Canoso and a great number of braves, BA July 9, 1792
\(^{560}\) Cortés to Muñoz, discussing Indian activities, BA October 15, 1792
modo subsistiesen con los frutos que cogieran, y alguna cría de ganados, sin tanto graven de la Real Hac(ien)da?\textsuperscript{561}

Escandón’s curiosity may have never been satisfied. On August 8, 1792 Manuel Muñoz, cleared of misconduct and declared free of all charges, reassumed the Governorship of Texas.\textsuperscript{562} By September, it was Escandón who generated a roster and summary of the review of the soldiers at the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar. Muñoz remained Captain, Bernardo Fernández continued on as First Lieutenant, and some of the other protagonists’ names that emerged from the Amangual-Rodríguez conflict reappeared on the roster. We learn that irksome First Alférez Manuel de Urrutia, (the soldier who had successfully embarrassed Amangual in a drunken tirade), last seen at Las Tortugas receiving the Espadas instructions from the two privates, was accompanying the Indians of the North; Amangual’s nemesis Sergeant Mariano Rodríguez was stationed with the horse herd, as were the Corporals Francisco de Sosa and Juan Antonio Urrutia; carrying the mail pouch, Corporal Facundo Mansolo, Cadet Eusevio de la Garza, and José Maria Olibarry [sic]. For his part, Second Lieutenant Francisco Amangual had traveled to San Luis Potosí for the payroll, accompanied by José Manuel Granados, Marzelo Borrego, José Leandro de Sosa, and Francisco de los Santos.\textsuperscript{563} Only one month later, Lieutenant Amangual’s expertise at

\textsuperscript{561} Revilla Gigedo to Governor of Texas, […] Lipan Indians at [Valero Mission…] productive in agriculture, BA June 20, 1792

\textsuperscript{562} Revilla Gigedo to Sierra Gorda, ordering Muñoz restored to […] Governor, BA August 8 [– September 30, 1792; however, Commander General Castro generated a letter from Santa Rosa to Muñoz on August 25, conveying the August 7 letter that Castro had received from Revilla Gigedo. In that document, the Viceroy indicated that once the autos of investigation into the conduct of Muñoz had been finalized and if he was proven innocent of the charges brought against him, Muñoz’s complete salary as governor was to be credited to him as of August 26. Thus Revilla Gigedo cleared him of all charges, and ordered Muñoz to immediately resume his duties as Governor of Texas, Escandón received notification of the Viceroy’s decision. Castro to Muñoz, […] reappointment as governor, BA August 25, 1792. In this same collection of documents, Castro conveyed to Escandón two further resolutions from the Viceroy; one concerned the complaint filed by Cipriano Sambrano against Muñoz; Sambrano claimed to have lost several days of profit from having to prove that the woman who had accompanied him on a trip was his lawful wife. Castro to Sierra Gorda, […] Revilla Gigedo’s […] acquitting Muñoz of charges from […] Sambrano, BA August 25, 1792. In another, Ygnacio Flóres complained that Muñoz’s manifold punishment of him by imposing the suspension of his permit to round up mesteño cattle; and, that he had to pay to the tribunal with the recognized cattle of the orejano stock that he had rounded up, had caused him to file his suit for damages. Again, the Viceroy declared the Flóres suit as unfounded. Castro to Sierra Gorda, […] Revilla Gigedo’s […] acquitting Muñoz of charges from Ignacio Flóres, BA August 25, 1792.

\textsuperscript{563} Roster of the company of San Antonio de Béxar, BA September 3, 1792
counting, very recently questioned by a high official from the Superior Accounting Office of the Royal Tribunal of Accounts in Mexico, was needed at his presidio.

4.2 Old Reliable Francisco Amangual: Yet Another Inventory

Amangual was called upon, yet again, to inventory goods brought by Toribio Durán from Nacogdoches to San Antonio; the list described by Christobal [sic] de Córdoba\textsuperscript{564} consisted of sixteen pots with three feet; four pounds of beads \textit{[quarto libras de cuentas]}; one \textit{garro} and three cloths.\textsuperscript{565} However, Amangual noted far more items than Córdoba had imagined. The Béxar paymaster listed three iron pots with six feet; seven iron pots with four feet; one of the same but with three feet; and nine small cotton cloths with various designs, probably embroidered; fourteen and one quarter \textit{varas} of superfine \textit{indianilla} cloth in two pieces. The remainder of the materials included:

- 2 1/3 varas of blue limbriz cloth
- 4 varas of blue Guinea [cloth]
- 1 woman’s jacket, finished and stained
- 6 ceramic dishes for coffee
- 1 pot of the same [material]
- 4 sealed letters
- 2 enameled metal boxes for powders
- 4 pounds of blue and white beads
- 86 chamois [skins]
- 21 deerskins
- 1 medium axe
- 9 ounces of coffee

Amangual made this inventory on November 12, almost one month after Córdoba’s initial — and substantially smaller — count, and subsequent description of the goods. When the suspect Durán appeared before Muñoz on November 12 with Córdoba’s letter in hand, Muñoz ordered the

\textsuperscript{564} Case against Toribio Durán for contraband trade, BA Oct 19, 1792. The document identifies Córdoba as the “commander and justice for the town of Nacogdoches due to the absence of Don Antonio Gil Ybarbo.” (Muñoz to Revilla Gigedo, November 19, 1792); later, he is also identified as the lieutenant governor of the town.

\textsuperscript{565} Ibid.
first lieutenant of the Béxar company, Bernardo Fernández, to go out and meet the loads being transported by Durán. Muñoz then inspected the haul and found the goods that appeared in Amangual’s list. Next, he ordered the goods to be deposited in the custody of habilitado Amangual until the Viceroy made the decision to either hold the items as contraband of foreign goods, or, hand them over to another entity.566

The coincidence of this episode of potential contraband confiscated, yet again, from a soldier of the King was such that, as Muñoz indicated, he took this measure since his colleagues were finishing the auction ordered by the Viceroy of the goods seized from the feisty Captain Juan Cortés from June 1792. Muñoz asserted that had he not taken such action, the implication would have been to further encourage the ongoing importation of goods that the military was attempting to curtail. Since it was understood by all parties that the pots and chamois skins belonged to a Manuel de Verasady, an employee of the parish priest of San Antonio, Muñoz informed the Viceroy that Verasady567 appeared in front of Amangual, having extracted a letter from those being carried by Durán, and subsequently made statements before the habilitado that lacked any decorum toward the Governor [quien óccurio (sic) a sacar una carta, de las que el anotado Duran conducia (sic), y produxo expresiones ante Amangual nada decorosas al Governador].568

Once remitted to the fiscal of the royal treasury, Viceroy Revilla Gigedo was asked to order that Amangual’s inventory be added to the proceedings associated with the Cortés contraband case.569 One month later, the fiscal Posada included more information for Revilla Gigedo; that in accordance with article 240 of an ordinance of December 4, 1786 issues of contraband and seizures were the jurisdictional purview of the intendants of the respective provinces, working with the lieutenant asesor ordinario570, without the participation or intervention of any other minister.

566 Ibid
567 As in so many documents from the period, the names are spelled variously; in this case, the last name of the merchant is spelled, both, “Verasady” and “Verasadi.”
568 Case against Toribio Durán for contraband trade from Nacogdoches (Muñoz to Revilla Gigedo, November 19, 1792); BA Oct 19, 1792
569 Ibid (Posada to Revilla Gigedo, December 31, 1792)
570 As described by Fisher, “the intendant general of army and treasury, and each one of the intendants of province, must have a lieutenant-lawyer who shall exercise for them jurisdiction over civil and criminal litigation in the capital
Further, the governors of Coahuila and Texas were considered sub-delegates of the intendancy of San Luis Potosí in cases involving the treasury and economic issues of war. Once received, the acting counsel of the intendancy Vicente Bernabéu received word from the public prosecutor [promotor fiscal] that the goods listed in “note number two” – the Amangual inventory – were not those of illicit trade, that the property was of very little importance, and even according to the Governor Muñoz (in his opinion of November 19) Durán himself was transporting the cargo without concealment or separation. However, since Durán did not list all of the good in the guía [guide] that he was transporting, he was sentenced to a fine and warned that if he repeated the offense, he would be more severely punished.

Though his tenure as paymaster ended in December 1793, Francisco Amangual’s name is the very last that appears in the documentation for the Toribio Durán case. However, Muñoz’s instructions that Durán pay for all of the goods seized – a value of eight pesos – and, as a fine, twenty pesos, was carried out and deposited into the possession of the habilitado at that time, José Gervacio de Silva, who also served as the Béxar company’s First Alférez. Without further information, we can only speculate as to why Amangual was the recipient of the certified copies of the proceedings. Moreover, the opinion of the asesor of the intendancy of San Luis Potosí and the decree of agreement of the intendant were included in the cache of documents with the instruction by Muñoz that they were all to be delivered to the “abilitado [sic] of the company [at the Béxar presidio]” for which the paymaster was to enter a receipt. Amangual complied on February 22, 1794, a period during which he was no longer the presidio’s habilitado.

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571 Case against Toribio Durán for contraband trade from Nacogdoches, BA Oct 19, 1792 (Posada to Revilla Gigedo, January 29, 1793)
572 Ibid (Luna to Bernabéu, February 19, 1793)
573 Ibid (Muñoz’s auto…fine of 20 pesos…, February 6, 1794)
4.3 COUNTING THE BORDERLANDERS AND THEIR POTS AND PANS: THE FRENCH AND A FEW UTENSILS

Like Courbiere, Pedro Joséf Lambremón, a native of New Orleans, had left his native land to seek his fortune, travelling to the villa of San Fernando, where he supported himself as a tailor. He was married for six years and had one daughter, four years old. 574 Similarly, Juan de Mouy came from Mobile, province of Louisiana, and went to Natchitoches and entered the militia that garrisoned that post. He served there until he obtained a dispatch of Second Lieutenant of which duties he carried out; he then received a passport to Béxar, owing Alejandro Dupon[t] 575 a debt for this passage. He was married and had one four year old daughter. 576 Pierre Chalis, baptized in the cathedral of Somer in the province of Anju, in France departed for Louisiana somewhere between the age of eighteen and twenty. During the first three years of his life in the Americas, he supported himself as a barber, and during the remaining six years he served in the military corps of the King of France. Then he accompanied Governor Jacinto de Barrios, who was headed to Coahuila and en route to the capital of Béxar, Chali apparently stopped at Los Adaes. He married twice, and from his first wife he had two children, and from the second, three. He had been in Texas for a total of thirty-three years, all of which he lived in San Antonio. 577 Ángel Navarro came from the island of Córseca, of the province of Ayacho and had left there in 1762. He left his parents against their will at the age of thirteen or fourteen and went first to Génova. Then, he sailed to Barcelona, and on to Cádiz, continuously seeking employment as a servant. Once arrived in the Americas, he found work at the Real de Vallecillos under the tutelage of Juan Antonio Aguilar where he worked for eight years. From there he came to San Antonio’s presidio as a merchant, remained a bachelor for six years, then married in 1783, and had two children. 578

574 Pedro Jose Lambremón to the Governor of Texas, stating reasons for residing in Texas, BA May 12, 1792
575 Colonial documents provide many examples of presidio administrators taking liberties when spelling proper names. The varieties of (mis)spellings are numerous and may hint at gradations of literacy, knowledge of grammar, and familiarity with foreign names and places among the frontier soldiery.
576 Juan de Mouy to the Governor of Texas, […] residing in Texas, BA May 12, 1792
577 Pierre Chalis to the Governor of Texas, […] residing in Texas, BA May 14, 1792; the document spells ‘Chali’ as “Sarly” further indicating that he is “Pedro” rather than Pierre – the name he signed at the bottom of the page -- and the “legitimate son of Pedro de Sarly.”
578 Angel [sic] Navarro to the Governor of Texas, […] residing in Texas, BA May 14, 1792
Foreigners were required to demonstrate to the governor of Texas what permission they
carried as could be ascertained from a safe passage passport, where they were from, and for what
reason they had come to the province. In April 1792, Viceroy Revilla Gigedo ordered Muñoz to
send an exact report on the foreigners living in the jurisdiction under his command, be they married
or housed there, and those who were travelers, traders, or any other pretext.\textsuperscript{579} When Muñoz
complied the following May, his report indication the name, country of birth, marital status,
number of family members, and occupation. The aforementioned Navarro, Charli\textsuperscript{580}, and
Courbiere are by now familiar to the reader of this study, but the census that Muñoz undertook
indicates that a Nicolas Lemé, from the island of Re, province of Aunis, came to San Antonio de
Béxar presidio in 1779 and admitted as a cadet where he remained for thirteen years. In August of
1792, he would be promoted to the post of Second Alférez of the presidial company of
Aguaverde.\textsuperscript{581} Muñoz also described Lemé as a bachelor and trader. One native of New Orleans,
Antonio Connar, “alias Lafore,” entered into Texas for the purpose of building the church of La
Trinidad, and since this had not occurred, he went to the presidio of Béxar in 1778, where he
married and as of the date of this census, had no children. Connar was a carpenter by trade and,
apparently, practiced medicine.\textsuperscript{582}

The census taken by Muñoz indicated that the aforementioned Pedro José[f] Lambremón
came from New Orleans “as a deserter” to the Béxar presidio in 1786. Another Louisiana native,
Juan Mauricio Demui [De Mouy] – also mentioned above -- from Mobile, had moved to Nachitos,
where he served as a second lieutenant in the militia company. At the time of the census, he had
come to San Antonio with a passport in order to reimburse a sum of pesos paid to him by Alexandro
Dupon[t],\textsuperscript{583} an individual who, at the turn of the century, will soon be working as a surveyor in

\textsuperscript{579} Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz, requesting report of foreigners in Texas, April 17, 1792
\textsuperscript{580} In this census, the name is spelled “Charli,” whereas in the previous document of May 14, 1792, it is spelled two
different ways; see footnote 558
\textsuperscript{581} Elguézabal’s declaration of Leme’s promotion, BA August 25, 1792
\textsuperscript{582} Census and biographical data of foreigners compiled by Muñoz, BA May 21, 1792
\textsuperscript{583} See fn 572
the mining industry. Married in San Antonio and with a daughter, Demui planned to return to his post once he had made the collection.\textsuperscript{584}

In just a few short sentences, the past and present were merged in the document generated by Muñoz as a government record of the required information necessary for understanding a specific sector of the province of Texas’s population. One particularly remarkable entry describes Pedro Miñón, a native of Boforte, in the province of Aldas, subject to the crown of France. From there he went to Nueba [sic] Orleans as a private, and having deserted, he entered the presidio of San Marcos and was enjoying the designation of \textit{ymbálido} in the Bexar company as an artilleryman by order of the Marqués de Croix. He was married for a second time, from which [marriages] he has had two sons and two daughters, one of the former being a soldier, and including the mother, the family numbered six.\textsuperscript{585}

In this brief entry, we learn that a Frenchman, once a private in New Orleans, had deserted. That infraction cost him little, apparently, since he successfully moved on to join the Béxar company as an artilleryman with the Viceroy’s approval. His children bore none of the potential taint of their father having been a deserter since one of his sons became a soldier as well.

At the presidio of La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, the census lists Francisco Bontan, a native of France, old and blind. He was married, supported himself as a carpenter, and had children and grandchildren. Since the number of the descendants was unknown based upon an incomplete profile, his family was calculated at five persons. Antonio Demecierres [sic], the son of Athanase Méziéres, was a native of Louisiana, married, and had obtained the rank of First Alférez in the

\textsuperscript{584} Apparently, de Mouy overstayed his welcome while in Texas. By September, he had not returned to Natchitoches and his commander Luis DeBlanc contacted Escandón to halt his journey and order his return. DeBlanc had only granted the second lieutenant leave so that he could bring his wife back with him, but that period had expired. Further, DeBlanc’s commander wanted the militias in his district ready to march at a moment’s notice for the benefit of the royal service. De Blanc to Sierra Gorda, BA September 4, 1792

\textsuperscript{585} Census and biographical data of foreigners compiled by Muñoz, BA May 21, 1792; like the others whom had provided Govenor Muñoz with their “reasons for residing in Texas” Minon had done so on May 14 and at that time, he provided a bit more information than that provided by Muñoz in his biographical date. Having served “as far as San Savá [sic],” he lost an arm to cannon fire and injured both legs while fighting the enemy and had since “remained crippled.” His ‘ymbálido’ status paid him eight pesos each month; Lambremon signed his testament since Miñón did “not know how to do it.” Pedro Miñón to Muñoz, stating reasons for residing in Texas, BA May 14, 1792. See also fn 321 for a discussion of the term ‘ymbálido.’
Bahía company, but at the time of the census he was apparently without work.\textsuperscript{586} Lorenzo Rene, a native of Marsella [Marseilles], and a widower. He worked as a shoemaker, and was receiving a stipend of three reales per day that was granted to him by the King at the time when Lieutenant José Curbelo [sic] went to get the bison \textit{[a llebar los síbolos (sic)]}.\textsuperscript{587}

At Nacogdoches, there is no such personalized data as that documented at the two Texas presidios. The only information given is

In the vicinity of this town are congregated 29 foreigners, 14 of them married, with 31 children and ten slaves, and currently present in [the town] are Don Nicolas Lamath and Juan Bosque. Altogether, they total 86 individuals, including 17 bachelors.\textsuperscript{588}

Across the Red River in Natchitoches, Luis DeBlanc found it necessary to contact Texas Governor Muñoz since he had been told by the Louisiana Governor de Mezieres that the entry of Anglo Americans into the French region from the Mississippi River was contrary to what the King had ordered. Further, DeBlanc claimed that under no pretext was he to allow them into his district under his command without a proper passport, and that he should have the Indians plunder the Anglos who entered the Indian nations. He stressed his obedience to his commander de Mezieres but added that when the intruders learned of this order, they entered clandestinely into Nacogdoches without his being able to prevent such movements \textit{[se introducen ocultamente en el de Nacogdoches, sin que Yo pueda remediarlo, y se hallan abrigados]}. Moreover, DeBlanc indicated that they were being harbored by the Indians that had been settled for several years in the vicinity of the presidio and in the jurisdiction of Nacogdoches. There, the Anglo Americans managed to slaughter the cattle for their sustenance, steal horses which they took to sell at posts far away from Natchitoches, and, did whatever pleased them \textit{[hacen horror, matan el Ganado}}

\textsuperscript{586} See page 10 of the previous chapter for a discussion of Neve’s direction to Governor Cabello to find a vacant post for the two sons of de Méziéres.

\textsuperscript{587} Espadas to Muñoz, reporting on foreigners living at La Bahía, BA May 18, 1792. Muñoz’s information is gleaned from the information sent to him by the captain of the Bahía presidio, Manuel de Espadas. There are two slight differences in the Muñoz redaction of the Espadas report: the captain included the King’s name in his report “Carlos the Third,” provided a statement about the “equally commendable conduct” of all three Frenchmen, whereas Muñoz’s insertion of the information about Curbelo and the bison appears to be an afterthought.

\textsuperscript{588} Census and biographical data of foreigners compiled by Muñoz, BA May 21, 1792
(...) para su manutención (sic), sobre el pretexto que tienen quatro bacas (sic), roban bestias, caballares, que van a vender en los puestos alejados de esta Prov(inci)a, y por fin hacen lo que les da gana].

In the final analysis, the Muñoz census of May 1792 listed one hundred twenty-five foreigners of all ages, categories, and sexes in the province of Texas. The viceroy gave the same order to the Governor of the Province of Nuevo Santander, admonishing the latter to not mistreat foreigners but to have them placed in close arrest to avoid their potential to flee. Foreigners employed in the presidial companies and those who were married or had a fixed residence were not to be given any reason for suspicion because of their good behavior, so discussion was to be limited if not avoided completely. The Viceroy did single out the aforementioned Alexandro Dupont and his efforts at seeking permission to work mines and proposing means of subduing the Lipan Apaches with the help of the Nations of the North and of hunters [cazadores] from the province of Louisiana.

His focus on Nuevo Santander’s foreign population was not the only concern for Viceroy Revilla Gigedo. By the beginning of 1793, he contacted General Ramón Castro in order to ask him for reports from Governor Muñoz of the four missionaries who transferred to Texas accompanied by an escort from one of the Laredo companies, not specified in his order of January 15. The missionaries had apparently heard statements from the Lipanes of the ranchería of El Canoso that caused the Viceroy concern. Moreover, Castro was to secure formal depositions from the servants of the padres and from a citizen of San Antonio who were among the Indians rounding up
mesteñas. In the meantime, while Revilla Gigedo determined the best approach to the results of his inquiries, he encouraged Castro to make use of the information gleaned in the depositions of the corporal and private from the Laredo company so as to guard against any offence by the Lipan [en las declaras(ione)s del cavo y soldado de Laredo a fin de precaver cualquiera insulto de los Lipanes].

Clearly the Spanish military units’ relationship with the Lipan in particular was a complex affair, and one that entailed seemingly petty concerns revolved around gift-giving and the dubious nature of ‘peace by purchase.’ The usually imperturbable Muñoz ordered the merchant Courbiere to make a report on the number of cooking pots (peroles) and the variety of cooking utensils, from the past and up to the present, used to prepare food for the Indians who arrived in peace at the Texas presidios. While Revilla Gigedo approved of, both, Muñoz’s decision to refuse their desire to conduct the slaughter of mesteña cows on the pasturelands of the mission at La Bahía, and, his ongoing gift-giving of trifles such as cigarettes and swords [velduques (sic)], the viceroy admonished Governor Muñoz to reserve more expensive gifts for the Nations of the North, the colonizers’ friends and allies. Moreover, he found it necessary to remind Muñoz to be very watchful of the Lipan movements across the borderlands. Furthermore, he considered the act of presidio soldiers taking Native families as prisoners justified on those occasions when Lipan treachery involved leaving their kinfolk in the safety of the vicinity of said presidios while their warriors went marauding into Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Nuevo Santander.

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593 Revilla Gigedo to Castro, […] Lipan situation around Laredo, BA January 15, 1793; on this same date, the Viceroy contacted Muñoz directly, enclosing a copy of his letter to Castro and emphasizing the importance of the information concerning the Lipan in Laredo. Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz, […] Lipans in Laredo, BA January 15, 1793

594 Muñoz to Courbiere, […] pots used to cook for the Indian visitors, BA January 11, 1793. Courbiere complied, describing large pots called chancaqueros, used when the merchant arrived in September of 1779. Courbiere included the rental price per day for these large pots (r reales), and even the names of their owners; Flórez de Ábrego, Juan José de la Santa, and Antonio Sanches[sic]. However, medium sized pots – the property of Juan Leal Boraz – were used when smaller groups of Indians appeared and their cost was only 2 reales per day. Wooden basins (artesones) were used to serve the food, and use was made of axes, hoes, and beldúquez [short sword] for the slaughter of cattle, and for the repair of the doors of the lodge (jacalón) where the Indians were housed. Courbiere added that he retained copper pots brought from the storehouse of the presidio in order to have them ready for use when a group arrived.

595 A type of short sword used to slaughter livestock.

596 Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz, […] Lipan policy and approving small gifts when necessary, BA January 16, 1793
Indian expenditures had the potential to cause presidial paymasters to stumble from, or, in some cases, to incur blame for, their accounting efforts; or, so it may have appeared to their immediate supervisors or high level administrators in San Luis Potosí and Mexico City. We learned the outcome of one soldier’s accusations of mismanagement of his presidio’s paymaster at the beginning of Chapter 3, and we shall see the resolution of yet another fiscal conflict by the end of this one. On March 19, Viceroy Revilla Gigedo sent to Governor Muñoz the five pages of objections made by the Royal Tribunal of Accounts’ José del Cavo Franco relating to the expenditures made in Texas for the maintenance of peace with the Indians, he summoned José Antonio de Bustillos y Zevallos to appear so that he might respond to the charges.597 Having no word from the latter, Muñoz sent an official letter on March 28 in the hope of getting a reply from Bustillos. Again, none was forthcoming so Muñoz went in person to the San José mission, where he found Bustillos ill and in bed, his bad health having prevented his departure for San Antonio. Bustillos promised to do so at the first relief that God might grant him 

\[ \text{ofreció ejecutarlo al primer alibio (sic) que Dios le concediese}, \]

and after a few days he was in fact moved to San Antonio but, a short while later, died without being able to respond to the matter.598

With Bustillos’ death, the weight of responsibility for a satisfactory response in one way or another for the Royal Tribunal’s objections fell upon the First Lieutenant of the San Antonio company, Bernardo Fernández, who also happened to be the former habilitado and was thus summoned by Muñoz. Fernández’s response was immediate: that even though he had not been familiar with any of it, the documents should be turned over to him to make appropriate responses

\[ \text{que aún sin embargo de que no havia (sic) corrido con cosa alguna se le entregasen los referidos docum(en)tos para exponer lo conveniente}. \]

Fernández received the cache on December 24, 1794 and returned them on January 16, 1795. Ten days later, the five documents of objections were sent

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597 Proceedings in the investigation of Ugalde’s report on Indian expenditures, BA January 22, 1793
598 Ibid
to Second Lieutenant Amangual, who similarly asked, after being briefed of their content, that they be handed over to him in order to digest their content [se le entregasen para abso(?)]berlos].

Asked to testify in response to the charges that were unilaterally ascribed to him, the First Lieutenant described a payment listed in the third document to the peones who prepared food for the Indians and the rate charged for that service; in the fourth document, the fifteen pesos paid to the surgeon who tended to the Indians at the garrison; the fifth document listed a charge of sixty-six pesos given to a captive, Francisco Cháves [sic], for a suit, and nine pesos to the notary. Charges for burial shrouds for several Indians, with the last one of these – colored linen for two burial shrouds for two Indians – were entered by Bustillos, and the first one was said to be by Fernández, prompting him, at this juncture, to assert his innocence: “(although erroneously [aunque con equivocación])”; and, the ninth document consisted of eighty-two pesos for the purchase of seven horses for the Comanche.

The conclusion of Fernández’s testimony is included in its entirety and from his own pen.

Up to here, I have discussed the charges resulting against me, made by the Señor auditor of the Royal Tribunal. From the [charges] that he would have encountered in the aforesaid accounts, I admit that they would be just, and that I would be obliged to reimburse them to the royal treasury, according to what the aforesaid señor auditor aims for [según lo que aspira dicho señor contador]. But were this minister aware that for my part I had no hand in this agency, nor have I run any part of it at all, I believe with no little basis that he would exonerate me of them for the reasons that I shall discuss.

At the time that the aforesaid accounts were drawn up, I was engaged in the duties of paymaster [havilitado] for this company, and I devoted the greater part of the year to them in trips back and forth [en las marchas y contra marchas] to the city of San Luis Potosí and to the villa of Saltillo, to the latter to stock up on supplies for the company, and to the former to pick up the funds corresponding to the salaries enjoyed by its troops. And for this reasons, I had no other participation than to write my signature on the accounts and on the place indicated by the form that was sent by the aforementioned Señor Don Juan de Ugalde to Governor Don Rafael M[a]r[tine]z Pacheco. The truth established, it would be doing an injustice to me were [the auditor] not to realize it and therefore hold me responsible for paying for

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599 Ibid. There is a difference in the dates of the Viceroy’s original directive from the previous year; on January 26, when Amangual was apprised of Revilla Gigedo’s December 19 inquiry (that initially prompted the proceedings) and received the documents for his own inspection, Muñoz indicated that the date was January 19 of 1792.

600 Proceedings in the investigation of Ugalde’s report on Indian expenditures, BA January 22, 1793
the results of the mishandling displayed by those managers in the expenditures for Indians during the ties indicated in the afore-cited documents [Asentada esta verdad sería hacerme injusticia a mi propio, sino la patentase y por consiguiente me hacía acreedor a satisfacer las resultas de la mala bersasion (sic) que tubieron los manexantes (sic) en los gastos de Yndios en el tiempo indicado en los citados pliegos].

At this point in his response, Fernández drew attention to the signatures that appeared on the accumulated documents, indicating that he signed his name with “characteristic sincerity [la sinceridad que me es propia],” and that he was convinced that the same earnestness would be observed by those who signed their names below his. Fernández made a pointed reference to “the one who with his own hand was requesting directly from Governor Pacheco the payment orders” for the resources that he needed in order to feed the Indians who came to visit. The person to whom he referred emerged as he continued his response:

Beginning in the year [17]81, appointment was made of Don Andrés Benito Courbiere as soldado distinguido, and his salary began to run on November 6 of the afore-cited year of 1781, with the duties of lodging the Indians, maintaining them, and serving as interpreter. To those ends he was employed by the governor of this province, Don Domingo Cavello [sic], and he continued during the term of his successor, Captain Don Rafael Martinez Pacheco, until the latter submitted the accounts about which we are speaking. Even though in the past year of 1788, the afore-mentioned Señor Ugalde, with the consent of Don Rafael Pacheco, gave investiture as warehouse keeper to Don José Antonio Bustillos – the cashier that I had for company issues, and no others [cajero que yo tenía para los asuntos de compañía y no para otros] – not for this reason did Don Andrés Benito Courbiere fail to handle the purchases and expenditures for the supplies that he considered [necessary] for the maintenance of the Indians, which likely and which I can prove with the copies of the afore-cited documents.

From all this, it results that the mismanagement [mala versación] of increasing expenditures on corn, beans, and the rental of pots came from no other hand than that of the manager, Don Andrés Benito Courbiere, who, if he sought to exonerate himself of charges (of this nature, which only he should absorb and reimburse to the royal treasury) [de esta naturaleza, que solo el deve acroberlos (sic), y reintegrarlos a la Real Hacienda], should have made it known to Governor Pacheco so that he might remedy this problem. But since he kept silent about these disorders, it can be seen prudently that he was taking advantage of [personal] interests in their management.

601 Proceedings in the investigation of Ugalde’s report on Indian expenditures, BA January 22, 1793; (Bernardo Fernández response, San Antonio de Béxar, January 16, 1795)
In this, he would have continued taking advantage had not the Most Excellent Sr. Viceroy Conde de Revilla Gigedo issued a call to undertake efforts to eliminate all mismanagement, in which the officers and other members of this company were questioned, along with some citizens, from which the royal treasury has reaped no little savings [En este hubiera seguido aprovechandose si el Ex[celentísi]mo Sr[eño]r Virrey Conde de Revilla Gigedo no hubiera librado correccion (sic) para que se instruyesen diligencias que cortasen toda mala versacion; en las que fuimos examinados los oficiales y otros individuos de esta compañía con algunos vecinos de lo que no ha tenido poco aorro (sic) la Real Hacienda], as will have been seen from the accounts submitted by the present government, which same have gone out under my hand, not for having managed or distributed the goods for maintaining [the Indians], but rather under the circumstance that appears in the decrees, and seeing that the gift items are delivered to the Indians. If in these there is some objection, it corresponds to the present governor to absorb them, since by this own [hand], without Courbiere having the despotic management that he had before, and it has been monitored that what is consumed among the same Indians is what is gathered for the Indians [Si en estas hubiese algun reparo corresponde al actual Governador acsobverle (sic, absorber), con respecto a que por su mano ha dado los libramientos, y en su auencia (sic) por la mia, sin tener Courbiere el (d)espotico (sic) manexlo que anteriormente tenia y se á fiscalisado (sic) que se consuma entre los mismos Yndios lo que se acopia para ellos]. If former Governor Don Rafael Martinez Pacheco had exercised similar management, all the efforts made by the most excellent Señor Viceroy and the Royal Tribunal of Accounts would have been spared.

It is an established fact that the one who manages a thing is obliged to make an accounting of it, and since I exercised no management in the first place, but rather the afore-mentioned Don Andrés Benito Courbiere, he is the one who should absorb the charges, as I have set forth and he will not deny them, because in this case, it will be confirmed with copies in his own hand, and knowledge will come of the truth of everything I have stated: I appeal to the Royal Tribunal to take this as sufficient, given the sincerity with which I have given my response to the charges made against me [el prenotado D(o)n Andres Benito Courbiere este es el que deve acsobber (sic, absorber) los cargos como llevo expreso, y no podrá negarse a ellos, pues en este caso se acreditará con exemplares de su mano, y se vendrá en conocimiento de la verdad de quanto llevo expuesto: suplicando al Real Tribunal tenga por bastante atendiendo a la cinceridad (sic) con que he dado mi repuesta a los cargos que se me hacian.].

Having asserted his innocence while urging the committee implicated in the proceeding to understand and acknowledge his non-involvement in any of the accounting miscalculations, Fernández was unequivocal in placing blame on the soldado distinguido603, and merchant,

602 Proceedings in the investigation of Ugalde’s report on Indian expenditures, BA January 22, 1793 [Bernardo Fernández response, San Antonio de Béxar, January 16, 1795]
603 According to Marchena Fernandez, in some geographic spaces across Hispano-américa and on the peninsula, this designation pointed to an individual that had requested their heraldry, and the title of ‘hidalgo,’ which signaled
Courbiere. Fernández would likely have been familiar with the penalties for committing perjury; Article 121 of the *Reglamento* of 1729 required soldiers to be watchful of its presence and was specific about the consequences of such outlawed behavior.604

By February 2, 1793 Lieutenant Fernández was able to preoccupy himself with other matters, conveying the news of appearances by Comanche, Taguacan, and the arrival of the Lipan Bautista. The chief reported that his people had killed a Comanche, captured another and a woman on the banks of the Colorado River.605 Ten days later, Fernández generated the weekly report of entrances and departures made at the Béxar presidio by members of the Friendly Nations of the North from Feb 4 – February 12; a Comanche, one Taguacana who had remained at the presidio since the previous month, and even Chief Sojas arrived with six of his people along with two women. On February 8, gifts were given to three Comanche and in the evening of that same day, the three ran away and stole three horses that were quartered beyond the adjacent plazas. However, they were not ordered pursued in consideration of the fact that of these fugitives, one was a brother of Sojas and another, his brother-in-law.606 In truth, irony figured into the machinations involved with the ongoing process of peace by purchase, and borderland military forces could often anticipate just such episodes that linked their collective beneficence to what they perceived to be ungratefulness on the part of their indigenous co-habitants.

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604 Prohíbise a todos los soldados servir de testigos falsos en ocasión alguna, lo que celarán los oficiales para que no se incurra en tal crimen, pena de diez años de servicio en galeras, si falsamente testificare en causa civil se fuere grave; y si en causa criminal, la misma pena que hubiese de imponerse al acusado, si fuese legítimamente probado el delito conforme a las leyes. [All the soldiers are prohibited from bearing false witness in any circumstance. The officers will keep a watchful eye so that such a crime does not occur. If false witness is given in a civil case and is serious, the penalty incurred is ten years of service in the galleys. If it occurs in a criminal case, the penalty is the same as that which would have been imposed on the accused if he were legitimately proven guilty of the crime according to the law.] *Reglamento...1729, Artículo 121*

605 Fernández to Muñoz, with details of Indian visitors, BA February 2, 1793

606 Bernardo Fernández’ detail of Indian visitors, BA February 12, 1793
It becomes clear that Sojas was an individual among the various nations that regularly appeared at the presidios and whose presence required judicious handling, given the sensitivity of his position among the Comanche. Periodically, touchy matters complicated the prescribed duties of military personnel. For example, during the time that he was held responsible by Ugalde for the presumed miscalculations by the now deceased Bustillos, and then had to explain himself to the Royal Tribunal of Accounts, Lieutenant Fernández continued his presidial tasks which often included the delicate issues of dealing with visiting Indians. When Lieutenant Colonel Muñoz instructed Fernández to send three privates, including Francisco Urrutia, provisioned and supplied for two months with the necessary remounts, Fernández complied and let Muñoz know that the soldiers were taking fifteen pesos of cigarettes, ten pesos of piloncillos (sugar loaves), a musket, and a three-foot copper pot (which came with a specific note about exercising care in its handling) with the order that the trio was to arrive by that weekend at the presidio – unspecified – where Muñoz was located. After the soldiers departed, there was increased activity at the Béxar presidio. Comanche appeared and withdrew, including the omnipresent Soxas and on the evening of February 20, the drummer of the Third Flying Company [3ª. (tercera) Compañía Volante] of the colonia of Nuevo Santander showed up at the garrison without any documents, but indicated to Fernández that he was sent by his captain to learn to perfection the beats of military ordinance [diciendo lo despacho su capitan para que aprendiera con perfección los toques de ordenansa (sic)].

In this particularly animated episode of presidio activity, Amangual emerges; it fell to him to provide the unanticipated volante drummer with what was strictly necessary for his subsistence. Moreover, this event brought together two accused paymasters – one current, the other a former habilitado – both of whom we learn apparently thought that lining their soldiers’ capes with scarlet flannel [bayeta], which was to be done without delay and in the hope that there would be enough

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607 Fernández to Muñoz, […] dispatch of supplies and […] events at Béxar, February 22, 1793
608 Ibid
for all of them. Without further information, it is difficult to know whether the fabric choice and its use was to provide better warmth for the troops that might wear the accessory, or, whether the flannel was intended to signify the identification a particular presidio. It may seem insignificant to document such an apparently trivial episode in the daily events of these two soldiers, but some minor affairs take on new meaning in light of the larger issues – both men living and working under clouds of suspicion stemming from intra-presidial disputes – surrounding the lives of these two individuals. In any case, both, Fernández and Amangual, persevered in their military responsibilities at a moment in their careers when even their workplace ethics were questioned. For that matter, so did Juan Cortés, at this time also under investigation for purported confiscation of contraband from the presidio.

Where it concerned the flying squadrons, on February 16 Fernández was able to report to Governor Muñoz that members of the horse herd detached and encamped at Los Encinos stream witnessed eleven of the twenty-six Comanche (that had set out to find the Lipan on February 11) slaughtering breeding cows [chichiguas]; subsequently, the commander of the horse herd reported that an escuadra volante set out to sweep the vicinity of the herd, and encountered an Indian track. The volantes followed the trail and soon encountered the eleven Comanche suspects. Even the recently exonerated (though not forgiven by Amangual) Mariano Rodríguez surfaced in the report as the brother-in-law of a woman who owned one of the slaughtered cows. And Cortés was named as the soldier who offered fifty tame riding horses to Muñoz. Further, a document from April 1793 reveals the presence of yet another unit of the compañías volantes as their troops appeared

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609 Ibid. Less than two months later, Fernández’s name would appear again in connection with an administrative blunder. Muñoz’s aforementioned census reports for the companies of San Antonio and Bahía del Espíritu Santo were not in compliance with Article 5 of the Viceroy’s circular of February 16, 1791. From San Luis Potosí, it fell to Bruno Díaz de Salcedo to inform Muñoz of the errors and to remind the Governor that the February circular had been forwarded to the Texas province’s government in March 1792. Díaz de Salcedo to Muñoz […] returning census of Texas to be corrected, BA April 10, 1793. Responding to the Díaz letter, Muñoz indicated that the first censuses were created by the alcaldes ordinarios of San Antonio de Béxar; having recognized the errors – and unable to attend to the corrections since he was recovering from injuries suffered during a trip to the Texas coast – Muñoz assigned the task to Lieutenant Fernández, who apparently worked under the Governor’s supervision but without having the necessary updated information from Nacogdoches. […] between Díaz de Salcedo and Muñoz, […] rosters of the companies of Béxar and La Bahía[…] according to Viceroy’s instructions, BA April 10, 1793

610 Fernández to Muñoz, BA February 16, 1793
in the military service reports. It was Cortés that provided the report of the constitution and strength of his company at La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, with the distinction by ranks of and the salaries paid to its officers and troops. Missing from Cortés’ report were the service records of one sergeant with the reason given that he had become an alférez in the compañía volante of La Punta de Lampazos.611

On July 14, 1793, superior orders brought together, yet again, three recently embroiled soldiers, the Lieutenant Bernardo Fernández, First Alférez Manuel de Urrutia, and Second Alférez Amangual gave a report to the Governor of the Plaza of San Antonio de Béjar that the master blacksmith José Francisco Pobedano had prepared for firing the burners of five canons brought up to San Antonio via the Trinity River. As it turned out, only four of the canons were of good service while the fifth had many imperfections, according to Amangual. He, Fernández and Urrutia safeguarded the four serviceable canons in the Guardia de Prevención.612 During the previous March of the same year, Muñoz had informed the Viceroy that he had taken certain measures to transport six bronze artillery cannons that were abandoned at the Trinity River when the residents of Bucarely [sic] and Pilar withdrew to Nacogdoches. In this case, Revilla Gigedo instructed the Governor to keep the commander general informed so as to receive future orders from him, rather than the Viceroy.613 And if this were not enough to keep Muñoz busy, he was also instructed by Pedro de Nava614 to keep the commandante general informed about the conduct of Urrutia.

611 […] Cortés and Muñoz […] military reports of the company of La Bahía, BA April 19 [- 26], 1793
612 Fernández and Amangual to Governor Muñoz of Texas, BA July 14, 1793
613 Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz, […] cannon left at Bucarely […], BA April 10, 1793; the following month, Nava contacted Muñoz regarding these same cannon but with a special interest in their vents [fogones] and calibers [calibres], or, diameters, and their serviceability. Nava to Governor of Texas, […] cannon brought to Béxar from Río de la Trinidad, May 14, 1793.
614 A royal order from November 1792 had been forwarded by the Conde del Campo de Alange to Pedro de Nava indicating that the King had ordered the commandency general of the Provincias Internas to become one entity, and independent of the Viceroyalty [sea unica (sic) e independiente del virreynato (sic)], reestablished on the basis upon which it was formed by a royal cédula of August 22, 1776; added to Nava’s command were the provinces of Coahuila and Texas, which had been segregated in order to create what was, now, the extinguished commandency of the East [reuniendole las de Coaguila (sic) y Texas que se havian (sic) seggado para formar la ya extinguida (comandancia) de oriente]. Nava was declared the superintendent general sub-delegate of the royal treasury throughout its jurisdiction. Nava to Muñoz, […] independence of the Comandancia General and his appointment as Superintendent, BA March 5, 1793
Alférez Manuel de Urrutia’s erratic behavior has been described in Chapter One of this study. He had faced jail sentences several times because of occurrences of domestic violence and public drunkenness. As we saw in Chapter Two, while under arrest at the time, he was a questionable deponent in the Amangual-Rodríguez lawsuit. When the commandency general was a dual entity, Ramón de Castro had received a directive from Viceroy Revilla-Gigedo to order Urrutia to withdraw from the village of the Taguacanes and present himself to the Viceroy in Mexico City; this was done under the pretext of a commission or assignment in order to, apparently, ensure the appearance of the troubled First Alférez. His whereabouts were known from very recent news confirming his physical location provided by Private Joséf María Hernández of the same company, Béxar, as Urrutia. Moreover, Castro encouraged Muñoz to carry out the Viceroy’s demands with all possible subtlety so that neither Urrutia nor anyone else would see through the ruse.  

Only the month before the presidio trio reported on the abandoned artillery cannons, Nava was notified by Muñoz of Urrutia’s behavior and so directed the Governor to not employ the alférez in any service that took him far from the presidio, nor require much from him in his individual performance […prevengo a Vm. que sin emplearlo en cosa del servicio que lo aleje de ahi, ni que exija particular desempeño].

Nava must have felt compelled to direct a separate letter to Governor Muñoz on this same day, and the information contained therein concerned the larger sphere of military performance among all the presidial soldiers, and specifically those stationed at Béxar and La Bahía. Nava instructed Muñoz to maintain vigilance over the soldiers so that they properly fulfilled their obligations. By extension, he scolded Urrutia to restrain his serious abuses so as not to be so detrimental with his loose conduct; in the meantime, Muñoz was to fall back on other measures.

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615 Castro to Muñoz, […] send Manuel de Urrutia to Mexico, BA February 8, 1793
616 Nava to Governor of Texas, concerning misbehavior of Alférez Manuel Urrutia, BA June 5, 1793
relajada, interin recae otra providencia] to discipline the unruly alférez. It did not take long for the Viceroy himself to learn of the Urrutia situation, and on the same day that Nava contacted the Governor, Revilla Gigedo also contacted Muñoz with further instructions. The state of affairs with this soldier had reached a point where Muñoz was to arrange to have Urrutia return from his stay at the pueblo of the Tahuacanes, and to come to Mexico City to appear before the Viceroy.

4.5 MISBEHAVING TROOPS: THE KING RESPONDS

By the middle part of 1793, several soldiers in the provincia of Texas had experienced a certain measure of discomfort from accusations of abuse of privilege and power through their employment status as soldiers for the king and in the execution of their work-related responsibilities. Unquestionably, the King had already become aware of certain vexing circumstances undermining the primary obligations of those serving in his service. He understood how these situations were often intertwined with the lives of civilians. On February 9, a certified copy of royal orders were sent from Aranjuez to the Conde del Campo de Alange, placing civil cases of military personnel under the jurisdiction of military courts. The King acknowledged the considerable shortages that had been experienced by the army, a result stemming from the extraction of twelve thousand militia men in 1770. The absence of that much manpower coupled with the general drafts [quintas generales] in 1773, 1775, and 1776 could be attributed to the abolition in many cases of the fuero and its privileges that had been granted to the military by his predecessors, Carlos I and Felipe II.

Carlos IV recognized that long delays in punishment and the freeing of the innocent presented serious problems to the state [los graves perjuicios que se siguen al estado (...) y a la disciplina de (...) tropas] and, by extension, affected the discipline of the troops. These kinds of entanglements arose from competitions between other jurisdictions and that of the military while decisions were being made by royal administrators. Sporadic lags in the judicial system had severe

617 Ibid
618 Revilla Gigedo to Muñoz, concerning misbehavior of Alférez Manuel Urrutia, BA June 5, 1793
619 Certified copy of royal orders to Alange […] civil cases of military personnel under the jurisdiction of military courts, BA February 9, 1793
ramifications for not only the soldiers but for the King’s ministers and fiscales of the superior tribunals, occupying a great deal of their time which might have been better spent on other duties.\textsuperscript{620}

In order to “sever at the root all jurisdictonal disputes [\textit{he resuelto para cortar de raíz (sic) todas las disputas de jurisdicción]},” Carlos resolved that military justices should hear solely and exclusively all civil and criminal cases in which the defendants were members of the army, with the only exception being demands of primogeniture in possessions and properties and the distribution of inheritances. Some of these cases might not have stemmed from a testamentary resolution [\textit{como estas no provengan de disposición testamentaria de los mismos militares}] by military personnel themselves, without which there could be no filing or jurisdiction admitted by any tribunal or justice under any pretext [\textit{sin que en su razón pueda formarse ni admitirse competencia por Tribunal}]. However, the King indicated that any filings pending, be they civil or criminal, were to be considered final and concluded. He further insisted that the justices and tribunals in which such cases were brought should forward the autos and proceedings to the proper military jurisdiction so that they might proceed to the corresponding duties according to the ordinances.\textsuperscript{621}

Offenders were to be arrested by prompt order of the ordinary royal jurisdiction, which would then proceed to file charges [\textit{y que los que cometen cualquiera delito, puedan ser arrestados por pronta providencia…que procederá sin la menor dilación a formar sumaria}] and send the perpetrator to the nearest military justice [\textit{y la pasará luego con el reo al juez militar más inmediato (sic)}]. No matter what had previously been called for in any rulings, royal resolutions, orders, pragmáticas, cédulas, or decrees the King revoked; however, the punishments imposed by the aforementioned statutes were to remain in force and vigor [\textit{ordenando como ordeno, que en lo}\textsuperscript{620\textsuperscript{,}621

\textsuperscript{620} Ibid
\textsuperscript{621} Ibid

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sucesivo quedan en su fuerza y vigor], but were to be imposed upon the troops by military justices.622

By mid-1793, it seems doubtful that Francisco Amangual would have made an effort to contact the King in an effort to resolve to his satisfaction his disenchantment with the final verdict of his slander suit against Mariano Rodríguez. Almost exactly one year after the initial charges had been brought about – for which he had been fully exonerated of any culpability – the absence of any serious jail time for his accuser particularly irked the paymaster. Second Lieutenant Amangual was keenly aware of military protocol and that the source of high esteem, that is, honor, presumably embodied by officers of integrity (a quality he no doubt felt he had fully earned), would be negatively impacted by Sergeant Rodríguez’s example of one disreputable soldier’s having escaped any serious consequences for his actions.623 First Lieutenant Bernardo Fernández urged the committee of his proceeding to understand and acknowledge his non-involvement in any of his predecessor’s accounting miscalculations while Captain Juan Cortés awaited the outcome of charges leveled against him for transporting contraband and for his family’s complicity in his alleged illicit activities.

The certified copy of royal orders sent from Aranjuez to the Conde del Campo de Alange that placed civil cases of military personnel under the jurisdiction of military courts constituted the formal instructions related to soldiers and their access to having their legal struggles appropriately deliberated. On the same day that Carlos IV wrote his orders plainly acknowledging the “serious problems that ensue to the state and to the discipline of [the] troops with the long delays in the punishment of transgressors,“624 he also generated another letter. In this next, short page and a half dispatch specifically extending the legal rights of his soldiers conveys a slightly different tone, one marked by a patriarchal benevolence that also assures his troops of their “satisfaction” with its

622 Ibid
623 See Chapter One of this study for a summary of the outcome of the Amangual-Rodríguez proceeding. See Chapter Two and Three for the documentary evidence pertaining to the lawsuit.
624 Certified copy of royal orders to Alange,..., BA February 9, 1793
content. Moreover, the King’s special beneficence towards those in the military had the potential to decisively impact the lives of soldiers like Amangual, Fernández and others, and would affect the outcome of the proceedings of their individual alleged misdoings.

4.6 His Majesty’s Assurance: The King Responds Further

Carlos IV grounded his compassion for the troops in his service as a willingness to “being every ready to dispense as many favors as possible” to his subjects, and especially to those who, by “postponing with generous spirit their convenicence and very lives,” devoted themselves to the defense of the state [Propensa siempre (...) a dispensar quantas gracias y beneficias (...) especialmente á los que posponiendo con animo generoso sus comodidades y propias vidas se dedican á la defensa del estado siguiendo la gloriosa carrera de las Armas]. In pursuing the glorious career of the military, the soldiers of the royal army occupied a “special admiration and distinguished position” in the King’s heart. Thus he saw fit to expanding the fuero so that military personnel might only have to answer in the courts of their cases “their own natural commanders [á esta recommendable clase el particular aprecio y lugar distinguido que ocupa en su Real y magnanimo corazón (...) de sus propios y naturales Jefes]” and, presumably, receive a more expeditious and prompt administration of justice.

The period 1792-1793 had seen accusations of contraband and mishandling of presidial finances to the degree that soldiers holding key military positions of authority and responsibility were having their job performances closely scrutinized by their fellow company members, superior commanders across the Spanish borderlands, and even the Viceroy and the King himself. By the summer of 1793, First Alférez Manuel de Urrutia, esteemed by the Lipan as one of their own had, from the perspective of Spanish military superiors, become a repeat offender based on his

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625 Certified copy of Alange’s letter to Commandant General […] extension of legal rights of military personnel, BA February 9, 1793

626 Ibid

627 As Julianna Barr explains, in the first year of permanent settlement for the Lipan, Goover Martínez Pacheco sent Lieutenant José Antonio Cuébelo and alférez Urrutia to begin a “cyclical pattern of living among the Lipan settlements for at least half of each month.” Apparently, the Lipan leaders and their families enthusiastically greeted Urrutia every two weeks, “expressing their joy in his company and their regret each time he had to leave.” Barr, 274-275
ongoing undisciplined behavior. In January 1792, Urrutia was placed under arrest for insubordination stemming from a drunken rampage directed against Lieutenant Bernardo Fernández. However, as distracting as was the willful comportment of one individual repetively charged with dereliction of duty, and even though the troubled Urrutia proved to be more than a minor annoyance to several of his superiors, during this time period colonial and peninsular administrators saw the need for consolidating their power towards eradicating criminality. Much of the misconduct already visible had become so pronounced in, albeit, isolated incidences that action was required. Clearly, the Viceroy more strongly felt the responsibility of conveying the King’s larger concerns about insubordination as it occurred among groups of individuals engaged in collective transgressions. In the Américas and across its borderlands, impropriety in martial performance had the potential to cause economic imbalances since untoward behavior enacted by soldiers involved issues related to regional and global commerce.

Two years earlier, in the summer of 1791, Revilla Gigedo communicated the royal order of clemency granted on the previous March 18 by Carlos IV to contrabandistas with special conditions as part of the criteria for the King’s general pardon. While acknowledging the harm caused to the state [los daños que causan al estado/los que faltando al cumplimiento de las leyes y reales ordenes] and to the royal treasury by his subjects who engaged in clandestine trade, the King also admitted to being unable to look with indifference upon the sad fate of the families of these wrongdoers [no pudiendo mirar con indiferencia la triste suerte de sus familias, aun que delinquentes]. Accordingly, he resolved to grant a general pardon for the crime of contraband to all of those who had not committed homicide, even if they might be deserters from the army or navy [he venido, usando de mi real clemencia, en conceder indulto general del delito del contrabando a todos los que no hayan cometido homicidio, bien sean desertores de mi ejército (sic) y armada]. Deserters, if they were in the province of their garrison and within a period of two

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628 Bernardo Fernández vs. Manuel Urrutia, charged with insubordination, BA January 25, 1792; this was not the alferez’s first time being arrested. See Martínez Pacheco to Espadas, […] arrest of Urrutia for insubordination and intoxication […], BA April 26, 1790
629 Revilla Gigedo’s orders to publish royal decree […] granting amnesty for contraband trade, BA July 22, 1791
months of abandoning their unit; or, those that were four months away without leave and outside of their province, could present themselves to their respective companies to serve out the time of their enlistments. Other contrabandistas were required to present themselves to the sub-delegates of the royal treasury who had jurisdiction in their cases, and comply in those courts with the formalities of the King’s royal decree.630

Evidence of the King’s extraordinary generosity became clear in his desire to give to the general pardon all the extension that justice would allow where it concerned smugglers who had committed homicide.631 So long as the act was not premediated or evil-intentioned, the King granted this class of smugglers not only the pardon for the crime of contraband but also a pardon granted to them in commutation with the requirement of a pardon de parte pursuant to the laws [a los contrabandistas que hayan cometido homicidio, con tal que no haya sido promeditado o alevoso, además del indulto del delito del contrabando, que también les concede en la misma forma que a los simples contrabandistas, se les admita a conmutación por el de homicidar, mediano perdón de parte con forme a las leyes]. However, those who repeated the act of smuggling were to be assessed for it as soon as they were apprehended, and without further investigation given the penalty of ten years in the presidio632 or public works, according to the degree of their offenses [desde luego que sean apesados, y sin otro examen, la pena de diez años de presidio, ú obras públicas, según la calidad de sus delitos].633 The special instructions included in the King’s orders included the following:

630 Ibid
631 By February 1794, a royal cédula that specifically addressed those accused of homicide and the privilege of immunity not being extended to them found its way to Chihuahua. This document targeted presidio soldiers at the time Nava conveyed a certified copy to the Governor of Texas for its publication throughout that province and for Muñoz’s compliance. Nava to Governor of Texas, [transmitting…royal cedula] of February 28, concerning punishments for homicide, BA July 23, 1794
632 I am grateful to John Wheat, chief translator at the Center for American History at the University of Texas in Austin, for his help with my research. I was certain that someone in the royal offices had meant to write ‘presión,’ instead of ‘presidio,’ since I was convinced that Carlos meant prison and not the garrison itself. As John pointed out, “In addition to garrison or fortress, ‘presidio’ also can refer to anything from prison, to convicts (collectively), to imprisonment or hard labor. A ‘presidiario’ is a convict.” Personal communication, February 26, 2015.
633 Revilla Gigedo’s orders to publish royal decree […] granting amnesty for contraband trade, BA July 22, 1791

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1) Smugglers were to turn themselves in to the sub-delegates and hand over at the same time the tobacco, arms, or other type of illicit commerce.

2) Smugglers were required to sign an obligation and post a bond of two hundred pesos Fuertes, according to the capabilities of each one [según la posibilidad de cada uno], not to return to the contraband trade, and to return to their towns of their residences and to devote themselves to honest work to support themselves and their families [de no volver al contrabando, y retirarse á los pueblos de su domicilio...y de aplicarse á ejercicio (sic) honesto para mantenerse, y sus familias].

3) If one, or some, of the smugglers could not post the aforementioned bond, and if that impossibility was substantiated, they would be relieved of it but still sign the obligation.

4) Those smugglers in jail while their cases were pending or with sentences not yet in effect were to be pardoned as well; those individuals were to follow the requirements of the newly accused with no difference whatsoever [lo mismo que queda referido para los que se presenten, sin diferencia alguna]. They were to be set free, as were any soldiers imprisoned for the crime of fraud, so that the latter could present themselves to their unit in order to serve the time remaining of their military obligations [á fin de que se presente en su cuerpo á cumplir tiempo que le falte].

5) Smugglers could not leave the places where they had established residences for other places without stating the reasons for doing so to the justices of their jurisdictions. With legitimate reasons for leaving, the justices could grant them permission, indicating the time that they could remain away; if the pardoned individual could not return in time or were notably overdue, the justice could determine if there was a justifiable reason for the tardiness, or if the individual had gone to suspicious places [si fueron a parages (sic) sospechosos]; in the latter case, the justice could proceed to punish the individual.

6) Sub-delegates of the royal treasury were to send to the justices in the town of the smugglers’ residences a copy of their signed obligation and the bond that they posted not to return to contraband trade and to devote themselves to honest work [y de aplicarse a algún ejercicio (sic) honesto para que los precisen a ello], so that they might be held to their obligations and the justices were to oversee their conduct. If pardoned smugglers engaged in fraud again or abetted that behavior, justices were to arrest them with a sumaria against them, and send both prisoner and paper to the sub-delegate of the royal treasury in their district so that a case might be made against the accused, act against their posted bond, and impose the punishment stipulated by the royal decree [á fin de que
Justices had specific obligations to enforce the royal orders and their dereliction of duty could result in a four hundred pesos fuertes fine for the first offense, and double the amount for the second, paid to the subdelegates of the royal treasury. Indeed, the subdelegates themselves were required to charge inspectors with tobacco and other revenues. Further, corporals and lieutenants completing the rounds of their respective jurisdictions were similarly required to exercise the greatest care in discerning where the pardoned smugglers might go and whether the justices were carrying out their duties [encargarán muy particularmente á los visitadores de las rentas del tavaco (sic) y demás, y á los cabos y tenientes de las rondas de sus respectivos distritos, que se informen con el mayor cuidado en los pueblos á donde fueren los contrabandistas indultados de si la desempeñan]. In case they were not doing so, or allowing some other persons to defraud the royal treasury, even with the potential fines and assorted punishments that could be levied against dishonest justices, the most damaging result according to the pardon would be the displeasure of the King himself once informed of their connivances [en el concepto de que será del desagrado de S(u). M(ajestad). qualquiera disimulo que tengan en este punto con las justicias que faltaren]. Smugglers who did not turn themselves in as prescribed by the decree were to be pursued with the greatest vigor for their apprehension and so that they might have the corresponding punishments imposed upon them [A los contrabandistas que no se presenten en el termino que previene el decreto, se les perseguirá con el mayor rigor, á fin de prenderlos, y que les impongan las penas correspondientes].

The subdelegates of the royal treasury were to send to the justices a copy of the decree and the instruction as soon as these had been published in the provincial capitals. Thereafter, they were to be entered into the ayuntamiento records and read by its scribe to the alcaldes at the beginning of each year so that its leaders might know the obligation imposed upon them. Even the scribes

634 Ibid
635 Revilla Gígedo’s orders to publish royal decree … granting amnesty for contraband trade, BA July 22, 1791
were to be assessed a fine of three hundred pesos fuertes if they were remiss in their responsibilities. Apparently, a specter of suspicion surrounded the pardon -- and its potential for abuse by its generosity and equanimity -- having been extended to the lawless and its beneficiaries to the degree that it makes one wonder if the King and his assistants, and perhaps borderlands administrators, questioned the wisdom of having issued it in the first place. It is not certain if Captain Juan Cortés was a beneficiary of the royal pardon, too, or if officers in the royal service were presumed to be better informed about the consequences, and by their officer status and long tenure devoid of the capability, of committing crimes against the empire.

4.7 AMANGUAL AND CORTÉS: SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENDING THE DEFENDANT

By December of 1793, Amangual had served thirty years, nine months, and fourteen days in the military. His immediate supervisor Manuel Muñoz described him as a soldier possessing valor, with good conduct, but apparently limited [“capacidad … corta”] skills. What precisely those skills were that Amangual had in limited supply is unknown; the service record notated by Muñoz reveals many admirable qualities in Amangual and, perhaps, certain skills were similarly limited, in a general sense, among many other presidiales of the far northeast regions, and thus Amangual was no exception. There is a strict formality in the correspondence between Amangual and his commander, the captain of the Béxar presidio Manuel Muñoz, most likely resulting from the multiple ranks held by the man who was also serving as Governor of the provincia. One short exchange between the two men and written by Amangual demonstrates this hierarchical relationship.

As a consequence of your order of the June 1, 1794 and the letter included by the Capitán Juan Cortés of the Presidio de La Bahía del Espíritu Santo, in which I am informed that I have been named as his defender of the soldier Juan José de la Garza, who is being prosecuted: I have arranged to transfer immediately to that presidio in order to take the oath and witness the rest of the directives that he anticipates; what I am notifying is for the record [Consiuiente ála or(de)n des. De 1 del corriente, y carta que incluya del Capitan del Presidio de La Bahía del

636 Ibid
637 Military service record of Francisco de Amangual, BA December 31, 1791

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It becomes obvious that when he was not defending his own work as his presidio’s paymaster, Francisco Amangual was called to defend the wrongdoers in other companies. In yet another ironic meeting of former and current accused soldiers, Captain Juan Cortés wrote to Governor Muñoz to allow Amangual to travel to La Bahía in order to defend soldado Juan José de la Garza in a proceeding having to do with the alleged murder of his fellow company member, the Corporal Vizente Serna. Juan José de la Garza emerged in the preceding chapter of this study, as one of the deponents in the Cortés contraband case. And now Amangual’s presence was necessary in order to be present for the ratifications of the witnesses, and to be able to establish the defense of a trusting unfortunate who was putting his hopes in him [permitirle el que pase (…) a presenciar las ratificaciones a los testigos, y poder fundar la defensa de un infeliz que pone en él sus esperanzas]. Where it concerned homicide, a February 28, 1794 royal cédula declared that those accused of committing homicide would not have access to immunity, since the act was not accidental [casual] or in self-defense [por la propia defensa]. And yet, the July 1791 royal decree discussed above pinpointed the fact that punishment for acts of homicide was exempt for smugglers as long as that misdeed was not premediated or evil-intentioned. Insofar as that concept further confounds the issue of a very particular charge related to death, it does prompt the question of what types of extenuating circumstances adjoined contraband trade and its perpetrators?

When he extended the legal rights of his soldiers, the King believed that the fuero was still relevant for maintaining the loyalty of his much abused troops. However, presuming his men’s ability to recognize what he and other like-minded adminstrators felt was a “glorious career in the
military” may say more about his being out of touch with the realities of life in the frontier. The notion of glory commensurate with long years in the service of the King may not have resonated with men experiencing chronic deprivations as part of life in the colonial army. Further, it mattered not whether privations occurred in the more populous regions of the empire or in its frontier spaces. A short excerpt from an administrator of the period indicates that

*En estos reinos, Señor, es difícil estimular a la nobleza y familias de mayor comodidad y jerarquía a que soliciten y admitan empleos en las tropas provinciales al ejemplar de las de España. No miran las armas como carrera que guía al heroísmo: son naturalmente [sic] delicados, entregados al ocio, al vicio, hijo de su natural desidia. No están elevados por los padres á ideas más superiores que a las de la propia conservación. Son vanos, librando sobre su riqueza, y el que no la tiene blasfemando de ser descendientes de españoles conquistadores; pero esto no estimula a la conservación del honor que adquirieron con bizarros hechos los que ellos quieren como protectores de su fantástico modo de pensar. Pruébalo el que son raros los que se han presentado para obtener empleos militares. El que tiene bienes de fortuna piensa en disfrutarlos sin riesgos ni incomodidad alguna. El que no los tiene, pregunta por el sueldo, y desenganza dado de que no le goza sino en los casos en que V.M. tiene por conveniente librarle, no dirije instancias, y estoy bien cierto de que si con el deseo de honrarles se les llenara un despacho, habría muchos que solicitarían el devolverlo.*

As Amangual and his ward, the accused *soldado* de la Garza, got on with the business of facing the outcome of their separate allegations, so, too, did Captain Juan Cortés. Similarly awaiting a final verdict in his own contraband proceeding, he received word from Commander General Nava regarding the outcome of the de la Garza murder charge. Nava was instructed by the Auditor of War that for a period of three years, on rations and without pay, de la Garza was to work in the public works at the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar and Cortés was to arrange for the passage of the indicted soldier to that location. The urgency and apparent finality of the order meant that

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640 Marchena Fernandez, 87
Garza was to leave immediately, that is, on the following day of the date of the Nava instruction and that Cortés was to make arrangements for the person to whom Garza was to be delivered.641

A better outcome appeared imminent for Cortés in his own legal entanglement. On April 23, 1794 Nava reported to Muñoz that he had received the five notebooks, returned to him, concerning the repayments made by the Tribunal of Accounts that Juan Cortés made with the satisfaction that the officer gave as to the charges that resulted. Moreover, he was informed that there were existing deposits that Cortés had delivered to the gratificación fund of the company in question the one hundred sixty pesos one real, ten granos that the Tribunal deducted from the deficit.642

In Nacogdoches, Christobal [sic] de Córdoba confirmed receipt of Muñoz’s letter of December 6 -- and acknowledged the Oct 29, 1793 Nava communication -- that Escandón had arrested Cortés with his contraband merchandise. Since protocol demanded that subordinate officers reiterate any instructions within an official document, Córdoba indicated his understanding that vigilance over this issue was very important and that it was necessary to be vigilant about forbidden goods not permitted to be introduced into the province [siendo mui importante el bigilar (sic) sobre este asunto, begile sobre que no permita de introduscan (sic) efectos bedados (sic)].643 In turn, Muñoz affirmed with certainty that few came from Nacogdoches that recognized La Bahía, and he pointed out that some of the things indeed were prohibited according to the spirit of the order [lo cierto es que cuantos vienen de esa poblacion reconocen La Bahía, y yo advierto algunas cosas que según el espiritu de dicha orden son prohibidos]644 Muñoz added that passports should be presented in Béxar before reaching the presidio at La Bahía in order to correct these types of behaviors.645

641 Cortés to Muñoz, BA November 6, 1794. For insight into work expected from condemned criminals as described by royal decree: Royal Decree concerning work of condemned criminals, BA April 3, 1794
642 Nava to Governor of Texas, acknowledging receipt of five accounting books of Juan Cortés, BA April 23, 1794
643 Córdoba to Muñoz, concerning orders to forbid contraband, BA June 18, 1794; in his response, Muñoz provided the wrong date of Córdoba’s letter indicating that it was dated June 13, rather than the 18th.
644 Ibid [– September 16, 1794]
645 Ibid
On July 17, 1794 Nava sent instructions to Muñoz about another notebook, this one of exercises, formations, and movements of cavalry, that the General had sent to the Assistant Inspector Juan Gutiérrez to be used to instruct the troops of the Provincias Internas. Nava had circulated the notebook to the company commanders so that they could set it to practice. And in order for this instruction to be uniform and put into practice quickly, Muñoz was to confer a suitable officer to muster the troops of the Béxar presidio along with those under the direction of Bernardo Fernández at La Bahía. Moreover, Nava advised Muñoz to make a subaltern officer available to take part in the exercise, with twenty-four men if it were possible, and when there were at least sixteen or eighteen, to instruct them in the new training during that assembly; this was to include all of the soldiers, even those soldiers exempt from duty in the company.

Once Governor Muñoz forwarded the copies of the notebook, Bernardo Fernández acknowledged his compliance with the instructions and promised to put them into execution with little loss of time by his troops at La Bahía. In November, Captain Cortés acknowledged that Lieutenant Fernández considered the troops of the Bahía company to be instructed in the new exercises of cavalry, but that he, Cortés, did not have one officer that could send to the assembly since they did not yet know the exercises. Further, he asked if his soldiers could return since the Lieutenant was the only one that could teach him, Cortés, how to understand them but that he was gravely ill and the troops were putting together expenditures.

4.8 Commanding the Wrongdoers and the Suspects

At the beginning of the year, 1794 Commander General Pedro de Nava’s order imposing penalties upon those who traded or dealt with the Lipan went into effect. By the following

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646 Nava to Muñoz, giving instructions for training troops, BA July 17, 1794
647 Fernández to Muñoz, acknowledging receipt of instructions for cavalry drill, BA September 9, 1794
648 Cortés to Muñoz, requesting the return of his troops from military operations, November 7, 1794
649 Nava to Governor of Texas, [...] proclamation forbidding trade with the Lipans, BA January 1, 1794
month, the Lipanes had demonstrated an unwillingness to move to Coahuila, and Nava was compelled to instruct Governor Muñoz that, for the time being and until more of their number were situated in peace, they knew by military procedures the good faith with which the presidiales treated them [por aora (sic) hasta tanto que mas radicados en la paz conozcan por nuestros procedimientos la bune fe con q(u)e los tratamos], in which case Muñoz would be able to smoothly repeat his suggestions, making Lipan see the advantages that would follow from their transfer to that province.650

It may have been that Nava and Muñoz were swayed by the notion that the Lipan maintained a mobile lifestyle and even at this point in the relationship status between Spaniards and Apache, it was important to reiterate the commandancy generals’s 1786 peace establishments (establecimientos de paz) policy. The rationalization back then for military commanders was that by making the Lipan dependent on Spanish officials by way of a program that offered incentives in the form of subsidies, goods, and ammunition, their communities would benefit if they agreed to settle near the watchful eye of the presidios.651 In 1790, even after several Mescalero bands had gathered at the presidio at El Norte, Commander General Ugarte had postponed the conclusion of a formal peace with them until he had achieved similar arrangement with the Lipan in Coahuila.652 By April 1794, Nava forwarded a copy of instructions issued on October 14, 1791 concerning the treatment and management of and assistance to friendly Apache established in peaceful settlements in Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora. Nava was particularly interested in the Lipan and the character of the lipanería, and indicated to Muñoz that if members of the tribe requested sanctuary (as he was convinced they would), and that they would establish rancherías, Nava wanted Muñoz to inform him when that kind of activity took place.653 All of these enterprises across the colonial frontier spaces may have convinced both, Nava and Muñoz, that maintaining vigilance over the movements

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650 Nava to Muñoz, instructing him not to urge the Lipans to move to Coahuila, BA February 13, 1794
651 Julianna Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 270-271
652 Moorhead 258-259
653 Nava to Governor of Texas, […] instructions […] governing treatment of friendly Apaches, BA April 18, 1794
and activities of the indigenous people was a far easier task than the alternative. Perhaps nothing compared to the amount of administrative stamina required to be ever attentive to the misbehavior of routinely difficult soldiers and the several other troops suspected of misconduct.

4.9 SMOKING OUT THE BEST VECINO FOR THE TOBACCO JOB

These most recent events concerning alleged misappropriations of presidial funds and the introduction of contraband so shook the nerves of colonial administrators that by the late summer of 1794, the all-important Tobacco Department was in need of several drastic measures to improve its accounting processes. At this point, neither Amangual nor Fernández had been indicted in their respective proceedings, which were still ongoing, and neither had Cortés, although he was never a paymaster. Long time tax collector at Monclova Juan Ignacio de Arispe determined that the habilitados of the presidios of Texas were no longer to handle the income from the resale of tobacco [por las que se exoneran (sic) a los habilitados de las compañías presidiales de esta provincia], and were to be substituted by the ‘vecinos’ of the same presidios that served the other rentas reales [royal revenues]. Arispe also communicated the news to the Assistant Inspector of the provincial troops so that the results would lead to the compliance of the resolution by January 1 of the next year.655

Muñoz could not form an opinion on the subject of possibilities for candidates that could take on this obligation except for Domingo de Outón who had, apparently, appreciable circumstances with visible principal, and could give a guaranty in Saltillo to the satisfaction of the Administrator Arispe [no conceptuo sugeto (sic) de posibilidad que pueda correr con este encargo...a exepcion (sic) de...Outón que es sugeto de apreciables cirunstancias, tiene principal visible, y puede dar fianzas en la villa del Saltillo á satisfaccion de Vm.].656 This particular vecino differed as a potential caretaker of the Texas borderlands tobacco revenue in several ways. His

654 Though his last name is alternately spelled with a “z” [Arizpe] in the original documents, I retain the “s” in order to maintain consistency in the text.
655 Correspondence between Arispe and Muñoz [orders to put] tobacco department, BA August 26 [– September 14], 1794
656 Ibid
financial resources were quite unlike that of other townsfolk, most of whom had no other value other than their houses; their land was of little value, and some were debtors, since even though they had their small bands of cattle that were exposed to all the contingencies of the open fields [pues los demás vecinos no tienen otros bienes que los de sus casas, sus pedasos (sic) de tierras de poco valor, y están unos con otros deudados, pues aunque tienen (sic) parte de ellos sus chinchorros de bacas están expuestas á las contingencias del campo].657 The few merchants that were in the capitol (Béxar) had little principal and were also indebted to Saltillo and furthermore could not be acceptable as guarantors [no pueden ser admisibles de fiadores]; but, Muñoz could send reports of José Francisco Pereyra [sic], Miguel Lovo, and Felipe Calsado, with Arispe could proceed with confidence that these men could provide a surety for the interests of the Royal Branch of Tobacco [puede Vm. recibir las (sic) informes (de estos hombres) con lo que se procedera con ascierto, y aseguran los intereses del R.(ea)l Ramo de Tabacos].658

By November 1794, Juan Thimoteo [sic] Barrera, the son of Juan Barrera in whom Arispe entrusted the interests of the Royal Treasury, was selected as the interim paymaster of the Bahía presidio through the knowledge that Arispe had about his conduct, and the respective surety that Barrera had conferred along with two vecinos,659 one of whom resided near the Béxar presidio. Since Muñoz had so highly recommended Domingo de Outón, Arispe conferred the same job of paymaster at La Bahía to him, as well. Given the fact that Arispe had to provide an account to the royal direction of his choices for the vacant positions of presidio paymasters in Texas, he stressed the importance of Muñoz’s integrity in his service to the King but to not lose sight of the results [efectos] with which he dedicated his compliance to that first obligation.660 Arispe went a step further; he reiterated his trust in the two men handling the tobacco revenues that they be devoted to higher performance in the matter [reencargar mui particularmente a los dependientes de la

657 Ibid
658 Correspondence between Arispe and Muñoz [orders to put] tobacco department, BA August 26 [– September 14], 1794
659 For the bond posted by Antonio Gil Ybarbo, captain of the militia of the town of Nacogdoches, see: […] bond for Juan Timoteo Barrera, manager of Tobacco Office at Béxar, BA May 26, 1798
660 Correspondence between […] Arispe and Muñoz […] Barrera […] Outón, BA November 25, 1794
renta se dediquen al mayor desempeño que les corresponde en el asunto (sic)]. However, by the turn of the new century, Arispe would probably regret his confidence in Barrera and perhaps even question the bond posted by a soldier who would shortly emerge as yet another exasperating member of the borderlands’ military strength, Antonio Gil Ybarbo.

**4.10 FINDING SOLDIERS FOR THE BORDERLANDS: TRAINING FOR A CAREER IN THE FRONTIER**

The nature of borderlands dynamics in the context of valuing troop strength and the talent of its individual soldiers can be seen in the career of Francisco Amangual. In spite of at least two episodes of allegations of wrongdoing as company paymaster, his services as an accountant, and especially his talent at executing laborious inventories, were still needed. His ability to testify in legal proceedings of a serious nature including providing testimony for a defendant charged with murder speak to his status as a trustworthy member of the presidial population. And, his ongoing engagement with the more mundane tasks associated with the work of a frontier soldier continued unabated. On Oct 2, 1794 the Amangual left from Béxar presidio with the allocation of the horse herd of the River below until his group could find a place for the horses to eat, since they did not find water in the pastures that they recognized in the banks of the Medina River, nor did they see in the environs where they could graze. This news was apparently quite pleasing to the Governor, who appreciated that Amangual and his troops had stopped to refresh the horses in a place apart from the desolate pastures. In January 1795, Manuel Muñoz continued to serve as captain of the Béxar presidio and Governor, Bernardo Fernández as First Lieutenant (although the roster indicates that he was sick

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661 Ibid; and for further correspondence from the senior Barrera, by 1798 the General Director fo the Royal Revenue of Tobacco, see: Certified copy of Barrera’s letter to Diaz de la Vega concerning his son’s position as manager of Tobacco Department at Béxar, BA December 25, 1798
662 Correspondence between Fernández to Muñoz, […] news from Béxar, BA November 1, 1794
663 Ibid (Muñoz to Fernández, Nov 7, 1794)
at the time of roll call\textsuperscript{664}) – Amangual as Second Lieutenant at Presidio de Béxar, Mariano Rodríguez continued as Sargeant, José Francisco de Borja Orandain served as the company armero. New recruits into the cavalry company included Juan José Cepeda, José Manuel Ximenez, and Pedro José del Toro, all born in the villa of San Fernando, Texas; José Matías García, from Saltillo and resident of San Fernando, entered the army too. The twenty-five year old José Burguez, formerly with the Artillery Corp, now petitioned for a position within the Béxar presidial company and like the new recruits, swore to a ten year commitment in the King’s service.\textsuperscript{665}

Whether it was the recent events involving paymaster inaccuracies; accused contrabandistas among the troops; convicted murderers from the ranks of the soldiers; or, a persistent and growing French and Anglo presence in the Spanish borderlands -- the latter issue of concern necessitating skilled frontier military personnel more so than the others -- Pedro de Nava had reason to send instructions to Governor Muñoz in Texas for ascertaining the abilities of enlisted soldiers.

Being responsible that the individuals in your company, that which is maintained by the King, are useful for all circumstances, you should be particularly get to know the conduct of each one, in order to request the separation (from the military) of those that are useless or detrimental [Siendo Vm responsible aquè los individuos de la compañía de su cargo que mantiene el Rey, sean útiles por todas sus circunstancias, deve Ud enterarse particularmente de la conducta de cada uno para solicitor la separacion (sic) de los inútiles o perjudiciales].\textsuperscript{666} You have to place the most care in the interior and economic governance of that company, and it will be an ongoing test of that care that the troop is presenting with possible tidiness which has its corresponding retention fund; and principally that it is equipped with what it needs for war, in which [the troop] understands the best

\textsuperscript{664} Fernández’s illness came to the attention of the commander general, Pedro de Nava, who then understood why the Lieutenant had not complied with a November 21, 1794 order. Apparently, the issue was not urgent since Nava indicated to Governor Muñoz that Fernández could respond when he had recuperated. Nava to Governor of Texas, […] report of Fernandez’ illness and postponement of […] orders, BA, January 12, 1795. By January 27, it became clear that Fernández’s illness still prevented him from setting out with a detachment from Béxar to Nacogdoches; Nava ordered Muñoz to send in Fernández’s place Manuel Espadas, who was then to head the expedition. Further, Nava instructed Muñoz to elect a paymaster for the Bahía presidio, and if no soldier was capable of fulfilling the role and responsibilities of the position, Muñoz was to select one of the sergeants that could potentially be appropriate for the role. One wonders whether the combative Mariano Rodriguez might have headed the list of possible candidates. Nava to Governor of Texas, authorizing retirement of […] Fernandez, BA January 27, 1795

\textsuperscript{665} Certified copy of roster of the company of Béxar, BA January 1, 1795

\textsuperscript{666} Nava to Governor of Texas, giving instructions […] ascertaining ability of enlisted soldiers, BA February 4, 1795
condition of the interception, the worth of campaign and the rest [Ha de poner Vm el mayor cuidado en el gobierno interior y economico de esa compania, y será una constante prueba de ello, que presentandose la tropa con el possible aseo tenga su correspondiente fondo de retencion; y principalmente que se halle equipada de quanto necesita para la Guerra, en que se comprende el buen estado, del atajo, vales de Campania (sic) y demas]. Prepared for departures [for campaigns from the presidio]: make yourself available so that the company is provided with whatever thing that it needs for such an important objective, and in that which your capabilities do not accomplish, that needs to be shown to me so that you can take the steps [to improve the performance].

A little more than a month later, Nava contacted Governor Muñoz yet again. This time the General apparently felt the necessity for what was, essentially, a refresher memo concerning the complexities of warfare in the borderlands. Nava insisted that the commanders were not the only ones that needed to practice reconnaissance exercises when they could, in addition to not having a better goal of service than to inhibit the enemy. He demanded that these exercises continue to be implemented without interruption by the provincial officers, sergeants, and corporals, so that the maneuvers of reconnaissance were sown. Likewise, there had to be a proportionate party [de manera que seimbre ha de haver (sic) una proporcionada partida] that continued the reconnaissance missions again and again, up to the greatest possible distance, except at those times when there were strong rains or snow; which would be expressed in the report of company strength and new occurrences [que repita dichos reconocimientos, hasta la mayor distancia posible, exepto (sic) en las ocasiones de fuertes lluvias ó nieve: lo que se expresará en el estado de fuerza y novedades]. A decade earlier, the Gálvez Instrucciones of 1786 drew attention to the use of reconnoitering on the frontier as a useful mechanism in the war against hostile Indians. However, at that time, the viceroy was quick to remind his intended audience of one, comandante general Ugarte, that if reconnaissance exercises were made at the same definite time and over the same lands, those efforts would produce no other result than that: when troop movements were observed by the Indians, they would simply follow the detachments’ trails to the interior country, make their raids, and retreat to their rancherias, without the troops being able to prevent it.

667 Ibid
668 Nava to Muñoz, ordering careful examination of frontier […], BA March 23, 1795
669 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo doscientos y dos
Here, in 1795, Nava stressed the importance of an undisputed truth: the type of war carried on in the Interior Provinces required a perfect instruction that anticipated the terrain that they had to break, owing to being familiar with and even guessing about all the moves that the Apache could make; and, studying with care the entrances, the exits, the watering places, and the quality of the passes (in order to know how far on horseback one could come in) just like the mountain ranges and slopes that are found in the interior of them (provinces) [la calidad de guerra de estas provincias requiere una perfecta instruccion (sic) anticipada de los terrenos que se han de batir, deviendose conocer y aun adivinar todos los pasos que puedan dar los Apaches y estudiar con atencion (sic) las entradas, salidas, aguajes, calidad de piso (para saber hasta donde se puede llegar á cavallo) como tambien las sierras y lomas que haya (sic) en lo interior de ellas].

Equestrian skills were clearly on the mind of Nava, since he stressed the need for certain maneuvers for the cavalry, which no doubt included soldiers of the compañías volantes. The days of horseback exercises, or when Muñoz and the other presidio captains were able to gather together a proportionate number of troops, they were to promptly train in occupying the closest gorges and canyons by hiding in them, as in cutting off the avenues [of passage]; taking in mind what Nava had foreseen in the Gálvez articles 19 and 20 of the protections for the campaign detachments [teniéndose mui presente lo que he prevenido en los articulos (sic) 19 y 20 de las prevenciones para los destacamentos de campaña].

Indeed, Article 23 of the Instructions of 1786 stressed the importance of allowing complete freedom of action of commandants of detachments or independent forces – like the compañías volantes – on campaign, unlimited by any restriction. Since the article was intended to serve as an indicator of the effectiveness of a forces’ operations and its commanders’ usefulness or inability, Nava’s emphasis to Muñoz on the element of surprise likely recalled the article’s instruction to

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670 Nava to Muñoz, ordering careful examination of frontier..., BA March 23, 1795
671 Ibid
commanders to guard against surprises which, apparently, some detachments experienced on a usual basis because of a lack of confidence stemming from their mismanagement.672

Nava indicated that these types of maneuvers were necessary so that neither the one who commanded nor the one who obeyed was taken by surprise by any of the actions or incidents that presented themselves; in these exercises, the spirited, the swiftest, and those who most distinguished themselves in these exercises were to be praised, in effect, tending to them in so far as it was possible [Son muy necesarias estas maniobras para que ni al que manda ni al que obedece le coja de nuevo ninguna de las acciones y lances que se ofrezcan; deviendo elogiarse en estos ejercicios (sic) a los animosos, ligeros, y que mas se distingan en ellos, atendendolos en efecto en quanto sea posible].673 Finally, the commander general believed that this practical instruction would give a clearer idea of the officers and the troops and of how many should operate in the campaigns than in any other type of drill. However, Nava was quick to point out that neither should the new soldiers be neglected that were readied as much on foot as those on horseback, for which reason they set out on the mission and were available to act with more success in war.674

4.11 Soldier Uselessness and Ineptitude in the Twilight of the Eighteenth Century

In some places across the borderlands, some companies did more damage – if they did anything at all – than they did that was of any use to anyone anywhere. With special instructions directed to the provincial of Nueva Vizcaya, Nava indicated to Ugarte that he had in his power the request of the ranchers in that region that they be excused from annual excise taxes for military

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672 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo veinte y tres; Los Comandantes de destacamentos ó partidas sueltas que salgan á Campaña, han de obrar en ellas con entera libertad, dexandole (sic) la accion sin limitársela por término alguno: pues así procederán sin timidez, y los efectos de sus operaciones acreditarán la utilidad ó inutilidad de estos Comandantes, debiendo tambien precaverse las sorpresas que suelen experimentarse en nuestras pequeñas partidas, por la nimia confianza con que transitan y se manejan.

673 Nava to Muñoz, ordering careful examination of frontier […], BA March 23, 1795

674 Nava to Muñoz, ordering careful examination of frontier […], BA March 23, 1795; [esta instruccion (sic) practica, dara mas clara idea a la oficialidad y tropa, de quanto (sic) deve operar en las campañas que ninguna otra clase de ejercicío (sic); bien que, n(?) por esa deben omitirse los sencillos que estan prevenido tanto de a pie como de a caballo, por lo que agilitan y dispon(gan?) para obrar con mas acierto en la Guerra].
purposes. These same individuals had offered to sacrifice themselves in the defense of their own province, so intent was their focus on exposing the uselessness of the flying companies of Anaelo and Pueblo del Álamo [los hacenderos de Nueva Vizcaya...ofreciendo sacrificarse en su defense propia y de la provincia, y exponiendo por ultimo la inutilidad de las compañias volantes de Anaelo y Pueblo del Álamo].

Financing the Spanish colonial borderlands and its military presence was a complex affair and we have already seen some of its personnel accused of wrongdoing and fiscal irresponsibility. At the time that Viceroy Gálvez presented his 1786 instructions to comandante general Ugarte, the concerns of civilians and their annual excise taxes incurred for military purposes were substantial. In Gálvez – or, in his frontier representatives, which, by 1795, would now have included Nava -- the ranchers of Nueva Vizcaya could count on a sympathetic ear for their complaints; The Instruction’s article 142 stated that

The general fund for excise taxes for military purposes of Nueva Vizcaya today must maintain three flying companies whose annual pay amounts to more than seventy thousand pesos; but if the royal treasury is taxed with them, and accordingly with the regular increase which should be possible, with salaries and supplies of subordinate officers and troops of these provinces, the new costs would rise to an inordinate sum.

Moreover, it becomes clear that Gálvez had not quite expended all of his ink conveying his disappointment with the martial capabilities of the compañías volantes of the region. Balancing his concerns for the fiscal well-being of civilians with his primary objective of saving the King’s money, especially where it concerned wasteful expenditures in the borderlands, Gálvez’s articles 143 and 144 censure the flying companies and explain not only the financial risk that these specific squadrons represent but also the possibility that some of their individual troop members were inept and thus increasing the drain on the Royal Treasury. Giving the troops of His Majesty’s army

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675 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo ciento treinta y ocho
676 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo ciento cuarenta y dos
677 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo ciento cuarenta y tres; artículo ciento cuarenta y cuatro.
the benefit of the doubt, the Viceroy encouraged Ugarte to find out whether the miners, merchants, and carriers of the province were of the same opinion as the ranchers. If there was consensus among all of these settlers, Gálvez wanted to know the causes of their inutility.678

The previous chapters of this study have presented documentation that establishes the King’s beneficence to the soldiers in his armies across the great reach of the Spanish army, and the patriarchal, and often perceptive or sensitive, approaches that some frontier commanders took towards their subordinates. However insignificant to contemporary observers the rewards for good conduct and productive service to the Crown may seem, given the unique challenges of life in the borderlands these forms of remuneration were valued -- inasmuch as they may have been just as quickly dismissed for their austerity -- by cliques within certain companies and among individual troops. Let us briefly recall some of the key issues of presidial incompetence and subsequent reform that emerged from the 1786 Instrucción as it concerned finances and management of the frontier forces during the final decade of the century.

Since it became apparent that the ranchers in Nueva Vicaya charged as “useless” the companies of Anaelo and Pueblo del Álamo, Gálvez proposed that if these two forces were not necessary to defend the province, then they were to be reorganized immediately; the Viceroy was convinced that this approach would end the primary cause for the exaction of the onerous taxes [Si consiste en que estas fuerzas no son necesarias para defender la Provincia, deben reformarse desde luego, con lo que cesará la causa principal de la exacción de arbitrios gravosos].679 Similarly, if their inutility was due to the fact that the officers and soldiers were unfit, he believed that all of this class should be eliminated, substituting for them others who had the necessary qualifications; and finally, if it was that the companies were not well located in both of these

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678 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo ciento cuarenta y tres; Los Hacenderos acusan de inútiles las dos compañías de Anaelo, y Pueblo del Álamo, proponen su reforma, y piden en consecuencia la de los impuestos de arbitrarios; pero sobre este punto debe saberse si los Mineros, Mercaderes y Traginantes [sic] de la Provincia son de la misma opinión [sic], si los vecinos de las Jurisdicciones del Saltillo y Parras quedarán gustosos con que se les quiten las próximas defensas a que ya se han acostumbrado, si efectivamente son inútiles las dos Compañías, y cuales [sic] son las causas de su inutilidad.
679 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo ciento cuarenta y cuatro.
locations – if there was a scarcity of pasture for the horse herds, or, because the greater number
did not assist in defending the territory and making war on the enemy in their rancherías – then the
alternative solution was to transport the companies to more advantageous posts.

[sí proviene de que los Oficiales y Soldados no son á propósito, ya he dicho que se separen todos los de esta clase, substituyéndolos (sic) con otros que tengan las circunstancias requisitas: y por último sí dimana de que las Compañías no estén bien colocadas en Anaelo y Pueblo del Álamo, ya porque en aquellos parages (sic) escaseen los pastos para las caballadas, ó ya porque no presten las mejores proporciones para defender el territorio que cubren, y hacer la Guerra incesante á los Enemigos en sus Rancherías, hay el arbitrio de trasladar las Compañías á otros puestos ventajosos].

Apparently, Gálvez had been in communication with one of the two men charged with assisting
the Commander General: Colonel Juan Ugalde, the colonel of the infantry, who also bore the title
of Commandant of the Armies (as did Rengel), and who had already proposed a plan to reform the
flying squadrons of Anaelo and Pueblo del Álamo. Further, Ugalde offered to defend the districts
of Saltillo and Parras with the troops which he requested for the garrison of the four provinces –
Coahuila, Texas, Nuevo Leon, and Nuevo Santander-- under his military control. The next series
of “articles” from the 1786 Instruction specifically concern the contentious taxes that triggered
quite an uproar from the citizen settlers of Nueva Vizcaya and the dismal opinion held by those
citizens about the volantes charged with defending that region’s populace. Most importantly, the
articles engaged with the most expeditious manner of bringing about reforms that would not
disrupt the delicate balance of maintaining the royal treasury while preventing competent soldiers
from being shortchanged. Finally, measures were necessary to avoid inciting potentially rebellious
civilians.

From a series of ideas in the narrative of the Instruction that Gálvez enumerates in his
customary “article” form, it appears that, at least as of 1786, the Provincias Internas had a force
of one thousand, three hundred fifty-nine soldiers; but, Ugalde would reduce that number to nine

680 Ibid
681 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo ciento cuarenta y nueve.
hundred sixty-nine, regrouping the two hundred men of the two aforementioned flying companies, and one hundred ninety of those of Nuevo Leon and the Colonia of Nuevo Santander [el Coronel Don Juan Ugalde las reduce á 969, reformando las 200 plazas de las dos referidas Compañías Volantes, y 190 de las que existen en las del Nuveo Reyno (sic) de Leon, y Colonia del Nuevo Santander], presumably also volantes. Further, the colonel was to indicate to the viceroy how the presidial and flying companies of the four provinces of his charge were to be formed or put upon new footing which is how he conceived of his plan as a reform. Moreover, Gálvez suggested that the collection of the excess taxes of the militias of Nueva Vizcaya was on the verge on suspension [consultandome que las Compañías Presidiales y Volantes de las quarto (sic) Provincias de su cargo se formen ó pongan sobre el Nuevo pie que manifiesta el Plan que acompaña adjunto: cuyo documento y las noticias de este artículo del anterior tendrá V.S. presentes para instruir y fundar sus informes sobre el punto de suspension (sic) de la cobranza de arbitrios gravosos de Milicias de Nueva Vizcaya]. 682 However, that suspension hinged upon Gálvez’s consideration of all the reports that Ugarte was to generate for the Viceroy.

The suspension was intended to relieve the burden on the contributors of these taxes [en alivio de los contribuyentes], 683 and Gálvez suggested that the relief would be greater if some of the troops of Sonora, Nueva Vizcaya, and Nuevo Mexico could be reformed [Sería mayor este alivio, si pudieran reformarse algunas Tropas de la Sonora, Nueva Vizcaya y Nuevo México]. 684 Gálvez, ever mindful of the slightest threat to the royal treasury, remarked that this burden should not be so considerable when increases of the salaries and assets, which had to be made in all of the presidios, flying companies, dragoons, and volunteers, were enacted [si los aumentos de sueldos y haberes que han de hacerse en todos los presidios, Compañías volantes, Dragones y Voluntarios, no gravasen considerablemente la Real Hacienda]. 685

682 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo ciento cinquenta
683 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo ciento cinquenta y dos
684 Ibid
685 Gálvez, Instrucción ... 1786, artículo ciento cinquenta y tres
Gálvez went a step further by focusing on the necessity for reform among the military ranks and by targeting certain members of the troop collective, even the non-Spanish soldiers. By allowing both, Ugarte, and Rengel to propose any new bases of reform or of greater economy in the class of individuals that should compose the presidial and flying companies of Sonora, Vizcaya, and New Mexico, Gálvez suggested that an effective Indian auxiliary could replace the leather-jacketed soldiers, or, cueras\(^{686}\) [En los informes que han de instruir V.S. y el Comandante Inspector sobre aquellos aumentos, puede proponerse algun Nuevo pie de reforma ó de mayor economía en la clase de individuos de que hubieren de componerse las Compañías Presidiales y Volantes de las tres referidas Provincias de Sonora, Vizcaya y Nuevo México, substituyendo (sic), por ejemplo, la plaza del Soldado de cuera con la del Indio útil auxiliar].\(^{687}\) Further, he was convinced that some of the corporals, sergeants, or subordinate officers could be excised from other companies and that beneficial results might occur with an increase in the number of ‘ordinary’ soldiers [suprimiendo la de algunos Cabos, Sargentos, u Oficiales Subalternos, y aumentando las Plazas sencillas].\(^{688}\)

Apart from the negative critique of the volantes that he had received from his ranching constituents in Nueva Vizcaya, it is certain that Viceroy Gálvez would have partitioned his 1786 Instructions in a way that specific regions would have recommendations for improvement specifically targeting their presumed shortcomings. The 1724 to 1728 inspection by Rivera, which resulted in the 1729 Reglamento of Viceroy Casafuerte, had instructions for each of the presidios with the captains of their companies and the governors of New Mexico, Texas, Sinaloa and Coahuila were specifically addressed to follow. The 1772 Reglamento presented the conclusions of the Rubí-Gálvez inspections and was thus promulgated by Viceroy Croix. From this outcome,

\(^{686}\) The leather-jacketed soldier was distinguished by the costume he wore as part of his body armor, composed of quilted buckskin that could also be a heavy, knee-length, sleeveless coat or doublet. The soldado de cuera was the heavily armed presidial who received a salary of 290 pesos and described by Moorhead as a “veritable human fortress on horseback […] a one-man arsenal.” See Moorhead (1975), 88-89; 186-189; and (1969) “The Soldado de Cuera: Stalwart of the Spanish Borderlands” in Journal of the West, 8:1 (January 1969)

\(^{687}\) Gálvez, Instrucción … 1786, artículo ciento cinquenta y cuatro

\(^{688}\) Ibid
one certainty remained: at some point, Gálvez was so much less impressed with the leather-jacketed soldiers, or soldados de cuera, composing the ranks of some companies and their detachments, to the degree that one of his proposed solutions was to recruit Indian auxiliaries to do the work of these other troops. Although, this might not appear so remarkable in light of the ongoing tensions between the Lipan and Comanche communities and the military personnel in the borderlands.

By mid-1795, it became clear that commanders were even willing to accommodate the special preferences of their indigenous allies when it came to supplying weapons for defense. This might even explain the attraction for the Indian auxiliaries as competent replacements for otherwise slacker soldiers at the presidios. In May, Pedro de Nava received word from the governor of Texas that the Friendly Indians valued rifles over shotguns – presumably because of their more precise aim – and so he acted on that information. He ordered the governor of Coahuila, Lieutenant Colonel Miguel de Emparán, to send to Muñoz the eighty rifles available in Monclova as a gift for their allies. Clearly, this was one method of appeasing the Indians in the orbit of presidial commanders and their subordinates, but accommodating the French was now an entirely different matter of concern.

689 Nava to Governor of Texas, [...] orders for sending muskets to Texas to give to friendly Indians, BA May 10, 1795
Chapter Five

5.1 “EN REALIDAD, YO NO ERA OTRA COSA QUE UN EMPRESTADOR DE LO QUE SE MANDABA MINISTRAR POR EL SEÑOR GOBERNADOR”: AMANGUAL SPEAKS IN HIS OWN DEFENSE

As we learned in Chapter 3, in May 1792 Amangual was asked to respond to series of questionable balances found by the Superior Accounting Office of the Royal Tribunal of Accounts in Mexico City regarding the habilitacion fund of the Bexar company.\(^\text{690}\) By April 16, 1795, three years after his receipt of the inquiry into his expenditures for gifts favoring peace-seeking Indians, Francisco Amangual had examined the objections issued by the Auditor of Royal Tribunal and sent to him on January 26. He was given the opportunity to provide a defense for the charges made against him. Where Fernández provided a timeline for the mismanagement of the purchases and expenditures made on behalf of Indian visitors to the presidio, Amangual had a slightly different approach to his explanation. As we shall see, his defense targeted the actual objects of use in question and key personnel linked to apparently unnecessary expenses, including the ubiquitous Pedro Vial. Indeed, his vast experience with inventory lists may have impacted his perspective and thus underscored the focus of the testimony in his own defense. Amangual’s response to the charges and with his conclusion is included here in its entirety.

The Second Lieutenant of this presidial company of San Antonio de Béjar Don Fran[cis]co Amangual having become informed of the content of the five pages that the Excelentisimo Señor Viceroy [Branciforte] sent to you [Governor Muñoz] with the order of November 19, 1792 of the objections and charges that the Señor Accountant of the Royal Tribunal of Accounts surrendered to then Governor Rafael Martínez Pacheco, by way of then Commandant General Brigadier of the Eastern Provinces Juan de Ugalde, of the expenditures laid out [erogados] for the maintenance [manutención] of the Indians that presented themselves in this district [cuartel] from Dec 3, 1786 until the end of the year 1788.\(^\text{691}\) Said papers are numbered from one to five. In this last page, I notice two points that call for targeting [conspiran contrayendo]; the first of the objections made for the superfluous expenditure that was hindered [impendió] by Pedro Vial and his four companions in the exploration of the road from the presidio of Santa Fé to San Antonio de Béjar, as well as for the considerable time they stayed in

\(^{690}\) See Chapter 3, pp 20 – 23; […] report on doubtful accounts of the company of Béxar […], May 14 [– December 19], 1792

\(^{691}\) Amangual to Muñoz, […] objections to accounting reports on expenditures for Indian[s], BA April 16, 1795
[mansionaron] this Presidio, that for more than seven months they were making individual expenditures like the one for the quantities that they requested and that were supplied to them at Nachitos and the town of Nacogdoches; in the first by Musr. [Monsieur] Requier [?], and in the second by the militia Captain Antonio Gil y Barbo (sic) in addition to the expenditure of veinte cinco [25] pesos that they paid to the youth [mozo] Juan José Medina who came to serve them from Nacogdoches to Béxar without expressing with what order furnished them these sums, nor enclosing a notice of the outlay of the ciento ochenta y un [181] pesos that were received by both, Vial, and his companions, nor if this quantity, and the 25 pesos of the youth [Juan José Medina], were taken by someone that they impulsively brought along with them [por algún señalamiento que trajeron echo].

The second consists of the objection that is made for the expenditure for more than was spent [erogó] in the renting [el alquiler] of houses, lights and maintenance [manutención en] for José Mares, Alexandro [sic] Martínez, and Juan Domingo Maiz and from October 8, 1787 until January 18, 1788 by his having been able to apologize for the objection that they each lived in a separate house and having reduced them to three living in one house, when it was found inconvenient in order for them to be lodged in the barracks with the soldiers.

I am equally unaware of the reason that is made for not making amends for the excessive costs that the renters generated for pans, vessels, and the rest of the utensils that were used for making food and other services for the Indians, but I ought not to respond to the charges that resulted from the incompetence [la mala versación] that provoked them. With respect to that, I did not have the least involvement in them since I did not do anything as paymaster from the company than give what was needed, by order of the Governor Rafael Martinez Pacheco. In the quality that I integrate and signed the accounts and receipts that I owed in other parts because of not having it [good] in the payroll office in my charge, for supplying it in the same way as when I reimbursed these quantities, and the rest that I supplied for the gift of the Indians and other things to that end.

To manage this [a (ma)nejo(as?) esto], I did with sincerity which is satisfying [genial] for me and only to certify here in some and in others that the named accounts and receipts that showed the aforementioned quantities were the same that they had supplied and that they had paid to me. And, it is clear that said involvement and knowledge for determining and laying out the expenses that they offered in this office [dependencia (sic)] have been reserved and restricted precisely for that very reason to the Governors under this concept. It appears that I will be less able to, nor can I, give a reason for the motives that there were for the excessive bad expertise [versación] and disorder like that in the useless data [ynutiles (sic) datas] [which is] like the strange style of the preliminary investigation [instruccion (sic)] of accounts, because in reality I was not anything other than a lender of that which I was ordered to supply by the Governor [en realidad, yo no era otra cosa que un emprestador de lo que se mandaba ministrar por el Señor Gobernador].

692 Ibid
693 Ibid
694 Ibid
Of everything there is to know or find out, I could give plenty of reasons as to why I am convinced that as José Antonio Bustillos was guard of the warehouse, but bearing in mind that he is already deceased [pero en atención a que este está ya finado], and in the duties of the distinguido Andrés Benito Courbiere, who was the one who helped him like that to set up the accounts [formar las cuentas], how to handle and distribute, what was corresponding to the department of the first; this second one [Courbiere] is able to know in terms of everything, and the reason for which they were observed and managed in that method since it is normal that he knows it [este segundo puede saber en las terminus que esta todo y la razon por que se obserbaron (sic) y manejaron en aquel metodo (sic) pues es regular que lo sepa], assuming that he was at his [Bustillos] side and carried out all his functions. and if the aforementioned [Courbiere] does not provide the information, Don Rafael Martínez Pacheco as Governor will offer it all about the Province [supuesto que estaba a su lado y desempeñaba en lo mas sus funciones y de no dar noticia el enunciado distinguido la dara (sic) todo el referido D[o]n Rafael Martínez Pacheco como gover[nad]or que era de la Pro[vinci]a]. I did not have a hand in any other thing than what I have related. This is all I have to explain about the objections presented [los presitados (sic) reparos]: that I appeal to the Royal Tribunal of Accounts for my part, to have [this testimony] as enough and satisfactory.696

San Antonio de Béjar, 16 of April 1795 Francisco Amangual

Amangual concluded with essentially the same response as the First Lieutenant Bernardo Fernández: Courbiere was the one to blame for the accounting mistakes. No other documentation resurfaces concerning this protracted, unsubstantiated (by their accusers) mélange of business after the April 1795 testimony of Amangual. Ironically, Governor Muñoz reported to Nava that the matter had been satisfactorily resolved and he did so on April 15, the day before Amangual’s own response.697

The following year, on March 3, 1796 Nava sent instructions to Governor Muñoz to settle – presumably, once and for all – the Martínez Pacheco accounts, and that directive specifically focused upon the two thousand, eight hundred and forty-two pesos extracted from the Mesteñas Fund. Subsequently, the amount was deposited in the Gratificación fund of the presidial company of Béxar. Moreover, the two thousand one hundred two pesos, six granos from the liquidation,

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695 See footnote 470 of Chapter 3 for an explanation of this title.
696 Amangual to Muñoz, […] objections to accounting reports on expenditures for Indian[s], BA April 16, 1795
697 […] Muñoz’ letter to Nava […] objections to financial report of Indian presents accounts have been satisfied, BA April 15, 1795
with an oficio of February 16, 1795, were remitted by Lieutenant Colonel Juan Gutiérrez and having been resolved by decree from that day, March 3, of a previous dictamen by the Assessor, would be reimbursed to the Mesteñas Fund the aforementioned two thousand one hundred two pesos, six granos, advising Muñoz that he verify all of this information immediately giving Nava notice for this to be duly recorded.

On June 18, having complied with what was explained by the senior assessor of the General Commandancy in the document about unbranded [orefano] livestock, horses, and cattle of Texas, and the examination and approval of the accounts of the Mesteñas Fund, along with the reimbursement of the quantities drawn from [extraídas] this same fund for diverse objects, Nava enclosed to Governor Muñoz a copy of the second point of the two in which the Minister shared Muñoz’s ruling of April 24 of the previous year. He did this so that in its content the Governor could proceed to put into as much effect [hacer efectivo cuanto le corresponde] as was needed; Nava anticipated what he saw as appropriate for the Provincial Governor (Intendente) of San Luis Potosí in order for him to arrange for the Treasury Minister of the Royal Treasury [Hacienda] of Saltillo [and his offices] to deliver to the Paymaster [Amangual] of Béxar Company the sum of two-thousand, eight hundred forty-two pesos, 1 real that was to be reimbursed by the Royal Hacienda to the aforementioned [Mesteñas] fund. Further, for the discount of the third part of the salary that the retired Captain Rafael Martínez Pacheco enjoyed, enough to cover the one-thousand, eight hundred forty-six pesos, three reales and eight granos which resulted in a deficit [descubierto] according to the liquidation made by the Assistant Inspector Juan Gutiérrez. And, so that the Governor of Coahuila had at Muñoz’s disposal an amount of 486 pesos, 6 reales extracted.

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698 Nava to Governor of Texas, [...] instructions] as to settlement of Martínez Pacheco accounts, BA March 3, 1796
699 According to a January 11, 1778 proclamation from the Viceroy de Croix, the Mesteñas fund had as its origins the unregulated appropriation of unbranded cattle and horses found in the wild and taken or destroyed by certain “vagabonds” among the populations of the citizenry of the presidios. The viceroy believed that such unlawful acts encouraged discord among families and instilled a lack of subordination to and respect for the governors and other officials whose duties include the administration of justice. The “vagabonds” that lived off the goods, wealth, and cattle of more respectable citizens [Spanish translation for honorable men] were not specifically named, and we can assume that they were part of the civilian and military population. Croix made it clear that a contributing factor to such behavior had been the liberty with which many had authorized themselves to build corrals and stockades, then round up, enclose and take possession of wild and unbranded cattle and horses. Croix to Ripperdá, concerning the government of Texas and the establishment and management of the Mesteñas fund; BA, January 11, 1778.
from the ransom of captives, with which quantity and the 86 pesos 2 reales belonging to the Mestenas Fund that Muñoz was to match [completarás] the 573 pesos invested in the rescue of captives, that the Mesteñas Fund experienced to whom they had to reimburse [á quien han de reintegrarse].

Nava indicated that the accounts of expenditures made from 1786 to 1792 did not exist in the General Commandancy, in Coahuila with the allied Indians, about whose explanation [glosa] formed the report that had not even been remitted to him from Mexico [City]. Thus, it was impossible to clarify, if it was found or not, overcharges [cargados] in the [account] pertaining to the [year] 1790. The seven hundred thirty-nine pesos, seven reales, six granos that Brigadier Don Juan de Ugalde distributed among those that accompanied and filled out [auxiliaron] his company, and having been able to find in the Chihuahua archive the rough draft, Governor [Muñoz] was to send Nava a copy of the draft, informing him of what he, Muñoz, knew of the subject. Thereafter, on August 1, Muñoz conveyed the Nava directive to the paymaster.

Amangual’s response was swift; as in so many of his formal responses in the administrative record, which appear to follow a penchant for precise repetition of shared knowledge, the paymaster remained faithful.

By the order of El Senor Commandante General of these Provincias of June 18 of this past year that you [Muñoz] served I introduced into your order of the tenth of the current month, I have given orders to the corporal of this company José Manuel de Castro, with Lieutenant Colonel don Miguel José de Emparán receiving from the Governor of Coahuila to whom I write with insertion of another order; the two-hundred eight pesos, six granos, six reales, that this is the same that I will put in your hands after you receive them in order to introduce them into the cashbox [caja] of the Mesteñas Fund; and the same I will execute with the two thousand, eight hundred, forty-two pesos, 1 real in accordance with [que arreglado á] the aforesaid Superior Order. The Señor Treasurer delivers it to me when I pass through to receive it from him; [that is,] the assets of this Company with the said orders that shall be complied with [los haveres de esta compañía con lo que quedaran cumplidas dichas ordenes].

700 Nava to Governor of Texas, […]instructions] as to settlement of Martínez Pacheco accounts, BA March 3, 1796
701 Nava to Governor of Texas, […] mesteñas fund, and transmittal to Amangual, BA June 18, 1795
May God safeguard you many years, San Antonio de Béxar, Aug 11, 1795,
Francisco Amangual

Only five days later, the paymaster delivered a notice of what had been provided to the Friendly Nations of the North as a result of the orders of payment given by the Governor of Texas, covering May 1 to August 16, 1795. In May, the Indians received gunpowder, bullets for the Captain Cabezón and forty-one Tancahue; ten pounds of cigarettes for presentation [para obsequiar] to the Indians of the Tancahue, Tahuacame, and Comanche nations; and for the rest of the month on two different occasions more of the same for all of these communities. In June, gunpowder and bullets constituted the gifts for the same nations but with the addition of the Guichitas [Wichitas], whom received only bullets.

The seven hundred thirty nine pesos, seven reales and six granos that remained from the original Mesteñas withdrawal were the same that Brigadier General Juan de Ugalde gave for expenditures for the enemy Indians that had filled out his company. This was true as well for amounts Juan Gutiérrez had proposed to charge for expenses of gifts to the allied [Indian] nations, with resolution of the report requested for Muñoz by the order of June 18, 1795. Those gifts would be ongoing, amounting to pages of expenditure reports for Indian visitors to the Béxar presidio from January to May 1796. Eight hundred forty three Indians representing the Comanche, Tancahues, Tahuacanes and Lipan nations were accommodated, as was the Second lieutenant Francisco Amangual.

5.2 MONEY SPENT FOR PEACEABLE INDIANS? PERHAPS BETTER SPENT ON TRACKING “FOREIGNERS”

However, during the summer of the previous year, the Governor and his presidio commanders may have wondered why the aforementioned expenditures had been necessary after all. On July 24, 1795 Escandón received word from the Viceroy Branciforte that American colonials would send emissaries to New Spain – and presumably, its borderlands regions – in order

702 Amangual to Muñoz, discussing collection of money for mesteñas fund, BA August 11, 1795
703 Amangual’s detail of goods given to Indian visitors since May 1, 1795, BA August 16, 1795
704 Ibid
to verify an unspecified uprising. Too, they were interested to know whether the governor of Louisiana had put the region in a state of defense, fearing a general conspiracy by the blacks of the province [los colonos de los estados unidos vendrían emisarios a este reino para verificar la sublevación y de que el Señor governador de la Luisiana se ha puesto en estado de defenso temiendo una general conjuración de los Negros que havitan en aquella provincia].

Escándon urged Muñoz, for his part, to look after with the utmost vigilance the security of [the Province] under his command by not permitting or introducing settlers or foreigners or any person that was or could be suspicious, and if verified [as such], to be apprehended [Ud. cuide por su parte con la mayor vigilancia para la seguridad de la de su cargo sin permitir, que en ella se introdusca [sic] colono ni otro extranjero ni persona alguna que sea o pueda ser sospechosa, y berificado [sic] apreenderlo] and the Viceroy given notice. To this end, it was fitting that Escándon open up correspondence with the governors of Coahuila, and Texas, in order to communicate his warnings and in case it was necessary, to aid each other [es conven(ien)te que Ud. abra luego su correspondiencia con los governadores de Coahuila, y Texas, para communicarse sus avisos y en caso necesario auxiliarse mutuamente]. In one message pinpointing the delicate circumstances of maintaining harmony between the chiefs of the Interior Provinces [las delicadas circunstancias … exigen la major armonia entre los gefes de Prov(inci)as Internas], Escándon suggested that Muñoz go out across the northern frontier of Nuevo León and, if he found it necessary, reinforce the Laredo company with the rest of the flying squadrons that were ready, the militias, and warn the residents so that they can go to all the points of defense [pareciendome conven(ien)te q(u)e Vs. se traslade a la frontera del Norte de esa colonia, q(u)e refuerce si lo conciderare (sic) preciso la compañía de Laredo con tropa de las demas volantes que tenga prontas, las milicias, y prevenidos los vecindarios para acudir atodos (sic) los puntos de defensa]. However, it is not clear whether he meant, by the term “jefes,” the Spanish commanders of the presidios, or, the leaders of the

705 […] Sierra Gorda to Muñoz, […] Viceroy’s orders to increase alertness to avoid foreign infiltration, BA July 24, 1795
706 Ibid
707 […] Sierra Gorda and Muñoz, […] peace treaties with Indian Nations of the North, BA July 24, 1795
Indian Nations of the North. In this episode of defense preparations, it seems that the *volantes*’ potential presence was in the forefront of Escandón’s mind where it concerned viable military assistance across the borderlands spaces and especially in terrain largely controlled by its indigenous inhabitants.

Indeed, the entire borderlands went on high alert with Governor Simon de Herrera of Monterey included in the communications of Branciforte, Nava, and Muñoz.\(^{708}\) However, the situation had apparently been enough to unnerve Nava, who then contacted Muñoz only one week later to be watchful of people who had passed and were passing through Texas from the United States [*las personas que hayan pasado y pasen a este Reyno de los estados unidos de América*], and especially its borders with Louisiana because of the aforementioned “emissaries” that might influence an uprising among the region’s inhabitants [*ivan (sic) a mandar emisarios para que influyan en la sublebacion de sus havitantes (sic passim)*].\(^{709}\) Yet another threat stemmed from news that was, apparently, accurate suggesting that the Baron de Carondelet, Governor of Louisiana, was intent on acting in a hostile manner against the greedy townspeople of the western states [*el Brigadier Baron de Carondelet Gobernador de la Luisiana se ve en la precision de obrar hostilmente contra los codiciosos vecinos de los estados del oeste*]. If that were not enough to alarm the *comandante general*, Nava also relayed the news to Muñoz that there had been internal movements in Texas caused by the many Blacks living there, and even by the same ethnic group in Louisiana [*y de que ya ha havido algunos movimientos interiores en la provincial de su cargo causados por los muchos Negros que le pueblan, y aun por los mismos Luisianos*].\(^{710}\) Nava’s intention was for Muñoz to warn the Lieutenant Governor of Nacogdoches Bernardo Fernández to apprehend whatever foreigners appeared, and that Fernández could rely on this news and relay its content among the allied Indian nations. Further, he could inform the principal chiefs of these same communities so that they could be assured and given the action that should be taken on these

\(^{708}\) Ibid
\(^{709}\) Nava to Governor of Texas, suggesting greater alertness in borders to stop foreign infiltration, BA July 30, 1795
\(^{710}\) Ibid
matters. Nava directed Muñoz to tell Fernández to carefully inquire about news occurring in Louisiana, especially that which related to the activities of unrest already noticed or of interest to Spanish borderlands security, news that was not difficult to know by way of Nachitoches, and with extraordinary news of severity and importance Muñoz was to convey to Nava

French ability to arouse Spanish suspicions in the borderlands was not extraordinary news to any presidio commander. In early 1685 the French established Fort St. Louis near the mouth of the Lavaca River. The founder, La Salle, abandoned the fort in 1687, and the last French soldiers were removed in 1689. Articles 40 – 44 of Rivera’s frontier inspection report specifically concerned the French menace. Rivera recalled the expedition diary of the Marqués de San Miguel de Aguayo that indicated that the presidio at La Bahía was founded for the purpose of preventing foreign nations from occupying and colonizing the area [como la razón que para su creación se tuvo, fue la de impedir que alguna nación extranjera ocupara el paraje en que se situó]. Rivera explained that the surrounding Indians – Cocos, Cancaraquases, Coapites, Cujanes, and Copanes – posed little threat since, according to the General, they “were known to be cowards and completely lacking in martial spirit [como por no ser de las de conocido valor, con que no teniendo el espíritu marcial que otras].

Several global events had made the Spanish government nervous about ‘foreign’ encounters in its colonial borderlands. Spanish policy on American trade and settlement in the

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711 Ibid
712 According to the Texas Almanac, the Lavaca rises in extreme southeastern Fayette County and flows 117 miles into the Gulf of Mexico through Lavaca Bay. It is the principal stream running to the Gulf between the Guadalupe and Colorado rivers. The Spanish called it the Lavaca [la vaca = the cow] because of the numerous bison found near it. http://texasalmanac.com/topics/environment/rivers
714 Rivera, Año de 1729, Proyecto, artículos 41-42.
frontier focused on maintaining the latter’s minimal presence, but the French Revolution changed that perspective. The Pinckney negotiations of 1795 successfully reoriented Spain’s position on foreign navigation of the Mississippi River, which by extension enabled settlers of many stripes to continue their efforts at westward expansion. Prior to the Treaty of San Lorenzo, military officials in the borderlands had been wary of foreign intrusion and the region between Louisiana and Texas was a hotbed of suspicion for commanders and their soldiers, and a springboard for clandestine activity among the daring. Earlier in 1795, a royal order gave explicit instructions for the arrest of the French in Mexico, and that operation was to be similarly carried out in the colonial borderlands.

When Nava conveyed the order to Governor Muñoz, a disclosure within the document indicated that merchants had special privileges that were to be given consideration. These individuals were not be arrested, nor was their material wealth to be seized or disposed of; they were to be ‘confined’ until a new determination in their residences or places of business, give safe deposit of their persons and their goods.715 One week later, Nava contacted Muñoz and gave instructions for apprising him of changing conditions in Louisiana due to a looming war with the French,716 and then on January 29, the general gave further orders for guarding Nacogdoches and the coast in anticipation of potential hostilities from the French and the Americans.717

5.3 FREEING THE FRENCH

By May 1795, Andrés Benito Courbiere was set free – along with other soldiers and citizens ‘confined’ as French nationals – by Commander General Nava who then ordered Muñoz to reinstate all of those men back into service.718 The soldado distinguido wasted no time requesting funds he considered his but as yet not remitted; in April 1796 Coubiere sought to ameliorate his losses while he was in charge of the care of the goods destined as Indian gifts.719 However, a year

715 Nava to Governor of Texas, […] arrest of French in México, BA January 6, 1795
716 Nava to Governor of Texas, giving instructions […] French war […], BA January 15, 1795
717 Nava to Governor of Texas, giving instructions […] hostile plans of French and Americans, BA January 29, 1795
718 Nava to Governor of Texas, ordering release of […] Courbière and all French military, BA May 10, 1795
719 Nava to Governor of Texas, […] Courbière’s petition for payment of services, BA April 5, 1796
would pass before his career would resume; in August 1796, Nava ordered Muñoz to reinstate Courbiere into the royal service, either sending him to the Nacogdoches detachment or on the trips to Saltillo, or wherever else he was needed.720

Though he had received orders to do so by both Nava (in his eighth resolution) and Governor Muñoz, the indefatigable Captain Juan Cortés never had to set free the citizens from Louisiana that were at the Bahía presidio since, from the beginning, he never had to put any of them in prison. Apparently, their conduct had not warranted such serious orders [No é (sic) tenido que poner en livertad (sic) a los Luisianos vecinos de este Pr[esidi]o, y Vm me manda en oficio de 10 de este mez (sic), por no haverlos puesto presos, con arreglo a lo que ordena el Señor Comandante General en la octava resolución, y ser su conducta contraria, a la que obligé a tomar tan serias providencias].721 In any case, all French prisoners were ordered released by Pedro de Nava since no charges had resulted and not one suspicion had been established to incriminate the French [no haviendo resultado cargo ni fundada sospecha alguna contra los Franceses].722 Nava received a royal order dated September 8, 1795 indicating that peace had been restablished with France in a treaty definitively concluded between Carlos IV and the French king on July 22 and ratified on August 4 of the same year. Nava instructed Muñoz to notify all the inhabitants of the province of the stable and dignified peace that would reopen communication and reciprocal treatment between both countries [Para que se verifique cumplida esta soberana determinacion disponga Vm. (...) se publique (...) a fin de que llegue a noticia de todos esta Pas solida y decorosa, y esta union y Amistad que abre de nuevo la comunicacion y trato reciproco entre ambos payses (sic passim)].723

On January 5, 1796 Second Lieutenant Amangual received an order of payment for his purchase of gunpowder at four and a half reales that was taken out of the store [repuesto] of that company, and bullets as gifts for eighteen Comanche and their rifles. This entry from the inventory

720 Nava to Governor of Texas, ordering […] Courbiere back into active service, BA August 5, 1796
721 Cortés to Muñoz, […] he has not arrested Louisiana residents in La Bahía […] good conduct, BA May 9, 1795
722 Nava to Governor of Texas, ordering to release all French prisoners, BA November 3, 1795
723 Nava to Muñoz, announcing peace treaty between Franc and Spain […], BA December 16, 1795
is provocative, not so much for its items of purchase and subsequent gift giving, but for the
description of Amangual as not only a lieutenant, but as ‘habilitado.’ Indeed, Amangual is
subsequently described that way in all of the pages of the inventory and, he purchased, on Jan 21
bullets and gunpowder. The frequency of Amangual’s purchases becomes clear since the Béxar
inventory was subdivided by days of the month, but not formatted in the customary manner. In
fact, the document appears to be a compendium of purchases covering the span of five months and
most likely extracted from a ledger or similar register that likely had categories for recording date
of transactions consistent with the formatting of the military service record.

On January 4, 1796 Muñoz certified a two-page document concerning the inventory of the
Tobacco Office at Béxar and acknowledged the five libranzas given by Amangual, which
amounted to nine-hundred three pesos, seven reales and totaled two thousand forty-three pesos,
seven reales that he received [y reconocieron cinco libranzas dadas por el Then(ien)te Abilitado
de esta compañía D(o)n Fran(cis)co Amang(u)a], que importan nuebecientos tres p(eso)s siete rr(eales), q(u)e una y otra asceinde a la cantidad de dos mil quarenta y tres p(eso)s siete rr(eales)s, que recivio d(ic)ho Then(ien)te q(uie)n entregó efectivam(en)te el]. In any case, it is curious to
see Amangual described as the paymaster when other documents indicate that he was no longer
employed in that position. Only later will it become evident that through election by his fellow
company members or by superior designation by the governor did he assume his customary role.

In fact, as of April 9, Governor Muñoz’s communication with Gutiérrez de la Cueva, the
captain of the presidio, reveals a certain irritation that the election of the company’s paymaster had
experienced several delays. However, only two months prior, Bernardo Fernández
acknowledged to Governor Muñoz that Manuel Menchaca had entered the Béxar company as its
Second Alférez, and that the new member was his choice for appointment as paymaster.

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724 Ibid
725 Muñoz’ certification concerning inventory of Tobacco Office at Béxar, BA January 4, 1796
726 Correspondence between Gutiérrez de la Cueva and Muñoz, BA March 26, 1796
727 Fernández to Muñoz, […] Menchaca as Second Alférez at Béxar, […] appointment as paymaster, BA February
25, 1796

281
However, Fernández apparently facilitated the process and contacted Muñoz, indicating that Manuel Menchaca had already been duly elected as the Béxar presidio’s paymaster. Writing from Nacogdoches, Fernández voted for Menchaca, as did other officers and he told Muñoz that the Corporal Manuel Granados was empowered to [deliver the votes] for the company [en quien recivió (recaió?) mi voto, el de los demas oficiales, y apoderado de ella que lo fuí el cavo Jose Man(ue)l Granados].

However, even after the election Amangual’s purchases continued. By April 1796, his purchases included two almudes of biscuits [viscocho] for unspecified Indians, and then on the 27th, gunpowder and bullets from the lieutenant went to eleven members of the Comanche nation. In February, the pattern of gift giving by purchase against Amangual’s account continued; he bought ten pesos of cigarettes for seventy-nine Comanche, Tahuacan, and Lipan members. Two other names, those of Antonio Baca, and Luis Menchaca, both likely merchants, appear repeatedly in the inventory as presidial benefactors of the indigenous communities that visited the Béxar garrison. The master tailor José de Arreola reappears in an entry of March 13, having been paid four pesos, two reales for this work on three chupas [waistcoats], one pair of breeches [calzones], one shirt of manta that he made for the Captains Sojas, Manco, and the son of the latter, all of these men representing the Comanche. Apparently, he was still owed money since he submitted a bill for his services for all the work he had completed for clothing and accessories by April 30, 1796.

728 Correspondence between Fernández and Muñoz, BA May 24, 1796
729 Ibid
730 As it pertained to colonial Mexico and its borderlands, the exact value of the unit varied by region. In the Spanish colonial frontier, it may have been, approximately, the equivalent of seven and a half liters.
731 Ternary reports […] support of friendly Indian visitors […] 1796, BA April 30, 1796
732 The names of these two men do not appear in the January 1, 1796 roster of the company of Béxar presidio; thus they cannot be soldiers of the company. Roster of the company of Béxar, BA January 1, 1796
733 Ibid
734 Ibid
735 Arreola’s statement of clothing[…], BA April 30, 1796
5.4 Strategizing the Borderlands: The Never-Ending Effort

While the concerns over French and American incursions into the far eastern reaches of the Spanish empire fluctuated over the course of 1796, and despite the news that peace with France was published in Nacogdoches on February 7 of the same year [en N(uev)a Orleans se publicó la paz con Francia el día de año Nuevo, y en este distrito el 7 del corriente], the ongoing necessity for maintaining peace with the indigenous nations proved to be a policy that required constant reiteration, from commanders to seasoned presidial leaders. Commander General Pedro de Nava never hesitated to reprimand – or, at least, remind – his subordinates of the inferred adherence of soldiers to long established strategies for quelling Indian troublemaking. As he found himself admonishing Governor Muñoz,

One of the maxims that should be observed by us with more care with respect to the Indian nations is to let them make reciprocal warfare, since upon achieving by this means the diminution of their forces, invigorating hatred between each other, and the avoidance of the union and alliance of them, which will bring forward those nations which are more consistent in our friendship which is where they will find assistance [Una de las maximas que con mas cuidado deven observarse por nuestra parte, con respecto á las naciones de Yndios es la de dejarlas hacerse reciproca Guerra, pues sobre conseguirse por este medio la disminucion de sus fuerzas, el vigorizar el odio de unas á otras, y el evitar la union y alianza de ellas, se adelanta el que sean mas constantes en nuestra Amistad, que es en la que hallan auxilio (sic passim)].

Nava’s admonition was quickly followed by a reprimand: apparently, when the Tahuacanes made restitution of the 21 horses that they took to the Lipanes, that action little conformed to Nava’s name (i.e., his commands), and to remind them so as to obligate them of the shortage that they incurred in removing the goods of Juan Joseph Bueno that he transported [y poco conforme el tomar mi nombre para ello, y hacerles reminicencia para obligarlos del a falta en que incurrieron de quitar á Juan Joseph (sic) Bueno los efectos que conducia].

736 Fernández to Muñoz, […] peace with France, BA February 25, 1796
737 Nava to Governor of Texas, […] letting the Indians make war among themselves […], BA May 4, 1796
738 Ibid
Afterwards, in one of the few documents describing a skirmish in more or less detail, Nava reported a victory of soldiers over Indians near San Elizario on May 5, 1796. A detachment on campaign under the command of Alferez Nicolás Madrid from the presidio of San Buenavista left for that at San Elizario in order to look for and pursue the enemy. Having passed the night of the fourth in the area around the Sierra Cornuda, in the early morning of the fifth, Madrid dispatched a small party with the object of surveying the region [una corta partida con objeto de reconocer la comarca] and to see if they could detect a trail [y ver si hallava (sic) algun rastro]. Shortly after losing sight, the soldiers felt in the camp a live firing of rifles that made the commander begin a march with his troops in order to quickly pursue [que hizo al command(an)te ponerse en marcha con su tropa aceleradamente para solicitar] the small party of soldiers. Then, they discovered that the party had recaptured 19 pack animals [la citada partida a la que halló que haviendo represado diez y nueve bestias] and, they even fought with the enemies.739

These Indians were entrenched in a cave of the Hollow Hill from where the advantage of the terrain and their greater number emboldened them enough to destroy the detachment. However, the officer in charge, focused on his skill and that of his troops [fiado en su pericia y la de la tropa], took to the ground and divided the men. They carried out the duty with bravery and perserverance and, in spite of the resistance of the Indians and the vigor of shooting arrows and bullets from the mouth and pockets of the cave, they had to abandon the region [hizo echar pie a tierra y dividida con conocimiento dió la function con tal vizarría (sic) y constancia que á pesar de la resistencia de la Yndiada y de su vigor en disparar flechas y valas (sic) por la voca (sic) y troneras de la cueba (sic) la obligó á abandoner el terreno]. Then the night came upon their retreat which was carried out by way of an almost inaccessible precipice [cuya retirada que ejecutó por un despeñadero casi inaccesible] accompanied by the cries of the wounded, leaving as proof the major setback [dejando en testimonio del gran descalabro] that they endured: nine dead gandules

739 Nava to Muñoz, reporting victory of soldiers […], BA May 20, 1796
(young male warriors) and large pools of blood that indicated that it was a large number of those that they took.\textsuperscript{740}

Nava determined that in order for the news to reach the companies, the commanders of the presidios of Texas should know that these advantages were accomplished so that all troops should strive for \textit{[que todos deben procurer conseguir]} with skill and bravery. Copies were circulated to the commanders of the presidios of La Bahía and Nacogdoches. Indeed, Manuel Menchaca read this news in front of the company of the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar on June 26, 1796.\textsuperscript{741} Similarly, Juan Cortés conveyed news to his company at La Bahía of the distinguished action of Nicolás Madrid and his \textit{presidiales}, adding that he did so in order to act as a stimulus \textit{[sirva de estímulo]} to his own officers and troops.\textsuperscript{742}

We have seen how Bernardo Fernández’s reputation had come under fire because of the misdeeds of a predecessor, and how the Lieutenant, following protocol as a means of obtaining the necessary documents for review in order to prepare a defense against accusations of presidio finances, was able to articulate several reasons for his exoneration by the Auditor in San Luis Potosí. Without further information, it remains uncertain as to the outcome of the proceedings instituted against him in 1792. However, by the middle of 1796, it becomes evident that his stature as a soldier of distinction remained untouched; he was granted the position of captain of the Third Flying Squadron of Chihuahua.

Considering the good merit fulfilled by and seniority of the Lieutenant of the Presidial Company of Béxar, Don Bernando Fernández, who I have named as Captain of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Volante of this Provincia [Chihuahua], and forwarded his office \textit{[despacho]} to Coronel Roque Medina, Assistant Inspector de Presidios, for the respective formalities anticipating that he will be given entry in the review of the first of this coming July: what I advise you to do is get another officer of that province relieves Fernández of that commission in which he works in Nacogdoches so that thereupon he can move with his family to this villa \textit{[para que desde luego se traslade con su familia á esta villa]}, and in the case of not having in those companies an officer of the necessary qualifications \textit{[circunstancias]}, you can

\textsuperscript{740} Ibid
\textsuperscript{741} Nava to Muñoz, reporting victory of soldiers over Indians near San Elíssario […]], BA May 20, 1796
\textsuperscript{742} Cortés to Muñoz, […] acton of Nicolás Madrid against the enemy Indians [announced per Nava’s orders], BA July 1, 1796
request [one] from my order to the Governor of Coahuila so that he can expedite [facilite] those [most qualified] of that Province.743

One month later, the other recently accused soldier forged ahead with the mundane tasks of his profession. On July 1, 1796 Amangual generated an inventory report of the Tobacco Office at the Béxar presidio, indicating the inspection of the warehouse’s supplies of cigarettes – which constituted the greatest amount -- cigars, gunpowder, card decks, sealed paper, and the totality of the goods on that day. Two orders of payment issued against the office of the paymaster were for the office of taxes charged for the entry and exit of consumer goods were collected with both totaling one thousand, nine hundred forty six pesos and 7 reales [por dos libranzas contra esta abilitación y a favor del fielato, la una de la cantidad de 1229 pesos, 7 r(eale)s y la otra de 717 pesos que unidas las dos partidas acienden a la de...].744 By the end of the same month, Nava sent to Muñoz a copy of a document that was to be posted and made public throughout San Antonio de Béxar. It was the royal general pardon for the prisoners who understood [the content of] two royal decrees from December of the previous year [del indulto general que S.M. se ha dignado conceder a los presos que comprenden la dos reales cédulas que se hallan insertas en dicho oficio sus fechas 22 de Diciembre].745 In September 1796, Francisco Amangual confirmed his compliance with the King’s order and that copies of the document had been posted in the plazas and streets of the capitol.746

At the beginning of the previous chapter, we saw that the King’s benevolence to his subjects in the borderlands of New Spain had emerged by way of general pardons specifically targeting contrabandistas, and even those that had been homicidal in the performance of these types of criminal activities. A few years later, a copy of yet another royal cedula appeared that demonstrated the King’s tolerance of inappropriate behavior from his frontier soldiers but that his compassion had its limits. Those men who committed the crime of procurement (of prostitutes)

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743 Nava to Governor of Texas, reporting appointment of […] Fernández as captain of 3rd Flying Squadron of Chihuahua, BA May 20, 1796
744 Inventory report of the Tobacco Office of Béxar, BA July 1, 1796
745 Nava to Governor of Texas, forwarding copy of royal general pardon for publication in Texas, BA July 30, 1796
746 Ibid
were to be dishonorably discharged and this information was to be widely broadcast among the commanders of the companies that garrisoned the province of Texas.\footnote{Nava to Governor of Texas, copy of royal ordinance giving dishonorable discharges to personnel guilty of procuring. BA, September 27, 1798}

Throughout the colonial period, soldiers misbehaved to varying degrees and across the spectrum of acting out shamefully because of their own misdeeds, the misappropriations of others, miscalculations from multiple quarters, and from being just plain misinformed. Here in the closing years of the eighteenth-century, some of these \textit{presidiales} would be faced with career and life-altering experiences stemming from their straying from the strictness of the garrison’s presumably constrained way of life.

For example, on August 5, 1796 Pedro de Nava contacted Governor Muñoz to arrange to have Courbiere assigned to do the service that corresponded to his rank since he was at that time in charge of, both, the detachment of Nacogdoches and of those traveling from Saltillo.\footnote{Nava to Muñoz, BA August 5, 1796} Then, on August 23, 1796, Bernardo Fernández contacted Muñoz to discuss the future change of administration, citing the order of July 25 that concluded the adjustment of accounts of the Nacogdoches company, and undertaken by, both, Lieutenant Amangual and the First Alférez Manuel Menchaca. The latter, elected in March as paymaster of the Béxar presidio, would soon assume his new position and, perhaps fittingly, veteran \textit{habilitado} Amangual was there to assist his successor.

Those tasked by the job you ordered last July 25, that completed the adjustment of that company’s accounts, completed between Lieutenant Francisco Amangual and Alférez Manuel Menchaca, will come from this post first to deal with it and as you order me to take this into disposal for that act that everything is appended to relinquishing power. Giving the management of the copy of the order to the effect that you gave me when I left the capital. And also extend the instruction that you mentioned to me when convenient so that Amangual can follow and observing the method that I have had until today for preservation of public tranquility of this place and the good harmony of the friendly Indians. [\textit{Estos impuesto por el oficio de usted de 25 del pasado Julio que concluido el ajuste de cuentas de esa compania (sic) entre el teniente Francisco Amangual y Alférez Manuel Menchaca vendrá de este}
puesto el primero á encargarse de el y como usted me ordena tendré en disposición para aquel acto todo cuanto es anexo (sic) eso a las entrega del mando. Dando el manejo de el copia de la orden que á el efecto me entregó usted al separarme de esa capital. Y extenderé igualmente la instrucción que me cita de lo conbeniente (sic) para que siga dicho T(enie)n [te] Fran(cis)co Amangual observando el método (sic) que yo he tenido hasta el día para conservación de la quietud publica (sic) de este puesto y bueno armonía de los indios amigos]749

5.5 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT AND RETIREMENT: GIL IBARVO, COURBIÉRE, AND MUÑOZ

In the investigations of cases involving inventories completed by Amangual in 1792 of suspected contrabandistas Cortés and Duran, the name Antonio Gil Ibarvo emerged. Pedro de Nava rendered several decisions in September 1796 in the case concerning the former Lieutenant Governor of Nacogdoches. Gil Ibarvo had tried to conceal contraband and Nava had to conform to the dictamen issued by the Auditor of War: Ibarvo was finished in military service and Governor Muñoz was to make the unfortunate man understand the decision. Moreover, the governor was to deliver all the goods that had been seized from Ibarvo so that the items could be placed where it was best suited.750 That same day, in a separate letter, Nava ordered that, upon its receipt, Muñoz was to stop paying Ibarvo his salary since there was no need to continue to burden the Royal Treasury [debiere cesar al referido Gil Ybarbo el enunciado sueldo, con que no hay necesidad continue (sic) gravida Real Hacienda]; in effect, the commander general retired the soldier.751 So great was the disgust that Nava had for Ibarbo that only two months after his ignominious departure, the Assistant Inspector ordered Muñoz to prohibit the disgraced soldier from establishing residence in Nacogdoches.752 However,

Four days after the soldier’s forced retirement, Nava ordered Bernardo Fernández to stay in Saltillo while the right circumstances were provided in order to move his wife and his company with ease [Fernández puede dejar en el Saltillo esa muger (sic) entretanto que se le proporciona

749 Fernández to Muñoz, discussing future change of administration in Nacogdoches, August 23, 1796
750 Proceedings concerning Nava’s decision in the Gil Ibarvo case [Nava to Muñoz], BA September 15, 1796
751 Nava to Governor of Texas, retiring Antonio Gil Ibarvo from military service, BA September 15, 1796
752 Nava to Governor of Texas, prohibiting Antonio Gil Ibarvo to establish residence in Nacogdoches, BA November 29, 1796
Subsequently, Governor Muñoz assigned the Nacogdoches post to the Cadet José María de Guadiana instead of Amangual, who may very well have been the initial candidate for Ibarvo’s replacement but who had apparently assumed Muñoz’s duties because of the Governor’s illnesses [aun no permiten mis enfermedades la traslacion del Th(enient)e D(o)n Fran(cis)co Amangual a ese [destino], prevengo a Vm que luego a el recivo de esta disponga entregar el mando de ese puesto, y demas concerniente a el Cadete D(o)n José Maria de Guadiana].

Muñoz must have felt convinced that Cadet Guadiana was well-informed about the issues and the method to follow in assuming the post [me persuado estará bien impuesto en los asuntos y método que se ha seguido]. With this directive sent to Fernández, Muñoz further ordered that Fernández’s instructions for his destination – presumably his May 20 appointment as captain of the third flying squadron in Chihuahua -- should be handed over to Amangual so that the latter could continue on with that assignment [se transportará Vm. a esta Capital donde le haré las prevenciones que combengan (sic), y presentaré las Ynstrucciones que deve a el precitado Amangual para que continúe en el destino con los aciertos], and Fernández was to move to Béxar. On October 24, Fernández acknowledged his receipt of Muñoz’s directive and that he had already given the command of Nacogdoches to Guadiana the week before, and would leave the next day to the capital. So went the (re)positioning of key players in the borderlands as a result of misconduct on the part of one senior officer who made the unfortunate decision to engage in and then attempt to conceal criminal activity. The irony of this reconfiguration was that it would be Guadiana who would, during the week prior to Nava’s order that Ibarvo not be allowed to establish residency in Nacogdoches, inform Muñoz that Gil Ibarvo would have his property...
returned after all. But other changes were on the horizon where it concerned particularly problematic soldiers, some of long tenure in the presidio system and others only recently arrived.

Even though in the previous month Nava had directed that Andrés Benito Courbiere be assigned to service that corresponded to his rank and previous experience, Governor Muñoz must have similarly felt disinclined to further engage the services of soldado distinguido, only recently set free from what was essentially ‘house arrest.’ Nava sent to Muñoz the license that he requested so that he had the authority to retire the French merchant and soldier of the King. Then, whatever illness that had played havoc with Muñoz’s capabilities as a leader had finally led him to inform Nava that he had taken certain measures to hand over authority of the Béxar presidio to Elguézabal. The markers of an imminent transition had become evident in September: Muñoz had forwarded the monthly reports of the Béxar company to the man who would succeed him, perhaps temporarily but potentially permanently.

Fortunately, Nava’s willingness to mollify potential disruptions to presidio function and efficiency were such that he accepted Muñoz’s efforts to maintain the necessary transfer of authority to another commander [no dudo que el mismo celo que [Elguézabal] ha estimulado a V.S. a no desprenderse de su conocimiento, lo moverá a hacer a Elguezaval aquellos encargos cuyo desempeño impidan a V.S. sus enfermedades]. However, by November 1, having been advised by Amangual that Muñoz had suffered an accident, unspecified by the Lieutenant, Nava wrote the Governor in order to ascertain if his disability was impeding the prompt performance of his job; and if so, Nava was prepared to install some other responsible person in Muñoz’s position while the Governor recuperated [me dio aviso el Teniente D(o)n Francisco Amangual de hallarse Vm. accidentado […] me informe si las enfermedades le impiden el puntual desempeño se

758 Guadiana to Muñoz, […] Gil Ibarvo will be returned his property, BA November 23, 1796
759 Nava to Governor of Texas, forwarding Courbiere’s discharge, BA September 30, 1796
760 Muñoz to Elguézabal, forwarding monthly reports of the company, September 12, 1796
761 Nava to Muñoz, approving measures taken by Muñoz to give […] charge of Béxar to Elguézabal, BA October 16, 1796
encargue á sujeto que lo sirva (entretanto que Vm. se recupera) con la actividad que corresponde].

On November 18, 1796 the captain of the presidio at La Bahía Juan Cortés acknowledged the receipt of a royal ordinance establishing penalties for the mismanagement by officers of company funds [me á pasado la misma copia … del exemplar del … orden … que hace saver (sic) la pena en que incurrén los oficiales que abusen de los caudales que tengan a su cargo]. This directive may have shaken the only recently accused Cortés who had apparently not been successful at extricating himself from allegations of carrying contraband from Nacogdoches to Natchitos. He would have almost one year to absorb the content of His Majesty’s ordinance and perhaps return to at least a temporary state of emotional equilibrium while he grappled with the ramifications of his misguided, ill-conceived, and very short, trip from Texas to Louisiana.

Cortés must have felt a measure of relief knowing that the Commander General recognized that it was necessary that the embattled captain could keep his arms and horses in order to continue in the King’s service [Al enunciado Cortés (sic) es necesario dejarle las armas y cavallos (sic) respectivos para que queda hacer el servicio a que se les destine]. However, his wife’s jewelry and other goods were to be sold off and the amount was to be deposited by Muñoz, and he was to have those interested referred to when the proceedings would occur [pero las alhajas y demas vienes (sic) que ha representado corresponden á su muger (sic) D(oñ)a Catarina Urrutia deven benderse y su importe depositarse haciendo Vm. saver (sic) á la interesada quando (sic) remita las diligencias ocurra]. It would be only a few weeks before things were going to get really bad for Captain Juan Cortés.

Elguézabal communicated to Governor Muñoz that Nava ordered that the property of Cortés’ wife, Catalina de Urrutia, be sold. To add to the irony, the newly installed captain of the

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762 Nava to Governor of Texas, asking if his health forbids the prompt performance of his job, BA November 1, 1796
763 Cortés to Muñoz, acknowledging receipt of royal ordinance … penalties for mismanagement of official funds, BA November 18, 1796
764 Nava to Elguézabal, giving instructions … sale of Juan Cortés’ property, BA September 9, 1797
Nacogdoches presidio Bernardo Fernández, himself once accused of misappropriating presidial funds, was to make the sale happen. Muñoz was to facilitate with any aid that Fernández might need. And, finally, in order to make sure that Cortés received the maximum amount of punishment for his misdeeds, and to help with the reimbursement he owed, his house was to be auctioned off. A few months later, in January 1798, Nava instructed Muñoz that Juan Cortés, the itinerant officer unafraid to speak his mind and most recently convicted of transporting contraband and subjected to the almost complete annihilation of his, and his wife’s, property was to remain at Béxar pending further orders.

We must assume that Fernández successfully, and perhaps with a bit of personal satisfaction, carried out the Cortés auction and that, though his flying squadron assignment was now apparently in the hands of Francisco Amangual, he was now a candidate for another new position: captain of the presidio at La Bahía.

5.6 MONEY MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION: ELGUÉZABAL EMERGES AND ESPADAS FADES

Throughout November, it must have seemed for some in the King’s army that an array of stricter codes of conduct were being established that also carried a range of penalties across several spheres of soldierly engagement. Royal instructions for military drills and maneuvers arrived on Nava’s desk, as did a letter from the Secretary of State and of the Universal Dispatch of War [Secretario de Estado y del Despacho Universal de Guerra] Miguel Joseph de Azanza conveying a royal ordinance enforcing the use of proper military uniforms. Moreover, issues of fiscal mismanagement continued to plague the military borderlands well into 1797.

765 Elguézabal to Muñoz, ordering the sale of the property of Cortés’ wife to cover his debts, BA October 5, 1797
766 Proceedings concerning announcement of sale of Cortés’ house, BA October 13, 1797
767 Nava to Governor of Texas, … Juan Cortés is to remain at Béxar, BA January 19, 1798
768 Nava to Elguézabal, notifying of Fernandez’ appointment as Captain of La Bahía, BA October 17, 1797
769 Nava to Governor of Texas, [Azanza’s letter] royal instructions for military drills and maneuvers, BA November 16, 1796; Nava to Governor of Texas, [Azanza’s letter] royal ordinance enforcing the use of proper military uniforms, November 16, 1796; Cortés to Muñoz, […] royal ordinance establishing penalties for mismanagement of official funds, November 18, 1796; and, Elguézabal to Commander of Bexar, […] Nava’s orders for management of Tobacco Officers in presidios in Texas, November 21, 1796.
In Oct 1797, Nava expressed his awareness of Elguézabal’s having collected and put into the coffers of the Bahía company funds that Alférez Antonio Cadena had improperly paid out to several individuals with the allocations [situados] of the previous year. It had come to light that these entanglements were due to the debts that Manuel Espadas had contracted during the year 1795.\textsuperscript{770} It would not be until December 1798 before Pedro de Nava contacted Governor Muñoz that Espadas’ promissory notes would be paid with funds from the sale of Espada’s assets.\textsuperscript{771} However, as of September 1797, the disgraced paymaster Espadas, having lost his post as a result of his bankruptcy of presidial funds, was transferred as a prisoner to Béxar where he was to remain until he had repaid his deficit [Espadas se trasfiera en calidad de preso al de San Antonio de Béxar, donde deve (sic) permanecer hasta que reintegre su descubierto].\textsuperscript{772} That same month, the Alférez Antonio Cadena and an escort returned from Saltillo to the presidio at La Bahía with the total amount in cash reales [de regreso del Saltillo con el total importe en reales efectivos] from the order of payment [libranza] submitted by Domingo de Outon to Elguézabal.

These funds constituted an amount for debts that had originated during the tenure of then paymaster Espadas’ and that had been paid haphazardly by Cadena from the appropriate allocation in 1796 [me entregó D. Domingo de Outon, por las deudas originadas en tiempo que fue Abilitado D. Man(ue)l de Espadas, y se las pagó ines(crimina)dam(en)te del situado correspondiente].\textsuperscript{773} Nava must have felt a sense of relief that, given the mysterious decline of Muñoz’s health, Elguézabal had expressed a desire to stay at La Bahía. In October 1797, he ordered Elguézabal to put all of the points of his commission into their current state and in order to do that and execute it so he agreed to allow the Inspector General to remain [y siendo necesario que antes de retirarse Vm, de ahi ponga corrientes y en estado todos los punto de su commission (sic), convengo en que

\textsuperscript{770} Nava to Elguézabal, BA October 17, 1797
\textsuperscript{771} Nava to Governor of Texas, […] promissory notes from Espadas to be paid with funds from sale of Espada’s assets, BA December 15, 1798
\textsuperscript{772} Elguézabal to Muñoz, transmitting Nava’s order concerning Espadas transfer to Béxar, BA September 30, 1797; Correspondence between Elguézabal and Muñoz, concerning trip of Espadas to Béxar to remain under arrest, BA September 22, 1797
\textsuperscript{773} Elguézabal to Muñoz, reporting the return of Antonio Cadena with a recovered sum improperly paid by Espadas, BA September 18, 1797
para ejecutarlo así permanezca en ese destino todo el tiempo].\textsuperscript{774} Despite the lackluster performance of some incompetent personnel, things often moved quickly in the colonial borderlands. By January 1798, Nava gave Elguézabal the final instructions for the payment of Espadas’ debts and, further, ordered Elguézabal to turn over the command of La Bahía to Lieutenant Joseph Francisco Zozaya.\textsuperscript{775}

For the period January through April, 1798 Amangual submitted a report for the items and their costs in maintaining and providing for the Indians of the North. These items included all types of cloth, buttons, gunpowder, bullets, cigarettes, and reimbursement for the freight charges on a box of rifles. The total charges amounted to 129 pesos, 8 reales, and 11 granos.\textsuperscript{776} Amangual would provide yet another report on articles supplied to visiting Indians in August of the same year, covering the period from May to August 1798. Cigarettes, cloth from Queretaro and ‘serge,’ tallow candles, payment for musicians and paper for roses all intended for the burial of an Indian woman. Vicente Michela required payment of thirty-six pesos for three dozen knives as did the commander of the pueblo of Nacogdoches for the maintenance of Indians at that location from October to January of 1798. The grand total of three hundred ten pesos, thirty reales, and six granos.\textsuperscript{777}

Taking care of visiting indigenous communities and seeing to the needs of frontier soldiers was but one of the multitude of obligations and responsibilities of presidial commanders and the provincial governors of the borderlands. The often harsh realities of life in New Spain’s \textit{frontera} obligated administrators working in the service to the King to provide for those left alone – and potentially destitute – when a soldier’s life ended. On May 22, 1798 the succeeding Secretary of State Juan Manuel Álvarez issued a royal order directing that two widows of soldiers killed by Indians in a June 27, 1797 skirmish receive pensions per a directive from Carlos IV. The two women were Juana María Calderon, wife of the deceased Francisco Flores of the Presidio at La Babia; and, Francisca Honesta López, wife of Valentín Quesada, a member of the \textit{compania}

\textsuperscript{774} Nava to Elguézabal, agreeing to let [him] remain in La Bahía as long as he desires, BA October 17, 1797
\textsuperscript{775} Nava to Elguézabal, […] instructions for payment of debts of Manuel de Espadas, BA January 19, 1798
\textsuperscript{776} Amangual’s statement of expenses for Indians, BA April 30, 1798
\textsuperscript{777} Amangual’s statement of expenses for Indians, BA August 31, 1798
volante de Parras. The monthly pension of eight pesos to each widow would be paid until the time
that the women remarried, if such an event occurred. Señora Calderon was to be paid by the
Treasury of Saltillo. The captain of the Parras flying squadron, Pedro Carrasco, informed Nava
that señora López would be paid from the royal coffers in Durango.\footnote{778} By November, Miguel del
Moral notified Governor Muñoz that he would immediately comply with the royal cedula of April
10 concerning the collection of pensions for soldiers’ widows.\footnote{779}

By August 1, 1798, Pedro de Nava appointed the Lieutenant Colonel Juan Bautista
Elguézabal, who also served as Captain of the presidio of the Rio Grande, and more recently as an
Interim Captain at La Bahía, to the post of Assistant Inspector of Presidios, a post vacated by
Colonel Roque Medina.\footnote{780} On September 17, Amangual assured Governor Manuel Muñoz that he
had informed the soldiers under his command of the new appointment.\footnote{781} Later, on December 21,
1798 Amangual traveled in the company of Alférez Manuel Menchaca, both of whom were listed
in the monthly report as paymasters [los Abilitados], along with an escort of one corporal and other
soldiers left the presidio for Saltillo. Ten days later, Amangual compiled yet another list of gifts
conveyed from the paymaster’s office and intended for the Nations of the North from September
through the end of the year 1798. The items included cigarettes given in September; an ox of
Matías Bargas [sic] and cigarettes in October; in November, cigarettes, gunpowder and bullets,
and payment to the blacksmith Manuel Flores for the nailing and ironwork [clavazon y errage
(sic)] of the ten carriages [cureñas] constructed for the artillery of the presidio, and the final item,
a portion of silk. The gifts totaled ninety-four pesos, three granos, 1 real, and the list was signed
by Amangual in San Antonio on December 31, 1798.\footnote{782}

\footnote{778} Nava to Governor of Coahuila, […] Alvarez’ letter […] pensions of widows of soldiers killed […], BA
September 22, 1798
\footnote{779} Morál to Muñoz, […] military widows for collection of allowances, BA November 13, 1798
\footnote{780} Nava to Governor of Texas, […] appointment of [Elguézabal] as Assistant Inspector of presidios, BA August 1,
1798;
\footnote{781} Amangual to Muñoz, [troops and officers of Bexar notified of] Elguézabal’s position as Adjutant Inspector, BA
September 17, 1798
\footnote{782} Proceedings concerning payment for articles supplied to visiting Indians [página 8], BA December 31, 1798
His military superiors had unswervingly relied upon Francisco Amangual for his expertise with the itemization and tabulation of presidial accounts. While it is true that their confidence would be placed with and expected from any presidio paymaster in the execution of his duties, Amangual’s role as trustee for his company is significant in view of the incompetence manifested by and outright illegal transactions of disreputable paymasters in the past and across the colonial borderlands. As we recall from Chapter 3 of this study, the Amangual inventory of the confiscated goods seized from Cortés, Treviño and other presidio soldiers, indexed the essential master data for two key purposes: 1) documenting eye-witness depositions of the alleged contraband, and 2) subsequent ratifications of testimonies by the military personnel involved with the alleged incident that traversed two points of engagement at Natchitoches and Nacogdoches in the summer of 1792.

Amangual must have spent practically all of the last day of the year 1798 fulfilling the same tasks that had underscored the latter part of his military career. Once again, he was called upon to catalogue the inventory of the Tobacco Department managed by the unfortunate Juan Timoteo Barrera, chosen four years earlier as interim paymaster of the Bahía presidio by the collector Arispe. On December 31, the paymaster found six closed crates [cajones] of four hundred eighteen boxes of cigarettes; one closed crate [un caxon (sic) cerrado] with 319 cigars; and, loose tobacco. Four hundred fifty-seven decks of cards, a close crate of gunpowder, a closed tin of gunpowder; and sheets of sealed paper.783 There were eight empty crates that had contained cigarettes, five for gunpowder, two for the cards, and twenty-five loads of burlap [25 cargas de guangoches] in which number is included those that sheltered the closed crates [en cuyo numero estan inclusas las con que se hallan abrigados los caxones (sic) cerrados].784 Amangual also counted a substantial amount of pesos and old currency [moneda bieja (sic)] of all types.785 He certified all of this information, with Gabriel Gutiérrez and Gabriel Gonzales as witnesses present,

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783 Amangual’s affidavit certifying inventory of Tobacco Department managed by […] Barrera, BA January 4, 1799
784 Ibid
785 A few weeks later, Nava ordered Muñoz to publish a proclamation in Texas concerning the prefixed term [of use] for the circulation of old stamped coinage [el termino (sic) prefixado para la circulación de la moneda del antiguo cuño]. Nava to Muñoz, ordering […] proclamation concerning retirement of old coinage, BA January 15, 1799
on January 4, 1799. Three weeks later, Barrera’s father contacted Díaz de la Vega about the possibility of examining the accounts of his son, Timoteo, in order to find a deficit in some quantity of *reales* that would not have to be paid [*se le tomen cuentas … en que lo contempla descubierto en alguna cantidad de reales en que no tiene con que pagar*].

Eventually, Arispe contacted Governor Muñoz, asking that Barrera return to the paymaster of the Béxar presidio the tobacco in his possession [*disponer que el yndicado D(on) Juan Thimoteo (sic) Barrera entregue al oficial abilitado de essa (sic) compan(i)a las expresadas cantidades*]; since he could not pay the sum that he owed to the treasury, Arispe requested documentation of the fifty-percent discount that Amangual needed to receive during the second half of 1799. By the beginning of the year, Arispe received a letter from Elguézabal reporting Luis Galan’s appointment as administrator of the Tobacco Department of Bexar. In this same document, Elguézabal approved Barrera’s detention until his accounts were settled [*esta bien haya Vm. detenido á D(on) Juan Timoteo Barrera para la liquidacion de las quentas pendientes (sic passim)*]. Both men must have been ecstatic that Barrera left for Lampazos in a junket intended to collect debts in order to pay the deficit in his accounts [*Barrera despues de haverseme presentado en esta para la liquidacion (sic …) me pidió licencia para hir (sic) á recaudar a la Punta de Lampazos y otros partidos algunas deudas á su favor*]. Eventually, the raw truth of Barrera’s debt emerged in the amount of five thousand, four hundred twenty pesos, three *reales*, and once *granos*. That damning information clarified much of the financial predicament of the unfortunate Barrera-as-paymaster episode, but when Antonio Ramon de Canalizo and Juan Ysidro Campos sent a co-signed statement charging Barrera, “vecino and diezmero [tithe-collector],” with embezzlement of the Cathedral’s funds in the amount seventy-two pesos, five reales, and nine
granos, and that over the course of eight years Barrera had, even after being reprimanded by the pair, never returned the funds [Barrera (...) debe a la claveria (sic/clavaria) hace mas de ocho años y sin embargo de haverle reconvenido por distintas ocasiones esta (...) no ha logrado, el que satisfaga la citada cantidad].

Consequently, after Barrera made good on a reimbursement of three thousand pesos which he offered to verify upon arrival at the Béxar presidio, he requested an additional three months leave in order to give complete satisfaction to the rest of his overdraft [Barrera se ha ynteresado a que se le den tres meses mas de prolonga para dar complete satisfacion al resto de su descubierto, despues de entregados los 3.000 p(esos) que ofreció verificar a su arribo a esse press(idio) (sic passim)].

The Barrera debacle foregrounds the nature of borderlands society insofar as it explores the relationships between military personnel and the colonial ‘vecino’ population and how jurisdictional boundaries structured these interactions especially when disputes revolving around commerce emerged.

5.7 THE FUERO MILITAR: POWER HAS ITS PRIVILEGES

Kyle McAllister wrote of Spanish colonial military privilege and the ramifications it held for its claimants and of the socio-institutional ruptures that this form of entitlement generated in the administration of justice.

The fuero militar was intended to convey to the military a jurisdiction which had definite limits and which would be exercised with responsibility. Instead, the army, and particularly the militia, regarded its fuero as absolute and, at the same time, as a general license for law evasion.

In 1768, the alcalde mayor of Purificación and Totmatlán, Mariano Pérez y Alamillo, described the character and circumstances of the inhabitants of the province [of Nueva Galicia] as “ignorant and illiterate” and having no understanding of legal principles and procedures. Further, he argued, those enlisted in the militia could not grasp the nature and extent of the privileges and

792 […] Canalizo to Elguézabal, requesting action against […] Barrera, accused of embezzlement while […] collector of tithes of Bexar, BA January 30, 1800
793 Arispe to Elguézabal, […]allow…[…] Barrera an additional three month’s leave to settle personal business, BA February 28, 1800
responsibilities conveyed by the *fuero militar.*” Pérez contended that their ignorance was compounded by the deliberate abuse of military privilege by militia officers.

Though in this instance McAlister specifically speaks to an incident involving the reaction of one civil authority to a directive issued by one commander of a militia, not a *regular,* company. This type of social interplay provides at least a glimpse into the early militarization of the border and its effect on jurisdictional processes of law and order.

The beginning of 1799 saw a proliferation of the distribution of royal ordinances across the colonial borderlands especially concerning officers and cadets in the service of the King. As usual, Nava conveyed the news that the military jurisdiction required knowledge of all the civil and criminal cases of all those individuals covered by the *fuero militar.*

A June 11, 1798 ordinance issued by Secretary Álvarez requested a declaration from Carlos IV about the one of the detachments’ potential for promotion among the first Lieutenants in the infantry, and those of the same rank from the Provincial grenadiers. The former claimed preference in service as opposed to the grenadiers, with the result that the King resorted to his previously issued royal ordinance of June 12, 1795. In that circumstance, the lieutenants of the Artillery corps alternated in service with the first and second lieutenants and did so based upon the seniority recorded in the dates of the royal dispatches. The practice continued since that division of rankings, of first and second lieutenant, could not be established throughout the various corps of the army and militias, as much in Spain as in America.

Another Álvarez communication from the King confirmed the seniority status of cadets in the royal service.

Soldiers who returned to Spain during military employment for a certain length of time, and then required more time, demonstrated with a justifiable motive, had to obtain permission from their superiors or they would not be paid their salaries.

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795 Ibid, 22-23
796 For more on the notion of the “essence of any fuero,” according to the Tribunal of the Consulado in a dispute involving military jurisdiction in mercantile matters, see McAlister, pp 34-39.
797 Nava to Governor of Texas, [...] ordinance ordering military courts to hear all civil and military cases [...] military rights, BA January 17, 1799
798 Nava to Governor of Texas, [...] order concerning precedence of officers by seniority, BA January 17 1799
799 Nava to Elguézabal, [...] royal ordinance concerning seniority of cadets in royal service, BA January 17, 1799
obtener, permiso de los expresados Gefes, sin el qual ó no haviendose presentado en el Puerto de su embarco en el término prefixado, no se les abonarán los sueldos desengados ó desegaren].

Chronic adjustments to military protocol and procedure as described by the aforementioned royal ordinances were symptomatic of the process of bringing organization, maintaining alignment with the larger apparatus of colonialism, and controlling the behavior of the personnel that embodied such an unwieldy bureaucracy. The foregoing developments revealed the fissures inherent in state building, some of which existed before obvious ruptures were exposed by paymaster misbehavior, presidial bankruptcy, reorderings of the military ranking system, and confronting the reality of illegal trade in commercial ventures. All of these episodes of soldier waywardness might not seem so surprising in the context of the twilight of the Spanish colonial empire. Habitual transgressions on the part of the King’s troops in the borderlands have formed a part of the historical trajectory of the Spanish army. Especially now, in the closing years of the eighteenth century, persistent attempts at reform and, even, forcing conformity within the ranks of the military continued unabated. Mitigating the worst offences preserved an ambivalence between the commander and the commanded in a type of uneasy alliance of a community bound by the presumed attributes of honor, respect for authority, and restraint. McAlister commented on the burgeoning capacity of the military, saying

During the closing decades of Spanish dominion, the army, thus created, acquired prestige and power as the defender of the nation in the face of almost constant threats of war and invasion. By the very nature of its functions and constitution it was also a class apart and so regarded itself. The possession of special privileges enhanced its sense of uniqueness and superiority, and at the same time rendered it virtually immune from civil authority.  

By privileging the voices of its key players across various episodes of contention and collaboration, this study has demonstrated the limits of state power and its corrosive effects of the socio-political dynamics of a region in flux.

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800 Nava to Elguézabal, […] royal ordinance concerning departure of officers […] as stipulated in orders, January 18, 1799
801 McAlister, 15
5.8 TRAVELING MAN: AMANGUAL AND THE MONEY

On December 21, 1799 Amangual set out with a corporal and six men for Saltillo, on an apparent trade junket [feriado]\textsuperscript{802} and to retrieve the year’s company funds. This route was well-traveled by presidiales over the centuries but it may have been that Amangual and other seasoned military personnel felt strongly about the need for more soldiers as a protective force on potentially dangerous travel across the borderlands. Only two weeks later, Nava confirmed his receipt of a list prepared by Elguézabal indicating the readiness of thirty vecinos at Béxar, and twenty-five at La Bahía, to serve in the militia and to go out on sorties with the troops when necessary [los vecinos útiles que hay en esa villa y el Presidio de la Bahía, y de que estaban nombrados treinta en la primera, y veinte y cinco en el Segundo para hacer el servicio como milicianos, y salir con la tropa cuando (sic) sea necesario].\textsuperscript{803}

Then, on February 3, Amangual returned to the presidio at San Antonio de Béxar from Saltillo with the company funds [caudales] along with the troops that had accompanied him. On that same day, soldiers left to attempt the capture of five Taguallases that had robbed two horses from the rancho at Candelaria while soldiers from an unspecified Laredo company arrived at Béxar, escorting Fray Francisco Moreno on to Nacogdoches. Comanche men and women also arrived, while nine Taguacanes left for their lands.\textsuperscript{804}

Upon orders from the former governor, Manuel Muñoz, Amangual spent some three hundred ten pesos, three reales and three-eighths of a grano over the course of two years that he had received from Elguézabal for the care and maintenance of the Friendly Indians. Amangual verified this transaction on April 9, 1800. Antonio Baca and Luís Menchaca also verified their respective transactions on this date.\textsuperscript{805} Three weeks later, Amangual is mentioned in receipts indicating more accommodations [subministraciones] provided for Indians with withdrawals from the Mesteñas Fund. One specific report out of many shows Amangual’s expenditures for the

\textsuperscript{802} Monthly report of cavalry division of Béxar, BA January 1, 1800
\textsuperscript{803} Nava to Elguézabal, […] discussing appointment of militia at Béxar and La Bahia, BA January 4, 1800
\textsuperscript{804} Monthly report of the cavalry division of Béxar, BA March 1, 1800
\textsuperscript{805} Report and receipt of payment for presents given to Comanches, Tahuacanas, and Tancahues visiting Béxar, BA April 1, 1800
Friendly Nations of the North [las Naciones Amigas del Norte] from a much earlier time period: January 1794 to July 27, 1799. For example, on June 11, 1794, he withdrew nine hundred eighteen pesos, seven reales, and three granos; on December 30, 1795, another nine hundred thirty-nine pesos, three reales, and six granos. The report also lists the transactions involving Alférez José Gervacio de Silva for his purchases in Saltillo, and payments made to Antonio Rodríguez Baca for corn, and for Alférez Habilitado Manuel Menchaca’s repayment of funds spent by Bernardo Fernández for gifts for the Indians at Nacogdoches.806

5.9 THE NEW CENTURY, THE TWILIGHT OF AN ERA

By the turn of the century, the historical development of the Commandency of the Interior Provinces relied upon other factors, the least of which was the de facto, leading role played by the commandency itself. As Luis Navarro García states, international wars, changes in ideologies across economic and political systems, and the growing tensions of a nascent insurgency began to have repercussions of major significance in the Interior Provinces. Moreover, Navarro García suggests that this period of transformation in the nineteenth century began with the cession of Louisiana to France, and its subsequent conveyance to the United States. The international frontier was now a fact in Texas and the consequences were immediate, including the division in the Commandency itself.807

The invasion of Spain by Napoleon followed and the incarceration of Carlos IV and his son Fernando VII was succeeded by the repression of revolutionary agents and followers of the Emperor. The year 1803 saw a new era of discoveries, chiefly that of mineral deposits, in the far northern reaches of the borderlands. Copper and gold emerged in rich mines in Chihuahua with a corresponding boom in population.808 Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora also began to experiment with a new reactivation of the mining movement; the mine at San Francisco de Asís counted four-thousand five hundred inhabitants, with more than two hundred occupied in the continuous hauling

806 Report of expenditures for Indian presents paid from the Mesteñas Fund, BA May 1, 1800
807 Luis Navarro García, Las provincias internas en el siglo xix (Sevilla: Escuela de estudios hispano-americanos de Sevilla, 1965). 1-4
808 Ibid, 4-5
of water from quite a distance; by February of 1805, miners had extracted two hundred marcos of gold. From December of 1806 to May of 1807, the mines at Cieneguilla produced nine hundred marcos of gold and other sources of copper emerged in places like Las Hornillas, near Mapimi, and La Boca, next to El Gallo.

Indeed, by 1808 Salcedo believed that mining in the Interior Provinces “lacked one of the most essential assistances for its prosperity, which is the rescue on behalf of the Royal Hacienda of the gold and silver that the poor miners need to reduce promptly to cash currency in order to continue the work of the mines [carece de uno de los mas esenciales auxilios para su prosperidad, cual es el rescate por cuenta de Real Hacienda del oro y plata que los mineros pobres necesitan reducir con prontitud a moneda contante para poder continuar las labores de sus minas].” Moreover, ongoing tensions with the emerging world power to its North created a politically volatile environment for the Spanish colonial empire during what can best be described as its twilight era.

From the moment that the United States purchased Louisiana from France in December of 1803, an era of disagreements emerged stemming from boundary disputes between the United States and New Spain. However, as we have already seen, instances of suspicion and mistrust became quite pronounced during the latter years of the 1790s. The intrigues of ‘mustanger’ Philip Nolan put Spanish garrisons and militias across the borderlands -- in places like Texas, Nuevo Santander, Nuevo León, and Coahuila -- on high alert since the American’s forays into that territory was considered a pretext for Anglo investigation of the region east of the Mississippi. Spanish colonial interactions with Nolan, at both the administrative level and at the local level among commanders in the Texas-Louisiana borderlands, had always been complex and a great measure of latitude was consistently advanced toward the adventurer.

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809 Ibid; mark: a weight measure of about one-half pound.
810 Ibid
811 Ibid, 8-9, fn 17
812 Ibid
For example, throughout 1794 and 1795, Nolan’s name figures into several correspondences between commanders and subordinates regarding a range of episodes including Nolan’s search for wild horses, a passport issued to him so that he might deliver furs at La Bahía for the commander general; and, in events related to his eventual apprehension. Then, on November 1, 1798 the itinerant Philip Nolan appeared at the Bahía presidio requesting horses from among the population.\textsuperscript{813} But, at the beginning of the year, Nava instructed Muñoz to aid Nolan in securing stock for Louisiana.\textsuperscript{814} By March 1798, Nava instructed Muñoz to refuse to permit Nolan to introduce goods into Texas.\textsuperscript{815} Then, on November 8, 1800 Elguézabal ordered the arrest of Nolan.

Indicative of his growing concerns about the fiscal impact of French movements across the borderlands, by 1802 Pedro de Nava provided to the Governor of Texas an account of expenditures amounting to one thousand fifty-three pesos that were spent on the maintenance and travel expenses of the Spanish and Anglo American companions of Nolan.\textsuperscript{816}

Only two years earlier, the Marqués de Casa Calvo in New Orleans assured the Governor of Texas Juan Bautista de Elguézabal that his best efforts from the east would be deployed in order to restrain French and American interlopers from the Texan frontiers. Further, Casa Calvo insisted that he had given the most precise orders needed to contain the borders of Spanish territory from clandestine entrances.\textsuperscript{817} From Nacogdoches, Miguel Moral sent to Elguézabal a copy of a more recent letter by Governor Casa Calvo who reported attempts to prevent another episode of foreign aggression. The Governor indicated that at the beginning of the year presented him the opportunity to give the tightest orders so as to report about an assault committed by the English and the French 

\textit{[al principio de este año se presentó oportunidad para el puesto Arkansas he dado las ordenes mas estrechas para que se informe sobre el atentado cometido por los Yngleses y franceses] along}

\textsuperscript{813} Monthly report of the Presidio of La Bahía, BA November 30, 1798
\textsuperscript{814} Nava to Governor of Texas, instructing him to aid Nolan […], BA January 9, 1798
\textsuperscript{815} Nava to Governor of Texas, refusing to permit Nolan to introduce goods into Texas, BA March 20, 1798
\textsuperscript{816} Nava to Elguézabal, BA January 30, 1802
\textsuperscript{817} Casa Calvo to Elguézabal, promising to restrain Americans and French from entering Texas, BA March 10, 1800
with the Arkansas, Cherokee, and Chicachas [Chickasaw?]. The aggressors were apprehended and brought to the capital at Nacogdoches for their punishment. He suspected that they were habitants of the American party that had passed on the river without knowledge of the commander and their action left him no other recourse but to reissue severe orders to contain whites and Indians, which began to be very difficult because of the lack of gifts which had been cut off [luego que los agresores seran aprendidos, y remitidos a esta capital para su castigo: rezeló (sic) sin embargo sean habitants del partido Americano q(u)e hayan pasado el rio, sin conocimiento del comandante, y en este caso no me queda otro arbitrio que el de repetir severas ordenes para contener blancos, é indios, lo que comienza á ser muy dificil por la falta de regalos, que se van cortando]. 818

Because of the vicinity of the American posts whose borders came to the front of the Colorado River, Casa Calvo feared that all of the measures taken by the Government were illusory [temo hagan ilusorias todas las providencias del gobierno]. 819 One senses a certain desperation, or, dissatisfaction on the part of Casa Calvo and his contending with all of these variables. However, he reassured Governor Elguézabal that he did his part and, furthermore, he promised that, in his replies to him, along with complying with the orders of the King, both required the harmony and good correspondence between the provinces of Louisiana and Texas. 820

Two months earlier, however, on February 2, 1802, Nava notified Elguézabal that permission was granted to a Francois DuBois to establish a mill to remove the seeds from cotton [molino de despepitar algodon] in Coahuila. At the same time another Frenchman, Alexandre Dupon, was allowed to survey the mines in the mountains of the Tahuayas as a result of a dispatch of the Royal Tribunal of Mining in Mexico. In this case, Nava directed the Governor to grant the

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818 Moral to Elguézabal, […] Casa Calvo’s […] reporting attempts to prevent aggression by the English, Americans, and allied Indians […], BA April 26, 1800
819 Ibid
820 Ibid
license that was requested by Dupon but insisted that the Frenchman provide the results of all of his operations to Elguézabal, which he in turn was to forward to Nava.821

The westward ambitions and expansionist views of President Jefferson were well known before, and after, Nolan’s execution in 1801, and the pursuit of Nolan’s friend Robert Ashley became a chief preoccupation two years later. It became clear that the North Americans were moving rapidly in their quest to explore the interior of the continent all the way to the Pacific. Comandante General Salcedo ordered the governor of New Mexico to organize a small expedition that would accomplish two objectives: the first, to ratify a peace treaty with the indigenous communities, especially the Pananas (Comanches) along the Missouri River, and to covertly survey the land up to the shores of that river.822 When the Spanish agent in New Orleans, the aforementioned Marqués de Casa Calvo, obtained the news that Meriwether Lewis had received instructions from President Jefferson to make observations along the Missouri River, General Salcedo gave orders on May 3, 1803. These were sent to the governor of New Mexico, Chacon, to quickly dispatch some interpreters and friendly Comanche with the simple mission of affirming peace between the allied Indians and to observe the movements of Lewis. However, nothing else could be attempted before so urgent a notice, since by that time Lewis was already at the confluence of the Mississippi and the Missouri rivers.823

5.10 THE TURN OF THE CENTURY: LIFE BACK AT THE PRESIDIO

In January 1800, Juan Bautista de Elguézabal issued a report listing the activities, the stock of supplies, and total troop force in place at the Royal Presidio at San Antonio de Béjar during the previous month. During this period, the presidio lacked a Captain, and seven soldiers were listed as “invalid,” meaning that in one way or the other they were unavailable for service. The presidio’s armaments were in good condition for service and the reserve supply consisted of thirty-nine

821 Nava to Governor of Texas, granting permission for […] Dubois [and] Dupont, BA February 2, 1802
822 Navarro García, 26-27
823 Ibid 28
shotguns, twenty-two pairs of pistols, and twenty-nine blades for lances [cuchillas de lanza].\textsuperscript{824} The monthly report contained as well a diary of sorts; in this case, the Elguézabal report, generated on the first day of the first month of the first year of a new century and millennia, represents a microcosm of presidial life whereas the earlier diaries of expeditions recounted events across a far wider trajectory across time and geographic space.

On December 1, the presidio’s corporal and six soldiers arrived carrying the outside ground mail [conduciendo la correspondencia de tierra fuera]; the next day, two men from the Bahía presidio left with the mail bag – presumably, the same one used the day before to bring in the mail – and the troop drilled with seventeen men.\textsuperscript{825} In the next few days, indigenous people representing numerous tribes appeared at the presidio for various reasons: on the third of December, Lipan Apaches headed by the well-known Captain ‘Chiquito\textsuperscript{826},’ arrived with one of their people wounded, telling the presidiales that the Comanche had killed two of their own, including four women and, apparently, their entire horse herd. However, by December 5, eight Comanche including three women departed; the day before, four Comanche including one woman had arrived. Throughout the month, other indigenous groups would present themselves at the presidio, such as a Captain Hoyoso ['pitted,' probably a reference to a pock-marked face] with three of his nation [con tres de su nación] and later, a larger group consisting of Taguacanes [Tawakonis], Taguallases, and Guchitas [Wichitas]. During the last two weeks of the month, other Comanche made additional appearances at the presidio, as well.\textsuperscript{827}

The amount of activity that took place at the Texas presidios, especially those at La Bahía and at Béxar, suggested its emergence as a kind of international hub of sorts for multiple

\textsuperscript{824} Elguézabal’s monthly report of the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, BA January 1, 1800. In the absence of a captain, the Governor of Texas was obliged to produce the monthly report for the comandante inspector, Pedro de Nava.
\textsuperscript{825} Ibid
\textsuperscript{826} Chiquito’s appearances in three documents held at the Béxar Archives concern his alleged theft of cattle from the mission at Bahía Santo, his request for gifts for his people from the Captain Bernardo Fernández, and his negotiations with the Governor of Texas for peace with the Lipan Apaches. See BA, July 8, 1798; BA, August 26, 1793; and, BA, September 12, 1793.
\textsuperscript{827} Elguézabal’s monthly report of the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, BA January 1, 1800.
interactions with people representing many ‘nations.’ In this potent social climate the necessity emerged for the transfer of one soldier with a particular skill set from the presidio at Río Grande (Coahuila), a Francisco Chaves [sic], to one of the presidios in Texas, most likely either La Bahía or Béxar. Chaves was selected to act as an interpreter since he was fluent or, at least, relatively familiar with the languages of the Comanche and Taboaya people to the degree that his special knowledge would be considered highly valuable. The governor of Coahuila was agreeable to the transfer but Nava wanted an agreement from Chaves, as well. If the soldier agreed to move to Texas, Elguézabal was to release him to travel to his new assignment.  

Apparently, the offer was appealing to Chaves who, by March 1802, was traveling alongside the Comanche captains Sojas and Yzarat for an interview with the comandante general Pedro de Nava. And for good measure, Nava encouraged the Governor -- whom he assumed knew the ‘character’ [carácter] of the group -- to make certain that the least amount of the Captains’ associates accompany the party since their number was known to make various annoying demands [advirtiendoles trahigan [sic] el menos numero de individuos de su nación que les sea posible, pues yá conoce Ud su carácter, y que es regular que cada uno promueva varias molestas pretenciones].

At other times, soldiers from other presidios made stops at the Béxar precinct while en route to other places. This was the case when three soldiers that came from Nacogdoches left to complete their journey to La Bahía. On most days, nothing remarkable occurred [sin novedad] and drills were conducted almost every day of the month. On December 21, 1799 then-Lieutenant Francisco Amangual left with a corporal and six soldiers for the villa of Saltillo, on a day that was apparently a religious holiday. Then, by December 29, Elguézabal indicated that “the corporal and six men returned” with the mailbag containing the ground mail, but there is no indication that Amangual was with the group. However, the March 1 military report indicated that Amangual

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828 Nava to Elguézabal, BA February 4, 1800
829 Nava to Governor of Texas, permitting Comanche captains to visit Nava with […] Chávez, BA March 2, 1802
830 Elguézabal’s monthly report of the presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, BA January 1, 1800
831 Ibid
had returned to Béxar the following month, on Feb 3, with the presidio company’s funds; he was accompanied by the same number of troops that had originally left with him, having the same rank, but it is not clear whether these six men were Amangual’s original travel partners.832

5.11 FRANCISCO AMANGUAL: FORTY YEARS (AND COUNTING) OF SERVICE TO THE KING AND THE COMPANIA VOLANTE DE SAN CARLOS DE PARRAS

Up to this point in his military career, and after two instances of accusations by his presidial comrades, Francisco Amangual had, nevertheless, distinguished himself in his duties as paymaster of the Béxar company, and in his capacity as alférez. By 1802, he had reached the rank of first lieutenant, and had completed forty years in the military service for Spain. When his commanding officer, Juan Bautista de Elguézabal, wrote of Amangual’s performance in a military record, he indicated that the lieutenant had demonstrated distinguished bravery, plenty of effort, and honorable conduct. Elguézabal also credited Amangual with medium ability and skill in his duties.833

On January 15, 1803, having been promoted to the rank of Captain and in command of the compañía volante of San Carlos de Parras, Amangual produced a military performance report for Juan Bautista de Elguézabal, who also filled the role of Governor of Texas. He described some of his soldiers in the following way:

El teniente Don Dionicio Valle tiene bastante valor, poca inteligencia en papeles, mucho amor al servicio, buena disposición en el mando, capaz de desempeñar cualquiera comisión que se le confiera. Al alférez Don Francisco Adam834 se le ha conocido bastante valor, tiene la mejor conducta, apto para el mando, bastante talento, ynteligente en papeles, y capaz de desempeñar otro empleo mayor que el que disfruta. El primer sargento José Mendes tiene bastante valor y disposicion para el mando, ninguna inteligencia en papeles, y apto para exercer cualquiera

832 Ibid, BA March 1, 1800
834 Three other documents in the Bexar Archives concern Francisco Adam. The original creators of two of the documents definitely wrote his surname ending with the letter “n,” and not “m,” as one might presume the Spanish-origin name would be spelled. However, the descriptions of each of these documents contained in the Bexar Archives Online indicate the name as “Adam.”

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comisión, a esepcion del manejo de ynterezes. El sargento secundo Felipe Arciniega tiene también bastante valor, aptitud para el mando promete bastantes esperanzas por su celo y amor al servicio, sabe perfectamente todas las evoluciones del ejercicio y el cumplimiento de su obligación, mas nada propio para correr con ynterezes. El de la misma clase Vicente Tarín tiene mucho valor, apto para desempeñar cualquiera comision, escepta la de ynterezes, es mas inteligente que el anterior en papeles, sabe con perfeccion el cumplimiento de su obligacion, exacto en el servicio, y manda con donaire el ejercicio de ynfantería, y caballería. El Cadete Don José María de Arze: su valor no conocido, su conducta mediana, poca aplicacion al Servicio, nada propio para mandar partidas, ni correr con Ynterezes, su trato reputar con la Tropa quiera efectos de su mosedad.

San Antonio Valero 15 de enero de 1803,
Francisco Amangual (rubrica). 

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Then, one month later, on February 15, 1803 comandante general Nemesio Salcedo determined that thirty-three of the one hundred positions of the compañía volante of San Carlos de Parras (including the aforementioned Francisco Adam[n] and Sergeant Vicente Tarín) had to be transferred from their detachment to Nueva Vizcaya, and he directed Amangual to comply with his resolution. After this same company marched to Texas, fourteen of their number left to various destinations, but Salcedo reasoned that these same men had to be counted [Quando la misma comp(añi)a marchó para esa Prov(inci)a, quedaron en diversos destinos catorce hombres de ella, los quales ha de contar Vm como existentes aqui p(ar)a cobre este núm(er)o completar los referidos treinta y tres: que es decir q(u)e ademas del Alférez Adam y Sarg(en)to Tarín se deven
nombrar diez y siete hombres de los que se hallan en esa Provincia] also, presumably as part of the entire force and, equally, as though they were still in Chihuahua (Nueva Vizcaya).836

In order to complete the tally of the aforementioned thirty-three soldiers of the volante unit, which included Adam and Tarín, seventeen more men had to be appointed from those there in Coahuila. In this number, and for this very reason, Joséph Olguín, Nicolas Soto, Francisco Planes and Nicholas Tomé, all of whom left their families in the villa of San Gerónimo, were to be informed that it was appropriate for them to join their families [que dejaron sus familias en la Villa de San Gerónimo (sic) y conviene se unan á ellas; cuya advert(enci)a hago a Ud. q(u)e la tenga mui presente]. Since the stated number of troops comprised a third of the total force of the volante company, Salcedo reasoned that within that number it was understood to have three corporals, bearing in mind that Rafael Soto, Santiago López, and Joséph [sic] Nava also had their families at San Gerónimo [Como el enunciado num(er)o de tropa compone una tercera parte de la total fuerza de dicha comp(añ)ía, es consiguiente q(u)e en el se comprendan tres cavos, y teniendo igualm(en)te sus familias en S(a)n Gerónimo Rafael Soto, Santiago Lopez (sic), y Joseph Nava].837 It was from these men that were to be appointed from there in Coahuila, since even though a Corporal named Ildefonso Galavis stayed, Salcedo was to determine if he were to join up with his company, here unidentified. This could only happen when he returned from the service where he was detached at the time the commander general wrote this letter.838

Salcedo recommended that Lieutenant Francisco Adán should be in charge of the troop destined for Chihuahua, and that Captain Francisco Amangual would formally deliver the accounts of the troops, as well as the report on the horses, the mules, armament, and the rest of the articles of clothing of each individual [El Alferez deve hacer carga de la trop destinada a esta villa y bajo tal concepto hara Ud. q(u)e el Capitan D(o)n Fran(cis)co Amangual le entregue formal(en)te las cuentas de ella, asi como tambien una relacion de los caballos y mulas de silla armam(en)to y

836 Nemesio Salcedo to Governor of Texas, ordering the return to Chihuahua of a detachment from the flying company of San Carlos de Parras, BA February 15, 1803
837 Ibid
838 Ibid
Salcedo cautioned Muñoz to make certain that Alférez Adán transported the money needed for the care and other needs of the troops of his command [En el concepto de que cuidará Um que el Alférez Adán conduzca el dinero necesario para socorros y demas atenciones de la tropa de su cargo.] However, it is more likely that veteran soldier Amangual had as much to do with the guidance of Adan and the assurance that the alférez would comply with Muñoz’s orders as it did when Salcedo placed his trust in him.

In this same letter to Elguézabal, the General gave the governor further instructions revealing his concern for the well-being of the company in their journey:

No siendo partida suficiente la que trahe dicho oficial para hacer el viage en derechura del presidio de Agua Verde al del Norte, le advertirá Vm. que desde el primero de los citados puestos pida derrotero al Coronel Don Antonio Cordero y que en su marcha se arregle á el que le diere (sic passim). [Not being sufficient group which he brought to do the travel directly from the presidio at Aguaverde to the [presidio of the] North, I advise you that from the first of these military posts, ask Coronel Antonio Cordero for the route and that in your journey settle upon the course that he gives you]

As we have already seen, when detachments were sent out, the result was that insufficiencies were felt elsewhere. Even as these types of inconveniences occurred, replete with their great potential for attacks and losses, officers and commanders communicated their best words of advice that could mitigate the potential for placing the presidio and its inhabitants in a vulnerable state. It served in a small way to prevent indecision stemming from future episodes of these necessary maneuvers.

On February 21, Captain Amangual reported that five days earlier a group of Comanche had robbed nine animals and killed two – including the Carancuahua named ‘Patricio,’ – from the Refugio mission and had entered in a corner of the site where the horse herd was kept [El día 21 del corriente se robaron los Yndios 9 bestias y mataron dos de la mission del Refugio, y

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839 Ibid
840 Ibid
841 Nemesio Salcedo to Governor of Texas, ordering the return to Chihuahua of a detachment from the flying company of San Carlos de Parras, BA February 15, 1803
842 Identified in a follow-up letter from Salcedo to Elguézabal, March 1, 1803; but, not in this one.
843 Ibid
entraron en el rincon de dicha mission donde estaba la caballada de esta]. He sent alférez Antonio Cadena twenty troops and nine vecinos in pursuit [mandé al Alférez D. Antonio Cadena con 20 homb(ros) de tropa, y nuebe (sic) vecinos en su seguimiento] of the raiders; the diary of the event was enclosed with the letter for Elguézabal’s understanding. It is not certain how the outcome of this attack on the mission played out. When comandante general Salcedo was informed of the events at Refugio, he responded on March 1 to Elguézabal indicating that he approved of the reinforcement of the mission’s company with eight men – most likely a detachment of the volantes – that was then sent out for the pursuit of the Comanche that followed. Amangual issued the order for the chase since, apparently, at that time he was the commander of the presidio at La Bahía. On March 3, Amangual reported the departure of three soldiers of the Bahía company as escorts for Father José María Sáenz to Béxar; the men were supplied for eight days [ban (sic) socorridos por ocho dias]. One week later, Amangual transmitted a summary of the proceedings in the case of a soldier that had deserted. Amangual’s one page message was necessarily brief since his summary was incomplete due to his anticipating further instructions from Elguézabal [lo que no se concluirá hasta que Usted determine lo que sucede de su agrado].

Then, on April 11, 1803 Salcedo acknowledged Elguézabal’s list of individual soldiers who had distinguished themselves in a February 1 campaign under the command of Lieutenant Juan Ignacio Arrambide. The comandante general wanted the Governor to ensure that Sergeant

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844 Amangual to Elguézabal, BA February 26, 1803. Indeed, some of the information missing in this letter can be found in the aforementioned March 1 letter; we learn the identity of the Indian tribes at the mission and of those that raided, and the name of the Carancahua (from the mission) who was killed.
845 Salcedo to Elguézabal, approving steps [to reinforce] Refugio Mission [… ] Comanche attack, BA March 1, 1803
846 Amangual to Elguézabal, reporting departure of soldiers escorting [… ] BA March 3, 1803
847 Amangual to Elguézabal, […] summary proceedings in case of Pedro Castañeda, deserter, BA March 12, 1803
848 Salcedo to Governor of Texas, […] list naming soldiers worthy of praise for bravery in action, BA April 11, 1803. The list was generated by Elguézabal (not identified as such) in a document dated almost one month before; List of soldiers cited for bravery, BA March 12, 1803. Arrambide was an interesting character among the presidial soldiers of the colonial borderlands. By August 1797, he was under investigation for embezzlement of funds from the Bahía presidio under his command. Then, in October of that same year, impeachment proceedings and an investigation of his wrongful activities were underway. Proceedings against Juan Ignacio Arrambide of La Bahía, charged with embezzlement, BA, August 21 [– Oct], 1797; Impeachment and investigation [of] Arrambide charged with malversion of funds as commander of La Bahía, BA October 3, 1797. However, bad feelings rarely lasted for very long on the colonial frontier; in March 1803, Arrambide was appointed defense lawyer of the deserter Pedro Castaneda, news reported by Amangual to Governor Elguézabal. Amangual to Elguézabal, […] appointment of […] Arrambide as defense lawyer in case of Pedro Castaneda, deserter, BA March 4, 1803
Vicente Tarín and the rest of the company knew of his appreciation, for the soldiers to bear in mind that he would promote them, and that he had no doubts of their continued enthusiastic and brave conduct that they were credited with in the campaign \[no dudo continuarán portandos con el zelo y valor que acreditaron en la referida accion: siendo advertencia que la nota en la oja de servicio y filiaciones de los interesados debe extenderse en los propios terminos que resulta calificado su respectivo merito y expresa la mencionada relacion (sic passim)\]849

Throughout the first half of 1803, Amangual exchanged correspondence with the comandante general Elguézabal on a wide variety of occurrences, some so seemingly inconsequential as to appear hardly worth the documentation. However, these documents illuminate not only the importance of recording everyday tasks and the personnel involved in routine events, but also the apparent significance of documenting all episodes of a multitude of transactions occurring throughout the borderlands. This type of testimony linked much of the inter-presidio system of governance and reveals the socially charged variables in disparate forms of official communication.

On April 13, Amangual informed Elguézabal that seven men including one corporal were escorting mules coming from Béxar and bringing seed (grain) for the company at La Bahía. 850 That same day, Elguézabal informed Cordero that the “current” Captain of the Bahía presidio, Amangual had examined the presidial accounts. 851 Ten days later, Amangual transmitted the judicial records that he had assembled for noting if the forty-eight cargo animals seized from the “mulato Denis” were transported illegally \[se conducían clandestinamente\] to Louisiana. In the meantime, Denis was being held as an inmate in the presidio’s jail \[entretanto queda el mencionado Denis en calidad de preso con el Presidio por cárcel\]. 852 On that same day, Amangual

849 Ibid; \[being a preface in the notes of their service and military file their performance needs to be written out in the proper terms so that it turns out to be noted in regards to merit and expresses the aforementioned report\].
850 Amanguel to Elguézabal, reporting minor military details, BA April 13, 1803
851 Elguézabal to Cordero, transmitting Amangual’s examination of presidial accounts, BA April 13, 1803. The designation of “actual capitán” is significant since this document is the only one that I have encountered in the Béxar Archives that specifically addresses the rank and location of Amangual, and his signature, in correspondence from this presidio. Thus, it verifies that he was the captain – perhaps, interim -- of this garrison at that specific time.
852 Amangual to Elguézabal, transmitting records in case of mulatto Denis, BA April 23, 1803
asked Elguézabal for a description of a fugitive priest that had apparently arrived in Texas in 1801; then, he transmitted a census report of the thieves among the foreigners and outsiders [los ladrones de los extrangeros (sic) y forasteros existentes en este presidio] that the comandante general had ordered.

On May 1, 1803, Nemesio Salcedo directed that the Corporal Yldefonso Galavés of the Álamo de Parras company – presumably the flying squadron of that unit – was to be in charge of leading the troops and families that lived in the villa of San Gerónimo as far as San Antonio de Béxar. Galavés was to take particular care to effect the departure, ordered and arranged in the manner that went with the assignment, and without allowing for any individual of the group to take leave nor to remain in the towns along the way unless one of them is prevented from continuing on the journey by illness. Galavés would have to qualify this type of mishap with certification from the Justice of the stop where it occurred so that the Governor of Texas was satisfied of the just cause that had obligated them to leave that person on the road [celará cuidadamente que practique su marcha hasta San Antonio de Béxar con el buen orden y arreglo que corresponde, sin permitir que persona alguna de la comitiva se supone ni quede en los pueblos del tránsito a menos que alguna de ellos se imposibilitará por enfermedad, se continuar el viaje, cuyo accidente calificará con certificación del Justicia del paraje en que ocurría para satisfacer al Governador de la provincial de Texas, de la justa causa que ha obligado a dejarla en el camino]. Under this idea, Galavés was to be held responsible for all the mistakes in which the individuals under his charge incurred and the punishment was to apply irretrievably [bajo el concepto de que el expresado Galavis (sic) será responsable de todas las faltas en que incurran los individuos que conduce a su cargo, y que se le aplicará irremisiblemente la pena a que por ella se haga acrehedor].

853 Amangual to Elguézabal, asking for a description of a fugitive priest, BA April 23, 1803
854 Amangual to Elguézabal, transmitting census report of foreigners in La Bahía, BA April 23, 1803
855 Nemesio Salcedo’s instructions for removal of troops and families from Parras to Bexar, BA May 1, 1803
5.12 The Year 1804: Correspondence, Relocations, and Departures

By the beginning of the New Year, a letter from Governor Elguézabal to Amangual indicated that an order had been sent from Salcedo to Captain Francisco Viana, the assistant inspector of the troops of Texas. In that January 23, 1804 order, which began ‘As to the sumaria drawn up in the case against Juan José López [...]’ they had just sent it to Salcedo at the villa [of Béxar] from the province of Coahuila. It will be recalled that Amangual had waited for a response from Elguézabal regarding a sumaria that Amangual created for the 1803 desertion case of Pedro Castañeda; it seems that now further patience was required for a response from the commander general regarding this case of an unspecified nature.856

We have already seen how the presidio continued to function as a hub of international dimensions, representing a way station for soldiers in transit and as an entity for indigenous communities to receive gifts in the form of replenishment of supplies including food. A report generated by José Joaquín de Ugarte reveals the composition of the detachment of Nacogdoches with its soldiers representing no less than two Tejano presidial companies: Béxar (16), Bahía (15), and one Coahuilense, Álamo [de Parras, Coahuila] (1) for a total of thirty-two men.857 However, there are entries in Ugarte’s report that are particularly compelling since it becomes evident that the borderlands also represented a liminal space in which individual migrants could claim, or at least, attempt to gain a foothold towards transforming their own lives. A man named ‘Bensan Misiel’ returned from New Orleans and went on to Nacogdoches to finish his business, unspecified; a deserter from the American troops, Miguel Bruno, described as an Irishman, arrived bringing information that New Orleans had been turned over by the Spaniards to the French on November 30, and in turn, the French turned it over to the Americans on December 15th, 1803. José de la Buaze left for San Antonio with two French servants, two slaves, two hired men, and a hunter; and, an American with his family, all natives of Louisiana and Catholic, arrived with a

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856 Drafts of [Elguézabal’s] letters to Amangual, transmitting orders concerning Parras company, BA January 23, 1804. In fact, there is no such information in the original letter which is merely a half-page of scribbled notes. As such, the identifying information for this document is incorrect.

desire to relocate to Nacogdoches. Finally, Corporal Castro returned from a trip he made to carry provisions to the Trinity River.858

Americans appear in several reports and their emergence is interesting for reasons related to the business that they conducted while at the Nacogdoches presidio. Its Captain Ugarte would later describe news of the transfer of New Orleans as emanating from reliable information, except that he then reported to Governor Elguézabal that the “Anglo-Americans” would receive the province from the French on December 25, not the 15th as the “Irishman” Bruno had indicated. Ugarte conjectured that the Americans would begin taking possession of all the towns belonging to Louisiana, and that it would not be long before they would do the same thing in the case of Natchitoches. Therefore, as he stated to Elguézabal, he planned to go to that town to watch the way the transfer would be done since he had doubts as to the dividing line between the Texas and Louisiana. He assured the Governor that he would abide by what was customary and what Elguézabal had instructed him to do in a letter of December 4, 1803.859

On January 28, 1804, when the “American” native of Louisiana and, apparently, Catholic Apostolic came in with his family desiring to relocate to Texas, Ugarte indicated that this man departed immediately to secure authentic documents so as to present them as proof of his legitimate goals.860 Desertion by Americans was cause for suspicion for provincial administrators. Captain Ugarte warned Elguézabal to exercise caution in handling Americans ostensibly seeking refuge as deserters of the American army. Apparently, Alférez José Maria Guadiana had contacted the Governor about this very issue; a response from commandante general Salcedo outlined the practice followed in Louisiana where it concerned American deserters and Ugarte intended to follow those instructions. He indicated that he thought these presumed deserters would not seek asylum in the Louisiana frontier but instead get themselves to ‘that capital’ [presumably San

Antonio de Béxar], or to Monclova. Ugarte suggested that more than one of their number could cause them “trouble” and not be “quite satisfactory” for the nation.861

For others, their service in the borderlands was quite enough. At this same time, some *presidiales* desired to leave the military service and made their wishes known to Ugarte, as did those soldiers wishing to re-enlist. Ignacio Pereda, José de la Garza and José Luis Maldonado did not wish to reenlist and consequently each asked for a discharge. Similarly, Manuel Ortiz did not wish to re-enlist but asked to be credited with a horse charge to him from the remount [*remuda*] of wild horses but which he claimed to have not taken. However, Francisco Galván re-enlisted for four years, but petitioned for two month’s leave; Juan de la Cruz Montalla re-enlisted for three years, and also petitioned for two month’s leave with pay from the retention fund. Only Agustín San Miguel requested placement on the invalid [*invalido*] list since his lameness resulted from a fall during his time of service.862

Fluctuation in the ranks of the borderlands garrison would continue through manifold strategies effectuated by the soldiers, like Pereda, Garza, and Maldonado, requesting a discharge, and those resorting to their own brand of escape, which included exiting the army by desertion. Changes in the Interior Provinces resulted from administrative strategies in an effort to provide innovations useful to the Royal service. For example, modifications included the 1804 division of the ten *provincias internas* into two general commandancies of equal representation but distinguished by the denomination of that of the West, and, of the East.863 Nevertheless, for some soldiers, change could be far less profound and, given the ongoing mundanity of their responsibilities, might even seem hardly noticeable.

861 Ugarte to Elguézabal, […] precautions needed against entry of Americans posing as deserters, BA February 4, 1804
862 Ugarte’s list of soldiers at Nacogdoches requesting leave, BA February 4, 1804
5. 13 MANAGING THE FLYING SQUADRON OF SAN CARLOS DE PARRAS: THE IMMINENT EXPEDITION

On February 11, 1804 Amangual sent by way of the paymaster of his company, three thousand, one hundred and four pesos, two reales to Governor Elguézabal. This amount constituted the balance left on December 31, 1803 from the expense fund for the company of San Carlos de Parras, at this time under his care. The sergeant Felipe Arciniega turned over the funds to the Governor and they were deposited into the storage box held there at Béxar, as per the instructions of the Commandante General.\textsuperscript{864}

It is at this time that the San Carlos company emerges in the customary form of the monthly recording of events that transpired at the presidial company of San Antonio de Béxar during February 1804. On the fifth of the month, a corporal and six soldiers that had gone with the unidentified paymaster [habilitado] of the company of the Álamo to Saltillo, returned with a half year’s supply for the troops. Then, on the fifteenth, a corporal with four soldiers of the Béxar company and that of Parras were sent with the outgoing mail. Ten days later, on February 25, due to information of the theft of six horses from the ranch of the Sambranos by the Indians, a Sergeant Melchor Rodríguez, along with twenty men from the Béxar company including those of Parras and Bahía companies, were sent in pursuit. When this group returned on February 28, they reported that they had seen the Indian thieves scattering and running away into the hills with the booty. However, the presidiales were unable to follow their tracks any further because they were confused by those left by wild horses. While the soldiers thought the thieves were Comanche, the presumed perpetrators took a very different route from that which their nation usually took when returning. The next day, a corporal with four soldiers of this company and that of the Parras unit were detailed to carry the outgoing mail.\textsuperscript{865} When the corporal from the Bexar company and the paymaster of the Álamo company returned, Elguézabal sent a notebook containing a record of the supplies issued to the San Carlos de Parras (Álamo) and their cost: four-hundred thirty seven pesos, seven reales, and six granos, to be paid by the royal treasury at Saltillo. Since the paymaster furnished

\textsuperscript{864} Correspondence between Amangual to Elguézabal, […] San Carlos de Parras, BA February 11, 1804
\textsuperscript{865} [Elguézabal’s] monthly report of military operations and events at Béxar, March 1, 1804
the supplies, the cost would come from the allocation of the next half year’s funds for the company. 866

Provisioning and supplying the troops on the colonial frontier had historically presented challenges for commanders and paymasters as has been noted in the previous chapters of this study. Meeting the supply and demand of replacing soldiers for his company was an equally challenging task for Captain Amangual. In some cases, the soldier had to go. When Miguel Pando petitioned to be transferred from company to which he belonged, perhaps the Álamo squadron, he must have not been entirely truthful about his years of service. Amangual indicated to Governor Elguézabal that Pando’s claim was inaccurate; instead, he had served three years, nine months, and fifteen days. Pando charged Amangual with prejudging him based upon a negative critique by a sergeant within the same company. Amangual responded, with a certain amount of indignation, saying that Pando had no foundation for making that claim since he had never had any bad treatment from Amangual nor had the captain allowed any idea of it to even be imagined. 867

Furthermore, as Amangual stated in his message to Elguézabal

I have reprimanded him only mildly, and sometimes arrested him, not punishing him harshly but being lenient because of the lack of subordination he shows toward the sergeants and corporals of the said company and also because of his being guilty on more than one occasion of disposing of the animals and equipment issued to him and perhaps selling them or aiding other persons in the troops to do so. Therefore, I will in no way oppose his being transferred from this post if it be left to my decision. 868

Three days after issuing his response to the Pando request for transfer, Amangual reported the desertion of José Arellanes from the detachment under the command of Lieutenant José Músquiz. Arellanes was from Amangual’s company and had carried off his arms, his mount, his clothing, and a horse belonging to Ignacio López, a fellow company member. It seems that Arellanes was in debt to the military department; he had five horses and mules that were now in the custody of

866 [Elguézabal] to Amangual, transmitting military accounts of company of San Carlos, BA March 8, 1804
867 Amangual to Governor of Texas, […] term of services of Miguel Pando, San Antonio de Valero, BA April 20, 1804
868 Ibid
Amangual, who asked Elguézabal if, from the proceeds of the sale of these horses, he could pay for the one belonging to López and stolen by Arellanes.869

At the age of sixty-five, Francisco Amangual had experienced a wide array of both, significant successes, and bitter disappointments, across his forty-year career in the military. Most of these experiences register his, and other soldiers’, stakes in the frontier community. Their ventures in the army reinforced the notion of personal and professional investment incurred from the demands of a life in the presidio that often left them, individually and collectively, the recipients of far fewer rewards than losses. In this study, I have tried to understand if devotion to duty, especially as it was prescribed by evolving ‘reglamentos,’ ordenanzas, and other official mandates, (and whose collective content was expected to be thoroughly absorbed by its target audience of soldiers and commanders on the ground), was not enough of a powerful motivator for its participants? I have attempted to make sense of the actuality that dedication could be usurped, by Urrutia, Cortés, and Barrera, by what they and others perceived to be necessary -- if often extralegal -- adjustments to the harsh realities of life on the frontier. Did it become apparent to even the most otherwise conscientious-minded military men, like Elguézabal, Amangual, and Salcedo, that the advantages of negotiation, accommodation, and perhaps even a deliberate bending of the rules, might be necessary to ensure survival in these same spaces?

All indicators point to the understanding that, for several reasons, such seemingly counterproductive activity among the King’s troops had its advantages. Even as the colonial apparatus in the Américas and especially in its far northern reaches was unraveling, the military institution had grown exponentially across the borderlands. The King’s extension of the military fuero and his extraordinarily benevolent pardons, both general and more specifically oriented, manifested the expanding authority of the army and even the frontier militias. In this era of impending governmental cleavages and political upheavals with repercussions that would traverse the Atlantic, some things remained the same. As we shall see in the next and final chapter, for

869 Amangual to Elguézabal, […] desertion of José Arellanes of the company of Béxar, San Antonio de Valero, BA April 23, 1804
Amangual changes abroad were only incrementally experienced while the everyday tasks of managing his flying company, caring for his soldiers, and performing the routine procedures of his office continued unabated in the face of imminent larger transformations across the Far North.
Chapter Six

On January 1, 1804, Elguézabal generated his company’s monthly report of the military operations and events that had occurred at Béxar during December 1803. On the 4th of that month, a corporal of the company of San Carlos de Parras, along with a carbiner of the Béxar company, and soldiers from the Bahía and Aguaverde presidios left for Nacogdoches as an escort for the wife of commandant Ugarte. Only a week and a half later, Elguézabal’s report indicates that Alférez Guadiana left for Monclova with a cadet by the name of José María Amangual, and the pair were accompanied by four other soldiers. The cadet Amangual was the son of Captain Francisco. More information on the young man will emerge shortly that will shed light upon the relationship of the father and the son from the perspective of generational participation in the King’s service. However, on New Year’s Eve 1803, Guadiana and the rest of the party, including José María Amangual, returned to the Béxar presidio.

It is provocative to consider what might have been the elder Amangual’s reaction to his son’s enlistment in the colonial army and, even more so to reflect upon what the cadet’s future might hold serving in the Far North. The younger Amangual would be subject to excursions across the borderlands and participation in campaigns against the enemy as the need arose. Where it concerned the fluctuating nature of the presidio population, it is certain that the younger man knew of his father’s loss of soldiers through reassignment, desertion, and death. By the middle of 1804, he would have known of the Pedro Castañeda desertion and his father’s sumaria of the case; José María would know about his father’s reporting of the desertion of two other soldiers from a detachment under the command of another officer; he would have heard of the Spanish transfer of Louisiana to the French, and their subsequent handing over of the province – indeed, the entirety of the territory constituting the Louisiana Purchase -- to the Anglo-Americans on Christmas Day 1803; and, he would soon know of those soldiers who wanted to re-enlist in the army, as well as

870 Monthly report of the military operations and events at Béxar, BA January 1, 1804
871 Ibid
872 Amangual to Elguézabal, […] desertion of soldiers Bernardino Ocon and José Valencia, San Antonio de Valero, BA April 23, 1804
those who requested a discharge from further service in the military. By April 1804, he likely learned of yet another loss for his father’s *compañía volante*; José María de Anze had been serving as a cadet in the Parras company but had been promoted to the rank of alférez and transferred to the presidio at Aguaverde. However, Anze’s place in the squadron would now be filled by Juan Pedro Walker, and this change was expected to be reported to Antonio Cordero in Monterrey as soon as it was accomplished.\(^{873}\)

Both, the senior, and junior, Amangual would have known of the diary kept by Lieutenant Miguel Músquiz during an expedition that he had carried out in order to prevent damage caused by a group of Anglo-American renegades that had presumably set out from Natchez. Músquiz described the lands that he traversed and reported the considerable loss of horses and clothing from the detachment under his charge *[las considerables perdidas que experimentaron en su caballería y vestuarios los individuos que componían el destacamento de su cargo]*.\(^{874}\) Shortly after, Amangual would be called upon to provide a diary of his own experience leading an expedition that would carry him and a company of soldiers across a large swath of the Texas borderlands into New Mexico.

In the meantime, the borders that ostensibly separated the United States from the Louisiana territory had all but been erased. By the spring of 1804, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark headed a secret expedition up the Missouri River to the Pacific. The practicability of an overland route to the great ocean was part of the goal of the two explorers working on behalf of President Jefferson. Bureaucrats in Mexico City had never lost interest in the region especially when incidences of perceived or actual threats of aggression emerged in the empire’s Far North. Commander General Nemesio Salcedo found it necessary to inform the Viceroy that precautionary measures had to be considered since the political status of Louisiana had changed. Now controlled

\(^{873}\) Drafts of [Elguézabal’s] letters to […] Amangual, Ugarte, […] pertaining to civil and military matters, BA April 16, 1804

\(^{874}\) Nemesio Salcedo to Elguézabal, […] Musquiz’ diary on expedition to prevent entry of Anglo-Americans, BA May 21, 1804
by an aggressive foreign power, those circumstances leaned toward the very real possibility that future hostile overtures against the security of Texas and so the need for the utmost vigilance.\textsuperscript{875}

Salcedo’s seemingly apologetic assertion that he needed to train and mobilize the troops required to serve in these dramatically altered conditions seems surprising. He felt that he ought to furnish them with as good weaponry as those of their opponents and instruct them in their use since, apparently, they were not accustomed to anything other than the common guns that they had needed up to this point for war against the Indian nations. Salcedo informed Viceroy Iturrigaray that very old cannon of ancient caliber remained in the provinces of Texas and Coahuila but none were in the proper condition. Moreover, the commander indicated that there was no one capable of training the soldiers in their use except for one artilleryman. This soldier belonged to the Béxar company, but was incapacitated due to his advanced age of one hundred years old and, also, his being completely deaf. If it was convenient for the Viceroy to do so, Salcedo requested four or six mounted cannon to be sent to Monclova and, from the companies located within that jurisdiction, a corporal and four artillerymen.\textsuperscript{876}

The commander’s requisition was in no way arbitrary. In truth, though his notification to the Viceroy of post-Louisiana Purchase conditions in the borderlands evinced a peculiar mix of both unflinching certainty and submissive inquiry, Salcedo justified his needs thus

By operating the number of cannon designation, the troops of these provinces can receive instruction in the art of handling and using mounted cannon. There will be no disturbance or innovation, because they will be placed inland from the frontiers at Villa Monclova where there is a military school for cadets and young officers. Later these soldiers can carry the instruction they have received to whatever post it might be necessary in the aforementioned provinces.\textsuperscript{877}

\textsuperscript{875} [...] Carpeta Número 2 [...] Salcedo’s correspondence with José de Iturrigaray [et al], BA June 12, 1804
\textsuperscript{876} Ibid. I have provided documentation with translations throughout this study. At this point, however, the original documents and especially those from 1804 forward have text with barely legible text from faded ink. This collection of documents has not been digitized and thus not subject to ‘zoomification’ by personnel at the Bexar Archives and housed at the Briscoe Center. I am unable to provide the Spanish language for the corresponding English version of the text.
\textsuperscript{877} Ibid
Salcedo’s credible petition was to no avail. The Viceroy’s sobering response was, simply, that no such cannon existed in the quantity required by the commander. Iturrigaray merely encouraged Salcedo to take whatever steps he deemed proper in view of the situation in the region. 878 The Viceroy’s confidence in the general’s military acumen is not surprising. Practicality underpinned most of Salcedo’s decisions and it is clear that, given the on-the-ground constraints at this time, Iturrigaray recognized the necessity of placing unfettered authority in the power of a veteran soldier like Salcedo.

On the other side of Texas, Governor Casa Calvo warned Captain Ugarte in Nacogdoches of impending expeditions from the United States. He also contacted Elguézabal after having been informed through reliable sources that President Jefferson was at the point of sending an expedition consisting of an officer, twelve soldiers, and a surgeon to each of the rivers: Colorado, San Francisco, and Arkansas, in order to examine and explore them from their mouths in the Mississippi to their sources, with instructions to make maps, to explore mining sites, and to form friendships with the Indian tribes they encountered. 879 From Casa Calvo’s perspective in New Orleans, it was urgent to take all the steps, measures, and precautions possible immediately for the purpose of diverting and even destroying dubious expeditions if the integrity of the territory was to be preserved. Casa Calvo invoked the strict regulations of the Rights of Nations in making his case to Elguézabal, declaring that defensive action on the part of the Spanish army would be justified.

Warning of foreign intrusion was nothing new for the Governor; it will be recalled that he had issued these same warnings in early 1800 and had, at that time, conveyed a certain dissatisfaction with the measures in place to prevent aggression from interlopers. 880 However, he cautioned that individuals within the exploring parties should be stopped, have their papers and instruments collected, and treated in the most humane and generous manner before being sent back

878 Ibid
879 Casa Calvo to Elguézabal, warning of exploration expeditions to be sent by the United States, BA June 27, 1804
880 See Chapter 5, pp. 39 – 41 of this study for the efforts of the Marqués de Casa Calvo.
to their government. A complaint of the infraction of the prerogatives and rights of the Spanish King were to follow, indicating that the actions of the explorers had disturbed the peace and good feeling that existed between the two nations. Casa Calvo’s efforts cannot be described as those of an alarmist; he had demonstrated his concern about the erosion of borderlands security years before the Louisiana Purchase and had cautioned his Texas counterparts, as he was doing so now, to be watchful of emissaries with what he perceived to be questionable intentions from the United States. He did not hesitate to convey this latest information to Elguézabal since, as he indicated, he was complying with his responsibility as a Governor and the steps he took were animated by his devotion for the best service to the King and doing so in a timely manner.  

Ugarte’s response to Casa Calvo’s admonitions followed protocol while asserting the spatial boundaries of his commission; the Captain stated that since the Colorado, San Francisco, and Arkansas rivers were in territory beyond the jurisdiction of his pueblo, Nacogdoches, he did not dare take any steps further other than to observe the Colorado from help by and the perspective of the Friendly Indians as a means of ascertaining if the Jefferson-backed expedition traversed it. But commander general Salcedo’s response to Elguézabal was more direct, if not stoic. The orders he sent to the Governor regarding the Anglo-American expedition were clear enough as were all the other points constituting the principal duties of the government, citing especially those of September 13, 1803 and May 22, 1803, and the contents of which Elguézabal was to always keep in mind. Further, Salcedo indicated that his orders were sufficiently complete to cover Elguézabal’s obligation, i.e., as Governor, and that there was no need to issue any new instructions to him. Finally, Salcedo made it clear that Elguézabal was to carefully and precisely observe those instructions already given, and not to make any decision on account of information that he may have acquired, through formal or informal methods. In fact, Elguézabal was to follow a prudent course in preventing any trouble among their allied Indian nations; he was to encourage the Tahuayases and the Wichitas to vigorously resist any attacks from tribes in Louisiana in order to

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881 Casa Calvo to Elguézabal, warning of exploration expeditions to be sent by the United States, BA June 27, 1804
882 Ugarte to Casa Calvo, [...] Anglo-Americans’ plans to reconnoiter the Mississippi River, BA August 1, 1804
keep them from being afraid. Salcedo was especially worried that attacks among ancient enemies might extend into Texas territory and spread to other tribes.883

Meanwhile, in New Mexico, Governor Chacón received the same news concerning the Lewis and Clark expedition. On May 3, 1804 Commander General Salcedo ordered him to organize a small expedition that would, both, function so as to ratify the peace and reaffirm the friendship of the Panana (Pawnee), while stealthily reconnoitering the region for signs of the Anglo-American presence.884 Named to head the New Mexico-based expedition was none other than Pedro Vial, the itinerant traveler who will figure into the discussion of the Amangual expedition of four years hence.

During this same timeframe, another administrative decision from afar animated the Spanish borderlands in ways that must have seemed, at least to some members of the King’s army, if not futile at least unfeasible. Field Marshalls and Chiefs-of-Staff of Engineers and Artillery, Antonio Samper and Joséf Navarro, in a letter of April 22, 1804 explained that the Viceroy, with the King’s approval, had decided upon a new system of governance for the Interior Provinces. In fact, the plan was not so new. During the Gálvez administration, the region had been split three ways: the western provinces consisted of Sonora and the two Californias; the central provinces consisted of Nueva Vizcaya and New Mexico; and, Coahuila and Texas comprised the eastern section.885 Only two years later, Viceroy Flores divided the Provincias Internas into two separate commands only to have it reunited by Viceroy Revillagigedo in 1790 and then divided, again, in 1791. Then, on November 23, 1792, a royal decree reunited the two divisions under comandante general Pedro de Nava and made the Provinces independent of the viceroy.886

The 1804 reorganization plan, an outgrowth of existing conditions, directed that the command of the region be divided into two distinct governments, under the names of Eastern and

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883 Nemesio Salcedo to Governor of Texas, […] Anglo-American intrusion […], Indian relations […], BA August 11, 1804  
884 Navarro García, Las provincias…siglo xix, 26-29  
885 Moorhead, 102 -103  
886 Ibid, 111 - 112
Western provinces. The first, consisted of Texas, Coahuila, the Bolsón of Mapimi, and the parts of Nuevo León and Santander situated between the Rio Bravo and the Pilón River from across several points. The second division was comprised of the provinces of Sonora, Sinaloa, Nueva Vizcaya, and New Mexico. As described in its content, the order indicated that the principal purpose for this split in the commandency was to increase and develop the population of Texas by means of military colonists and the militia as a buffer territory. The order revealed that since these were not the essential resources found in the province, troops and colonists from Coahuila would arrive to alleviate that deficiency. Until that occurred, the reconnoitering, clearing, and distribution of the lands which were to be initially settled would begin.

The viceregal division of the Interior Provinces provided the impulse for collaboration from myriad sectors across the borderlands and beyond; settlement was to begin on the coast, boats and barges were to be constructed to enter the Río Grande del Norte and the Colorado River, and the bays of Espíritu Santo, San Bernardo, and Galveston. The laborers for these public works were to be furnished from Cuba under the supervision of the Navy Department at Havana. In proportion to the settlers’ continued increase over time, the troops were to originate from the army of Spain and the other two-thirds were to come from America and the frontier presidios; all were to be organized one after another. Similarly, another company of mounted artillery was to be formed, and officials for the administration of the treasury and justice as well as parish priests were being considered for inclusion in the process of organizing the government within the “new” system.

6.2 AMANGUAL: INTERLUDE FROM THE VOLANTES AS CAPTAIN OF LA BAHÍA

In July 1804, a superior order from comandante general Salcedo directed Francisco Xavier de Uranga to pass the [interim?] command of the presidio of La Bahía to Captain Francisco Amangual. In his absence, Lieutenant Dionisio Valles was to be in charge of the flying company.

887 Certified copy of orders describing re-organization of the government of the Interior Provinces, BA May 18, 1804
888 Ibid
889 Ibid
890 Ibid
of San Carlos de Parras. Captain Uranga was then to proceed to Coahuila in spite of his ongoing illness, an unspecified affliction. Only four days later, Amangual reported that Corporal Diego Cadena was going to Nacogdoches with six men of his company, all fully equipped for the trip, to relieve a detachment of an equal number returning from that post.

From Nacogdoches, Captain Ugarte reported that the general of the Apalache tribe, Luis Tinza, had not yet presented himself at the presidio. Ugarte reassured Elguézabal that he would obey the May 8 order of Salcedo that Tinza’s new plan for settlement the selection of the territory the tribe was to occupy was still uncertain, but that he would be vigilant about the Apalache’s conduct so that no trouble arose from their settlement and that a chapel might be built for them and a priest appointed to minister to them. An influx of Anglo American traders, and settlers with surnames like Davenport, MacFadden, Barr, Hesser, Hinso and Clark emerges in the documentary record in places like Nacogdoches to Coahuila. By the first week of 1804, the Viceroy informed the Governor of Texas to refuse to permit any immigrants coming from Louisiana to enter the adjacent province. If they did, they were to be sent to Béxar or Coahuila, and presumably Monclova, under certain conditions. By the spring of that same year, Salcedo reported that he received the news of Robert Ashley’s band of Anglo-Americans having increased to one hundred and forty-three men bound for the frontiers of the Tahuayas. Lieutenant Músquiz

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891 Nemesio Salcedo to Governor of Texas, […] Amangual[‘s, …] and Valle’s new military commissions, BA August 13, 1804
892 Uranga to Elguézabal, […] determination to start for Coahuila after delivering La Bahía company to Amangual, BA July 20, 1804
893 Amangual to Elguézabal, reporting departure of detachment for Nacogdoches, BA July 24, 1804. Then, on July 29, 1804 Amangual reported that he had received command of the company and presidio of La Bahía from Uranga; Amangual to Elguézabal, […] command has been turned over to him by Uranga, BA July 29, 1804
894 Ugarte to Elguézabal, promising to obey orders […] immigration into Texas of Apalache Indians, BA August 1, 1804
895 Census report of foreigners in Nacogdoches, BA January 1, 1804; Uranga to Elguézabal, […] non-admission of Louisiana immigrants into territory under the Viceroy, BA February 11, 1804
896 Nemesio Salcedo to Governor of Texas, […] Viceroy has refused to permit immigrants from Louisiana to settle […] , BA January 9, 1804
of the Nacogdoches presidio was to use the detachment under his command to apprehend Ashley, if possible.897

By September 1804, Amangual still held his position as interim captain of the Bahía company but promotions were awarded to members of his compañía volante. The post of second alférez was vacant because Francisco Adán, who held that position, was advanced to First Alférez. Since Elguézabal served as Assistant Inspector of Troops for Texas, and because Amangual was away on the aforementioned special duty, he could exercise the authority to recommend soldiers for vacant posts. Elguézabal indicated that Vicente Tarín, Third Sergeant of the flying company and who is remembered from Chapter Five, had served for twenty-one years, seven months, and twelve days as a private, corporal, and sergeant, the latter a rank he had held for two years, five months and four days, up to September 1804. Moreover, Tarín had set out on two campaigns in which he killed seven braves, took twenty prisoners and brought in sixty-one head of stock. He also took part in the battle with the Tahuayases in which, single-handedly, he killed one and put two others to flight at the point of a lance. Where it concerned the intangible qualities considered necessary for all soldiers, Elguézabal wrote that Tarín deserved the rank of second alférez because of his faithfulness, ability and honor. And, since the Governor wanted to fill the post with a person of courage, good conduct and dependability, in spite of his youth, Tarín was his first choice.898

Elguézabal’s second choice was Juan Antonio Urrutia, Third Sergeant of the Béxar company, a thirty-year veteran of the army who served as a private and corporal. He held the rank of sergeant for ten years, five months, and nineteen days and made various scouting expeditions and forays and had commanded various parties. In one battle, his horse was killed and in a recent battle he killed nine Tahuayases.899 The third, and final, choice for the position of second alférez

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897 Nemesio Salcedo to Governor of Texas, discussing precautions against Robert Ashley’s band, BA March 3, 1804
898 Elguézabal to Commandant General, naming [Arciniega, Urrutia, Tarín] for promotion in the flying company of San Carlos de Parras, BA September 12, 1804
899 Ibid; Urrutia, had served thirty years, three months and sixteen days with the presidial company of San Antonio de Béxar. He is not to be confused with the troublesome, abusive Manuel (de) Urrutia of previous chapters in this study; however, Elguézabal apparently had a change of mind where it concerned this particular sergeant. In a short note presumably sent to General Salcedo ten days after his initial recommendations, Elguézabal rescinded his
was Felipe Arciniego, second sergeant for the *volantes* of Parras, who had served for nineteen years, three months, and fourteen days as a private, corporal, and sergeant, the last rank held for five years, ten months, and four days. Arciniego fought in a July 27, 1797 battle under Captain Pedro Nolasco Carrasco.\textsuperscript{900}

By the fall 1804, the monthly report of the military operations of the company of San Antonio de Béxar provides evidence of the law enforcement activities of the *compañía volante* of San Carlos de Parras. When Ignacio Pérez reported the discovery of the dead body of a fellow servant lying on the road leading away from the presidio, forty-six soldiers -- half representing the Béxar company and the other half from that of Parras -- accompanied Alférez Manuel Menchaca and set out to find the perpetrators and punish them for their crime. Elguézabal reported that his initial suspicions were confirmed by the first *alcalde* of San Antonio: the citizen had been shot by the Indians, from an unspecified nation. When the Menchaca party returned on September 4, after following the tracks of two men on foot and two on horses from the spot where the murder was committed, they continued to pursue the trail made by the horses. However, their tracking of the presumed criminals was disrupted by an encounter with two citizens with forty horses traveling to Nacogdoches without permission; Menchaca seized the horse herd and brought the two people back to the capital.\textsuperscript{901}

Without further information, it is unknown if the murderers were ever caught. However, it is perplexing that on September 4 the *volante* component of the search party was not sent out independently from the other troops of Béxar to continue the search or, minimally, to determine the extent of the trail left by the horse tracks. It is difficult to imagine that Menchaca would have required all forty-six of the soldiers to manage the confiscated horses of the Nacogdoches-bound travelers and, further, the borderlands flying squadrons were expected to have the ability to roam

\textsuperscript{900} Ibid
\textsuperscript{901} [Elguézabal’s] monthly report of the military operations and events at Béxar, BA October 1, 1804
freely across the frontier and especially about those spaces that were little populated. Moreover,
while this episode illustrates at least one of most widely understood tasks of the volantes, the
documentary record also shows that by year’s end, members of the flying squadron of San Carlos
de Parras went out on detachments. This establishes the fact that some of their number were
extracted from their specialized unit, thus proving that their duties incurred fragmentation from
within the volantes’ composition. Disunited more frequently than the historiography would
suggest, the primary sources show that several soldiers from their ranks disproved the often
presumed strict maintenance of cohesion among the flying squadrons. In fact, these troops often
escorted the mail bag from one presidio to another, further validating the notion that the volantes’
daily tasks extended further than exclusively patrol duty or reconnaissance on the open range.902

In any case, the reorganization plan of mid-1804 delineated new divisions for the Interior
Provinces. Further east, boundaries were reconfigured after contentious disputes among the usual
competing factions. From Nacogdoches, Captain José Joaquín Ugarte reported to Governor
Elguézabal that on December 27, 1804 Captain Felix Trudeau conveyed news of the quarrels
between the Spanish Cortes and the Americans about borderlands demarcations. If the Americans
retained the Floridas, the stretch on the western side of the Mississippi was to be Spanish territory,
with the river itself as the boundary. Ugarte also received news of the English declaration of war
against the Spanairds but that the report was unconfirmed as of the date of his letter.903 This news
may have shaken Elguézabal enough to reach out for reinforcements. Or, Ugarte anticipated that
extra troops might be necessary for the Texas capital. On January 6, two days after Elguézabal
received Ugarte’s news, soon-to-be Governor Antonio Cordero, having conformed to the order of
the Commander General Salcedo, arranged to have a fully equipped detachment assembled at the
presidio of Rio Grande ready to move out at an instant to present themselves before Elguézabal

902 Monthly report of military operations and events at Bexar, BA January 1, 1805. This same document records the
December 16, 1804 death of Manuel Menchaca, First Alférez of the Bexar company, from natural causes.
903 [Captain José Joaquín] Ugarte to Elguézabal, reporting news [...] temporary settlement of boundary dispute with
the Americans [...] war declared by the English, BA January 4, 1805
and obey his orders. The Lieutenant Jose Rávago was charged with the welfare and discipline of
the troops but all were to be under the supervision of Elguézabal.904

6.3 LOOKING BACK, THE INVETERATE TRAVELER VIAL GOES FORTH

Over a decade earlier than the August 1804 expedition by Vial, Amangual responded to a
letter sent to him two days before, on February 7, 1791 and forwarded from the Viceroy
Revillagigedo, in which the latter had instructed the intendant of San Luis Potosí to arrange for
Amangual to receive the one thousand one hundred ninety-seven pesos, five reales, and seven
granos spent on the expeditions of discovery of routes. These journeys had been carried out by
Mares in late 1787 and later by Pedro Vial with several companions, from the villa of Santa Fé, to
that at Béxar, in which the intendant was to send the sum at the first opportunity in order to
reimburse it to the funds that had supplied it [se me entreguen los mil ziento noventa y siete p(eso)s
cinco r(eales), siete granos gastados en las expediciones del descubrimiento de camino ejecutadas
p(o)r Mares (...) y despues por Pedro Vial con varios companeros desde la villa de Santa Fe (sic
passim)].905 Further, the Viceroy raised the question of whether or not the account included the
entry for four hundred ninety-one pesos, two reales that Field Marshall Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola
said were provided to Vial and his companions in 1788 by the Nachitoches commander, Luis
Blanc. Amangual verified that the entry had not been included in the accounts that were sent from
the Béxar presidio, and that he had received no word of an expenditure for Vial and company made
at the Nachitoches presidio.906

Vial was a frequent traveler across the hispano-indio borderlands. In 1784, he had
accompanied Juan Bousquet on an expedition to the village of the Taboayazes in order to investi-ate
a silver mine found in that area.907 After completing a journey to the Comanche nation and
accomplishing his mission there on behalf of the Spanish crown, Vial apparently offered to

904 Antonio Cordero […] reporting that troops are being sent to Elguézabal, BA January 6, 1805
905 Amangual to Muñoz, regarding payment of expenses incurred in opening road to Santa Fé, BA February 7, 1791
906 Ibid
907 Cabello to Rengel, […] Juan Bousquet from trip to silver mine with Pedro Vial [and others], BA February 18, 1785
establish a road from Béxar to Santa Fé. Commander General Ugarte stipulated that it would have to be the most direct route from any of the villages of friendly Indians from the interior and provided that [Vial] formed an exact itinerary as he promises [puede ser útil el descubrimiento de camino que ofrece verificar el primero (Vial) desde esa villa a la de Santa Fé, siempre que sea por el rumbo más directo desde cualquiera de los pueblos de Indios Amigos de adentro, y que forme el derrotero exacto que promese]. After making his offer, the commander general approved Cabello’s effort to commission Vial for the expedition. In September, Cabello transmitted Vial’s response to Ugarte’s question: when can you start your journey? He answered Cabello: right away, immediately after he bought supplies for the journey from the three hundred pesos he had received as reward for his expedition in 1785 [le propuse cuando quería emprender el dicho viage, á que me respondió q(ue) e luego ymmediatamente en cuanto comprase (…) respecto á la proporcion q(u)e tiene p(ara) ello (…) recibía].

Pedro Vial’s three principal trips in the closing decades of the eighteenth century consisted of the Santa Fe – San Antonio journey; the one lasting from 1788 to 1789, from Santa Fé to Natchitoches, to San Antonio and back; and, the Santa Fé to St. Louis trip from 1792 to 1793.

Now, in August 1804, entrusted with another expedition by Governor Chacon, Vial set out in the company of interpreter José Jarvay and a few Pawnee that were among the Spanish and ten vecinos and ten Indians from Taos. By September 3, they arrived at the edge of the Chato River and after not encountering the Clark-Lewis company, but receiving valuable information from French visitors to a Pawnee camp, Vial’s party returned to Santa Fé on November 5, 1805.

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908 Ugarte y Loyola to Cabello, ordering payment to Vial […], discussing plan for exploring road to Santa Fe, BA August 17, 1786.
909 Ibid.
910 Cabello to Ugarte y Loyola, […] Vial’s journey to Santa Fé, BA September 24, 1786.
912 A Frenchman in the service of the Spanish, his name is variously spelled in the English and Spanish historiography of the period: Chalvert, Calbert, Jarvet (Jarvay), Tarbet, and so on. Ibid, 171-172.
913 Ibid; this date is very likely incorrect. Navarro García may have intended to write ‘1804.’
6.4 Expeditions across the Borderlands: Antecedents to the Amangual Journey

I will briefly summarize some of the most significant expeditions that occurred prior to those of Vial and especially preceding that of Francisco Amangual’s from San Antonio to Santa Fé and back. Multiple expeditions through Texas preceded the 1808 route to Santa Fé. However, most of these *entradas* headed east, some to search for the French colony of LaSalle and others to “pacify” the indigenous populations. Whether the journeys were intended to subvert the establishment of outsider communities or convert the native people, in all cases the overarching objective of these expeditions was to establish an Iberian presence that would dissuade other ‘foreigners’ from incursion into territory claimed by the Spanish. This summary is in no way to be construed as comprehensive since that is not the focus of this study nor the purpose of this section.

One expedition intended to project Spanish hegemony was led by Governor Alonso de León in 1689 in search of the LaSalle fort in 1689. He returned in 1690 to lead a second expedition to present day Matagorda Bay (which he had located and named the year before), followed by travel directed at establishing a mission near the Neches River in present day Houston County, only on condition that this specific type of edifice was requested by the *Tejas* chieftain. Yet another expedition emanated from the Presidio of Coahuila in May 1691 but this one differed from the previous two in that the leadership was split between two overarching goals, a missionizing agenda and a military one: the clerical leader was Fray Damian Massanet and the military leader was Domingo Terán de los Rios. Thereafter, Gregorio de Salinas Varona, the governor of Coahuila and a co-expeditionary of both De León and Terán, set out on May 3, 1693 to resupply Massanet in East Texas.

By the turn of the seventeenth century, expeditions continued into Texas but in an easterly direction. In 1709 military and missionary travelers headed past the Frio River and beyond for the first time from the new Presidio San Juan Bautista and associated missions. In 1716, Ramón’s

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915 Ibid 33
916 Ibid 51-52
917 Ibid, 95
expedition with Fray Isidro de Espinosa (1679-1755) utilized the services of the French traders Saint-Denis and the Talòn brothers. Having earlier accompanied the expedition of Capitán Pedro de Aquirre into Texas, Espinosa was named President of the Texas missions which were to be established by friars from Querétaro during the 1716 Ramón expedition.  

As noted above, Alonso de León’s 1689 expedition was the first Spanish entrada to venture from northeastern New Spain and beyond the San Antonio River. The expedition went no further than the west bank of the Colorado River and brought the Spaniards into contact with the Tejas Indians of east Texas. Further east, the French remained a threat in Louisiana and controlled the pattern and flow of Spanish expeditions during the last years of the seventeenth century and for more than half of the century that followed. During the early years of the eighteenth century, the Spanish reinvigorated their efforts to seriously explore the far reaches of the colonial empire of the Americas. In Europe, Spain experienced stiff competition from France, England, and the Dutch in the determined effort towards land acquisition. Because of these increased challenges to Spanish hegemony in the borderlands of the so-called Great Southwest, royal administrators found it necessary to produce current and, as far as possible, accurate maps of its own apart from foreign

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918 Jackson and Foster indicate the significance of the auditor of war, Juan Manuel de Oliván Rebolledo, as a leading advocate of presidial reform in New Spain in the early years of the eighteenth century. As a judge of the Royal Audiencia and an influential member of the Junta General, he had cross-examined the French trader Saint-Denis when the latter appeared at the presidio-mission complex at San Juan Bautista; the Frenchman’s testimony made Oliván acutely aware of how critical the defense of Texas was to the welfare of neighboring provinces. As such, Oliván outlined the potential of French intrusion and, from an encompassing perspective, realized that the frontera was a “cohesive unit whose problems were interrelated” and, moreover, required an integrative approach in order to be corrected. By the end of 1715, Oliván’s report to Carlos III was enough to generate the decision to reoccupy Texas. Thereafter, once the presidios and missions were established by the Ramón expedition, the threat of French intrusion was seen as a potential menace to the mining regions of Nuevo Leon and Nueva Vizcaya, along with Coahuila and New Mexico. Jack Jackson and William C. Foster, *Imaginary Kingdom, Texas as seen by the Rivera and Rubí Military Expeditions, 1727 and 1767* (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1995). 6-11
919 During the colonial period, the term ‘Tejas’ was broadly applied to a collection of indigenous identities that formed the larger Hasinai Confederacy, consisting of the Hasinai, Kadohadacho, and Natchitoches peoples. Twenty-three bands of these confederacies and at least three other independent Caddo bands clustered in the river valleys of present-day northwestern Louisiana and northeastern Texas, along the Neches, Sabine, and the Red riverways. The Hasinai, later called ‘Cenis’ by the French and ‘Tejas’ by the Spaniards, were members of the Caddoan peoples, and had maintained a thriving culture in the region for over eight hundred years of agriculturally based communities encompassing hundreds of miles across present day Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. Juliana Barr. *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2007). 19-20.
generated printed maps, delineating the scope of its territory across the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{921} In Texas, two missions had been founded among the Hasinai but were abandoned by 1693, but the Franciscans did not forget Texas. Indeed, the missionaries that carried forth the process of Christianization – or, as the indigenous communities (re)fashioned that process into one that met \textit{their} criteria for compliance, that is, the ‘Indianization’ of Christianity -- from the region between Monclova and the Rio Bravo. Further, the \textit{padres} managed to persuade the viceroy to reinvigorate the colonization of East Texas in 1716.

\textbf{6.5 RECORDING THE EXPEDITION}

\textit{Solo debería VS. remitirme con la mayor brevedad el Diario que es regular haya formado Luis Cazorla de su viaje} [Your Lordship should proceed immediately to send me the diary supposed to have been kept by Luis Cazorla of his trip].\textsuperscript{922}

\textit{He recivido el diario seguido por el Teniente Miguel Múñquiz en la salida que acabara de egecutar con el fin de impedir los daños que podia causarnos la partida de Bandida Anglo-Americana} [I have received the diary kept by Lieutenant Miguel Múñquiz in the expedition he has just finished for the purposed of preventing the damage [caused by] by the company of Anglo-American outlaws].\textsuperscript{923}

Accuracy in descriptions of the terrain and the details of the changing topography provided a necessary counterbalance to other aspects of the expedition diary. Inasmuch as daily movements and projections of distances traveled were, in reality, estimations based upon the use of the compass and the astrolabe, the latter preceding the development of the sextant, a device necessary for recording longitude and latitude based on the angle of the sun at any given time. Diaries were assumed to be the “primary and most reliable source” for determining expedition routes; they were official Spanish documents, mandated by the Crown, and usually signed under oath by the diarist and attested by at least two responsible members of the party.\textsuperscript{924} Often, more than one expedition diary or account was kept, which gave an additional means of verifying the route. In most


\textsuperscript{922} Bucarely y Ursua to Ripperdá, requesting Cazorla’s diary of exploration of the coast […], BA December 9, 1772

\textsuperscript{923} Nemesio Salcedo to Elguézabal, […] receipt of Miguel Múñquiz’ diary on expedition to prevent entry of Anglo-Americans, BA May 21, 1804

\textsuperscript{924} Foster, 7
examples, two notations were required: the distance in leagues traveled recorded in the entry itself, and, further, indicated in the margin of the page and at least one notation of the directed travel each day.

Experienced travelers were familiar with the use of the compass and the astrolabe and the distance traveled was affected by the condition of the terrain, the severity of the weather, and the whether the route was one that had been used repeatedly, or, was newly created along a previously uncharted pathway. The distance recorded was measured by a formula: diarists multiplied the travel time by an experienced estimate of the speed of the march that day. Foster makes the point that experienced indigenous guides were essential to an expedition’s success and the 1772 reglamento asserted their significance and value to such travel when issues evolved concerning exchange of prisoners. Indeed, the captains of all expeditions were to ensure Indian scout retention at all costs. A leader’s intimate knowledge of known Indian trails was based upon the previous two centuries of Iberian expansionist efforts in the Americas. However, as Foster indicates this meant that no new expedition routes would be created through previously untrodden wilderness; indeed, the ancient trails of the indigenous inhabitants represented the “best available” trade routes.

The opening pages of the Ramón “trail diary” list the travelers, including the religious personnel who are described as representatives from various colleges along with the captain Domingo Ramón, twenty-five soldiers, twenty-two settlers -- including French citizens -- in a mule train, and eight married women. Having essential knowledge of the terrain and its particular hazards, indigenous scouts were expected to accompany the expeditions. In this regard, the Ramón

925 Ibid, 8
926 Reglamento ... 1772, Título Décimo, Trato con los indios enemigos ó indiferentes, artículo cinco: “I especially charge [the] governors and captains of presidios to stipulate the release or exchange of prisoners as the first condition of the treaties or suspensions of fighting that they concede [and the] exchange will be man for man, etc., but if this is not possible and it is necessary to give more for my troops, it will be two or three Indians for each Spaniard. By no means will this extend to Indian auxiliaries or scouts […]” [y de ningún modo se entenderá esto con los indios auxiliaries ó exploradores(sic passim)].:
927 Ibid 11
foray was no different in that four Tejas Indians\textsuperscript{928} accompanied the party even though they are not mentioned in Espinosa’s diary.

Thereafter, the Espinosa diary follows the customary format for all expedition travelogues, as prescribed by viceregal edicts, of day of the week, month and date, followed by descriptions of two key elements that repetitively appear in colonial documents of expeditions. The first of these was the requirement for precise descriptions of the landscape, soil conditions, and locations of water sources; and, the second element deemed just as necessary was the recording of all religious observances, including the Catholic obligations of mass, sermon, and feast days. Friendly encounters with Indians, celestial sightings, and the occasional animal stampede serve to detail the precarious aspects of expeditions, although these events are fundamentally unremarkable in that colonial documents of this type are replete with assorted challenges to a travel itinerary. However, skirmishes with native populations are noteworthy and magnify the reality of incessant danger to life and limb across the colonial borderlands. The final note on each entry of all expeditions is the number of leagues traveled, a distance roughly equivalent to two and six tenths of a mile.

In his study, historian William Foster’s singular challenge was to track as precisely as possible the route followed for eleven expeditions begun with the de León expedition of 1689 to the Solís 1768 Inspection tour of the Zacatecan missions in Texas. He plotted the daily directions and distances recorded from some seventeen diaries (kept on the eleven expeditions throughout the six hundred- to eight hundred-mile trek from Monclova and Saltillo in the state of Coahuila to Matagorda Bay, East Texas), and in some instances on to Los Adaes, the colonial capital of Tejas.\textsuperscript{929} However, the central purpose of the present chapter is to compare the content of the Amangual diary as translated by Mattie Austin Hatcher in 1934 with that of the Loomis and Nasatir 1967 text that published, in a separate chapter, the 1808 expedition in its entirety, with annotations and footnotes, and using the Béxar and the Guerra translations. As the authors indicate

\textsuperscript{928} Adding to the knowledge of the Texas indigenous communities provided by Barr, Hadley and Naylor indicate that the Tejas, or Hasinai, were Caddoan speakers for whom the first mission of San Francisco was established in 1690. 377
\textsuperscript{929} Foster, 1995
[There is] a copy of the Amangual Diary [...] in the Mexican Archives [...] under Tierra y Marina, 1836, legajo 7, number 2. A fuller but different copy is in the Bexar Archives, and is found in the Indexed Translations. There are entries in the Guerra copy that are not in the Bexar copy, and there is considerable material in the Bexar copy that is not found in the Guerra copy. There are extensive omissions from each. Our copy is the Guerra copy, collated with the Bexar copy.930

I adopt this comparative approach in order to ascertain the similarities and differences that existed in recording the events, however apparently prosaic, or, dramatic, among interpreters of this key primary document and, further, I seek to determine in what ways the translated narratives that emerge contrast through the years and across space and time. Though I seek to identify the common threads of daily experiences on the trail of discovery across the colonial borderlands, I dwell less here on the minute details of each day’s activities and, instead, opt for understanding if the differences in Hatcher’s Bexar translation and Loomis and Nasatir’s Vial are so slight, or, conversely so profound as to warrant a renewed translation in the future. Such a project is beyond the scope of the present study. However, a reinvigorated investigation of the 1934 translation might be well worth the time and energy generated by intense scrutiny from a scholarly perspective.931

6.6 AMANGUAL’S STORY: THE EXPEDITION TO SANTA FÉ, 1808

En orden de 31 de Enero ultimo dixe [sic] a Vm entre otras cosas que un cuerpo de tropa de la guarnicion de Texas que habia prevenido batiera [va a tierra] todo el desierto que intermedia desde aquella provincia a esa podia tocar en algunos puntos de ella y que en consecuencia le facilitara Vm los auxilios que el comandante le pidiera bajo el concepto de que si necesitara Vm aumentar de tropas por algun suceso extraordinario, podia detener el todo o parte del referido cuerpo y darme cuenta inmediatamente; pero habiendo hecho reminiscencia de que por noticias que adquiera esta superioridad sera tal ves indispensable subsista ahí algun tiempo el propio destacamento.

Prevenga a Vm ahora que precisamente lo detenga y me de parte por extraordinario a fin de decirle lo que deva [sic] ejecutar, sirviendo a Vm de gobierno que conforme apropuesta al Señor Gobernador de la enunciada Provincia de Texas, tengo determinado que el mando de la enunciada expedición

931 Time constraints prevented my viewing the original Amangual Diary during the course of two research trips to the Briscoe Center for American History, where the document is housed. The Diary has not been digitized for remote viewing on the Bexar Archives Online resource of the Briscoe Center.
When Captain Francisco Amangual set off from Béxar on March 30, 1808 he was accompanied by Second Commandant, Captain José Agabo de Ayala, they and their group of two hundred men were expected to find a northern route to Santa Fé; visit Indian groups along the way and secure their friendship; explore the Red River and reconnoiter the territory to the Sierras Oscura, Blanca, and El Sacramento. Then, the group was to return to Texas. During these last two days of March, the expedition made it to Arroyo Novillo where their first loss occurred: a mule loaded with piloncillo belonging to the Second Company of Nuevo Santander. The next day, the loss of a stallion belonging to the Company of La Bahía. Clearly, this expedition would be no different from any other, including those that formed Vial’s multiple peregrinations across the frontier, in that it included men and animals from multiple garrisons. Since the company’s next few stops targeted arroyos as camp sites, it can be surmised that since water was necessary, a low lying water flow would be ideal as would any adjacent grassy areas for the horses. Stampeades of the horse herd plagued the expedition during the first week of travel, and these animals represented those belonging to the companies of Nuevo Reyno de Leon, Nuevo Santander, and a group referred to simply as the “veteran” troops.

From the second to third weeks of April, Amangual’s men cleared vegetation with axes, crow bars, and shovels so as to cross marshes along a creek’s banks; they killed a bear at the Arroyo de Chimal and spotted buffalo; and, continued through a region that Amangual described as extremely rough country, heavily wooded. They made it to the Llano River on April 9, which

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932 Nemesio Salcedo to Governor of New Mexico, March 9, 1808; Inventory of the Spanish Archives of New Mexico II, 1621 – 1821, reel 16, frame 460-461 (State Archives [hereafter SANM])
933 Francisco Amangual Diary, 1808, Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin [hereafter Amangual], March 31 – April 2, 1808
934 Ibid, April 2 – 4, 1808
the captain described as very wide, with wild onions growing on its banks, and continued on through country with high, rocky hills. Apparently, there was no grass to be found until the group arrived at the San Saba River, where they discovered more herds of buffalo.935

Then, on April 11, two Comanche came to the campsite, declaring that they were from the ranchería of Cordero and on their way to Béxar. Amangual gives no further information on the pair although it is highly possible that the two, presumably men, were on their way to the presidio to receive gifts. At this camp, Amangual noted the extensive woods of pecans and other trees, and many fish, turkeys, bear, along with all kinds of other animals. Later that morning, accompanied by ten soldiers, he went out to examine the presidio of San Sabá abandoned some fifty years before. He found a small plaza enclosed on all four sides with a stone wall, partly destroyed with evidence of bulwarks at each corner. At the north end, there was a ruined building, possibly two-story. There was an east to west water flow, from a ditch or spring, used to irrigate an extensive plain extending from the hills to the river on the south. Amangual described land very suitable for all kinds of planting (seeding).936 The next day, the expedition’s Indian guide reported that they were near the aforementioned Cordero ranchería.

Two soldiers and an Indian, perhaps another from the group and not necessarily the guide, were sent ahead to make the expedition’s arrival known; a while later, a Comanche came running to inform the party that the chief, named ‘Cordero’, had moved the community to a place where there was good grass and plenty of water. Traveling through low hills, they could see the Rancheria which looked like a city, perched atop one of the hills near a beautiful plain.

As the troops were drawn up in column formation, the Comanche captain Cordero and his men approached, painted with red ochre and dressed in various costumes. The presidials beat a march on the drums and went through various ceremonies showing goodwill and fellowship. Amangual’s company stayed at the Arroyo de Conchos in order to discuss the expedition with Chief Cordero and to rest the animals, described as very thin, and this area with its pasturage was

935 Ibid, April 6 – 10, 1808
936 Ibid, April 11, 1808
good for refreshing them. The formalities used to cement the reciprocal friendship and allegiance that underscored the Amangual expedition continued; on the 13th, Amangual, escorted by two chiefs, an assistant [presidial?] and an interpreter went to the lodge of Chief Cordero to make the presentation of a walking cane and rifle – for the Comanche leader to govern and defend his village -- sent by Texas Governor Antonio Cordero, which the chief received cordially. Then, since Amangual and his troops came with a specific course of action, Cordero answered all questions from the Captain and Cordero offered to supply guides that would be experienced, loyal, and have good conduct. The next day, Amangual invited various captains of militia, presumably representing various units, Chief Cordero, and other Indian chiefs, most likely of his Rancheria, to a luncheon which resulted in overt displays of gratefulness and true affection. Though he does not say so, Amangual and his men stayed the night of the 14th and then pressed on just a short distance in the morning. However, the next two days were spent hunting buffalo with their Indian friends, and tend to an injured arriero of the company of Nuevo Leon; the soldiers even managed to bring back three live calves, one a yearling and described as very wild.

In spite of the positive interchanges between soldiers and Indians, the Comanche guide who had accompanied Amangual and his troops complained that he had lost an iron chain, perhaps attached to a quirt, and this concern instigated a search of the soldiers’ belongings by Captain Agabo de Ayala, the expedition’s second-in-command. The soldier Matias Cantu, whose rank is not identified, found the chain in the possession of Faustino Lozano and the discovery led to the thief enduring twenty-five lashes with a long stick by the corporal [Cantu?] as punishment and as an example to the others. He was then placed in the guardhouse as a prisoner until further orders.

From April 22 – 26, the company continued across country with plains and good grass, and very little mesquite. Though Amangual and his expedition team was treated discourteously by the indigenous village of Chief Chiojas, he presented a small gift, unspecified, to its leaders, in the

937 Ibid, April 12 – 14, 1808
938 Ibid, April 13 – 20, 1808
939 Ibid, April 20, 1808
same way as had been done with Cordero’s chiefs, and an interpreter’s skills came into play.
Amangual made a long speech about their arrival having the aim of inviting the community to come visit them, to let them know the love of their king (Carlos IV) and father – perhaps, the Christian God, or, Jesus -- toward them, the loyalty and fidelity that they bore towards both. Amangual encouraged the Chiojas Indians not to trade with any other nation for those nations’ objective was to destroy the loyalty shown towards the Spanish. In response, a spokesperson(s) for their community indicated that they were satisfactorily informed of everything that Amangual had stated; they considered themselves Spanish and believed everything emanating from the Béxar company; and, they apparently accepted nothing from any other nation. The Indian nation added that they knew nothing of American entry into their lands nor the establishment of a trading post. As before, Amangual requested guides for the continuance of the expedition, and he emphasized good conduct and loyalty as the best attributes for the task. However, one soldier from the company of Lieutenant Luciano García, a man named Rafael Mansilla, fell ill complaining of pain in his side and the company’s chaplain immediately went to hear his confession. Two days later he died and was buried; without further information, the cause of his death is unknown. Until the end of the month, the journey continued with further stampedes from the usual culprits, the horse herds belonging to the companies of Nuevo Leon and Santander. They crossed over very flat country with scattered hills as well as patches of mesquite trees, several arroyos and a number of dry creeks. One of those arroyos, flowing into the Almagre and the Verde, presumably the names of rivers, ran west northwest to east southeast.940

On May 1, Captain Agabo de Ayala ascended a particularly high hill that provided a very good view of the landscape; he saw nothing but other hills in every direction. The expedition party traveled through them and entered a small valley along the river; according to the Indian guides, the accumulated riverways were branches of the Colorado. Amangual described the rivers in this area as having large numbers of trees near them, fresh water, good watering places, and abundant

940 Ibid, April 21 – 30, 1808
grass. He indicated that the soil was the best he had seen. The following week included buffalo hunting, so abundant that the soldiers could kill them near the camp while, at the same time, the expedition team endured hailstorms, windstorms, and a troubling scarcity of watering holes. Reconnoitering determined that no further water sources lay toward the north, which was the directions of their destination, and this dilemma caused the company to turn in order to reach northward running streams so that the journey could continue. On May 3, in the first instance of Amangual’s written expression of deep concern for the well-being of his men, and fears for their survival, he wrote “May God take care of us.”

Three days later, Amangual had to take precautions for the welfare of the animals in the expedition, issuing fresh orders to each company to take charge of its own caballada since keeping the animals together did not allow them to graze or drink sufficiently. Thus each division of horses and mules was put under the care of a corporal and six soldiers. This differed from the procedures followed at the presidios where animal stock was usually guarded by only one, perhaps two, soldiers; however, the number of animals in the expedition was larger and even if collected as one unit, individual companies like those of the Amangual journey would still contain an increased number of horses and mules. Plus, they had to contend with the three buffalo calves.

As the party rested and cared for their animals, they waited upon the arrival of the chief [Quegue?] of the Ymparica, whose ranchería was located in the hills only recently traversed. When he, Lieutenant Cadena and four soldiers as escorts, returned with another Ymparica named Sanbanbe and two companions, the Indians expressed their desire for the friendship of the Spaniards of Béxar. Rather than return to their village, the Ymparica stayed the entire night in the expedition camp. It is likely that the choice of an emissary from the Spanish army in encounters with indigenous representatives across the borderlands depended upon individuals with highly

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941 Ibid, May 1 – 3, 1808
942 Ibid, May 6, 1808
943 “Ymparica” is a Spanish-language corruption of Penateka, identified as the southernmost band of the Comanche. This band ranged from the Edwards Plateau to the headwaters of the Central Texas rivers. Carol A. Lipscomb, “Comanche Indians,” Handbook of Texas Online (www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/bmc72)
944 Ibid
developed relational skills. That competence would have required the ability to project a non-threatening demeanor, and perhaps the talent to deploy a high degree of discernment in order to demystify the potentially thorny process of becoming acquainted with veritable strangers. The next morning, Amangual and his men asked the Ymparica for information about the roads to locations on their itinerary, the places that had the best pasturage and water for the animals, and the best route for reaching their destination.945

In yet another ironic episode of successful engagement with native peoples contrasted by misbehavior on the part of company members, the day after the productive meeting with Ymparica and his people, Captain Amangual arrested Luciano García, lieutenant of one of the companies (unspecified by the diarist) in the expedition. That action required that Alférez Manuel Alanes [Alanis], of the same company, be charged with overseeing the administrative and fiscal affairs of the company.946 García’s crime is not mentioned; Amangual appears to be far more concerned with relating troop interactions among indigenous people and especially the leaders of rancherías. Over the course of two days, expedition personnel distributed presents, promised protection, and issued the customary request that the Ymparica should not consent to allow passage to other foreigners [non-Spaniards]. For their part, the Indians “showed a true and sincere willingness947 and promised to be faithful in their friendship”, gave factual information about the country about to be traversed by the expedition, and offered the company a guide to take them towards those places having abundant water. Amangual admitted that the land was “very different from what we thought it was” since they found it to be so from their map.948

The maps could not have indicated weather conditions and throughout the month of May, and so the expedition team endured heavy rains and the consequent high water, the latter circumstance preventing visits from the Indians to the soldiers’ camp. When they were able to appear, Amangual indicates that his men could not eat or sleep or do anything, for that matter,

945 Ibid
946 Ibid, May 7, 1808
947 The Loomis/Nasatir translation reads: “They displayed a deep understanding”, Vial, 1967. 482
948 Amangual, Diary, May 7, 1808
because the Indians were curious, “meddling in the tents and among the soldiers.” 949 Inquisitive behavior by the Indians was tolerated since, as it will become obvious, throughout the 1808 expedition to Santa Fé Amangual and his men relied upon their native guides. That dependence was not unusual since the entirety of an international array of folks in the service of foreign powers, working as tourists, explorers, and even solo adventurers, like Vial, were keen on investigating unfamiliar geographic spaces across the frontier for economic and political motives. This reliance becomes clear with an episode in mid-May when the guides told Amangual and his party that there was nothing further on past a stretch of high country of low hills and valleys, and that it was impossible for the expedition to get through in only one day.

Moreover, according to Captain Amangual, the guides warned the party that to try to continue the trip in one day would result in exposing both man and beast to death by thirst. 950 Instead, the company made the trip along ravines where there was water, which the guides had located. As soon as they pitched camp, the Indian guides immediately went out to locate water for the next day, such was their apparent devotion to the well-being of Amangual and his men as well as to their promise of loyalty and showing good conduct. However, it will become apparent that this interaction between outsiders and native people did not mean that trust and good will were given without certain reservations.

One night, an Indian arrived at the camp and presented himself to the guards. When they reported the arrival, the Lieutenant, along with an interpreter, were summoned to interrogate the man. He replied that he was a dependent of the rancheria of the Ymparica chief 951 that the expedition had met the ten days before, and that he was searching for an escaped horse of the chief. It seems that the soldiers feared that he might cause harm to their horse herd and so they suggested

949 Ibid, May 10, 1808; Vial: “[…] going uninvited into the tents and walking around among the troops.”
950 Ibid, May 12, 1808
951 Loomis and Nasatir translate the name as ‘Ysambanbi,’ or “Sabanbipit,” a chief mentioned in the peace treaty with Anza in 1786. The authors indicate that in the Amangual diary the name will appear as Ysambanbi, which is “probably closer to the correct version.” Vial, 488. Further, they state that “in 1808 he [Ysambanbi] showed typical Comanche scorn for the Spaniards.” However, if this is the same chief of the Quegue retinue that the Amangual party met on May 6, such an attitude was nowhere in evidence based upon Loomis and Nasatir’s narrative and commentary.
that it would be better for him to sleep in the guardhouse [jail], and that he could continue on his
tourney the following day.\textsuperscript{952} Another instance of shaky underpinnings of reciprocal trust between
outsiders and native communities occurred subsequent to a moment when Chief Quege of the
Ymparica and his followers promised to inform the Amangual party of any dangers in the region.
As was customary, the chief was then approached with the proposition that they supply a guide
since there was illness among those accompanying the expedition. To further complicate the
matter, the wife of the most experienced guide for the explorers was seriously ill and thus he would
be unable to continue on the trip. In fact, the other guide was also ill but, even if he were not, he
knew nothing about the land or the water holes so he was useless at this point in the journey.\textsuperscript{953}

The Indians declared that since the route the explorers wished to travel would entail many
difficulties, not the least of which was the lack of water, their determined efforts would result in
great losses to the animals. Finally, the Ymparica’s chief told the party that under no circumstances
would they provide any of their people to be a guide. If Amangual and his troops expected loyalty
and good conduct from their guides, and since they themselves had no knowledge of the terrain, it
is difficult to fathom why they would rebuke the Indians, reminding them that they were allies of
the Spanish, that \textit{Carlos Rey} had shown his love for them, and that the Indians knew how well they
had been treated by Amangual and his men. The chief’s response could be alternately interpreted
as reasoned, or, paternalistic: through an interpreter he answered that he had no authority to force
one of his people to act as a guide, and that their laws were very different from those of the
Spaniards. Furthermore, the chief asserted that this was what he told his men but, he added that if

\textsuperscript{952} Again, the Hatcher translation differs, semantically, from that of Loomis/Nasatir. I have followed the Hatcher
but the other translation reads like this: that the Indian was made to understand, “in a very kind way,” that it would
be better for him to sleep in the guardhouse. Hatcher translates this section as “as nearly as possible,” suggesting to
me that these translators working in different time periods emphasized an attentive, but certainly cautionary,
approach by the soldiers to the late night visitor.
\textsuperscript{953} Amangual, May 17, 1808
any one of them wished to go, voluntarily, they could go, guiding the expedition as far as Santa Fé.⁹⁵⁴

As the dilemma unfolded, practicality over benevolence prevailed: the explorers remained in camp, attempting an effort to relieve the sick woman since, as Amangual states, it was not possible to travel without an experienced Indian guide. Moreover, the most desirable guide promised that he would continue the journey the following day whether or not his wife recovered. Eventually, the woman recovered enough to be brought out of the ranchería where she had been taken for medical treatment.⁹⁵⁵ Thus the expedition continued the next day.

From May 20 to the end of the month, the journey forged ahead, having multiple interactions with native peoples, the latter group carrying out their own individual and collective responsibilities to their local communities. In one valley, a Caddo man, returning from a visit to the Comanches to appeal for peace, where he succeeded, asked to travel with the Amangual party so that he would not have to travel alone. Through one canyon, some Indian men and woman arrived indicating that they were destined for a campaign against the Lipillanos [Lipans or Llaneros?⁹⁵⁶], and all carried lances and four had muskets. The suggestion here is that the woman was also a warrior since she too, apparently, carried a lance and of the four that had rifles, one may have been in her hands. Travelling across an expansive plain that descended to El Blanco creek, the expedition party encountered an Indian and two women who were hunting.⁹⁵⁷ It is equally likely that the two women were active participants in the hunt and not simply tag alongs.

⁹⁵⁴ Ibid; The Loomis/Nasatir translation of this final section of this contentious episode included additional material from the Béxar copy of the Amangual diary. Apparently, the chief further indicated that there “were several [men] ready to go at once [as guides], but that they were aware of the positive risk in going over the route.” 490-491
⁹⁵⁵ Amangual, May 19, 1808. Again, the translations from the same archive manifest in different ways. The Hatcher states that “the sick woman was left in the village of Chief Quegue because she became worse, but the Indian guide cheerfully [emphasis mine] continued with our company. According to the Vial, “we had left a sick Indian woman [a different one?] at the ranchería of Chief Quegue because she was very sick. But the Indian guide was quite satisfied to accompany us.” 492
⁹⁵⁶ So indicates the Vial, 493 (May 21, 1808)
⁹⁵⁷ Differences in the interpretation of language may provide a glimpse into translator bias about gender roles. Where Loomis and Nasatir credit the women with also being hunters, Hatcher indicates that only the man was hunting; Ms. Hatcher may have assumed that the women could not possibly have been engaged in the presumably male-only task of “looking for meat.”
Environmental conditions were such that Amangual and his team were astonished at the barren landscape, wiped clean of grass by, both, buffalo and drought. But, by the end of the month and after traveling sixteen leagues [approximately fifty-five miles] and almost reaching the Red River, they found trees, pools of water, seeping springs of permanent water, wild grapes and even wild Castilian rose bushes. The last two days of May and the first day of June 1808 found the troops of the expedition engaged in very hard manual labor, using pick axes and crowbars opening the way through very rough country -- hills, creeks, bluffs, and precipices -- making a path up and down for the train which progressed with great difficulty. At one point, it was almost necessary for the muleteers to carry the loads across in their arms and in fact they made multiple turns looking for the best terrain to travel over until they came to the banks of the Red River.958

On June 1, the party met a group of six men, including one Frenchman, claiming to be settlers from Santa Fe on a hunting expedition. That afternoon, five of the men retired to their camp but the Frenchman remained to spend the night with the Amangual company. He described the surrounding territory as very peaceful; that the adjacent river was the Colorado, otherwise known as the Red River, but that it did not flow past Natchitoches; and that a long distance from here it joins the Napestle [Arkansas] River, and both of them join the Mississippi; and that the river the expedition had passed on May 22 was the Natchitoches River [Red] and that they were at its source. The next day, the expedition met a soldier, Manuel Martínez, an interpreter to the Indian nations, who was hunting with those of the San Miguel del Bado missions. The team had every reason to trust the word of Martínez. He and Lieutenant Facundo Melgares959 had explored the river together and confirmed the Frenchman’s information: the river was not the one that

958 Amangual, May 22 – June 1, 1808; Vial, 495 – 498. Loomis and Nasitir wonder why such strenuous work, with crowbars and pickaxes, should have been necessary for mounted men and a mule train (Vial, 498, fn 32). It seems to this writer that such labor might be a real possibility given the size of the expeditionary force (a fact that the authors will themselves point out as remarkable), the number of animals brought along, and the nature of the route being taken. Clearly the Amangual team was not retracing the trail of previous sojourners, whether those were native people or outsiders; the expedition required water in very large quantity and thus were obliged to seeking routes that were conducive to finding such a resource. This would have entailed travel over unchartered terrain and, as such, the use of implements designed for reshaping the environment for access and unfettered passage.

959 “Don Facundo” in the Hatcher translation, more fully identified in Vial as “Lieutenant Don Facundo Melgares”. Vial, 500
flowed to Natchitoches, that its source was in the Sierra Blanca, and it was indeed impossible to travel on horseback. Subsequently, the journey continued by way of a level sandy plain along the river until they met up with an unidentified settler from New Mexico.

At the head of a hunting party of one hundred twenty men, the commander gave information about the route and then returned to their camp. On June 4, traveling along the river the expedition continued accompanied by the soldier Manuel Martínez and Indians from the area; the going was rough and many horses and mules came up lame. Great care and special arrangements had to be taken in order to avert further damage to the pack mules. The journey continued over hills, creeks, and dry ravines [cañadas] along the river until the team reached some ditches, identified as the work of the Ymparica Comanche, dug by them as a method of defense against the Quitaray.960 Bad country with hills, creeks, and stretches of rocks along the river, made for unpleasant travel and since there was no other crossing, the company was forced to ascend a canyon with many rocky mesas961 with the unfortunate result of many injured horses and mules. Almost daily heavy rains plagued the expedition in this region, and left the troops and the supplies wet and so delayed departure. On June 6, Manuel Martínez accompanied a sick soldier to Santa Fé so that he might be given medical attention.962

Throughout the middle part of June, detachments of soldiers of various numbers set out to look for water holes; to inspect the ground for suspicious trails; and, to follow the flow of the river. For a few days, Amangual and part of the company remained stationary since separate parties of troops arrived while others were still out on reconnoiters. When all the soldiers were reassembled, the news was not good from all quarters. The collective evaluation from Amangual’s emissaries

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960 Both, Hatcher, and the translators of Vial, identify and spell the name: “Quitaray”. The latter add the disclaimer, “We cannot identify the Quitaray Indians in [Frederick Webb] Hodge [ed., Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1907].” Vial, 501. However, it may be that an entire group’s identity is subsumed by its most prominent leader and in this case, the name Quitaray may refer to an individual chief: Barr mentions a Taovaya chief named “Qui Te Sain” who had dealings with Bernardo de Gálvez when he was Commandant General. Peace Came, 220, 224, 226. Is it possible that ‘Quitaray’ was a Wichita chief, whose titular designation may have been corrupted into the suffix, “rey” (but misspelled by translators as “ray”)? The result then would be Qui Te Rey.
961 “high rocky bluffs” [Amangual, June 5]
962 Amangual, June 6, 1808
was that travel over the rough country, on foot, on horseback, and with a mule train, was impossible. The windstorms and rainstorms erupted followed by calm. Then, Amangual issued one particularly interesting order: thirty men and one lieutenant were to be ready at dawn on June 11 with supplies for three days.963

At daybreak, Amangual set out with his escort to reconnoiter all the ground already explored by all the patrols previously sent out. When he and the large group left, the remaining troops broke camp and traveled over what he described as good country skirting along the creek. In a matter of a few hours, the two parties reconvened, traveled a short distance more, and then camped on a level elevation without any trees of any kind.964 One might be prompted to ask if Amangual had lost a measure of confidence in the surveying abilities of his troops and simply decided to do the job himself. He certainly does not mention his reasons for re-covering the terrain of his detachments and it is clear that his group and the other one encountered perfectly serviceable country to travel with no major incidents. The consistent routine of reconnoitering, waiting out a hailstorm, and a rainstorm, and moving camp because of rising waters continued until it was time to move on, following the riverway in the direction of the first mission they would find in New Mexico. An apparently relieved, if slightly ruffled, Amangual wrote in his diary

Having concluded the expedition, and in order to fulfill the instructions of Antonio Cordero, Governor of the Province of Texas, we continued to travel over a level plain until we arrived at some small hills that form several cañadas and some low hillsides.965

Second-in-command Captain José Agabo did what he did best: he climbed up one of the highest hills, and sighted a range of high snow-capped mountains to the northwest. Following the elevation and the windings, they came to a small creek which eventually dumped out into the Gallina River where they camped. After crossing flat country and entering a narrow canyon formed by the

963 Ibid, June 7 – 10, 1808
964 “[desengaño claro]” – The documents generated by Amangual and housed at the Béxar Archives evince a man of very good education and it would be surprising if he had misspelled the word desengaño; this is almost certainly a misspelling by the translator(s), or, the letter “a” in the word was mistaken by them for an “e”. Vial, 504
965 Amangual, June 14, 1808.
mountains, the expedition traveled ascending and descending slopes until they approached the Pecos River with the mission San Miguel del Bado about three miles distant.

**6.7 June 16: Arrival in Santa Fé**

After spending the night on the Pecos, Amangual sent forth a corporal and ten soldiers with the following message to Santa Fé so that the men would report the expeditions’ arrival and receive any orders emanating from the Commander General.

*El día 15 del corriente de haber finalizado todos los puntos de mi comision, he arribado a este Pueblo de San Miguel del Bado a fin de [...] con la expedicion de docientos hombres [...] tres capitanes, siete de mi cargo de provincia de Tejas la superioridad del comandante [...] Haya tenido a bien comunicante [sic passim/remainder text illegible].*

Late in the evening on the next day, two soldiers came with a letter from the governor; it was delivered by Captain Dionisio Valle, who was camped at the Pecos mission. Valle is remembered for assuming command of the *compañía volante* of San Carlos de Parras when its captain, Francisco Amangual, took interim command of the Bahía presidio in 1804. Upon receipt of the letter, Amangual ordered that the march towards the city would begin the next day. When the day dawned, the company crossed the Pecos River, traveling across rough country and skirting along a mountain range with spruce trees until they reached the Pecos Mission where they camped. The next day, after covering even rockier terrain, the expedition reached the Sierra Nevada and a high point from which the town of Santa Fe could be seen. The squadron halted and a soldier was sent to give information to the acting governor of their arrival; the soldier returned at once with an order for the expedition to come to the capital. Eventually, the troops of the expedition were able to go to another large plaza with very comfortable barracks; two barracks were assigned to each company and the officers were told to select the best quarters available. Amangual and his

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966 Francisco Amangual, San Miguel del Bado, reporting arrival of his expedition, June 16, 1808; Inventory of the Spanish Archives of New Mexico II, 1621 – 1821, reel 16, frame 536 (State Archives [hereafter SANM] image 2117)

967 Amangual June 19, 1808; The Hatcher translation reads: “In this place the squadron halted.” The Vidal translators indicate that the “squadron” was that of the Santa Fé company: “In this same place was waiting the squadron under the command of the interim governor.” 508
company remained in Santa Fé for three months, and set out on the return trip, traveling through
the presidios at San Elizario and El Paso. He set aside the diary during that time, but resumed the
narrative when the time came to push on.

Quedo enterado de copias de fecha 20 del corriente varios documentos pondré en manos
de Ud. para su olvido cuerpo y cumplimiento a las superiores ordenes. Dios Guarda a Vm
muchos años, 21 de Junio 1808 Francisco Amangual [Amangual, Santa Fé, acknowledging
receipt of orders from the governor, June 21, 1808].

Por oficio de [?] numero 7, de 28 de Junio ultimo, he recibido el diario y mapa del viaje
que desde San Antonio de Bexar executo hasta esa villa el Capitan Don Francisco Amangul con
un destacamento de doscientos hombres de tropa y quedo impuesto de que hecho cargo del
Socorroc de la enunciada partida. Don Francisco Ortiz ha reservado las mismas del dinero que
condujo el correspondiente a dos mercede pagar y [?] para bastimentarse a su regreso. Dios
guarde a Vm [muchos anos], Chihuahua, 23 de Julio 1808, Nemesio Salcedo

6.8 AMANGUAL’S STORY: SANTA FÉ TO THE TOWN OF SAN ELESARIO

When the expedition party left Santa Fé on September 20, 1808, they traveled south until
they reached the small settlement of Rio Abajo (Lower River district), and at four o’clock they
passed the mission of Santo Domingo, and one hour later were only about a mile away from the
San Felipe mission. Amangual notes in his diary that “nothing unusual happened except the
desertion of two militiamen of the first company of the Colony [unspecified, but likely Nuevo
Santander, throughout the Diary referred to simply as the ‘Colony’].” The Captain also indicated
that two other soldiers broke their guns. Perhaps, by this time in the journey, nothing surprised
Amangual and that desertion was nothing so unusual. He may have wondered why the soldiers

968 Amangual, Santa Fe, acknowledging receipt of orders from the governor, June 21, 1808; Inventory of the
Spanish Archives of New Mexico II, 1621 – 1821, reel 16, frame 548 (SANM image 2127)
969 Nemesio Salcedo to [?], acknowledging receipt of diary and map of Amangual’s trip, Inventory of the Spanish
Archives of New Mexico II, 1621 – 1821, reel 16, frame 575 (SANM image 2139)
970 Amangual, September 20, 1808; the Vial translation states that: “another militiaman [singular] of said company
broke his musket.” Vial, 510
971 The abundance of documentary material related to desertion in the holdings of the Béxar archives is
considerable. Sumarias related to desertion and its perpetrators fall under such headings as “cases and reports of”;
“decrees on”; “punishment for”; “pursuit of”; “from Béxar”; “from La Bahía”; “from New Mexico”; and others too
numerous to mention. See Adán Benavides, The Béxar Archives (1717-1836), A Name Guide (Austin: The
University of Texas Press, 1989), 1141-1142, 1166-1167

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chose to depart on the day the expedition left Santa Fé, after a lengthy stay in the capital. He probably counted on the men returning at some point, given the King’s ongoing beneficence where it concerned desertion from the royal armies. As of a royal decree of January 26, 1801, the King was determined not to deprive soldiers of bonuses they earned when, after being punished for their misdemeanors, they proved themselves worthy of forgiveness and had thereafter continued to act honorably and loyally. Except, in this case, Carlos was no longer on the throne and, even his son Fernando had managed to become deposed and subsequently replaced by a Bonaparte. However, it was 1804 and the King’s paternal view towards transgressors and the decree’s fundamental premise had remained unchanged.

Over the next two days, the expedition made many stops but Amangual does not provide nearly the amount of detail on the terrain and road conditions as he had when en route to Santa Fé. On September 22, one of the two deserters from the militia was found in the cavallada at dawn, and one of the muleteers ran away from the company of La Bahía during the night. The next morning, the second militiaman who deserted the day of departure from Santa Fe was found in the cavallada, and the day before two drummers, one from the First Company of Nuevo Santander and the second from the company of Nuevo Leon, deserted. In the five years preceding the Amangual expedition, cases of second desertions and trials dealing with repetition of desertion constituted a significant part of military affairs in communications between comandante general Salcedo and the Governor of Texas during the spring of 1803. As we have already seen, Amangual had to occupy himself with the dereliction of duty by at least three truant soldiers in April 1804, and by November of that same year, he had given information regarding the desertion of four more soldiers.973

972 Copy of Caballero’s communiqué of royal decree [...] covering reinstatements after desertion, BA December 3, 1804. There were an assortment of conditions that had to be met in order to receive His Majesty’s pardon, and some of those included a loss of credit for time served.

973 See for example: Nemesio Salcedo to Governor of Texas, giving instructions on procedures in cases of second desertion, BA March 14, 1803; Cordero to Governor of Texas, [...] case of Miguel Losaya, charged with second desertion, BA March 18, 1803; Nemesio Salcedo to Governor of Texas, [...] punishment [...] for desertion and [...] trials dealing with repetition of desertion, BA June 4, 1803; [...] Luzero and Elguézabal, [...] remittance to the Real Sala de México of all criminal cases in Texas dealing with desertion, BA June 22, 1803; Amangual to Elguézabal, [...] desertion of Vicente Durán, Pedro García, Nepomuceno Ceballos and Blás Ramón, BA November 19, 1804.
The same night as the desertion of the two drummers, two soldiers, one from the First Company of Nuevo Santander and the other from the Second Company [of the same province] deserted. The next morning, Amangual and his troops found the trail left by the pair and it was apparent that they had taken animals with them. Immediately, a captain, subordinate officer, and twenty-five men followed the trail and appraised it as that of two saddled horse and two led mules. However, when their last horse was exhausted, they gave up the search and returned without having caught the two deserters. Then, they discovered that a soldier of the militia whose horse and been the first to give out, had climbed a tree to see if his companions were returning, had fallen and broken a leg.974

Bumbling deserters aside, it became apparent that Apache raiders had stolen cattle on September 4. However, the Indians left a trail and the expedition followed it eastward from Sevilleta until they had reached a fairly level plain in the early evening. The party continued along this type of terrain so that the enemy would not see the dust raised by the horse herd. When they finally arrived at Sierra Oscura, having left the exhausted mule team behind, the company was forced to make camp with no water at 4 o’clock in the morning. They had traveled twenty-one leagues over seventy-two hours.975 Then, they were up after only three hours of rest; at 8 o’clock in the morning, they found a pool of water and Amangual decided to wait there for the mules which arrived at 11 o’clock. The party continued to travel for eight leagues through the Cañon de la Piedra Parada, and only at near midnight did they stop because their mules were very tired.

6.9 Bad Lands, Very Bad Lands

For the next few days, water was scarce and camp sites at the end of the long days of travel were determined by both accessibility to water and exhaustion, even if some places had no water. According to Loomis and Nasatir, the expedition had just crossed the Jornada de Muerte.976 On the entry for September 30, Amangual made a note after his brief summary of travel for the day.

974 Amangual, September 23, 1808
975 Amangual, September 25 – 27, 1808
976 Vial, 513 fn45
He described the area as “bad lands,” which ran from north to south between two mountain ranges, the Oscura and the Blanca. The land seemed to be formed in their entire length by volcanos and were impassable except for trails made by the Indians. Apparently the rocks were melted by fire and Amangual compared them to an iron mine. As if that were not daunting enough, he indicated that the trail by which his men had traveled had horrible precipices on both sides and at every step.\textsuperscript{977} The terrain improved and the party remained watchful for the enemy, and that included spying on some of the Rancherias. Then, on October 7, one of the most remarkable episodes occurred while the expedition was \textit{en route} to San Elizario.

In the very late evening, while the company was still on horseback, a boy of ten or eleven years old came out from a thicket where he had been hiding. Amangual identified the child as the one who had been taken by the Apache in Sevilleta on September 4. He told the company that he had run away from the Apache five days before when they were rounding up their horses to move their ranchería to another place. Amangual wrote that the unfortunate boy miraculously escaped from the vigilance of a multitude of Indians. And, sadly, his body bore the most evident proof\textsuperscript{978} of the cruelty of the Apache, identified by Amangual as “savages,” who beat the boy constantly. His name was Juan Cristobal Padia [Padilla/sic passim]\textsuperscript{979}. Apparently, he lived five days on nothing but \textit{piñones} which he had gathered before coming out of the woods.\textsuperscript{980} This is the only information that Amangual provides concerning the child; he writes nothing else about the discovery of the boy nor provides any other information about the episode. His narrative takes up with a description of rejoining the reconnoitering party that had left the day before.

Fresh trails of presumably Indians were discovered that required detachments to pursue, and then further travel by the main contingent of the expedition, and then waiting for the various

\textsuperscript{977} Amangual, September 29 – October 1, 1808
\textsuperscript{978} “His body was covered with lacerations” \textit{Vial}, 516
\textsuperscript{979} The Loomis and Nasatir text identifies him as “Juan Cristobal” and then further on in the paragraph mentions his last name. The \textit{Vial} does not mention his age but credits the “Bexar copy” with listing “about 10 or 12 years old.” Ibid
\textsuperscript{980} Amangual, October 7, 1808
detachments to return. Scarcity of water was still very much a concern. On the morning of October 13, 1808 Amangual decided that the Indians that were fleeing [keeping ahead] from the troops were part of those that had committed the robbery – which included the boy Padilla – at Sevilleta. He ordered eighty-nine men to select the best horses, and leave the rest with the expedition under the command of the Lieutenant; the search team was to go along the river to join the main train under the command of Captain of militia José Agabo de Ayala. On the 14th, the expedition caught up with the Indians, running on foot through the highest part of the Sierra de las Pitacas and driving their families and horses before them. Amangual ordered his men to dismount and he and the troops went up the hill where some of the Indians had been sighted. They pursued them as far as they could but the Indians, lying in wait behind rocks, sent a shower of bullets and arrows upon the men. In this skirmish, knowledge of the geography played in the Indians’ favor as they even threw rocks down upon the soldiers from the summit of the hill. Since the expedition team was unfamiliar with the terrain, they were at considerable disadvantage and after three hours of warfare, Amangual ordered a retreat. One soldier from the Company of Nuevo León was left dead and six others were wounded, including two veterans.

Although the moans and cries of the Indians were certain indications to Amangual and his men that many of their number had perished in the attack, Amangual could give no exact count of their losses. At 1 o’clock in the afternoon, the team retired in “good order,” and having given aid to their wounded and watered their horses, Amangual held a review of arms and ammunition. He found that the gun, lance, ammunition and cartridge belt, and a box of cartridges were missing; these belonged to the deceased soldier, Vicente Lustaita. Four lances belonging to the wounded militiamen, two lances belonging to the veterans and two guns belonging to the wounded militiamen, José Benegas and Antonio Nañes, were missing. By 3 o’clock in the afternoon, the expedition set out and in an hour and a half, they made a dry camp.

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981 Ibid, October 8 – 11, 1808
982 This is the first time in the Diary that Amangual describes Agabo as the captain of a militia.
983 “Huraita” – Vial, 521
984 Amangual, October 14, 1808
Only two days after the battle on the hill, they encountered troops under the command of Lieutenant José Arvio Salas from the garrison of Santa Fé. At 2 o’clock in the afternoon the expedition arrived at Brasita where they were joined by the detachment that had gone out on campaign and remained in the command of Captain of Militia [unspecified] Cayetano Quintero.

Their stay in Brasita was unremarkable except for one significant event: the boy Juan Cristobal that had escaped the Apache was returned to his father. The next day, the expedition found the herd belonging to the company of San Elizario. Amangual decided to leave the horse herd of over six hundred animals there with a guard of forty men under one officer. He continued traveling with only the loaded mule team and got as far as Paraje de las Boregas, where the company stopped to camp. Just before noon the next day, the expedition passed through El Paso and came to the edge of the fields of the villa. Finally, at 3:30 in the afternoon the Amangual expedition reached the Presidio of San Elizario where the troops accessed their respective garrisons. The captain made a notation: I arrested a soldier of the company of Nuevo Reyno de León, named Nepomuceno Martínez, for having been insubordinate in a matter of service and for having drawn a short sword [belduque (sic)] which [hit] the cartridge belt of the carabinero Vicente Cabrera of the Béxar Company, while under his orders.

Insofar as the long journey had resulted in the loss of life of one soldier and the wounding of several others during a skirmish with enemy native people, and even though the troops had, in the middle of nowhere, came upon an abandoned child marked with the signs of cruelty, it seems that some of their number upon arrival at a safe haven crumbled emotionally under the pressure of having endured episodes of high drama and even death. On the other hand, tensions among the various companies had reached a level of volatility that even arriving at a military outpost after an

985 “who declared that he was going to Santa Fé as a member of the detachment” – Amangual, October 16, 1808;
986 “who said he was from the garrison of Santa Fé” – Vial, 521
987 “El Bajio [sic]” – Vial, 521
988 “San Elesario”; Ibid, October 19, 1808. “At 11 o’clock we encountered the situado of the Company of San Elzeario.” Vial, 522
989 Amangual, October 21, 1808
arduous experience, even surrounded by men of their own stripe, was not enough to mitigate the psychological toll experienced from a life, literally, in the saddle.

6.10 From San Elesario to the Capital of Béxar: November 8 – December 23, 1808

Two weeks passed before Amangual took up his pen to continue the narrative of the expedition diary. Proving that the Apache could also be beneficial and not solely harmful, Amangual and his men set out with two Apache guides and headed southeast. They crossed the Rio del Norte at noon, and camped at a watering place called San Antonio remaining there all the next day because troops had stopped to wait for the mail from Chihuahua.990 From the presidio at Elizario to the banks of the Pecos River, the team traveled seventy-three leagues (251 miles); that travel took its toll on several horses and mules mostly resulting in exhaustion but often death, too. Throughout these days, watering holes were available and Captain Amangual records that rest periods for the animals occurred, but not as regularly as their being overcome by fatigue.991 A militiaman of the company of Nuevo Leon fell off his horse, causing his musket to break. Whether his horse was suffering from extreme exhaustion or became frightened and thus threw the rider is not known. On this same day, however, a total of twelve horses were exhausted.992

On November 29, Amangual and his party witnessed three Indians running away on horseback on the other side of the Pecos River; he sent out a reconnaissance team that reported they found the ranchería abandoned with eight fires still burning. Later that evening, three of their number appeared at the expedition camp site and indicated that they were Comanche, followers of Chief Cordero, and were on campaign against the Apache. Further, they promised to provide guides who would take them to the village of Cordero. They made good on their word the next day.993

990 Amangual, November 8 – 10, 1808
991 Ibid, November 11 – 26, 1808
992 Ibid, November 28, 1808. The Hatcher translation does not mention the fatigued horses, only the Loomis and Nasatir, although they cite their “Bexar” copy. Vial, 528.
993 Ibid, November 29 – 30, 1808
By the first week of December, two mules from the Béxar company and two horses belonging to the company of Nuevo León died on the trail; during the two days prior to their deaths, the animals had traveled only five leagues and had rested the entire day before. The entirety of the journey had apparently extracted a mighty cost on the animals since the periods for refreshment were insufficient as further proof will emerge. After the death of the four equines, the expedition remained in camp from December 5 – 6, 1808. The next morning, the company traded twenty-one of the most worn out horses so as not to lose them on the road with four mules and four horses left in the care of the Indian captain Cordero. Fortunately, at least for the animals, December 8 was rainy all day so the expedition stayed in camp.994

For the remainder of the Amangual’s narrative, the entries become attenuated, as though he had made a decision to only provide the most essential information for his commander’s edification. The expedition reached the headwaters of the Rio Verde, the creek of Nuestra Senora de Loreto, and the abandoned presidio of San Saba. One week away from home, Amangual indicated that the poor, run down, worn out animals set out in the care of one sergeant and twelve men to travel by slow stages, further noting that this procedure was followed until they reached Bexar. If the return trip did not physically exhaust to the point of death the expedition team, it must have broken the spirit of at least two soldiers; Juan Govea of the First Company of Nuevo Santander was placed under arrest, charged with insubordination towards the Corporal of his company.995 Two days later, Private Faustino López met the same fate as Govea, placed under arrest for the same reason: insubordination for having threatened with weapons his Corporal Francisco de León. Both soldiers represented the First Company of Nuevo Santander. The rest of the week was uneventful except for one very sick horse belonging to the Bexar company broke down. On December 23, 1808 at 11 o’clock in the morning the Amangual expedition arrived at the presidio of San Antonio de Bexar “without further incident.”996

994 Ibid, December 1 – 8, 1808
995 Ibid, December 16, 1808; Loomis and Nasatir identify the Corporal as Francisco de León. Vial, 532
996 Ibid, December 17 – 23, 1808
CONCLUSION

In some ways, the expedition to Santa Fé represented the culmination of a life in the military for Francisco Amangual. The documentary record shows his relinquishment of certain duties tied to his military obligations and prior to his departure, like his transferring the management of the Bexar military hospital to Mariano Varela,997 his being relieved as Major of the Viceregal Militia Corps,998 and the transfer of command of the compañía volante of San Carlos de Parras to Jose Antonio Aguilar.999 All of these events directly preceded his leading the expedition team of two hundred soldiers, indigenous guides, a chaplain, and other personnel out from the Béxar presidio to that of Santa Fé on March 30, 1808. A life in the military was not, essentially, desirable for a wide array of reasons, but for some, enlistment equated to an income – of sorts – and for others, it served as an opportunity to ascend yet another rung on the colonial hierarchy of ethnicity and social status. During the era covered by this study, challenges to life and limb had in large measure been significantly reduced. Spanish policy across its frontier outposts utilized, to wavering effect, benign maneuverings like peace by purchase through incessant gift-giving to the indigenous nations. In the same vein, royal administrators and agents of the empire recognized the weakness of colonial mechanisms of control by their acknowledgement of indigenous powerbrokers within the domain of entrenched geo-political spaces and their inhabitants. Those regions included the Apachería, Comanchería, and other spatial strongholds of Native communities. As Brian deLay has explained, raiding in the Indian/Spanish/French borderlands, though it had never ceased entirely, had dramatically lessened. In fact, by the 1780s New Mexico and Texas had entered a new era of security, growth, and prosperity. Thereafter, by the 1790s and on the eve of the nineteenth century, New Spain’s colonial administrators could claim a part of that victory in securing the frontier through their manifold strategy of financing frontier defense and infrastructure, centralizing command, and by “acting respectfully toward native allied and treating them as sovereign peoples.” Fundamentally, they understood that the

997 Transfers management of Bexar military hospital to Mariano Varela, BA March 14, 1808
998 Relieved as major of Viceregal Militia Corps, BA March 17, 1808
999 Transfers command of Flying Company of San Carlos de Parras to Jose Antonio Aguilar, BA March 25, 1808
security of the frontier hinged on good relations with the Apache, Navajo, Wichita, and especially the Comanche, described by DeLay as “the real masters of that vast, difficult realm.”

However, even if certain transformations mitigated some of the difficulties associated with presidial life in New Spain’s Far North, such modes of existence did manage to harden some men in far less productive ways. As this study shows, some soldiers converted to criminal behavior or, at the very least, men of some military stature fell under the sway of illegal activity, desertion, and addictions, including alcoholism. It is clear that carving out an existence through military life in the borderlands, even with the communal sense presumably articulated by its garrisons, its occupants, and its environs; relatively unfettered access to the presidios’ concentration of valued commodities like tobacco, cloth, and paper; and, fulfilling the obligation to Cross and Crown, was difficult for many soldiers if not fraught with extreme danger.

A survey of the historiographical landscape and even a glancing review of the archival record makes it possible to identify the multiple hardships endured by soldiers in the saddle or stationed at the borderlands presidio. Like others in Spain’s colonial army, Francisco Amangual experienced increased debt due to poor governance, continued hardship, and a decrease in assistance in spite of an apparent ready and abundant supply of provisions available in the province. Privations in many areas of military life were an aspect of the lives of all soldiers, irrespective of their particular unit designation or attachment to specific companies, and it appears that ascension in the ranks in the ‘frontier’ offered no quick remedy to its harsh conditions.

Identifying Francisco Amangual’s position within the presidial community and charting his experience from among a host of other better known names across the military landscape of the Spanish colonial twilight era serves two purposes. First, highlighting the everyday tasks and consequences of martial administrative procedures, however mundane and unglamorous, allows us to project onto the stage of borderlands history one soldier’s role as an unapologetic navigator of the unique dynamics of the region. Since he worked for so long as a presidial paymaster,

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substantive documentation survives across the centuries of the daily activities of several presidios and their environs. Second, routine activities constituted the bulk of the responsibilities of any presidio paymaster and thus deflect any notions of frontier life as a kind of peripheral theatre for endless warfare, with heroic acts of daring by men on horseback, or, as a socio-politically charged space consummately engulfed by gunshots, wild horse rides in the night, and incessant confrontations with obstinate Indians. It is true that these conditions indeed existed across large swaths of the borderlands and that the army’s relationship with indigenous nations fills the annals of regional history with source materials marked by an often paradoxical tenor. There can be no mistaking that such antagonistic events permeated the borderlands and were even advanced by multiple factions for reasons broadly related to survival, economic gain, and control of resources.

However, this study shows that the testimonials provided by Amangual and his cohorts within the historical record cast light upon the overarching administrative functions fulfilled by the paymaster and others in the colonial Far North. Further, it may help orient scholars to understand the significance of the empire’s intermediaries documenting the seemingly mundane activities of life in the garrison. Colonial mechanisms of regulating the frontier extended to the management of the King’s armies and reflected the system-wide policy of standardization implemented in the 1786 Ordinance of the Intendants system; the post-inspection Reglamentos of Havana (1719), of 1729, 1772, and the final Instruction of 1786; and, the contentious fuero militar. However, all of these policies, brought to bear as they were in an effort to renovate the aging and, essentially, obsolete Laws of the Indies, underscored the King’s determination to centralize the management of Spain’s overseas colonies.

In much the same way, assigning a cogent place to the presence of the compañías volantes [flying squadrons] allows for a more thoroughgoing understanding of their history by disentangling their place from among the various presidial units in the colonial borderlands. The compañías volantes – referred to as ‘cuerpos volantes,’ ‘mobile troops/tropas volantes,’ and, simply ‘volantes’ – evolved in tandem with the development of the presidio system and served as a mounted military squadron charged with defending the Provincias Internas. As this study has
shown, this type of inquiry into the historiography in some ways perhaps reverses the trend of imagining the *volantes* as a spirited patrol force or even as a remarkably mobile offensive force against hostile enemies of the region. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, they may well have fulfilled that function; however, during the period covered in this study the *volantes* as a unit were a rather mixed lot, and their performance as a military unit in some locales across the frontier was seriously questioned by Pedro de Rivera and his team of inspectors. Having witnessed the disarray of the San Bartolomé flying squadron, Pedro de Rivera indicated in no uncertain terms that its soldiers were unaccustomed to military service, unlike the soldiers of the other presidios, and their laziness encouraged them to indulge in vices. Moreover, by the promulgation of the Galvez *Instrucciones* to Ugalde in 1786, its Article 91 stated that his commanders should immediately prepare to eliminate the unfit men from presidial companies, and this included the *volantes* among others, and replacing them with those more suitable for warfare. In fact, as it has been noted, Article 52 even questioned the appropriateness of the name ‘volante’ to describe the actual, and ongoing, duties of this unit of the borderlands military force and how the term devolved upon the group. The terminology of that time implied that its troop members were to wander incessantly across the frontier since they had not been assigned a physical locale in which to garrison.

For well over a year 1791-1792, Amangual weathered the accusations of presidio contractors from the merchant José Macario Zambrano regarding the supply of corn to the soldiers as well as a complaint filed in 1788 by Joaquín Menchaca against Amangual. No documentation exists specifying the circumstances surrounding the conflict between the latter two men, but it does demonstrate that Amangual was capable of committing some kind of an oversight that required correction so that it might serve as a guide in the future to both, to Amangual and his company.\(^\text{1001}\) However, that conflict was not so severe as to hinder Francisco Amangual’s successful election in 1788 to the post of paymaster. Four years later, the son-in-law of Zambrano, Sergeant Mariano

\(^{1001}\) Martínez Pacheco to the *Cabildo* [of San Fernando], discussing complaint filed against Amangual, BA Dec 24, 1788
Rodríguez, would make accusations against Amangual a family affair by launching one of his own that resulted in a forty-three page proceeding. As if these contentious episodes in his military career and in his duties as paymaster were not enough to cause anxiety, Amangual had an obligation to ensure the strict maintenance of the general accounts of debits and credits with the greatest clarity and justification. This was necessary, as we have seen in multiple examples, in order for his records to be examined and approved by the captain and other officers, including the *comandante inspector*, at each year’s end.

As I have argued, as soon as one charge of wrongdoing terminated, always in Amangual’s favor, another one emerged just as quickly. In May 1792, Amangual would find himself, yet again, having to answer for his bookkeeping records based upon suspicions from on high. When the Superior Accounting Office of the Royal Tribunal of Accounts in Mexico issued a document inferring questionable balances against the *habilitación* fund of the presidial company of San Antonio de Béxar, Amangual then had to answer overseers in Mexico City. Such a daunting notice coming from a colonial administrative authority in the capital must have shaken the confidence of the paymaster, since the Tribunal sought a review and examination of the accounts of expenditures for gifts for the Indians covering a period of almost four years. This type of record keeping was routine for Amangual, and it is evident from the mass of documentation generated by the Béxar *habilitado* that clear-headedness prevailed and the case was closed.

Then, two months later, in an ironic twist, Amangual found himself as the caretaker and inspector of contraband (allegedly in the possession of another fellow soldier, the ever diligent Juan Cortés) that was now to be housed in his *habilitación*. Amangual was called upon, yet again, to inventory goods brought by Toribio Durán from Nacogdoches to San Antonio. The nature of borderlands dynamics in the context of valuing its troop strength and the talent of individual soldiers can be seen in the career of Francisco Amangual. In spite of at least two episodes of allegations of wrongdoing as company paymaster, his services as an accountant, and especially his talent at executing laborious inventories, were still needed. His ability to testify in legal proceedings of a serious nature including providing testimony for a defendant charged with murder
speak to his status as a trustworthy member of the presidial population. And, his ongoing engagement with the more menial tasks associated with the work of a frontier soldier continued unabated. The day-to-day practices of a presidial company’s paymaster were invariably suspect; indeed, there had been many unprincipled individuals involved in fraudulent activities where it concerned the provisioning of soldiers. Whether elected by fellow soldiers or simply implicit in a presidio captain’s responsibilities, the frontier paymaster faced enormous challenges in his duties as the caretaker of funds for a garrison.

The Cortés contraband proceedings, and the Amangual-Rodríguez lawsuit, represented the commingling of presidio soldiers and merchants in troublesome episodes of misadventure, charges and counter-charges, and dishonorable behavior with serious implications for the military community. Unrelenting incidents of contraband and its confiscation had a long history in the colonial borderlands, as did occurrences of soldiers accusing one another for misdeeds, or the suspicion thereof, and were to continue over the course of time and involve other players from the same socio-economic arena. Amid this flurry of less than beneficial activities, in places like San Antonio and its garrison, like that at La Bahía, today Goliad, and into Nacogdoches in eastern Texas, other communities entered into the military garrisons. Into these complex networks of accommodation and accusation emerged a dynamic that presumed compliance and cohesion through spatial relations at once joined by reciprocal efforts that were intended to seal loyalties, if often permeable and uncertain, among presumed ‘friends.’ The business of maintaining rather shaky alliances was ongoing; formal treaties of peace were but one method to promote adherence to prescribed modes of behavior in the best interests of all parties. Undeniably, the codification of these interactions were mandated by indigenous negotiators, as well as the French, Anglo, and Spanish. It is also true that other endeavors involving the usual actors involved as much diligence, and therefore, documentation. This study has presented documentation that establishes the King’s beneficence to the soldiers in his armies across the great reach of the Spanish army, and the

1002 See Chapter 1, pp 51-53
patriarchal, and often perceptive, approaches that some frontier commanders and the King took towards their subordinates.

However insignificant to contemporary observers the rewards for good conduct and productive service to the Crown may seem, given the unique challenges of life in the borderlands certain forms of fiscal and psychological remuneration were valued -- inasmuch as they may have been just as quickly dismissed for their austerity -- by cliques within certain companies and among individual troops in the final decade of the century. For colonial administrators, this meant conceiving the most expeditious manner of bringing about reforms that would not disrupt the delicate balance of maintaining the royal treasury while at the same time not shortchanging competent soldiers or further inciting potentially rebellious civilians. As we have seen, chronic adjustments to military protocol and procedure as described by the royal ordinances were symptomatic of the process of bringing organization, maintaining alignment with the larger apparatus of colonialism, and controlling the behavior of the personnel that embodied such an unwieldy bureaucracy. In the person of Francisco Amangual and others, much of that process found expression and authentication on the ground.

The foregoing developments in this study revealed the fissures inherent in state building, some of which existed before obvious ruptures were exposed by paymaster misbehavior, presidial bankruptcy, (re)orderings of the military ranking system, and confronting the reality of illegal trade in commercial ventures. All of the episodes of soldier waywardness might not seem so surprising in the context of the twilight of the Spanish colonial empire. Habitual transgressions on the part of the King’s troops in the borderlands have formed a part of the historical trajectory of the Spanish army. In the closing years of the eighteenth century, ongoing attempts at reform included, at times, forcing conformity within the ranks of the military which did nothing more than maintain an ambivalence between the commander and the commanded. This resulted in a type of uneasy alliance of a community ostensibly bound by the attributes of honor, respect for authority, and restraint. In the first years of the new century, events on the Peninsula induced other transformations of a type that would eventually ignite the call for Independence across the Atlantic
in regional spaces throughout Mexico. In certain ways, life in the borderlands went on in much the same way as it had over the course of many centuries even though the colonial apparatus that had structured the lives of frontier inhabitants started its inevitable decline.

The historical record tells us that, following the 1808 expedition to Santa Fé, Francisco Amangual received permission to marry María Trinidad de Los Reyes y García in 1810. However, the month before he left to lead the expedition, he wrote to the Governor of Texas indicating that since December 1805, he had been lodged in a dilapidated one-room jacal [thatched, adobe hut] situated on the outer walls of Valero [the Álamo] and that the unit was the property of the King. In fact, his own home was occupied as a military hospital.1003 From Amangual’s pen, we learn that the shack consisted of one room of eight varas and a porch; both buildings were used as a kitchen, the land was fifteen varas deep, not counting a narrow strip of public land adjoining the formation. Amangual’s shack and porch, formerly occupied by an Indian woman named Dolores, was one of those still standing when the mission was demolished.

Apparently, Amangual had done personal work on the unit and expended a large sum to repair the shack. Considering the expenses that he incurred and realizing that if he left the shack for any assignment – for example, the impending trip to Santa Fe – no purchaser would be able to afford to reimburse him for the expense. The main thrust of the letter was to request from the Governor that he sell Amangual the land and the shack [but, perhaps, not the porch] after its appraisal so that from its gross value a deduction could be made for the expenses incurred by Amangual. The captain made the renovations in order to provide a suitable home for himself and his baby girl.1004

1003 Amangual served as the manager of the Bexar military hospital, and though no documentation exists of that assignment, when he left on the Santa Fe expedition, the transfer of his job to Mariano Varela occurred two weeks before. Transfers management of Bexar military hospital to Mariano Varela, BA March 14, 1808
1004 Signed, rubric of Amangual, Bexar, February 9, 1808. In “Land Grants and Sales of the Bexar County Spanish Archives, no. 34,” copy from the Robert Bruce Blake Collection, 976.4 R639r v. 53 (Francisco de Amangual), Daughters of the Republic of Texas Library. Without further information, we must assume that the girl is most likely the daughter of his last wife, María Trinidad de los Reyes y García. Amangual’s first wife was María Trinidad Castelo, and his second was María Fuentes.
In his last will and testament, dated in Bexar, April 15, 1812, Francisco Amangual indicates that he owned a stone house in the capital which he used as a residence. He described it as having four rooms facing the street, on which the frontage was thirty-five varas with six rooms to the rear, running in depth to the river which flowed by his property.\footnote{1005}

He stated that he provided well for the three children from his first wife and he supported them until their deaths. Amangual added that his son, the Cadet José María, received a soldier’s salary but, nevertheless, Amangual paid for whatever he needed. When José left for Coahuila, his father completely equipped him with clothing, arms, munitions and horses, at a cost of three hundred eighty-six pesos. Later, the elder Amangual sent his son forty-five pesos, none of which was ever returned to him after José’s death\footnote{1006} because, as it is indicated the father’s will, all of his effects were sold to cover the shortage in his accounts for army equipment of which he was in charge. The expenses for the funerals, burials and associated costs for Amangual’s first wife and his two daughters, María Antonia and María Gertrudis, as well as the prayers for the repose of José María, amounted to six hundred eighty-four pesos. The son left a debt of seven hundred sixty-eight pesos, two and a half reales, payment which the father assumed. At the time of the writing of the will, Amangual had not paid his son’s debt in full but had provided in his last will and testament funds for the payment of the balance. Ten days after the execution of the document, Francisco Amangual died, and his will and codicil were unsealed the following day.\footnote{1007}

\footnote{1005} “Last Will and Testament of Captain Francisco Amangual, Bexar, April 15, 1812.” Printed in Los Bexarenos Genealogical Quarterly, no further information for citation.
\footnote{1006} As of July 2015, I have found no documentation for the cause of the younger Amangual’s death. Further, it is presumed that Francisco Amangual died from natural causes related to old age.
\footnote{1007} Ibid
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Vita

Roland Rodríguez received his MA in Art History at the University of New Mexico, specializing in the *Art of the Americas*. His thesis, “The Emperor's New Cloak: The Maximilian *Sarape*, History, Nomenclature, and the Dealer as Designator,” investigated a particular type of Mexican *sarape*, or *poncho*, purported to have been used by, and produced during the reign of, the Archduke Maximilian who was installed as Mexico's emperor during the French Intervention (1864-1867). As a curator, Rodríguez was responsible for both “The President, the Prince, and the People: A Selection of the Zimmerman Library’s Literary and Pictorial Sources of the Mexican Reform and French Intervention Periods,” and “Drawing the Body: Memory, Mimesis, and the Florence Academy: Recent work by Kathleen Keating”, both exhibitions presented at the Herzstein Latin American Reading Room, Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico.

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