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Through The Eyes Of The Dead Others

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THROUGH THE EYES OF THE DEAD OTHERS

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Dedication

For my grandparents, who instilled in me from a young age that an education was a way out of the struggle. To my entire family, who supported me on my path to a higher education. To all the people in this world hustling to improve the lives of those unfortunate enough to promote positive change on their own. To artists, such as Immortal Technique, who have shown that there is more to the world than the whitewashed narrative being portrayed by those who engineer popular culture. And most importantly, to all the dead others of the past who never had a chance to tell their side of the story, as well as all the voiceless others who are currently still being subjugated, marginalized, and forgotten: it will not be much longer. Until then, I leave to you the words of my grandfather:

Siempre para adelante.
Epigraph

My destiny is to show the world that the [struggle] is real. Go back in time and play this [music] for the slaves in the field and for my children in the future, waiting to breathe. People slowly dying hanging on, waiting to leave. Believe when I'm gone, and this album's on a library shelf, I'll be one with God and one with you and everything else... Revolutionary Volume 2 has been brought to you by the type of [people] who ain't scared of [anything]. And if you playing this album, and I'm no longer here, and sometime far away from when I recorded this, remember that history isn't the way the corporate controlled media made it look like. Read between the lines and free your mind, revolution is the birth of equality and the antithesis to oppression. But this is only built for real [people]. So when I'm gone, don't let nobody I never got along with try to make songs kissing my ass, recycling my beats or my vocals. The [struggle] is real over here man. Thank you for listening, and thank you for supporting independent Hip-Hop, the heart and soul of our culture keeping the truth alive. Goodnight my people. Goodnight... - Immortal Technique
THROUGH THE EYES OF THE DEAD OTHERS

by

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THESIS

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I would like to thank the professors who worked with me on my thesis for their continued patience throughout the writing process, especially given the abstract nature of the topic. Specifically, I want to thank Dr. Jules Simon, who not only introduced me to the wild world of phenomenology, but also helped me formulate my thoughts in a more cogent manner. A special debt of gratitude goes out to Dr. Marion Rohrleitner, who chose to work with me on such short notice and who, despite not being a “philosopher” by trade, contributed precious insight. Lastly, to Dr. Caroline Arruda, whose contributions helped formulate the crux of my argument.
Abstract

I use Edith Wyschogrod’s figure of the heterological historian to argue that we have a responsibility to learn from the “dead others” of the past in order to better apply in practical ways the lessons we learn from history. I draw on an interpretation of Nietzsche’s view on historiography to examine the claims of Hegel’s dialectic, namely, that the Ideal Absolute for which Spirit pines, is actually achievable, particularly through the advent of the Internet.

Beginning with a relatively well-known interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history, Fukuyama’s, I show how Hegel’s dialectic takes shape in Fukuyama’s interpretation as a negative aspect of Spirit’s unveiling. This “negative aspect” results in Spirit being stuck in a perpetual feedback loop from which only the conscious realization of its current state, and a cognizant effort by the future subjects of history to free it, will in fact do so. Consequently, this thesis serves as the basis for rejecting Fukuyama’s claim that history came to an end with the fall of communism, and, as such, the task of engaging in the dialectical work of Spirit in order to continue to work towards its final “Ideal” form is incomplete and calls for further philosophical and ethical work. I show how this active acknowledgement, the “conscious realization”, and concerted, “cognizant effort” to bring about the necessary change needed for Spirit to carry on its journey is a fundamental part of Spirit’s ongoing unveiling of the parousia that we, humans, are intimately a part of. It is an unveiling that is made manifest by the heterological historian’s implementation of socially conscientious art and technology.

Additionally, I further argue that this parousia can only be completed by way of active, practical engagement, and that phenomenology, in practice, can lead one to this realization. Furthermore, I argue that once one understands the conditions entailed by these claims and begins to engage in the practices they involve, one has a moral obligation to not only the dead others but
to all future others to help them do the same. The practices involve addressing the voices of the
dead others as victims of the dominant agents acting irresponsibly to achieve their own
self-interest at the expense of the interests of excludes, or “dead” others. In order to do so, I make
the claim that this is a moral prerequisite for all individuals who have satisfied the basic tenets of
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. More specifically, I argue that the conditions for which the others
can elevate themselves to the upper echelons of Maslow’s hierarchy must first exist before
indulging in the exploits afforded by Western liberalism, a condition which is not afforded to us by
Fukuyama’s interpretation of Hegel’s dialectic.

In doing so, I hope to show why I believe Wyschogrod is correct in stating three arguments
for better taking into account the lost possibilities of the “dead others” and the potential
possibilities of “future others”, the first of which is that the inherent contradiction in Hegel’s
dialectic leaves out certain people and cultures from history. The second is Wyschogrod’s claim
that a new ethics, an ethics of understanding, is needed to manifest Spirit in a more conducive
manner than war. Lastly, I hope to show that Wyschogrod is correct in stating that history, as we
know it, is coming to an end via technology, and that it is the moral obligation of the heterological
historian to help it do so.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ vi

Abstract ............................................................................................................................ vii

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. ix

Chapter

1. The Get Out of The Ghetto Blues .............................................................................. 1
   1.1 Kill The Poor ......................................................................................................... 1
   1.2 I Hate it When They Tell us How Far we Came to be, as if Our People’s History Started With Slavery ................................................................................................. 2
   1.3 Some People Think I Won’t Make It, But I Know That I Will, You Can Make The Future, But it Starts With Leaving The Past .................................................................................... 8
   1.4 The Poverty of Philosophy ..................................................................................... 12

2. The Revolution Will Not be Televised ...................................................................... 16
   2.1 Started From The Bottom Now We’re Here? ............................................................... 16
   2.2 Past is Dead .......................................................................................................... 17
   2.3 Holes in Our Spirit Causing Tears and Fears, One Sided Stories For Years And Years ................................................................................................................................. 18
2.4 I Follow The Moskva, Down to Gorky Park, Listening to The Wind of Change ......23

2.5 Rage Against The Machine.................................................................25

2.6 Take The Power Back........................................................................30

2.7 Without a Face.....................................................................................34

2.8 The Military Industry Got it Poppin’ and Lockin’ Looking For a Way to Justify the
Wolfowitz Doctrine ...................................................................................35

2.9 Born as Ghosts....................................................................................40

2.10 We Didn’t Start The Fire ....................................................................40

2.11 April 29th, 1992 (Miami).................................................................45

3. Art and Responsibility ...........................................................................49

3.1 I Against I ..........................................................................................49

3.2 Without Her, we Are Lifeless Satellites Drifting.................................52

3.3 Cowboy Dan And The Lonesome Crowded West ................................56

3.4 I Got no Time For Livin’, Yes I’m Working All The Time ....................59

3.5 World, Hold on ....................................................................................62

3.6 Redemption Song..................................................................................63

3.7 Nazi Punks: In The Real Fourth Reich, You’ll be The First to go (Unless You Think)
3.8 The Rose That Grew From Concrete .................................................................69

3.9 Get Up, Stand Up, Don’t Give Up The Fight: Life is Your Right ......................74

4. My Name is Peace This is my Hour, Can I Get Just a Little More Power? ........76

4.1 Art of Subconscious Illusion ..............................................................................76

4.2 A Toast to The Dead ..........................................................................................77

4.3 I’m Livin’ in the 21st Century Doing Something Mean to it .............................80

4.4 Justice Could Just be Clearing a Path For People to Dream Properly ...........82

4.5 The Message And The Money ..........................................................................83

4.6 Homeland And Hip-Hop ..................................................................................87

4.7 Bullet With Butterfly Wings ..............................................................................88

4.8 I’m Relying on Your Common Decency: So Far It Hasn’t Surfaced, But I’m Sure it Exists .................................................................................................................93

4.9 Don’t Stop Thinking About Tomorrow: Don’t Stop, It’ll Soon be Here ........100

4.10 Give Away The Stone: Let The Waters Kiss and Transmutate These Leaden Grudges Into Gold ..........................................................101
5. Now I Could Let These Dream Killers Kill my Self-esteem, or Use my Arrogance as The Steam to Power my Dreams ................................................................. 105

5.1 Resistance is Fertile .......................................................... 105

References ........................................................................... 118

Curriculum Vita .................................................................. 121
Chapter 1: The Get Out of The Ghetto Blues

1.1 Kill The Poor

There is a specter haunting Western liberalism, and that specter is future oriented community that calls for a new ethical imperative that thinks of communities in a new manner; a manner which takes into account an adequate emphasis on the plight of what Edith Wyschogrod refers to as the dead others. There is a reason for my borrowing and modifying these famous lines from *The Communist Manifesto*, and the reason is in response to Francis Fukuyama’s work *The End of History?* Specifically, I find it is important to be critical of the fundamental philosophical commitments of Fukuyama views, which are identified through a Hegelian critique of Marxism. Following the logical mandates of Hegel’s dialectic, Fukuyama’s view holds that history has synthesized as capitalism’s victory over communism and its related forms of government. Given the neo-liberal agenda however, things do not look good for those who have been subjugated by the mandates of capitalism, which is why it is important to be critical of Fukuyama’s preemptiveness through a Wyschogrodian lens. In turn, this approach requires that I borrow various literary tools from Wyschogrod in hopes of remaining faithful to her philosophical enquiry. Furthermore, for my thesis, it is important to affirm that the *Communist Manifesto* is still informing the perspective of the voiceless dead others through the work of Wyschogrod’s heterological historian as a means of offering an antithesis to Fukuyama’s claim. As such, I am aware of the fact that informing my writing in such a manner also reflects an influence of the *Communist Manifesto*’s style, for there is still work to be done and a battle to be fought for the subjugated dead others.
1.2 I Hate it When They Tell us How Far We Came to Be, as if Our People’s History Started With Slavery

Located in the southwestern desert of the United States on the border with Mexico, lies the once sleepy city of El Paso, Texas. Until recently, El Paso’s fame consisted of very few incidents that brought it front and center to the American oculus at various points in history: the 1966 men’s national college basketball championship win by the then Texas Western Miners,¹ being the hometown of Felina, the Mexican maiden who’s love proved to be the downfall of Marty Robbins’ scorned outlaw in the song El Paso, but most recently, a cutaway segment in Family Guy.²

In this segment, after being informed of having to stay in El Paso for two days, the show’s lead character, Peter Griffin, despondently asks “What are we going to do for two days in El Paso?” His friend, Glen Quagmire, responds by stating “There’s a Chicano heritage festival.”, to which their third friend, Joe Swanson, immediately and firmly responds “No way”. Eventually, Quagmire proceeds to suggest they visit the Pershing House, where John Pershing took control of the 8th Army brigade in 1914. After exchanging quixotic looks, the scene cuts away once more to the trio inside what appears to be Pershing’s bedroom, in which an enchanted Peter joyously names off various items that once belonged to Pershing; namely his bed, his floor, and his lamp.

As harsh as this satire may seem, until recently, it was an unfortunately relatively accurate observation of a city that, despite historical significance and a wide ranging Mexican culture, had nothing to offer on a national scale. Being the second largest border city in America, El Paso is the size of, and in some instances larger than, various major cities located within the United States. Yet, despite outnumbering the city of Atlanta, Georgia, by over four-hundred thousand people, El

¹ UTEP’s NCAA Tournament Teams
² Family Guy
Paso has no major sports franchises to speak of. And although El Paso outnumbers Las Vegas, Nevada, by over two-hundred thousand citizens, El Paso has no major entertainment districts to boast. Furthermore, despite outnumbering Lake George, New York by a whopping 800,000 people, El Paso has no major amusement parks to speak for.

In terms of entertainment, it is not hard to see why El Paso makes for such an easy punch line. And yet, despite its many perceived shortcomings, El Paso is a rapidly expanding community that, unlike most American cities enmeshed in the national downfall resulting from The Great Recession, is experiencing a robust growth spurt. Depending on whose version of relatively contemporary history you accept, the growth spurt is due to one of two reasons. The first view holds that the rapid growth that has “recession proofed” El Paso is due in part to the massive allocation of government resources that has invested millions of dollars into the local economy and infrastructure to accommodate the massive influx of military personnel and their families. According to this view, one of the major beneficiaries of this redistribution of wealth has been the local El Paso workforce, of which ten percent is employed by the Army’s local installation, Fort Bliss.3

Despite the questionable significance of an economy that relies so heavily on such a massive military presence, the competing view about why the El Paso economy is growing, and appears to be booming, is outwardly grimmer. This latter view holds that El Paso’s economy improved correlative to the mass exodus of Mexican citizens seeking refuge in response to the violence and bloodshed that once made El Paso’s sister city, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, the most dangerous city in the world. Supporters of this view recognize that both El Paso and Ciudad Juarez are inexorably joined at the hip and it is not merely because these sister-cities are only separated by a two-minute walk across an international bridge. Their being joined at the hip more adequately

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3 Tseng, Nin-Hai
and economically refers to the way that the former historically reaps benefits off exploiting the latter. On this view, not only has the money that has traversed the border served to stimulate the local economy, it has also invested in it by way of various bars and restaurants that have brought a rambunctious nightlife to a once quite city. Yet, this one way transfer of business has done more than just shift the economic interest from one side of the border to the other; it has managed to do so while quarantining the violence in Juarez, which in 2010 averaged nearly ten murders a day. Comparatively, in 2010 El Paso was ranked the third safest city in America with a population over 500,000 people.

There is plenty of anecdotal evidence to attest to the factors surrounding El Paso’s recent growth, but the numbers give us some hard evidence to galvanize such claims. According to Nin-Hai Tseng, within the last twenty-five years alone, the individual earning power in El Paso grew 147%, with 2% coming during the initial years of The Great Recession, 2008 and 2009, respectively. What these numbers mean is that, while much of the rest of the U.S. was declining, El Paso was able to achieve the largest per capita income growth among the nation’s one hundred largest metropolitan areas.

Despite its relatively optimistic appearance, there is an underlying reality about the booming El Paso economy that is not so rosy. That is, regardless of where the stimulus is coming from, if we follow the money trail from those who have great wealth to those who do not, we discover a great deal of suffering. Whether it be the suffering of the Wise family, who lost two of their three sons in Afghanistan, an Afghani teenager known only as Abdulhai who flatly states

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4 Rice, Andrew  
5 City of El Paso  
6 Tseng, Nin-Ha  
7 Tseng, Nin-Hai  
8 Ian Shapira
that the he hopes war will end soon and that people will live and share humanity together,\(^9\) or a Mexican family of eight that was murdered over a $125 debt,\(^{10}\) these and many other numerous examples of suffering can be said to be interconnected with the economic growth in El Paso. A growth that, dubious as it may be, is unfortunately as welcome to the southwest desert land as a drought breaking rain.

As reported by Tseng, despite the massive growth spurt El Paso is experiencing, it is still ranked 99\(^{th}\) overall in the United States with a per capita income slightly under $29,000. The reason the surge looks so impressive, according to Tseng, is only because “El Paso… is starting from a much lower base than most cities.”\(^{11}\) Although Tseng’s analyses is relegated to a brief sentence in the concluding remarks of her article, and as such results in only passive interest to most readers, this insight is worthy of its own article. Perhaps, as a native El Pasoan, a manifest critique would be that I am biased in claiming that the once economically sub-par conditions of El Paso need to be further studied; naturally, what is to be expected of someone other than to be concerned for the community from which they were spawned? For my thesis, a scholar like Tseng sheds the light of hard evidence on the economic plight of the traditionally immigrant and historically poor Mexican community, adding to the vocalization of what has become known in popular culture as “the struggle” experienced by most El Pasoans. This is a struggle that I identify with, and as a result, am admittedly empathetic towards others who are dealt a similar role.

Although Tseng may not realize it, yet alone have intended it, in using her position to give credence to an easily overlooked injustice, she was giving a voice to countless number of past individuals who, in their voicelessness, never had the ability to make their struggle known, let alone capitalize off the hypothetical awareness that would bring about the physical change

\(^{9}\) We do not want war
\(^{10}\) Benedetti, Ana
\(^{11}\) Tseng, Nin-Hai
necessary to end it.

For the majority of its existence, El Paso has consisted of a community of predominantly underutilized, underemployed, and all around underrepresented Mexican immigrant population that has formed the foundation of the city. Regardless of their origination in Mexico, and undoubtedly other south-American countries as well, the Diaspora of Mexicans that concentrated in El Paso, until recently, found itself on the losing end of Western liberalism. Having very little money, no land, no owned homes, no voice, no grasp of the English language, or primary education (let alone degrees) to speak of, many of the original inhabitants of El Paso found themselves forced to labor just to get buy. Moreover, most were only given seasonal work that required strenuous physical exertion for minimal pay, only to be forced back to their homeland when the job was finished. For the lucky few who, either legally or illegally, were able to stick around in America, the prospects were not much better, for although they were in the land of opportunity, few had the above mentioned tools necessary to buy into the American dream.

In time, however, those who managed to work their way up from Mexico to the United State were able to establish themselves as productive members of society. Arriving here with almost nothing, most of these individuals were able to establish families and homes, a trend that, with each passing generation, was able to further afford the opportunities inherent in Western liberalism. As time further progressed, these families who were once so dependent on manual labor for survival were finally able to begin affording the remarkably priced state sponsored higher education provided by the local university, a trend that only further served to advance the local population by allowing them to buy into the mandates of Western liberalism that prefers “educated” individuals in its professional workforce. No longer relegated to the realm of physical work, the children of those who originally labored to build the homes that fostered the sprouting of
“professionals” were able to begin securing jobs that provided not just the means of survival, but leisure and expendable income as well.

Synchronically, it would appear as though the steady foundation afforded by the original laborers served to ground the pedestal built by the professional workers who, in turn have given their children the opportunity to seize the benefits of a rapidly expanding El Paso economy. If it was not for this trend, I most likely would have never had the possibility of writing a master’s thesis, and as a result, I can attest to being the beneficiary of such a support structure. Having not only grown up in an economically depressed neighborhood of an already economically depressed city, I believe it is fair to say that I have an insider’s perspective on the happenings of growing up in El Paso as part of a marginalized group.

Furthermore, having lived outside of El Paso for various periods, particularly during both the military expansion phase and Juarez massacres, I can also attest to having the outsider’s perspective of watching the city erupt from a humble desert town to a bustling town. For almost six years, I, like most young El Pasoans, left searching to find “something to do”. This came as a response to eighteen years of being frustrated with the realization that, in a city that once lacked the entertainment outlets currently available, there really was nothing to do in El Paso. In returning, however, I find that that is now no longer so much the case. While El Paso still lacks the major attractions enjoyed by smaller cities, their appears to be something perhaps more important sweeping through the desert town; an artistic renaissance of sorts.

Until very recently, outside of the summer season, which provided the opening of the local water and amusement park and a couple of small scale festivals, the options for entertainment were generally limited. Aside from typical outlets, such as movies and bars, there was no real channel for creative expression. Although a few bands managed to escape El Paso and eventually make it
big, there was no real music scene, no art or entertainment district, and few sports outlets to rally around. In 2014, however, it is not uncommon for there to be multiple musical shows on any night of the week, to take in an art exhibit at either the local museum or various other outlets that cater to local artists, to dine at locally owned mobile and traditional restaurants, or to enjoy the festivities at any one of El Paso’s three entertainment districts. Furthermore, at a time when El Paso hosts not one, but two major yearly music festivals, it is not uncommon to bump shoulders with musicians, DJ’s, and all around artists in general.

Granted, while it is perhaps preemptive to state that this artistic awakening is in anyway related to the economic upturn experienced by the city, one still must ask the basic question: what happen? In a community that has been steadily increasing in population since the mid-19th century, did all it really take for it to experience its largest cultural revolution is a hefty government contract and a massacre? While the most recent incarnations of both certainly serve as “positive” examples for such a claim, given the history of El Paso, there seems to be more to the puzzle than just an enhanced government presence and massacres. After all, El Paso has maintained a military presence throughout the majority of its history, and massacres in Ciudad Juarez are nothing new.12 Furthermore, given its proximity to the border, there has also always been a wealthy slew of Mexican nationals maintaining residents in El Paso who invested in the local economy throughout various points in history. There seems then to be an added condition, atop of the two previously mentioned, that serves to explain the shift towards artistic expression in the borderland southwest.

1.3 Some People Think I Won’t Make It, But I Know That I Will, You Can Make The Future, But it Starts With Leaving The Past

In A Theory of Human Motivation, Abraham Maslow attempts to define a series of

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12 Cave, Damien
propositions that enable him to establish a “definitive” theory of human motivation, and thus, perhaps help us discover what that “something else” is. Amongst these propositions were that:

1. The integrated wholeness of the organism must be one of the foundation stones of motivation theory.

3. Such a theory should stress and center itself upon ultimate or basic goals rather than partial or superficial ones, upon ends rather than means to these ends.

4. There are usually available various cultural paths to the same goal. Therefore conscious, specific, local-cultural desires are not as fundamental in motivation theory as the more basic, unconscious goals.

7. Human needs arrange themselves in hierarchies of pre-potency. That is to say, the appearance of one need usually rests on the prior satisfaction of another, more pre-potent need. Man is a perpetually wanting animal.

11. The situation or the field in which the organism reacts must be taken into account but the field alone can rarely serve as an exclusive explanation for behavior.

In response to these mandates, Maslow introduced what has become known as his *Hierarchy of Needs*, which define the various conditions he believes must be met before an individual can achieve higher levels of self-actualization. For Maslow, this hierarchy consists of five different levels, the first four of which Maslow believes account for the “deficiency needs” in humans. In these first four levels, Maslow believes humans satisfy their primal desire for various needs which help build the foundation for an individual who will ideally one day be able to capitalize on the “growth need” of the fifth level by becoming as self-actualized as possible.

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13 A. H. Maslow
In the first level, Maslow believes individuals must satiate fundamental physiological needs, such as breathing, having food and water, and sleep, to name a few. Maslow notes that these needs are the most pre-potent of all, and that without being able to satisfy them, one’s motivation for them will surely outweigh their motivation for any other desire.\textsuperscript{14} Maslow states that, in a state of hunger-seeking-satisfaction, other possibilities, such as the urge to write poetry or take interest in American history fall by the wayside, with the sole intent being hunger-satisfaction.\textsuperscript{15}

Furthermore, Maslow contends that

Another peculiar characteristic of the human organism when it is dominated by a certain need is that the whole philosophy of the future tends also to change. For our chronically and extremely hungry man, Utopia can be defined very simply as a place where there is plenty of food. He tends to think that, if only he is guaranteed food for the rest of his life, he will be perfectly happy and will never want anything more. Life itself tends to be defined in terms of eating. Anything else will be defined as unimportant. Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy, may all be waved aside as fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the stomach. Such a man may fairly be said to live by bread alone.

Maslow proceeds to offer the remaining levels of his hierarchy, the first of which being safety, which ensures the security of things such as the body, employment, morality, and the family. The next level, love and belonging, is fulfilled once an individual has established friendship, family, and sexual intimacy. Having satisfied this level, Maslow believes the individual may progress to the esteem level, which ensures self-esteem, confidence, achievement,
and respect by and for others.\textsuperscript{16} Once the deficiency needs have been satisfied, an individual may progress to address the growth need, which, as the self-actualization level, fosters morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, lack of prejudice, and acceptance of facts.\textsuperscript{17}

As dictated by Erik Erickson’s \textit{epigenetic principle}, however, progress through each stage is in part determined by [one’s] success, or lack of success, in all previous stages.\textsuperscript{18} That is, as noted by Maslow above, if one stage is left unsatisfied, advancement to a further stage will be nothing more than an afterthought. Therefore, in returning to El Paso, we find that while some of the basic tenets of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs were clearly present in early El Paso incarnations, various other mandates, to varying degrees, were left unmet. As stated before, having started from the bottom rung of Western liberalism’s ladder, most early El Pasoans were charged with the task of satisfying the fundamental tenets of Maslow’s hierarchy.

In mandates of Western liberalism, such as income, cost of living, and education, it is fair to say that the early wave of El Paso immigrants who had no education, and thus were limited to “unskilled” low paying jobs, were forced to allocate what little money they did receive for various survival necessities, such as shelter from the elements, food, water, and security. As a result, the prospect of advancing past deficiency needs was relegated to nothing more than an afterthought. After all, how is one supposed to partake in the humanities when they need money to feed, shelter, and clothe themselves? Clearly, if one has not labored enough to protect themselves from the elements, how is one supposed to contemplate the vast mysteries of the universe? Without a firm foundation on which to fall back on, most creative ventures are desires at best. Once one is no longer concerned with their physiological health, safety, belonging, or esteem, however, the

\textsuperscript{16} A. H. Maslow
\textsuperscript{17} A. H. Maslow
\textsuperscript{18} Erikson, Erik
possibilities for self-actualization begin to unfurl before an individual’s eyes.

It would appear, then, that once the basic tenets of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs were met that enabled El Pasoans to not only protect themselves from the environment and manufacture enough goods to sustain their survival, there appeared to be a generation lying in wait to reap the fruit of past generation’s labor. No longer forced to labor for subsistence, the current generation of El Pasoans is able to capitalize on the economic growth the city is currently experiencing, and thus serving as a driving factor in its growth by supporting the local community. Their contribution, however, is no longer limited simply to their spending power, as now more and more El Pasoans are able to contribute their own personal works of art into the mix. And while the classic archetype of the starving artist is every bit alive and well throughout the El Paso artistic community, it definitely eases the brunt of not having the sustainable income associated with most artistic ventures if you have a solid support structure to fall back on. Whether it is mom or dad, cousin or friend, grandmother or grandfather is irrelevant; the fact remains that that with the economic upswing experienced in El Paso within the past quarter century, more and more individuals have been given the privilege of inserting themselves into a world that is only available because it was built by previous generations.

1.4 The Poverty of Philosophy

Despite the fact that, on a national scale, El Paso is still playing catch-up, the current economic and cultural boom is all an example of what is possible with Western liberalism, given the right conditions. Having had the “fortune” of having two significant events unfurl in its vicinity simultaneously, as well as a young population ready to embrace change, El Paso was able to capitalize on an opportunity and bring about the evolution it desperately needed. But what if El Paso was Anytown U.S.A. that was not located next to such an infamous city, or had the benefit of
ecological conditions conducive to military operations? That is, what if El Paso was not in its unique position of being situated within a mountainous desert climate that mimics the environment of the location of the current war in Afghanistan, or located next to a city that was at one point as dangerous as the most infamous cities of all time? And what is to be made of those who are not living in a city experiencing an economic upswing as El Paso currently is? What if El Paso was another Detroit, Michigan, and once the factories shut down, it was left in the wake of destruction? Given the ephemeral nature of history’s progression through time, it is certainly not impossible to imagine a post-massacre, post major-government-headquarter El Paso where such a scenario is in fact the case. In fact, commentators, such as Tseng, have already predicted this very scenario.\(^{19}\)

The question then becomes, what can El Paso offer when such a time comes? Given that there is still no major industry for which to speak of, is El Paso’s fate consigned to reverting back to its pre-military expansion, pre-massacre stage, or worse? Or, having satisfied the basic tenets of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, will El Paso be able to embrace new forms of production and move forth on its road of upward mobility?

These are all questions that remain to be answered. At this point, however, what is for certain is that El Paso’s economic boom would most likely not have been possible without Western liberalism. To the extent the suffering induced by military operations and drug trafficking inspired massacres as a manifestation of Western liberalism in El Paso then, becomes the question. Furthermore, without a population that was comfortably situated on the upper echelons of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, there would not have been a population \textit{able} to partake in the “positive” effects of the current El Paso renaissance. It would appear, then, as though, prima facie, perhaps a certain level of suffering unavoidable, and certainly inherent in order for El Paso to

\(^{19}\) Tseng, Nin-Hai
experience an economic revolution.

Given the nature of Western liberalism, it is easy to focus on the positive manifestations that have unfolded in El Paso due to its economic growth. But what is to be made of the suffering at the end of the money trail? Although data undoubtedly exists to document the struggle faced by those who died in response to military operations and drug related massacres, are they to be ignored from the mainstream narrative for not fitting in with the traditional narrative of success inherent in Western liberalism? Furthermore, would promoting awareness of the others plight celebrate their suffering? A suffering that, if left untold, however, may ultimately be for not? More importantly, is it possible to redeem the suffering of individual others, such as Ben and Jeremy Wise, by telling their narrative?

All of these and then some are questions posed by Edith Wyschogrod’s heterological historian, a concept I will be employing phenomenologically in an attempt to arrive at the answer to these and other questions. In doing so, I will directly challenge Fukuyama’s claim that history is over, and that Western liberalism, in its current incarnation, is the victorious form of governance that can no longer be expanded upon. In order to do so, I will bring to light various inconsistencies in Fukuyama’s narrative in an attempt to put forth the claim that, although Western liberalism is in fact the most ideal form of governance, it could serve to adopt a more community oriented perspective that renders the suffering of those who have not satisfied the lower levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs moot, a task that is grounded in Kant’s Principle of Humanity. This will be done by demonstrating why the heterological historian is morally obligated to insert themselves into the world through action and art, both of which will be shown to be manifestations of the updated views of production essential to Wyschogrod’s notion of community. In order to do so, the heterological historian will employ the manifestation of their contribution to the information
culture with the intent of shedding light on the plight of the voiceless others, as well as taking into account the plight experienced by past and future “others” who were not and possibly will not be able to.

In doing so, I will ultimately argue that, contrary to Fukuyama’s view, the process of empowering individuals to insert themselves into the world through art and action intended towards establishing a future oriented community predicated of hope and promise simply amounts to another manifestation of Hegel’s Spirit; a step towards its ultimate quest for the Absolute. Specifically, I will argue that humanity is currently in the process of a historical epoch that is coming to be via a technological unveiling of Spirit. In doing so, I will advance the claim that, much as the Battle of Jena and the resulting principles from the French Revolution were quintessential components of Western liberalism’s formation, the creation of the Internet is the end of our historical age, with the ensuing events serving to establish a true universal homogenous state. I will show that this process is ultimately a parousia that helps bring us to the realization that we are all in fact a community founded on humanity, an understanding made possible by the connectivity afforded by the Internet by way of the information culture. In consummation, I will argue that the empathetic connections created by witnessing the plight of the others through the work of the heterological historian will conclusively fulfill the promise for the future by empowering those who were once rendered voiceless to engage in a Nietzschean revolution by challenging the historical narrative of victory that has traditionally served to propagate solely the “victor’s narrative”, and thus offer an antithesis to the dominating account of history’s unveiling.
Chapter 2: The Revolution Will Not be Televised

2.1 Started From The Bottom Now We’re Here?

Although it is a commonly held belief that the United States of America is the land of opportunity, recent research clearly indicates otherwise. In *Harder for Americans to Rise From Lower Rungs*, Jason DeParle illustrates by way of various articles the stark reality that, in terms of upward mobility, America is far behind its Canadian and most Eastern European counterparts. Specifically, DeParle offers scathing critiques of the level of upward mobility enjoyed by American, such as Republican Congressman and former vice-presidential candidate Paul D. Ryan’s belief that “mobility from the very bottom up is where the United States lags behind.”, or the Brookings Institution’s Isabel V. Sawhill’s claim that “It’s become conventional wisdom that the U.S. does not have as much upward mobility as most other advanced countries.”, in order to convey his concern towards the lack of economic mobility afforded to most Americans.

Particularly, DeParle focuses on a study conducted by Markus Jantti, which discovered that 65% of Americans raised in the bottom fifth income bracket tend to stay there as adults, while 62% of Americans who were raised in the top fifth income bracket manage to stay in at least the top two brackets as adults. DeParle notes that while the fluidity of mobility in the middle classes tend to stay relatively consistent, it is in the upper and lower classes that are of biggest concern. In DeParle’s words, “affluent families transmit their advantages, and poor families stay strapped.”

Although DeParle’s article proceeds to measure the differences in opinion between liberal and conservative accounts, the underlying theme, as summated by Scott Winship, also of the

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20 DeParle
21 DeParle
22 DeParle
23 DeParle
24 DeParle
Brookings Institution, remains constant; “Poor Americans have to work their way up from a lower floor.”

Clearly this is not the case for everyone, as the opportunity to improve one’s economic condition still exists. For my thesis, however, the concern is not for the conditions of those individuals who do manage to climb the ladder of upward mobility, but rather for those who are stranded on the lower rungs, whether they are American or not. This concern is predicated off my reading of Fukuyama’s *The End of History?*, which claims issues, such as economic inequality, have already been resolved in America. In order to first understand the historiographical context of Fukuyama’s position, and the ramifications of his argument, however, it is important to first understand the Hegelian framework and the ensuing historical milieu from which he is operating.

### 2.2 Past is Dead

For Hegel, there are three modes in which historiographers engage in to achieve their goals of fathoming Sprit’s unveiling, the first of which being an attempt to decipher what he refers to as original history. In this view, we receive accounts of actions that were actually witnessed by the historian. As such, traditional means of recording history, such as legends, folk songs, and traditions are excluded, for they are recorded from obscure modes of memory. Hegel notes that the goal of this type of history was to internalize the external world, and was interested in people who knew what they were and what they wanted. For Hegel, this type of history is merely a portrait of time, and it cannot offer a true reflection, as the modern reader was not a part of the Spirit of the time in which it was recorded. Hegel notes that statesmen, naïve monks, and people of high social standing are generally the recorders of this type of history.

Conversely, reflective history is defined in terms of current historians recollecting the past.

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25 De Parle
26 DeParle
27 Hegel, 4
To that extent, there are four sub-categories, all of which Wyschogrod notes are a non-reflexive and naïve naturalistic way for people to accept things as they are told. The first form of reflexive history is universal history, which aims to give a history of individuals and the world. Hegel notes that not only is the Spirit once again not the same in each instance, but that the historian instantiates the Spirit of his own culture upon their accounts, thus biasing the entire analyses. The next form is the pragmatic universal, and it is driven by a theory or ideology. Its aim is to bring the past into the present, a task which is solely dependent on the mind of the historian. Hegel notes that each culture faces decisions that can only be made in that particular era and that, referring to the ancients is inconsequential, as one reflective history supersedes another. Furthermore, much like universal reflective history, Hegel feels as though the historian is imposing their Spirit on the Spirit of that time. The third form of reflective history is critical, his least favored in the sense that it is simply a history of history. In attempting to differentiate fact from fiction, it is simply passing off subjective views as reality. The last form of reflective history Hegel offers us is specialized, which focuses on a specific field, as well as forms the transition to the final form of history Hegel offers us, the philosophic. In this form, Hegel gives us further insight into his view of Reason and Spirit, and demonstrates how they affect his views on philosophy. Specifically, Hegel feels as though philosophy influences thoughts and events, and as such, past events can be understood according to thoughts, which Hegel feels are a priori.\textsuperscript{28} Specifically, thoughts first occur in the realm of consciousness, and it is only later that they are manifested in the material realm in the form of actions. Wyschogrod notes that this last view of history is one in which the historian is elevated into a position of timeless topography.

2.3 Holes in Our Spirit Causing Tears and Fears, One Sided Stories For Years And Years

\textsuperscript{28} Hegel, 10
In briefly analyzing Hegel’s views on historiography, we are further introduced to a key philosophical component that drives his dialectic, Spirit. For Hegel, as well as for my thesis, it is important to note that the essential feature of Spirit is its pursuit of actualized Absolute freedom. For Hegel, history is the unfolding of Spirit, what I am calling a parousia in the sense of a self-creating process that makes of itself what it will become. History, for Hegel, is “a vast spectacle of events and actions in restless succession”, the work of reason expressed as optics, as Wyschogrod states. Hegel believes that it is our responsibility to fathom the cunning of reason in hopes of achieving the end goal of Spirit, the Absolute. Per Hegel, however, The Absolute is only achieved through a “slaughter bench” of history, in which Spirit manifests itself in dubious manners, such as war.

In order to accomplish this actualization, it is a fundamental feature of Spirit that it remain in motion, or, as Hegel states, be in “constant negation of all that threatens to destroy freedom.” To that extent, Hegel feels as though the embodiment of Spirit’s self-realization in history is the nation, and that the nation’s progress towards freedom is measured by its actual level of freedom, which, according to Wyschogrod, is defined as the pursuit of the rational ends intrinsic to the life of Spirit.

For Hegel, the beginning of Spirit’s quest to manifest as Absolute freedom also marks the beginning of history, a move which is set into motion by the ancient Orients and their acknowledgement that the despot was free. Unfortunately, Hegel felt as though Chinese moral laws were compulsory rights and duties, and that what was missing was the element of freedom.

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29 Wyschogrod, 116
30 Wyschogrod, 117
31 Wyschogrod, 117
32 In order to convey the efficacy of my argument, it is important to remain faithful to the original langue of the authors, in hopes of drawing out the haughtiness of what I deem “the victor’s narrative”.
33 Hegel, 74
For Hegel, the people of the ancient Orient were not aware of the fact that they were free because they did not know of Spirit. Since it is the essential aspect of Spirit to be free, and the Orientals were oblivious to it, Hegel deduces that they in fact were not free. Instead, Hegel refers to the ancient Orient’s belief that only one person was free as “mere arbitrariness, savagery, stupefied passion…” and that this one free person was not in fact so, and was merely a despot feigning freedom.

Continuing from this point, Hegel moves to the ancient Greeks and Romans, noting that it was through them that the consciousness of freedom first arose. As such, Hegel believed that the ancient Greeks and Romans were free. However, Hegel notes that both these cultures only believed certain individuals were free, and as such, states that “their freedom itself was partly a matter of mere chance…”

For Hegel, it was only through Christianity and the Germanic people that the awareness of the fact that it was a core tenet of human essence to be free came to be, simply by virtue of being human. Despite this fact, Hegel notes that the awareness of this freedom alone was not the end of the journey, noting that regardless of this acknowledgement, hindrances, such as slavery, still existed. That being the case, if the ancient Orientals were the germ of the plant, then the Germanic state would be the tree that eventually gave rise to the eventual fruits of absolute freedom.

According to Wyschogrod, the unveiling of Spirit as history is “a spectacle of ephemera which arise, endure for an interval, decay, and give rise to new forms.” This process leads to the development of the notion of time that witnesses the rise and fall of various peoples and civilizations. This process is an evanescent spectacle of birth, death, and rebirth, one which Jules Simon referred to as a dazzling display under the gaze of the rational subject. Wyschogrod

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34 Hegel, 21
35 Hegel, 21
36 Wyschogrod, 114
believes that the documenting of this spectacle was made possible through the manifestation of the parousia that gave Hegel’s backward glance of history concrete objects in the form of images, which solidified its existence. Wyschogrod claims that “Hegel’s history is an ocular display brought under rational control, with Spirit the subject, creator, viewer, and object of this display.”37 This stream of past events, for Wyschogrod, is a history of achievements that unfurls less as a discursive record, and more as a dazzling spectacle.

Wyschogrod affirms, however, that under the precept of Hegel’s rationalization, Spirit itself cannot transcend its essence as the content of an image; the Spirit of an image, as it were. It also cannot remain in a fixed position in history, surveying as a panopticon of Spirit’s unveiling, for to do so would be to simply stand idly by, a contradiction for that which is, by nature, constantly unfolding. As intent as Hegel is to establish the end of Spirit at The Battle of Jena, Wyschogrod notes that it is crucially important to examine the time that proceeded it, for although the founding principle of Western liberalism may have been established in 1806, it is evident in 2014 that history continued after that.

Furthermore, operating under a Hegelian lens, it is crucial to understood that it is in Spirit’s nature to constantly be in negation of all that threatens to destroy freedom, and the only way this can manifest is when consciousness of true freedom is made evident, an event that is triggered by a lack of external coercion.38 Wyschogrod-reading-Hegel affirms that true freedom is not freedom from all restraint, for this expresses itself in terms of violence. Rather, true freedom is the rational expression of the subjective will through the universal will.

A critical feature of Hegel’s views on Spirit’s unveiling, however, is the belief that history “is out of the question” for entire continents of people, such as those living in sub-Saharan

37 Wyschogrod, 114
38 Wyschogrod, 117
Africa. As Wysogrod contends, however, this view of history marginalizes entire groups of people and civilizations, delegating them to the chance of two things, the first of which being their geographic location. Wysogrod notes that, for Hegel, only those living in temperate environments with access to the sea are included in the throes of history, while those who are not have been marginalized. The second of these chance occurrences would be a culture’s subjective disposition. As Wysogrod demonstrates, individuals whose society has been deemed primitive by Hegel, cultures marked by such things as simple technology, agrarian and herding economies, and social organizations established via custom rather than law, also are not included in the unfolding of Spirit. If that is the case, Wysogrod asks, what ontological status are those left out of history, and ipso facto Spirit, afforded?

This is a problem for Hegel, who, as previously mentioned, felt as though the conclusion of Spirit, and thus history, came to fruition in 18th century Europe. Clearly this gives rise to an unavoidable contradiction in Hegel’s dialectic, for if Spirit’s quest is the Absolute, what is to be made of people and cultures that are both Spirit and not-Spirit at the same time? Furthermore, Wysogrod asks, by not relegating these people and cultures to the realm of the real, does that not then make them hyperreal? And if that is the case, would not these types of individuals and cultures be getting their countenance from that which they are tokens of, namely primitive objects? Furthermore, by consigning these individuals and cultures to the realm of hyper reality, is Hegel not admitting that there exists something outside of the Absolute? Wysogrod believes so, noting that what these individuals and cultures represent is an alterity, or otherness, that does not conform to the process of Spirit unfolding. That being the case, these marginalized people and cultures do in

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39 Wysogrod, 118
40 Wysogrod, 118
41 Wysogrod, 119
42 Wysogrod, 119
fact play a larger role in Hegel’s dialectic than originally imagined, namely that of negation, which would call the entire notion of Hegel’s Spirit into question. Specifically, Wyschogrod’s thesis is in direct contradiction to Hegel’s historiographical views, for how history could have started, yet alone have come to an end, if not all people and cultures have been taken into account?

2.4 I Follow The Moskva, Down to Gorky Park, Listening to The Wind of Change

Despite this glaring contradiction, many still seem willing to embrace Hegel’s dialectic and historiography as a means of justifying the exploits inherent in a victor’s narrative. Specifically, in *The End of History?*, Fukuyama asserts that, in light of relatively recent historical events, Western ideology has prevailed over competing theories. Chiefly, Fukuyama asserts that the fall of the Berlin Wall is the completion of the Hegelian dialectic, signaling a victory for Western liberalism over the competing theories that arose in the East, namely Marxism and its offshoots. Fukuyama notes that this victory is evidenced by the total exhaustion of systematic alternatives to Western liberalism, and made evidence not by the political evolution of the world’s two largest communist countries, China and Russia, but by their desire to engage in the free-market economics of Western culture.

Because of this, Fukuyama believes that we are witnessing not only the end of a post-war era in particular, but the end of history in general. Fukuyama notes that the complete end will not occur until the evolution has manifested itself in both the world of consciousness and the material world but, for all practical purposes, there is simply no further evolution that human ideology can make that will lead to anything better than, or even expand upon, Western liberal democracy. As such, Fukuyama believes Western liberalism is settled as the final form of human government.

Fukuyama states that the idea of an end to history is not an original one, noting that it was present in both Marx’s and Hegel’s dialectic, with the former simply being an inversion of the
latter. Fukuyama, reading Kojeve, notes that for Hegel, the establishment of the founding principles behind the French Revolution are settled as the founding principles of Western liberalism. From this, Fukuyama’s reading of Kojeve claims that the vanguard of humanity shifted with the introduction of the idea of the “imminent universalization of the state incorporating the principles of liberty and equality.” As such, Fukuyama’s reading of Hegel remains faithful to Hegel’s belief that the Battle of Jena marked the end of history, because, despite the fact that there were things “outside” of Spirit, the “basic principles of the liberal democratic state” could no longer be improved upon. Fukuyama notes that the state that emerges at the end of history is liberal for only as long as it both recognizes and protects the human universal right to freedom through a system of laws, and remains democratic only insofar as it exists through the consent of the governed. Fukuyama’s reading of Kojeve notes that this actualized state is known as the universal homogenous state.

Fukuyama proceeds to declare that human history is based on contradictions that arose from various factors, such as primitive man’s desire for recognition, the master-slave dialectic, a desire for mastery of nature, the struggle for a universal recognition of rights, and the relationship between the proletariat and the capitalist. Fukuyama’s reading of Kojeve claims, however, that in the universal homogenized state, all conflicts have been resolved, and there is no longer an issue in regards to “large” problems. As such, Fukuyama believes that the only thing left to be made sense of is economic activity.

In regards to the contradictions that drive history, Fukuyama claims that they exist primarily in the realm of human consciousness, and as such, that Hegel’s simplified view is that all

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43 Fukuyama
44 Fukuyama
45 Fukuyama
46 Fukuyama
human behavior, and thus history, originates in the realm of consciousness. Fukuyama posits that the realm of consciousness affects the material realm as ideas are what initially give birth to actions. Fukuyama argues that, despite the fact that other countries may be slow in adopting the principles of liberalism, it is only a matter of time before the overwhelming thought process manifests itself amongst the subjects of the nations which have yet to accept Western liberalism in the material world. Fukuyama claims how this is most readily seen in the example of the Burmese officer who, upon being sent to the Philippines for medical treatment, allegedly was reduced to tears in coming to realize how far behind his socialist nation had fallen to a liberalized one, as well as that of top Russian officials who admittedly paid only lip service to the founding mantras of Marxism and Stalinism.47

Because of this, Fukuyama essentially arrives at the conclusion that, with the fall of communism and all of its politically affiliated ideologies, Western liberalism was clearly the winner in the game of global chess. Fukuyama affirms that this is no more evident than in Asia, where the demand for access to consumer culture has fostered a welcoming society ready to promote the perceived positive aspects of economic and political liberalism. Fukuyama notes that, in true Hegelian form, the former is following the latter and that universal acceptance of Western liberalism, however slow it may be, is inevitable. Continuing on his claim, Fukuyama proceeds to highlight the political evolution and recent historical exploits in order to trace the slow rejection of Marxism-Leninism in what Fukuyama believes is the golden child of Western liberalism’s success; manifesting itself in the largest and oldest Asian cultures of them all, China.

2.5 Rage Against The Machine

In light of Fukuyama’s analyses, it should be evident that as far as general retellings of history are concerned, both he and Hegel simply appear to be remaining faithful to the tradition of

47 Fukuyama
propagating de-facto principles established by those who managed to ride the tide of history into a position of power. That is, as was Hegel’s observation, there seems to be an inherent truth to the fact that group thought manifests itself in the physical world through conquering, whether it be the physical conquering of a people that results in the seizing of a land, the ideological conquering that results in the supplanting of traditional customs and beliefs, or both. Furthermore, if the ideology that managed to thrust itself into a position of power is to remain intact, ideally it would continue the same thought process that afforded such a position in the first place by ensuring that the thoughts circling about the realm of consciousness that originally drove it also remain intact. It would appear, then, that choosing to dictate the course of history, how it is told, what is told, what light it is told in, and who is ultimately included, is simply the spoils of war, as it were.

For Hegel, of course, the majority of this is predicated off chance. Furthermore, if one is afforded a position of power that grants them the ability to dictate the course of history, and how it is recorded, it is in their best interest, and in the best interest of the others as well, as per cultural hegemony, to allow the power structure which has supposedly manifested itself in the most ideal form of governance to continue controlling the narrative. The problem with this, of course, is that the possibility exists that those in control of the narrative will be motivated to ensure that the little fort of privilege they have ensconced themselves in remains in power.

This view is best defined by Nietzsche’s inversion of the master/slave dialectic, which holds that the actual genesis of the concept “good” does not stem from those to whom “goodness” is rendered. Rather, Nietzsche believes

it [is] the “good” themselves, that is the noble, powerful, higher-ranking, and high-minded who felt and ranked themselves and their doings as good, which is to say, as of

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48 Solomon, 79
first rank, in contrast to everything base, low-minded, common, and vulgar.49

Given their position of power, Nietzsche believes “they” have taken it upon themselves the right to create values, regardless of their utility. In that respect, that same logic can easily be extended to the information, or as in cases such as propaganda, misinformation, that is distributed to rally individuals around any given cause. In contemporary society, this is most readily seen in states such as North Korea, where the party members not only transport “laborers” to makeshift “cities” in Russia where they are told they are actually still in North Korea, but also provide citizens with state-sponsored media that encourages them to remain in school so they can learn how to defeat their “American adversary”.50

In terms of history, this simultaneously blatant and subliminal form of information control has had wide-ranging success. One need look no further than the extreme prejudice exercised by the Catholic church’s controlling of the sole source of supposed information in an attempt to maintain the power structure they had amassed; from John Wycliffe, who forty-four years after his death, was victim of Pope Martin V’s despicable demand to have his remains exhumed in order that they be crushed and thrown into a river in retaliation for translating the Bible from Latin to English51 and beyond. As has been shown by history, however, this sort of control only remains viable for as long as the information that leads to alternative thought processes is kept under control. Given historical accounts, it would appear as though there was nothing more destructive to the monopoly of the Church than both the advent of the printing press and the translation of the Bible into the vernacular. In other words, those who managed to manipulate Spirit in such a way that afforded them a position of power seemed, either by lack of technology that threatened to break their stranglehold on information or a concerted willingness to preserve the status quo, to

49 Solomon, 79
50 The 5 Craziest Children's Cartoons from North Korea
51 Wycliffe, John
enjoy the benefits of maintaining the sole source of supposed information, and appeared willing to continue this monopoly with no qualms whatsoever. Once the information was made readily available to the others, however, it did not take long before the commonly held belief that the Church should control the sole source of supposed information was called into question, thus allowing for change to begin manifesting in the realm of consciousness.

What resulted, of course, is a subject of history that could take up a thesis of its own. For our intents and purposes, it is important simply to note that, once the crack in the dam allowed for the voices of the repressed to seep through, it was only a matter of time before they burst through the wall of censorship imposed on them by the domineering narrative. Simply put, even though it is in the best interest of those in power to build walls to try to remain in a position of power, to do so is only a futile attempt at pacifying a restless Spirit.

Ideally, then, the goal would be to provide a way in which the voices of the others could be gathered in such a way that would enable them to formulate the thoughts necessary to manifest the change needed in the realm of consciousness to begin breaking these walls down. As Nietzsche notes, the only way the master/slave dialectic, and thus the relation the others have to the authors of the narrative, will end its perpetual continuity is that a revolution be undertaken in hopes of bringing it to an end.\textsuperscript{52} It cannot, however, be a physical revolution, for in undertaking any form of violent action, the slave class will simply be propagating the values of the elite. Instead, Nietzsche advocates a different approach that would require the undertaking of a “spiritual” revolution in hopes of re-evaluating the values one deeply holds. Nietzsche notes that:

\begin{quote}
Of all that has been done on Earth against “the noble”, “the mighty”, “the lords”, “the power-holders”, nothing is worthy of mention in comparison with that which the Jews have done against them: the Jews, that priestly people who in the end were able to obtain
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{52} Solomon, 81
satisfaction from their enemies and conquerors through a radical reevaluation of their values, that is, through an act of spiritual revenge.\textsuperscript{53}

Nietzsche observes that the spiritual revolution undertaken by the Jews was in direct response to the aristocratic equation of values, which held that anything that was good was noble, and anything that was noble was powerful, and that which was powerful was also beautiful, and if it was beautiful it was happy, and thus loved by God. Nietzsche notes that the Jews dared to invert this equation, driven by an unfathomable hate driven by powerlessness, and established the view that “the miserable alone are the good; the poor, the powerless, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly are also the only pious, the blessed in God”.\textsuperscript{54} Nietzsche proceeds to claim that the noble, powerful, cruel and insatiable godless ones are cursed, doomed, and living in perpetual hell.

Nietzsche argues that this revolt in morality is only undertaken once \textit{ressentiment} becomes creative and gives birth to new values.\textsuperscript{55} Nietzsche claims that it is irrational to assume, let alone to expect, that power express itself in any other way than power, and for weakness to do so in any other way than weakness. Despite this inherent truth, however, Nietzsche believes “\textit{that the strong one is free to be weak, and the bird of prey to be a lamb}”, and as such, \textit{they} (the lambs) thereby gain for themselves the right to hold the bird of prey \textit{accountable} for being a bird of prey.\textsuperscript{56}

In order to convey this belief, Nietzsche offers the example of the battle between Rome and the Jews, with Rome playing the role of the powerful and the Jews that of “priestly ressentiment

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{53} Solomon, 81
\item \textsuperscript{54} Solomon, 81
\item \textsuperscript{55} Ressentiment, in this instance, serves a dual purpose by highlighting key facets in Nietzschean philosophy, the first being the idea that both individual and human institutions exist in a hostile and indifferent society and Universe, as well as the belief that one is ensconced in an oppressive awareness of the futility of trying to improve one’s status in both life and society.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Solomon, 83
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
In regards to the actual “battle” itself and who emerged victorious, Nietzsche simply asks which of the two bows before the other. And Judea did not simply stop there, according to Nietzsche, as it continued to use ressentiment as a means of transforming the lives of those far beyond the initial borders of Jewish influence, both in regards to spirituality and in thirst for a dramatic reevaluation of values. This is best characterized by the events of the French Revolution, an event of which Nietzsche posits led to great jubilation and to the manifestation of the belief that the “privilege of the few” was now the “privilege of the majority.”

2.6 Take The Power Back

As dictated by both Nietzsche and Hegel, it would appear as though the catalyst for change would ideally be a new credo predicated off non-violence that must first form in the realm of consciousness. However long it takes to manifest is irrelevant. All that matters is, once this understanding is in effect, it is only a matter of time before it externalizes in the material realm. The question is, how is such a thought to enter the collective consciousness if it has yet to be properly formulated?

Enter Wyschogrod and her version of the heterological historian, who is driven by the eros for the dead and the urgency of ethics, and who speaks from out of the cataclysm that [they] cannot name. Riding the wave of technology at her disposal, Wyschogrod intends to provide the framework from which the heterological historian, operating within the information culture, can function when attempting to uncover the past. In doing so, Wyschogrod not only empowers her heterological historian with the archaeological toolkit necessary to fill the void left by “the entry of nihil into time” but also gives a voice to the dead others who were unfortunately relegated to the fringes of history. In other words, Wyschogrod’s heterological historian offers one of the first

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57 Solomon, 84
58 Wyschogrod, xiii
59 Wyschogrod, xiii
phenomenological tools necessary to survey the entire scope of history subjectively, through the
lens of technology, in hopes of bringing to the gaze of rational subjects a number of various
injustices that have both prohibited the telling of alternate forms of history and perpetuated the
manipulation of those fortunate enough to control the historical narrative. In doing so,
Wyschogrod has established the foundation necessary for an ethics of remembering and
understanding to begin taking shape as an ideological principle.

Although it may seem a daunting task to attempt to establish a system of beliefs powerful
enough to manifest a conscious revolution, Wyschogrod notes that the heterological historian has
at their disposal a vast array of references that were previously unavailable to professional
historians. Moreover, Wyschogrod notes that the professional historian may even be left out of this
“culture of images” produced by an increased availability of photographs, films, television, and
museum exhibits, to name a few, which have contributed to what Wyschogrod posits is a
fundamental epistemic transformation and cultural upheaval that has revolutionized not only the
way information is distributed but, as we shall see, the way ideas are spread as well.

As a result, unlike Kant who, as an idealist, hopes to direct us towards a teleological aim or Hegel, who claimed such a progression had already manifested itself through a dialectic
process, Wyschogrod makes us aware that, because of the acceleration and increased availability
of such technology, it is impossible to reduce meaning to any particular historical event, for the
phenomenon of a historical event means the event itself is constantly being divided into
innumerable signs. That is, given the infinite amount of subjective perspectives, there are no hard
and fast meanings to any historical event.

The question for Wyschogrod then becomes, in response to Hegel’s concern of the

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Kant

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historian instantiating the spirit of their respective culture on the culture of the others, how is the heterological historian to “speak the language of their time so that she may be understood… from within the cataclysm that cannot be pictured?” Moving away from isolated incidents, Wysogrod posits that in this new culture of images, large scale phenomena involving sizeable sums of people necessarily move past the written word and into an ocular realm where the events are ensnared in both still and moving images. Thus, Wysogrod believes a new language is necessary to account for this advancement that would allow the heterological historian to “dis-figure [an] artifact, this photograph… that has been con-figured by the age of images so as to re-figure it within the non-space of ethics.” In doing so, the heterological historian would be able to point out the context dependent character of the past using contemporary language, and thus avoid imposing their own phenomenological perspective on the event in question.

Wysogrod proceeds to note how, just as the heterological historian stations themselves within the cataclysm, so too does the culture of images create observations that cannot be overlooked. Wysogrod claims that the historian is not simply a conduit for information, but rather an “eyewitness” that inserts themselves into events and “carries forward the work of naming and speaking in the name of the dead others.” Wysogrod believes that, for the heterological historian, this is best accomplished through photography because, at its core, it is essentially a manufactured phenomenological tool that has enabled any given individual to concretize their respective experience by “taking notes” of everything in the world from every possible angle.

Through photography, we find Spirit unveiling itself through a self-revealing act of parousia, one which allows that which will never again be repeated, to be eternalized in the form of

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61 Wysogrod, xiii
62 Wysogrod, 71
63 Wysogrod, 76
“the absolute particular”. Unlike times which proceeded the universalization of camera-ready devices, the historian is now able to have physical proof of events as perceived through the eyes and lenses of those who were not fortunate enough to write from the perspective of the victor’s narrative. Because of this, Wyschogrod notes that the historian no longer names, describes, or analyzes an object; rather, the object names itself.

This act of a self-establishing unveiling serves as the foundation for the galvanization of narratives that allow the heterological historian to solidify the claim that, where the camera once stood, an event was as such; a phenomenological manipulation of tools that allows the heterological historian to capture a punctiform moment of space and time to affirm one’s subjective experience. Wyschogrod, citing Barthes, notes that these photographs serve as political and cultural statements, as well as artifacts that are subject to critique. Furthermore, this phenomenon emanates entirely from within the content of the picture itself, further substantiating the importance of establishing the narrative of events. Most importantly, this gives the ability to speak for oneself, a privilege that was taken away from the dead others.

As a result, Wyschogrod believes the real power of an image emanates from its ability to “destabilize” the viewer by wounding them with the most glaring element of an image that stands out the most. Wyschogrod notes that, due to the epistemic differences inherent in the phenomenological experience, different interpretations of this punctum will arise. What remains universal, however, is the fact that images delineate what is both visible and invisible, what was and what could have been. Most importantly is the fact that images remove any boundaries of localizability; that is, no longer are people simply “over there”. They are now also in my living room, computer, or palm in El Paso, Texas, despite the fact that they may be physically located on

64 Following a Benjaminian line of reasoning, the importance of the preponderance of camera-ready devices, particularly amongst those who initially could not afford them, should not be underestimated
the other side of the world.

2.7 Without a Face

While the role thus defined by Wyschogrod amounts to an undoubtedly important task for the heterological historian, there remains a gaping hole that needs to be filled, namely that of the role played by the others that are not yet dead. For if giving voice through images to those who were rendered voiceless by events of the past is praiseworthy, certainly giving voice to those who are still capable of being saved from future tragedies is even greater. Which is why it is important to expand Wyschogrod’s original definition of the others to include those currently on the fringe in hopes of extending her theory in order to give voice to all victims that have been rendered voiceless, not just those that are dead and, in doing so, fulfilling Wyschogrod’s desires of establishing and maintaining an institution such that people who were once voiceless will no longer be.

Much like Wyschogrod’s original formulation of the heterological historian, this new historian uses any means available to them, whether it be to write, photograph, film, televise, and/or archive as a means to fulfill their promise to the dead others to tell the truth of the conditions which prevent them from satisfying even the basic levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Instead of being consigned to playing the role of Kierkegaard’s Knight of Infinite Faith, who, wish though he may, will never taste the sweetness of the princess’s love, our future-oriented heterological historian will see the “necrophilia for the past” re-imagined as a reciprocated mutual relationship of vivacity that will seek with sick passion to give birth to a future where the plight of the others is nothing more than a dark chapter in human history, filed next to The Crusades and The Holocaust; one which future subjects of history look back to with disgust and disdain as they wonder to themselves, “how did our ancestors ever allow such a thing to happen?” The concerted effort by

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65 Wyschogrod, xi
the heterological historians, who will one day themselves be subjects of history, to give voice to
the others is a crucial element in this expanded view of Wyschogrod’s heterological historian, lest
we fall victim to Nietzsche’s belief that an excess of history serves to neuter the individual’s
motivation for action.

That said, maintaining Wyschogrod’s understanding of the heterological historian is of
utmost importance, as it undoubtedly serves as the basis for my expansion. Without the
groundwork that she laid, it would be impossible to arrive at my conclusion. I am simply hoping to
expand on Wyschogrod’s initial definition to better accommodate the potential plight of all the
others, in hopes of establishing a precautionary principle that demands individuals act in such a
way that would prevent a future cataclysm. Ideally, this modification will simultaneously allow
the historian to traverse space and time and be concerned with not only the dead others of an
irrevocable past, but the current and future subjects of history as well, who hope to avoid the state
of nihil imposed on them by both the Cataclysm and the cowardly. Future subjects who, unlike
Wyschogrod’s spurned historian, are able to not only reciprocate the love of the brave who chose
to stand by their side, but perpetuate it as well.

2.8 The Military Industry Got it Poppin’ and Lockin’ Looking For a Way to Justify he
Wolfowitz Doctrine

As far as the heterological historian is concerned, not only has history not come to an end,
there is still plenty of work that needs to be done before the idea that is necessary to manifest
constructive change can even enter the realm of consciousness, let alone the material realm. Of
course, maintaining this view requires the adamant rejection of Fukuyama’s assertion that history
ever came to an end, an arbitrary claim that wreaks of cultural hegemony. More specifically, if
Fukuyama is correct, and Western liberalism really has won, then the marginalization of the others
will not only be allowed to continue, but essentially be accepted.

Given Fukuyama’s credentials, one would be hard pressed to argue against his understanding of the political and economic tide that swept across the world in recent history; thankfully, there is no need to question his understanding of either landscape. I do not seek to enter into a line by line deconstruction of *The End of History*; rather than concern myself with Fukuyama’s theme at a technical level. I am interested in the philosophical kernel of his argument, for it is on a meta level where Fukuyama’s stance seems to have its deepest flaws, which are summated as follows: True to Nietzsche’s master-slave dialectic, Fukuyama, in attempting to defend Western liberalism, attests to the side of “liberalism” that only a privileged few are privy to enjoy.

This is most evident in response to his question of whether there are any contradictions left that cannot be resolved by Western liberalism and that would be resolved by “an alternate political-economic structure”; Fukuyama, in continuation of his above mentioned claim that “The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident by the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternative to Western liberalism” claims that his concern is “not to answer exhaustively the challenges to liberalism promoted by every crackpot messiah around the world, but only those that are embodied in important social or political forces and movements, and which are therefore part of world history (emphasis mine).”

In other words, in true Hegelian form, Fukuyama is concerned *solely* with those individuals who were fortunate enough to satisfy Hegel’s absurd conditions for qualification into the unfolding of Spirit. Thus, in the dismissive nature typical of any victor’s narrative, Fukuyama proceeds to briskly cast off the plight of the others in one fell swoop, relegating them to the realm

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67 Fukuyama
68 Fukuyama
69 Fukuyama
of inconsequentiality solely for their lack of presence on the same scale as those “larger” and more “developed” states of the world “who after all account for the greater part of world politics.”

In attempting to establish “consumer culture” as the hallmark for Spirit’s Absolute, Fukuyama proceeds to use the word “liberalism” in a very liberal manner; as if being able to buy a VCR is truly an indicator of freedom. By choosing to focus solely on the financial aspects of Western liberalism, not only is Fukuyama speaking to/from the fortunate side of something that is radically disproportionate across the “Westernized liberal world”, income, he is completely ignoring the basic tenets that Western liberalism is supposed to propagate; freedom, equality, brotherhood, life liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. When seen less subjectively, it is clear that Fukuyama’s “Western liberalism” is nothing more than a euphemism for neo-liberalism. In other words, all the self-evident beauties entitled to the individual simply by fortune of birth, not by fortune of location of birth, as both Hegel and Fukuyama mistakenly believe, are not as important as all of the gadgets they can have if they can afford to buy into Fukuyama’s version of Western liberalism.

This so called victory that Fukuyama proclaims on behalf of Western liberalism is prima facie at best; when seen from the inverted perspective of the others, it is quite clear that Fukuyama is interested only in how “diverse contents”, such as color televisions and rock music, have infiltrated the “peasant’s markets.” This itemization essentially amounts to a written account of The Kitchen Debate, and in no way should this superficial notion of success imply that Spirit has manifested itself in its final form of government. When Fukuyama speaks of the exhaustion of competing theories, he himself is being extremely liberal to the promise neo-liberalism, has shown. For one, while the basic tenets of freedom and things of the like may

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70 Fukuyama
71 Fukuyama
initially be present, when the interest of power comes into play, history tells us that those in control would not hesitate to restrict said freedoms in order to maintain rule. Granted, to Fukuyama’s credit, he does offer the caveat that

The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man’s universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed.\textsuperscript{72}

As has been seen in the early part of 21\textsuperscript{st} century, however, the increase in heightened security in response to possible “terrorist threats” has resulted in the drastic reconfiguration of American civil liberties. Given that, it would appear as though there is in fact room for expansion in Western liberalism, namely that which restricts the ability to restrict Spirit’s basic tenet, freedom, contrary to Fukuyama’s initial claim.

It must then be taken into account that, as per Hegel, as long as there is a hindrance to Spirit, it will constantly be seeking to destroy these impediments through constant negation, and thus never be completely actualized. One need look no further than the events that illustrated the \textit{Occupy Wall Street} movement in recent years to see this fact manifest in the physical realm.

Despite the lack of opportunity for upward mobility faced by most citizens of the United States, the majority of Americans are clearly still on the winning side of the victor’s narrative in regards to the technological goods Fukuyama trumpets as the hallmarks of Western liberalism’s victory. The underlying concern, then, is that it takes more than a smart phone and rock music to instill a sense of justice. Given that, by claiming that the ability to buy into the luxuries afforded by Western liberalism is sufficient to proclaim victory against any competing theories, Fukuyama is clearly perpetuating the above mentioned critique of attempting to perpetuate the power structure that has enabled the so called victor to remain in control.

\textsuperscript{72} Fukuyama
In doing so, however, Fukuyama is falling victim to the majority Hegel’s historiographical concerns. For one, given Fukuyama’s social standing, particularly at the time of writing *The End of History*, it would be naïve to say he does not fit Hegel’s description of an original historian. Furthermore, in attempting to establish the historical significance of the fall of the Berlin Wall on a global level, Fukuyama makes a sweeping assumption about the state of current affairs faced by various citizens of different countries, and as such, falls victim to reflexive universal historicizing. In addition, given the fact that Fukuyama is motivated by his neo-liberal agenda, he also falls victim to reflexive pragmatic universal historicizing. Moreover, having been made aware of the negation the others play to Hegel’s dialectic, and the fact that Fukuyama not only makes no attempt to include them into his end of history, but goes so far as to explicitly state that they are of no concern to him, Fukuyama is simply passing a subjective fictional account of reality that is not based in facts, and as a result, falls victim to Hegel’s least favored form of historicizing, reflexive critical historiography.

Most importantly, however, is the fact that not only is the Spirit of Fukuyama’s neo-liberal culture hardly relatable to the majority of individuals, but in prematurely proclaiming victory for his notion of Western liberalism, Fukuyama is instantiating the Spirit of his own culture upon the accounts of billions of marginalized individuals the world over who do not share in the same spoils as someone afforded Fukuyama’s position does, thus biasing his entire analyses.

None of Hegel’s historiographical concerns burden the heterological historian, for as has been shown, rather than speak for the dead others and the others, the heterological historian has at their disposal the above mentioned framework to manipulate the information culture in such a way that avoids the instantiation of their Spirit on that of other past and current cultures. In proceeding

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73 At the time of writing *The End of History*, Fukuyama was the deputy director of the State Department’s policy planning staff.
phenomenologically through the non-space of ethics, the heterological historian is free to arrange themselves in a position where they can take seriously the subjective condition of any and every theoretical perspective, including Fukuyama’s.

2.9 Born as Ghosts

While the founding ideals established in the Battle of Jena are almost certainly not going to be advanced, that does not mean that they cannot be manipulated to fit into a better system of governance. As it stands, Fukuyama is simply molding abstract concepts to suit the needs of his own personal theory. These ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, to name a few, however, are less defined than we would like to think. Rather than instances, they are more like noble principles that have yet to be properly applied. As such, words like “freedom” and “autonomy” remain general terms that are yet to be truly defined, for we are still in the process of trying to flush them out. And this “flushing out”, contrary to the belief that history has come to an end, can only be done through application.

Therefore, much like Wyschogrod’s earlier critique of Hegel and in response to Fukuyama’s previously posed question, there does seem to exist a contradiction to Spirit. Aside from the glaring contradiction posed by those left out of Spirit, we have in 2014 both the potential as well as the manifest content for a radical reevaluation of the concept of Western liberalism. With the steady increase of connectivity afforded by technology, it seems intuitive that the expansion and push towards a more universal community is inevitable, and thus, change to the system it operates within should be anticipated as well. As a result, we are left with no other option but to reject Fukuyama’s thesis that, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise of access to consumer culture, victory can be proclaimed for his version of Western liberalism.

2.10 We Didn’t Start The Fire
To claim that one has been freed from the plight of the others simply because of their ability to afford material objects is a gross misunderstanding of, or complete ignorance towards, the statistically sound principle that correlation does not equal causation. This failure can be most readily seen through the lens of the cameras capturing grainy images of brutal crimes being committed during cases such as the Syrian Civil War, where footage of an alleged chemical attack was live streamed on the Internet for the world to see.\textsuperscript{74}

Currently enmeshed in Hegel’s slaughter bench, to say that a Syrian is living a better life simply because they have access to technology that enables them to live stream the death and destruction currently enshrouding them is a gross overstatement made from an uninformed position; a statement that does not so much signal a victory for Western liberalism as it does an affirmation of aesthetics. Although Fukuyama is wont to claim that the ability to have the technology in the first place is evidence of one’s desire to partake in Western liberalism, the truth could more easily be that most people, as evident by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, are drawn to nice[r] things. Whether it be material, ideological, or just overall quality of living, why would anyone be content with substandard conditions when better options are readily available? While it could be argued that the hypothetical Syrian’s desire for the phone is simply a result of their desire to film the horrific events they are currently enmeshed in in the hopes of drawing attention to their plight, in hopes of one day arriving at the Western liberalism Fukuyama triumphs as the end all, I do not believe that is Fukuyama’s intent.

In Fukuyama’s narrative, there is no such desire for nicer things, as the notion of a class struggle is an “issue that has actually been successfully resolved in the West.”\textsuperscript{75} In a convenient recounting of history, Fukuyama proceeds to offer an apologist take on contemporary society,

\textsuperscript{74} Syrian Civil War
\textsuperscript{75} Fukuyama
noting that the income inequality that exists in American society is less a result of Western liberalism and more the byproduct of things such as the thought processes that manifested during the culmination of the slave era. In other words, for Fukuyama, the fact that minorities, namely Blacks in this instance, are disproportionately unaccounted for in terms of monetary equality has nothing to do with his euphemized notion of Western liberalism and everything to do with the belief structure of those who propagated the legacy of slavery and racism.

Never mind the idea that this view completely discounts the fact that most indigenous pre-slavery era Africans almost certainly never thought of a world where they would be brutally ripped away from their homeland, only to be shipped away thousands of miles to a foreign one where they would eventually be subjugated to some of the most inhumane conditions ever documented. Fukuyama’s claim blatantly disregards the fact that most people do not have the same starting point to be able to buy into capitalism, let alone influence policy. If one is fortunate enough to be born into a position where their basic needs, per Maslow’s hierarchy, are already met, ideally they already have the opportunity to be educated in this form of governance. Thus, they naturally have the advantage of manipulating the system in such a way that benefits their desires. What this amounts to, essentially, is Fukuyama backing away from the argument with his hands raised so as to say “Hey, do not blame me for the negative drawbacks of the Western liberalism, that is just the byproduct of ancient ways of thinking that are just now starting to manifest themselves.”

This reasoning is reminiscent of manipulation tactics employed by English settlers in British India. In his article Ethnographic Mapping and the Construction of The British Census in India, Kevin Hobson notes that in an attempt to control the indigenous population in British India, English settlers sought to exploit the religious beliefs of the Indian caste system. Hobson
notes that while the English originally viewed the caste system as a way for the ruling Brahmin class to remain in power, it actually existed on a different cosmological framework that sought not to measure one’s worth by economic ranking, but rather the ability to regenerate on a higher plane of existence. Once the difference between the traditional English class system and the Indian caste system was discovered, however, it became easier for the British to manipulate in return for acquiescence.

For our purpose, we have the domineering narrative telling us that everything is ok; just keep plugging away in your role as one of the others, and who cares if you do not have as many opportunities as you would like, charge this new game console to your credit card and keep giving us money to further perpetuate the income inequality to the point where you will not even be able to afford the very products you make. If you work hard enough, one day, after you have managed to pay off your inflated mortgage, car note, and school loans, “Western liberalism” will allow you the opportunity to join the club of affluent individuals who have managed to come out ahead.

Furthermore, while Fukuyama seems content in offering fragmented examples of how Western liberalism has positively affected the lives of individuals, he conveniently fails to mention how it has negatively impacted them as well. For example, in relation to the consumption of goods, Fukuyama continues the Hegelian tradition of marginalizing Sub-Saharan Africa by opportune failing to mention the plights of cultures such as the Congolese, who, dating as far back as the mid-19th century, have been brutally exploited for the minerals in their country for the sake of profit.\textsuperscript{77} In regards to his Asian golden child, China, Fukuyama, through no fault of his own, at the time of writing \textit{The End of History}? was unaware of the eventual suicide nets that would eventually be erected at the Chinese-based company Foxcon, a company that produces

\textsuperscript{77} Conflict Minerals, Rebels, and Child Soldiers in Congo
If Fukuyama is right, then the fact that workers, some of them children, are made to suffer is merely the process of Spirit manifesting itself in its ideal version of Western liberalism. Surely this cannot be the case. Seen through a Hegelian lens analyzing the benefits of “Western liberalism”, however, it seems as though Fukuyama would be wont to say that incidents such as the amputation of an innocent Congolese’s arm or the ending of an innocent Chinese person’s life were necessary sacrifices that had to be made solely to promote the Absolute manifestation of Spirit as Western liberalism. Clearly this also cannot be the case.

As much as Fukuyama wants to establish the claims that history has come to an end and the principles of Western liberalism can no longer be expanded upon, there seems to be an excessive amount of negations left out of the grand scheme that still need to be accounted for. Although it “matters little what strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso” to Fukuyama, to the heterological historian, it matters plenty that anti-government protests are being held in Albania, a democratic nation, in regards to a lack of response to poverty and unemployment, or that aid consultants for a charity that was supposed to provide Burkina Faso, which is also a democratic country, with clean water were paid £1 million, while the residents received nothing.

If Fukuyama was truly “interested in what one could in some sense call the common ideological heritage of mankind”, ideally he would understand that Mankind is a universal made up of individual parts, and that freedom, as dictated by Hegel, is the rational expression of the subjective will through the universal will. Furthermore, ideally Fukuyama would understand that while it is convenient for the rent seeking inherent in Western liberalism to simply marginalize the plight of

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78 The making of an iPhone
79 Fukuyama
80 Anti-government protests in Albania
81 Aid consultants paid more than 1 million while charity gets nothing
82 Fukuyama
the others for the sake of the “greater good”, it is not convenient for those relegated to the annals of history.

As one sided as Fukuyama wants to make the argument, there is no Law of Excluded Middle in human affairs; by simply proclaiming victory for Western liberalism without taking into account the negative ramifications it may have on those not fortunate enough to be part of the upside of its manifestation, he is leaving out all the gray area that needs to be expanded upon to take into account those who are in fact left out by his interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history. In that regard, Fukuyama is a unmistakably preemptive in stating that all viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism have been exhausted, for while Marxism, as a practice, has consistently failed to be properly applied, as has been shown, the same could be said of Fukuyama’s Western liberalism, as well.

2.11 April 29, 1992 (Miami)

In Fukuyama’s defense, I completely grant Hegel’s claim that the basic tenets of freedom were established during the Battle of Jena. After all, it is no coincidence that the principles seeking universal liberty, equality, and brotherhood were established in response to, and in the aftermath of, a revolution started by a group of the others who had long been subjected to the whims of the those in power. What I argue against is Fukuyama’s belief that Hegel’s dialectic concluded during the latter part of the 20th century. For if this is the case, then Fukuyama is left with the following dilemma: if the argument that history has come to an end with the establishment of Western liberalism, which is predicated on the principles of the French Revolution, is to be accepted, then things like conflict minerals and sweatshops pose a direct negation to this claim. And until the suffering of all of the others, such as those exposed to dehumanizing conditions for the sole purpose of manufacturing the consumer goods Fukuyama posits as the hallmark for Western
liberalism’s victory, is eradicated, then the claim that Western liberalism can no longer be expanded upon are baseless, for ideally, some alternative can be devised where sweatshop workers do not have to be exploited simply to enjoy the pleasures of technology.

Most damning for Fukuyama, however, is that in sermonizing from a unitary perspective that is far removed from the reality it attempts to manipulate, his account of Western liberalism modernizes Hegel’s initial contradiction by running afoul of Spirit’s quest for Absolute. That is, rather than simply negate only individuals who were not fortunate enough to be born in a temperate environment or subjective disposition, Fukuyama negates any and everyone who is starting from the lower rungs of Western liberalism.

Specifically, as shown in *Harder for Americans to Rise From Lower Rungs*, DeParle demonstrates the problem arises when not everyone is free to partake in Western liberalism at the same level as those who have more economic liberties are. As DeParle argues, given the depth of American poverty that leaves poor children starting from especially far behind, compounded with the premium placed on higher education by American employers and the tendency for children to follow their parents educational trajectory, having an uneven starting line dictates that people coming from a background of less schooling are subject to an especially difficult path towards upward mobility.83

Furthermore, DeParle affirms that since higher educated individuals tend to be higher earners, an added premium is placed on the ability to come from an educated and affluent background, as ideally one would have the added bonus of having access to better schooling. To further convey this urgency of this point, DeParle quotes the president of the Russell Sage Foundation as saying: “Upper-income families can invest more in their children’s education and

83 DeParle
they may have a better understanding of what it takes to get a good education.\textsuperscript{84} For the others who do not have access to the same starting as their wealthy counterparts, it would appear then that they will be in a perpetual state of “catch-up”.

Seeing as to how the nature of Spirit is to manifest at the end of history as Absolute, and the essence of Absolute is perfection, however, the establishment of history’s end point \textit{demands} that there no longer be any flaws that serve as negation. As has been shown, there is still room for the final tenets of Western liberalism to be expanded upon, ideally in a way that would enable those who do not have as many economic or political liberties to advance, contrary to Fukuyama’s thesis. Inversely, if the progress of Spirit is measured by the level of freedom inherent in the nation, it would seem shortsighted to accept Fukuyama’s notion of Western liberalism as the end all if there is still room for those who are fortunate enough to be in power to build a fort of protection that allows them to be “more free” than those who are not in power. That being the case, how can we have already arrived at the final form of government if we are still trying to perfect the one we are at? While Fukuyama’s position is based on the fact that the fall of the Berlin Wall signals the decisive end of history, I believe it is preemptive at best. If the more recent forms of the National Defense Authorization Act, which conveniently passed measures that prohibited some of the very actions from the \textit{Occupy} movement,\textsuperscript{85} teaches us anything, it is that even in the nation that is the purported harbinger of freedom, the notion of liberalism can easily be manipulated to satisfy intrinsic desires under the guise of supposed protection from intangible threats. This manipulation of power, of course, originates from the top, as very few people seldom volunteer to have their freedoms taken away. Most damning of all is that as a result of this constriction in liberties, the nation that is supposed to be the harbinger of Western liberalism has

\textsuperscript{84} DeParle\textsuperscript{85} 2013 NDAA
further erected walls that serve to attempt to confine Spirit’s actualization towards freedom. These are all very real issues that no level of aesthetics will ever be able to mask, and if Hegel’s conception of Spirit is to be believed, then it is only a matter of time before the thought of “something better” enters the realm of consciousness.

As has been shown, the foundation for the thought of something better to be built upon has already been laid by Wyschogrod’s heterological historian. In response to the increased access of to the information culture, Wyschogrod argues that Spirit no longer needs to manifest through Hegel’s slaughter bench. Rather, Wyschogrod posits that Spirit can unveil in ways productive to a community united in hope by way of emphatic connections established through art. As alluded to earlier, however, Wyschogrod feels as though Spirit is currently in a state where it is unable to transcend images, for it is stuck in the very essence of what images are, a punctiform of time. Regardless, Wyschogrod does not believe Spirit is confined entirely to this state of stasis, as Spirit is capable of embracing infinitely many new perspectives. It is incumbent, then, on the heterological historian to manipulate the information culture in such a way that allows them to “see with the eye of the concept”, in hopes of “fathom[ing] the cunning of reason” in a more conducive manner than Hegel’s slaughter bench. After all, if the point of historiography is to provide the ocular tools by which to view the stream of past events, the intention would be to provide the platform from which human history, as the ultimate quest for freedom, can ultimately manifest as the Absolute.

86 Wyschogrod, 116
87 Wyschogrod, 116
Chapter 3: Art And Responsibility

3.1 I Against I

Thus far, my focus has primarily been on referring to the “others” in my different accounts of history as an ethereal amalgamation of varying collectives of marginalized people who are so beyond the realm of sayability that they have simply been consigned the title of voiceless, dead others. While it is easy to simply label those who are perceived to be the victims of histories domineering historical narratives for the sake of brevity or convenience, it is the fundamental task of the heterological historian to sort through the piles of dead others in order to give face to all those who were and are rendered voiceless. In order to do so, I turn to Heidegger to arrive at a working definition of what it means to be a ‘Being’ in the world, whether past, present, or future, dead other or otherwise, in the form of Heidegger’s Dasein.

According to Heidegger, Dasein is an entity which “gets its character from what is inquired about—namely being.” More specifically, Heidegger posits that Dasein, unlike any other entities defined by scientific discourse, is that very being which is “ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.” In regards to its characteristics, Heidegger claims that Dasein is that Being which always understands itself in terms of its existence. Heidegger claims that this existence is essentially a possibility of itself, faced with the decision of whether to be or not to be itself in its own way of being in the world. Heidegger affirms that Dasein has chosen its own possibilities, has had those possibilities given to it, or simply grew up in them, which is what Heidegger means when he talks about Geworfeneit, or “thrownness”. Heidegger asserts that the individual Dasein is responsible for its existence, either by affirmation or neglect, which he differentiates with the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity.

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88 Heidegger, Martin PG 30
89 Heidegger, Martin PG 32
Furthermore, Heidegger notes that authenticity and inauthenticity are both ways in which Dasein’s Being takes on a definite character, and that this character is defined through the structures of *Being-in-the-world*. Additionally, Heidegger is firm in his belief that existence is only straightened out through existing.

Given those ethical and ontological challenges, in order to first understand what it means to live an idealized life, one must first understand what it means to be a singular entity in the world such as a Dasein; that is, that sort of being that is responsible for taking responsibility for the choices which confront it, either by acceptance or neglect. For Heidegger, the possibility to lead authentic life is an individual matter; one can either choose to accept that their decisions and projects are their very own, or neglect to raise questions about their life’s choices. This is a challenge Wyschogrod’s heterological historian gladly accepts.

Furthermore, by using Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein, we can embark upon the messy work that is necessary to attain a level of understanding that would enable one to commence the sort of individualizing projects that gives meaning to one’s life. It is only from understanding these sorts of existential projects, according to Heidegger, that we are able to get possibility structures for ourselves from life. For my thesis, commencing in this way means that we learn how to look at things in a different manner, a manner that enables us to embark upon the path of figuring things out subjectively by beginning to understand the varying degrees of impact these projects have on our life. Once one begins to think in this relatively “authentic” manner, more possibilities begin to present themselves, to the point where one can begin to see the horizon of their possibility structures. This, in turn, allows one to envision what it is they can genuinely and authentically be in life, and thus begin to put in the work necessary to hopefully complete their given projects.

In order to truly understand what this entails, however, one must first come to terms with

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90 Moran, Demot PG 260
their own-most possibility structure, that is, the possibility of no more possibilities. Heidegger presents this as becoming aware of the finitude of one’s existence that entails understanding that one’s own death is inevitable, unknowable, and unpredictable. This is an event which, according to Heidegger, must be experienced phenomenologically, and that until one understands this assertion, one will not be able to live a truly authentic life. Once one comes to terms with the fact that not only can one never truly understand the actuality of death until one actually dies, and that no one is ever going to die for them, can someone then be in the position to understand or “own” death as their own-most possibility structure and start to make their “own” decisions based on this newfound horizon of possibilities. Understanding the definitive role that one’s own death plays in figuring out their own possibility structures and the decisions related to them, then, serves as the determining factor in the structuring of our possibility horizons.

Unfortunately, it is in the nature of being one of the dead others, a victim of the cataclysm, to have their own-most possibilities stripped away from their horizon of possibilities. Furthermore, in response to Fukuyama’s idealized version of Western liberalism, other others are completely plugged into a system of rent seeking, where they are so busy trying to keep up with the mandates of Western liberalism, such as a mortgage, utilities, et cetera, that, for the most part, they are not free to philosophize about what their ideal life would consist of. That is not to say most people do not have dreams and desires, but rather that there are other conditions that must first be met before one can ever even embark upon the path of achieving them.

For some, these hindrances are the byproduct of simple financial difficulties that could be overcome with various strategies aimed at accumulating the wealth necessary to advance them in the corporate ladder of Western liberalism. As was previously shown, however, the trend of upward mobility, particularly in the United States, is slowly declining. As a result, for others,
especially those already suffering the disadvantage of not having had the fortune of being born into an established Western liberalized state, it is not as easy of a task. Furthermore, if Wyschogrod is correct, this may very well be the result of systematic conditions inherent in the economic structures of Western liberalism designed to keep the marginalized others in substandard conditions. These others are so busy wondering where their next meal is going to come from, that they do not have time to sit around and wonder what they can contribute to the world before they die. And whether this truly is a systematic effort or merely a byproduct of Western liberalism is inconsequential; the fact of the matter remains that there are others who do not share equally in the spoils of Western liberalism. The question then becomes: what is to be made of the Dasein who is Being-in-the-world with the dead others?

It is incumbent upon the heterological historian, beginning with the foundation of a Dasein established as an authentic being in the world, to understand how it is that one is going to embark upon the project of manifesting one’s own subjective possibility structures to incorporate the dead and voiceless others. In order to do so, the heterological historian must manipulate various phenomenological tools that serve to focus their attention in such a way as to actually bring about the completion of the project they desire. In doing so, ideally the heterological historian will be able to give further explanations of what it is to be a Being-in-the-world-with-the-others, and what such a responsibility entails. In order to do so, it is important to understand the role intentionality plays in directing the mental acts of the heterological historian.

3.2 Without Her, we Are Lifeless Satellites Drifting

According to Andrew Spear,\textsuperscript{91} Husserl believes that there are three essential features that define his central thesis of intentionality: intentional acts, intentional objects, and intentional content. The first of these three, intentional acts, is defined as that which is said to be a particular

\textsuperscript{91} Spear, Andrew
mental event, such as perceiving, remembering, thinking, and so on. The second of these, an intentional object, is that which the intentional act is directed upon, such as perceiving (act) music (object), thinking about music, or remembering that piece of music that reminds one of a time past, and so on. According to Husserl, there is no psychological reality between intentional acts and objects which allows for one to have multiple intentional acts directed towards multiple intentional objects. That is, though one is currently thinking about music, they can also remember that completing a different task is equally, if not more, important than reflecting on the memories a song stirs, though not simultaneously.

As for intentional content, it can be defined as “a description or set of information that the subject takes to characterize or be applicable to the intentional objects of their thought.” In other words, intentionality towards an object is always perceived in an independent sense, and is therefore subjective to the individual’s own personal perspective. So in regards to one’s intending towards music, the intentional content of their experience is uniquely their own. Any given Dasein has their own personal thoughts, ideas, and overall intentions that are all part of the intentional acts, objects, and content involved in the completion of the ultimate intention they hope to accomplish, whatever it may be.

Furthermore, Husserl notes that it does not matter whether an intentional object is real or not. This view is crucial in understanding the significance that non-physical objects play in our lives. History, dreams, ideas, desires, et cetera have no physical merit; one cannot reach out and manipulate their desire to make the world a better place the same way they can reach out and fulfill their desire for a cleaner desk by picking up all of the items laying around. That does not, however, imply that there is no efficacy to these conceptual desires.

To further clarify this point, Heidegger uses the example of a hallucination in *The Spear*,
Fundamental Discoveries of Phenomenology, Its Principle, And The Clarification of Its Name, to demonstrate the efficacy of non-physical objects. Using the example of an automobile that is not present at hand, Heidegger notes that there is no coordination between the psychic and the physical. Heidegger posits, however, that the “hallucination” of this imagined automobile is in itself still a perception of something, namely an automobile. Heidegger further notes that this perception, which is not intended towards any physically real object, is in itself directing itself toward something presumably perceived. Therefore, even if this non-physical object is nothing more than a hallucination, it is still an intentional act. As Heidegger himself specifically states it is the case that perception, correct or deceptive, is in itself intentional. Intentionality is not a property which would accrue to perception and belongs to it in certain instances. As perception, it is intrinsically intentional, regardless of whether the perceived is in reality on hand or not. Indeed, it is really only because perception as such is a directing-itself-toward something, because intentionality constitutes the very structure of comportment itself, that there can be anything like deceptive perception and hallucination.\(^93\)

While the heterological historian may not be able to physically manipulate concrete objects, such as past events, that does not take away from the fact that they are intentional objects, for, as Heidegger notes, intentionality does not take the form of an objective relationship between physical and psychic processes, but rather is better understood as the structure of directing-itself-toward. To further clarify this concept, Heidegger introduces his notion of empty intending. According to Heidegger, empty intending is the mode of representing something in the manner of thinking of something, or recalling it. In this particular instance, Heidegger refers to a bridge which is not physically present, yet can be made the object of consciousness by intending.

\(^93\) Moran, Dermot PG 260
oneself towards the location of the bridge. That is, the empty intending occurs simply by intending the psychically absent bridge, a form of intentionality that Heidegger believes makes up the majority of our day to day talk, for it is not physical objects we speak of when we refer to certain physical objects, such as the bridge, but rather the matter of intending itself that includes the intentional object. In regards to heterological historians speaking of the past, clearly they are not speaking of a physical object, but rather of an ethereal substance that seeks to formulate in one’s mind the vision we have of some un-constructed reality.

Heidegger proceeds to present both an example of the distinction he is making, as well as an explanation of how it is that an intentionality can be fulfilled through intuition by offering the example of his desk at home and his relation intending towards it. Heidegger notes that at first, this is nothing more than empty intending towards an object for the sole purpose of example. He notes, however, that he can fulfill this empty intention in two ways, the first of which is simply by envisaging the desk, and the second of which is actually going home and seeing the desk in an authentic and final experience.

Similarly, the heterological historian can speak of the dead others as an empty intention, but they can also envisage them by way of various tools offered by the information culture and, as a result, imagine what they believe life for the dead and voiceless others was/is like, what it would perhaps be like to be in their position, the feelings they may have were they to be in their position, or perhaps even the outcomes that may result from being in their position. As such, the heterological historian has this intangible yet very real intention of something that, although may not be as simple as going home and witnessing a desk, can be fulfilled under the right circumstances.

In light of Heidegger’s views on intentionality, the heterological historian now has the
backdrop for what it is to be Dasein faced with the task of envisioning a future existence that includes concern for others who are not yet physically represented. Furthermore, through an understanding of, and ability to manipulate intentionality as a phenomenological tool capable of adequately operating with non-physical mental objects, the heterological historian also has a crucial instrument necessary to begin constructing possibility structures that take into account the potential plight of others.

3.3 Cowboy Dan and The Lonesome Crowded West

As alluded to earlier, Being-in-the-world is an essential characteristic of Dasein. Specifically, unlike the spatio-temporal location of physical objects, Dasein’s being-in-the-world is defined as having an actual, existential relationship with the world itself. That is, although a computer, like one’s self, is located within a house, a computer does not share the relationship one does with their house. A computer does not come home after a long day of school thankful to be home, nor does it refer to their house as a home; it is merely a place where the computer is stored. For Dasein, however, a house is a place to escape the elements, a place to retreat to when overburdened, tired, lonely, or afraid. Much like a house, there are other places on earth where Dasein finds itself at home, such as a childhood home or in a city. Unlike a computer, which is just located in the world, Dasein could be said to be dwelling within it. This dwelling in the world is a feature characteristic of all Dasein.

Having arrived at an understanding of what it is to be a Dasein Being-in-the-world, the heterological historian is still left with the question of what they are to do with their lives while they are here. The solution was alluded to earlier in the form of intentionality and possibility structures, but there seems to be a crucial element missing, for as it stands, we have only the numbers to an equation, and lack the mathematical symbol necessary illustrate what action needs
to be taken. Simply put, the missing function is involvement, a key facet in the responsibility of the heterological historian. In its Being-in-the-world, Dasein is able to interact with the environment by means of intentionality and to manipulate its malleable nature to fit its specific needs and desires. This involvement can take a literal, physical form, such as when Dasein builds a house with bare hands to protect themselves from nature, or it can take the form of manifesting a thought in one’s mind by projecting it through three dimensional space through sound so that others who have both a syntactical and semantic understanding of the vibrations created by their vocal chords can be similarly affected by the emotion or thought Dasein is attempting to convey. Whatever the case, according to Michael Wheeler, Heidegger, believes this involvement involves multiple facets of Being-in-the-world, what Wheeler calls a *totality of involvements*.

In order to demonstrate the magnitude of this claim, Wheeler offers a Heideggerian example of how these totality of involvements come into play. Using the example of a hammer, Wheeler shows how a hammer is involved in the act of hammering, which is involved in the act of building something, which is involved in the act of protecting Dasein’s from nature. These entities are thus defined not simply by the actions they perform, but by the purposes they serve Dasein. Wheeler notes that as this chain of network events progresses, worlds are created. Similarly, the heterological historian uses the various tools of the information culture at their disposal, such as a camera, in order to build windows into new worlds of the dead others that were once inaccessible. As a result, it is understood that the heterological historian’s role, whether large or small, plays a crucial role in developing the platform from which the telling of various forgotten events comes to fruition.

Wheeler goes on to demonstrate how the worlds in which we are involved are not a harmonized process, and that it is only through disturbance that we come to understand the effect

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94 Wheeler, Michael
these involvements have in shaping our intentionality. To modify the example given by Wheeler, the heterological historian could be at their computer room highlighting various cataclysms in hopes of bringing the struggle of the dead others to the forefront of consciousness. While they may be entranced by a forgotten world visible at the moment only through a computer screen, occasionally, an innocuous event, such as the ringing of a phone, may snap them out of delirium and remind them that they also have plans to meet up with friends for dinner. In that respect, the heterological historian as Dasein is entrenched in two separate worlds that direct their heterological and auxiliary intentionality simultaneously yet at different levels of involvement at any given time.

Perhaps most crucially for the heterological historian, however, is, given Wyschogrod’s previously defined prerequisites, the heterological historian is able to position themselves into two different worlds simultaneously, all while avoiding instantiating their own personal spirit on the culture of the others which they are witnessing through the lens of technology. This ability is in stark contrast to that of individuals such as Fukuyama who, sincere as his intentions may have been, is unfortunately unable to capture life from the perspective of someone not granted a similar privileged position of power. According to Heidegger, these ultimate involvements, these for-the-sake-of-which, are all invariably connected to the other events involvements in one’s life. Therefore, there are no isolated events; all things are inexplicably related to the others, and any individual action is liable to affect the collective, either directly or indirectly, blatantly or furtively. This is important, as Heidegger believes Dasein is constantly choosing the way it intends its life to be. Furthermore, Wheeler notes that Heidegger believes they also serve as a way in which the projects and possibilities of Dasein are related to the way other entities may become intelligible. Wheeler notes that this is because these for-the-sake-of-which levels are both a launching pad for

\[95\text{ Wheeler, Michael} \]
possible equipment-defining totalities as well as an opportunity for Dasein to demonstrate what it is or can be. Simply put, at any given moment, one can be made aware of both the equipment, such as Heidegger’s tool box or the information culture, which defines one’s actions, as well as the possibilities and/or unacknowledged desires one possesses. As a result, one is never out of reach from coming to terms with the plight of the others, nor understanding how one’s actions as a possible heterological historian can help bring an end to senseless suffering.

3.4  I Got no Time For Livin’, Yes I’m Working All The Time

Thus far, our intentionality has been directed towards the various phenomenological equipment that the heterological historian can manipulate in their quest to give voice to the others, and educated on how it can be applied theoretically. It can also, however be applied practically, a task Arendt set out to accomplish in Labor, Work, Action. Beginning with the questions, “What does an active life consist of? What do we do when we are active?” Arendt proceeds to lay out her argument for what she believes the vita activa, or active life, is, and how it relates to the contemplative life, or vita contemplativa. Arendt states that an active life is that which most men are engaged in and cannot escape altogether, noting that through labor, work, and action we ensure the ability to lead a life of contemplation. Most notably, Arendt remarks that action is necessary “in order to organize the living together of many human beings in such a way that peace, the condition for the quiet of contemplation, is assured.”

Like Heidegger, Arendt believes that Dasein defines itself through the work they do, noting that the work of our hands, as distinguished from the labor of our bodies, fabricates the sheer unending variety of things whose sum total…[is] the world we live in.” To that extent, much like Heidegger, it could be said that the decision to live an active life is a personal one that Dasein has

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96 Moran, Dermot et al PG 360
97 Moran, Dermot et al PG 362
98 Moran, Dermot et al PG 366
the perpetual choice to make. For Arendt, however, it is through works of art that Dasein manifests the distinction of an inherent duality between work and laboring for the means of survival. According to Arendt, the work of art is meant to create an object of permanence, unlike work and labor, who’s toils inevitably get sucked back into the earth from which they arose. Arendt, drawing from her inner Husserlian and Heideggerian roots, argues that, despite the fact that the inspiration that led to the creation of these works of art are thoughts (non-physical objects) this does not prevent them from being things. Arendt contends it is the reification that occurs in writing something down, painting an image, composing a piece of music, et cetera which actually makes the thought a reality; and in order to produce these thought things, which we usually call art works, the same workmanship is required that through the primordial instrument of human hands builds the other, less durable and more useful things to the human artifice.  

In other words, it does not matter whether it is labor, work, or action intending their own unique interests, the fact remains that actual work as effort is needed in order to manifest them. Whether it be the labor necessary to protect Dasein from nature, the work necessary to create a piece of furniture, or the freedom and action necessary to manifest a dream or create a work of art: concerted effort, choosing to live a life of authentic action, is necessary to ensure a meaningful life. The problem, once again, remains that a vast majority of people living under the conditions afforded by Western liberalism in its current incarnation are unable to partake in such pleasures-as works of art, for they are too engaged in the labor necessary for their survival.

Regardless, Arendt believes that non-biological life from birth to death manifests itself in action and speech, and through it we insert ourselves into the world. Arendt goes on to discuss how in our differences, namely in our distinctly original ways of expressing our Being, we share a

99 Moran, Dermot et al PG 366
uniqueness with the others who are also Being-in-the-world with us. Given that, the only way to distinguish ourselves from the others is through expressing our individuality, a self-affirming act that establishes us as unique individuals. Unlike being born, Arendt notes, this insertion is not forced upon Dasein. Rather, it is a conscious choice Dasein makes, a choice which is driven by an internal impulse embedded in Dasein from the moment it is born. The impulse, according to Arendt, is an initiative prompting Dasein towards action.

This view is most readily embodied by Nietzsche’s views on the will to power. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche asks that we suppose if we finally succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of the will, the will to power. Nietzsche states that all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power, and that from it, so to the understanding that it is our needs that interpret the world. That is, while some are perhaps content with getting by with the bare minimum, many others seem to be driven towards completing tasks that increase their level of power. What these tasks are naturally vary by individual, but what both Arendt and Nietzsche have made clear is that there is invariably a driving force that pushes most individuals towards achieving the outward expression of their individuality.

Per Nietzsche,

What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness. What is happiness? The feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome. Not contentedness but more power; not peace but war; not virtue but fitness…

That said, there seems to be an inherent desire in all individuals to insert themselves in the world as a means of satisfying some form or preternatural power that drives them as a unique

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100 Solomon, Robert PG 97
101 Solomon, Robert PG 99
individual. This is best represented by Wyschogrod’s example of Billie Joe, the homeless man she once met while standing guard at a moving van, who rather than heed Wyschogrod’s advice of going to the hospital, simply asked that she remember his name. This Nietzschean will to power plays a crucial role in the arsenal of the heterological historian, however, for now, it will suffice to note that Nietzsche’s views on the will to power dictate that every specific body strives to become master over all of space and to extend its will to power by “thrusting back” everything that that resists its extension. In doing so, however, it continually encounters other bodies with similar desires, a paradox that is resolved only through the merging of power.  

Similarly, Arendt goes on to note that, despite this newfound individuality, we are still conditioned by human plurality, by our Being-in-the-world-with-others, for we are not alone in this world. Arendt notes that wherever Dasein lives together, there exists a web of relationships that is woven by the deeds on the words of countless other Dasein, both those alive and dead. Much like Heidegger’s views on the for-the-sake-of-which, Arendt believes this interconnected web is a way to suggest how our experiences of action and speech are inter-related in a totality. That is, the actions of any one individual Dasein has the potential to be felt by the collective Dasein as a whole. As Arendt states

The smallest act in the most limited circumstances bears the seed of the same boundlessness and unpredictability; one deed, one gesture, one word may suffice to change every constellation; In acting, in contradistinction to working, it is indeed true that we can really never know what we are doing.  

3.5 World, Hold On

This condition of coming to terms with our plurality in the world is perhaps as important as

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102 Solomon, Robert PG 99
103 Moran, Dermot et al PG 372
understanding that we are Dasein living under the precepts of our own-most possibility structures. The problem with this, of course is two-fold; first, how do we even know other people have similar psychological states and experiences like myself, and secondly, why should I care that they do? The general response to the former is that one can infer from actions that other individuals are in fact Dasein much like myself and not automata or machine; that is, if I punch someone in the face, chances are they are either going to try to duck it or be in pain. While this response suffices in regards to the first question posed, it certainly has no answer to the second. That is not to say, however, that the question cannot be answered.

According to Edith Stein, one can get to know the existence of another Dasein through empathy. According to Kris McDaniels, Stein’s use of empathy can be defined as an irreducible intentional state in which both other persons and the mental states of other persons are given to us. Moreover, empathy allows us to see our fellow Dasein as much more than just another body in motion, but rather as a feeling individual that is capable of experiencing the same amount of emotional range as I am. That is, the joy I feel when accomplishing a goal is just as real for me as it is for someone else who is accomplishing their own respective goals, as is the pain I would feel if I were to be punched in the face just as they would.

3.6 Redemption Song

In returning to Wyschogrod, the heterological historian, as future subject of history, must acknowledge the binarism of time and the role it plays in establishing intersubjectivity. Wyschogrod notes that “past events cannot be lived in the manner of firstness but merely relived in memory as the etiolated images, the replicas, of what they had been.” At the same time, however, if the heterological historian is to be able to complete their work, they must be able to

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104 Schliesser, Eric
105 Wyschogrod, Edith 146
re-surrect the past as it was by somehow inhabiting the past they wish to recover. This can most obviously be done in the temporal world in which one presently thinks of the past. Unlike Fukuyama, the heterological historian is able to utilize skepsis in order to avoid surveying the historical topography from a panopticon and, as such, the heterological historian has available to them the ability to traverse time and space in order to be able to adequately express the conditions in which the others found themselves relegated to throughout history.

While this has yet to be done physically, philosophers such as Herder believe this act of transgression can be achieved by literally immersing oneself in the Spirit of the culture they are attempting to define. One way in which this could be done, according to Herder, is by “feeling” one’s way through the history of others. Instead of considering historical predecessors inferior, the heterological historian actively pursues a means in which to empathize with their position. In doing so, not only does the heterological historian pinpoint a starting point for understanding, they also open up a space in which ethics can come into play. For Wyschogrod, this would imply an ethics of understanding that allows us to “feel” the particular terrors or cataclysms that previous people and cultures experienced. In doing so, the heterological historian manufactures the framework from which an outside observer may be put in a position where they can then empathize with the struggle of the others, an act Herder found crucial to truly understanding history.

In a move that predates Wyschogrod, Herder notes that through studying the precursor for the technological image, art, the heterological historian can identify with a culture, and in doing so, literally immerses themselves in the Spirit of a given period. In doing so, this move towards empathy would ideally put both the heterological historian and the future subjects of history in a position where they would be shaken out of their state of apathy towards the conditions of the
others, and into a new form of consciousness, one in which individuals make a concerted effort to avoid having future others experience similar travesties.

Furthermore, Wyschogrod notes that, with the advent of Husserlian phenomenology, the act of physically looking at an image has taken on a life of its own. Instead of being a passive process resulting from sensory stimulation, Wyschogrod notes that the phenomenological look is an intentional act aimed at the world that either aims or fails to fill an empty intention with content. Wyschogrod’s explanation of Sartrian and Foucauldian interpretations of the look is instructive in this regard. She notes that for the former, the look is an act of violence that both allows the looker to identify another person’s materiality with their consciousness, as well as an act of theft that allows the other person to be deterritorialized, as the space around them is sucked towards the lookers ocular intention. In that sense, the phenomenological look functions as a means of unraveling the barriers inherent in anonymity that the heterological historian employs as a way of deconstructing alterity.

For the latter, the look is an act of epistemic expression of an object under surveillance. Wyschogrod notes that for Foucault, the gaze manifested with this intent are forms of social control which simply seek to exercise a form of power over the those whose wellbeing is purportedly of concern, citing various panoptical manifestations of this intent, such as prisons and psychiatry wards, for example. Wyschogrod notes how this “gaze” is a Foucauldian take on Sartre’s notion of the look with the added twist of it being given the seers invisibility from the seen. Wyschogrod notes that this is a power structure that maintains the object of consciousness in a perpetually vulnerable position, while the subject-who-looks remains in a position of power.

Clearly, this type of look is more synonymous with narratives such as Fukuyama’s *The End of History?*, for not only is Fukuyama speaking from a lofty perch that enables him to look over the
topography of history from a position of power, as alluded to earlier, but in a way, doing so subliminally comes with the intent of maintaining an illusory form of power. That is, by claiming that conditions of subjugation, such as unequal wealth distribution, have been equalized in Western society, Fukuyama spreads the potentially harmful, and certainly loaded, message that wealth distribution really is not a problem when, as has been shown, that is not the case. If Foucault is correct, then this sort of marginalizing can be understood as an attempt to maintain a form of advantageous social control by implicitly saying, “do not worry that you are struggling to get by, unemployed minority high school dropout who was born to a single mother in a crime ridden neighborhood; it only appears that way. In actuality, you are doing just as fine as any other American. And even if your conditions are not ideal, Western liberalism is no longer going to evolve, so you may as well make the best of it, because this is the best of all possible worlds.”

Furthermore, if Foucault is correct, then, as alluded to earlier, it is in Fukuyama’s best interest to maintain such a narrative, in the hopes of keeping the subject-who-looks comfortably ensconced in their position of power.

In this respect, Fukuyama’s biggest pitfall can be illuminated by using Nietzsche’s views on the maladies of historiography, namely the fact that the study of history confuses sentiment or, as Wyschogrod states, attempts to aestheticize that which cannot be aestheticized. Furthermore, Nietzsche notes that history is recorded by those who did not make it, which in true Nietzschean form, is essentially a warning to beware of those who claim to be harbingers of truth. Although Fukuyama surely may have been in a position to influence some policy, the true merit of the importance of the fall of the Berlin Wall could be better understood by the acts of those East and West Germans who, after twenty-eight years of politicized separation, were finally able to unite once more. This is a task that is difficult to do when surveying the situation from the vantage point

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106 Of particular interest is Voltaire’s critique of Leibniz’s views on the best of all possible worlds.
of a panopticon, yet is easily accomplished by the heterological historian feeling their way through the trenches, or the rubble of the wall that came down peacefully, in reconstructing how the events transpired. Moreover, there seems to be an inherent arbitrariness in Fukuyama’s setting of history’s end point, as well as his claim that the essence of the victory of liberty should provide us with some sort of guideline for how to act into the future. To say that the “victory” of Western liberalism is the end of history based on a historically significant event is shortsighted at best. Lastly, in trying to be subjective, Nietzsche believes historiographers neuter history instead, a naiveté born of their desire to objectify something as abstract as history. This is a frivolous game for Nietzsche, who believes we must be weary of those who, like Fukuyama, try to also make of the past a trivial game to fit their political preferences, and who cast off as superficially objective anything that does not fit their understanding of the rational plan of history.

3.7 Nazi Punks: In The Real Fourth Reich, You’ll be The First to go (Unless You Think)

In light of the inherent duality of the phenomenological look, Wyschogrod posits whether an object that serves to establish a narrative can avoid framing the perspective of its intended audience. Despite the fact that it is in the nature of a camera lens to capture the unfiltered truth, everything from subconscious motives to digital manipulation is likely to alter both the intended and unintended narrative of an image. Wyschogrod, citing Benjamin, notes how this manipulation is to be feared for, when applied improperly, images may serve to aestheticize a life that both causes and feeds fascism, a form of control whose ultimate expression is war. In regards to Fukuyama, he can attempt to paint a rosy picture with his victor’s narrative, but this is clearly a dangerous position to take, as it negatively aestheticizes the very real plight of the others.

And it is this manipulated expression that Wyschogrod-reading-Benjamin is ultimately afraid of, for, left unchecked, it would “release a nostalgia for and fetishization of a heroic past that
inevitably leads to war.” Currently, one need look no further than the social media accounts of combative’ to see attempts to aestheticize questionable events. In one instance, there is the example of the Israeli soldier who depicts a photo of a young Palestinian whose head is in the crosshairs of a sniper rifle, while in another, there is an al-Qaeda soldier whose account depicts casualties of war run through various enhancing filters.

Furthermore, because such possibilities do exist, Wyschogrod notes that the heterological historian must be wary of unintended audience responses, as well as the way in which visual artifacts construct otherness, for fear of commodifying the others as exotic, marketable images. Such an attempt to establish otherness is merely a facilitation of events that should be avoided by the heterological historian by inserting themselves into the non-space of ethics. In this void, the heterological historian is able to establish a nook in which they can seek reprieve from the excuse of evasion from difficult subjects by inserting themselves into the contestation, a move which inherently requires a stance.

To not take a stance, then, is the real issue, for as previously established, the heterological historian must have both the courage and ability to take a stand and say “yes, this happened as such, with proof being in the form of this here image.” Even in dealing with large-scale phenomena, where individual parts may be lost in the overall whole, establishing one’s own personal subjective experience is not so much a trite attempt at superficial “coffee shop revolutionaryism” so much as an establishment of faciality. As Wyschogrod notes, both the victimizer and the victim have faces, with the former clearly having the advantage of numbers on their side. In this decidedly skewed balance, however, the voiceless, united by the common bonds of cataclysm, gain presence in the form of image. And while an overabundance of these images

\[107\] Wyschogrod, Edith PG 86
may lead to a twisted form of hedonistic adaptation, Wyschogrod notes that it is the responsibility of the heterological historian to battle back against this apathy and give credence to those who were deemed expendable. By giving voice and face to the others, the heterological historian can use the mass accrued by their collective weight to catapult their momentum into the front lines of the collective ocular consciousness. Instead of the narrative propagated by the ruling class that once maintained the sole source of images, and ipso facto the historical narrative, the collective voice of the others now has the visual platform to solidify their stance and offer the unadulterated perspective of history, as opposed to history, as sponsored by CNN.\textsuperscript{108}

Such a shift in power leads to the increased ability for Dasein to “be there”. Ignorance is no longer a sound excuse; in the age of social media, all one need to do is to intend their gaze at images in an actively involved way, a way that serves as a means of deterriorlalizing the gap between oneself and the others. Of course, in this dialectic, the influence of the affluent remains a very real factor, and as such, the heterological historian must seek to avoid falling victim to orchestrated images with ulterior intentions. This fear is most readily embodied by the damning example of the official social media account of Bashar-al Assad, which, despite the prevailing narrative of death and destruction currently emanating from Syria, depicts a president being supported by his subjects in a time of peace. Because the possibility of such a manipulation exists, and thus the advancement of potentially harmful narratives, Wyschogrod believes it is incumbent upon the heterological historian to reclaim the image for the realm of ethics.

3.8 The Rose That Grew From Concrete

Despite the perceived differences inherent in the subjective phenomenological experience of individual Dasein, the notion of empathy serves the important role in my thesis of establishing

\textsuperscript{108} Greenwald, Glenn
the mandate to relate ethically to others who are not us. One need look no further than the images detailing unspeakable travesties, such as those highlighting victims of drone strikes, in order to understand that the empathetic connection felt for a fellow Dasein who had the misfortune of being born into conditions of alterity is very real, and that the responsibility to shed light on the acceptance for conditions that allow Spirit to continue progressing through Hegel’s slaughter bench is of utmost importance. This means that our phenomenological inquiry has now taken us from objects of consciousness to considerations about a practice in ethics.

Ideally, once a Dasein has established their being-in-the-world’ness and gone about the steps necessary to begin living their own personal self-actualized life, they would arrive to the conclusion that others, who perhaps are not as fortunate as they, have similar aspirations of self-actualization. This may be clearly obvious to some, but it seems as though for the majority of people, such as Fukuyama, it is easier to just forgot about the others; in this land built upon pulling oneself up by one’s boot straps, it is only the Alpha that is revered. Moreover, once the Alpha has ascended the peak, they seem to be solely concerned with maintaining their coveted position, willingly sabotaging any who try to lay claim to their throne, while forgetting about the others who may never have had a chance to compete in the first place.

Once again, this seems to be the case with narratives such as Fukuyama’s *The End of History?*, which, rather than reading like the insightful truth expected from a person in his position, reads more like the blueprint to a defense strategy of ensconcing oneself in a position of power by propagating the power structure that afforded them their position. That is, rather than making any necessary changes to modify conditions that would ideally lead to the socio-political actualization of terms such as “freedom”, and “liberty”, those who control the narrative seem intent on attempting to maintain the status quo. This is readily seen in *The End of History?*, as Fukuyama
proclaims that Western liberalism is the political conclusion of the history of political, ideological conflict.

This seems like a relatively simple claim to make from the winning side of Western liberalism, but what if you are stuck digging for conflict minerals under the threat of violence? Fukuyama’s concept of “freedom” is simply too vague and besides. In a time when the nation long held as the hallmark of Western liberalism is home to thousands of social media users who use their respective accounts to display their lavish spending power, others use them to document the hundreds of thousands of dissatisfied Americans lining up to protest the perceived abuse of the financial infrastructure that propels Western liberalism.109

Following the mandates of Hegel’s spirit as searching for absolute, I assume that the ultimate goal of the human experience is some form of universal equality which actualizes in the form of a perfect nation. However, given the various ways in which history has repeatedly unfurled, the methods employed thus far entail counterintuitive approaches to achieve such a goal. That is, if Wyschogrod is correct, and there is in fact a systematic process of marginalization in effect, it would appear as though some potentially key pieces to the ultimate puzzle are being utterly ignored. For all we know, there may be a Dasein at this very point in time who has the potential to cure cancer, and yet, given the fact that they were thrown into a world of poverty and neglect, will never get a chance to so much as emptily intend the desire to be a molecular biologist, let alone fulfill that intentionality, for they will be too busy struggling to get buy. As Arendt notes, the life of action is dependent upon the life of contemplation, and vice versa, and if one is too busy simply working just to get by, they will never have the chance to sit back and contemplate what it means to live an actualized life. As a result, the task of the heterological historian takes on an added significance in the sense that it is their moral responsibility to ensure the conditions are one

109 Occupy Wall Street
day met in which *all* Dasein are able to partake in the spoils of Western liberalism, not solely those affluent enough to buy into it.

The problem is, who is going to care? In a capitalist society of PlayStations and reality TV, it is easy to get caught up in one’s own personal desires and ambitions, relegating those who were thrown into a less fortunate situation as somehow less than you or I. The prevailing notion seems to be to let them figure it out on their own, which is understandable, to an extent. If social psychology has taught us anything, it is that hedonistic adaptation dictates that people cannot simply be given things.\(^{110}\) This is not a point I am contesting. Rather, I am merely drawing attention to the fact that, as children, we are all told that change will never happen unless you try to bring about that change on your own; as Mahatma Gandhi once said, we must all be the change that you wish to see in the world.\(^{111}\)

The change that the heterological historian wishes to see is simple; the improvement of conditions for past, present, and future others. To preach to the end of history while others are still within the grips of a cataclysm, all the while denying that there exists such a state, is simply no longer an option. Take for example the infomercials on TV showing emaciated children in tears. Despite the precarious organization’s the ads are attached to, the message delivered by these dollar a day charities is quite clear; even with the prevalence of Western liberalism, there are people the world over who are struggling. It is a phenomenon that, thanks to the advent of various information channels, suffering can be seen through the images of the faces of others. In experiencing this “imaged” emphatic intentionality, ideally it should become evident that it is nothing short of greediness to continue along the path of self-actualization without taking the plight of the suffering others into account.

\(^{110}\) Lyubomirsky, Sonja  
\(^{111}\) Forbes
Ideal as this task may sound, it certainly is not new. Take for example Kant’s ethics of deontology.\footnote{White, Lewis Beck PG 39-42} In *The Foundations of The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant gives us examples of a failure of duty, to which he offers a rebuttal. For our purposes, we need only focus on the final two, the first of which poses the example of a person with a talent that, through cultivation, could make them useful to many people. Kant continues that rather than cultivate this talent, however, this person would revel in the mundane pleasures of life, essentially neglecting the gifts they have been given. Kant notes that this cannot be willed into a universal maxim, however, for in such a world where everybody resigns themselves to neglecting their gifts, nothing would essentially ever be accomplished, and thus, it is incumbent upon them to maximize their potential.

Additionally, Kant offers us the example of an individual who is living a well-off life. Kant notes that this individual is not concerned with the struggles of *the others*, and believes that each one should be left to be as happily as heaven wills or as they personally desire, and as such they will not concern themselves with their welfare or their assistance in their time of need. Clearly this last example is an explication of an unfortunately popular sentiment that has not only lasted for centuries, but is most obviously evident in many modern Western liberal societies today. Kant notes that, while this type of scenario could easily be willed into a law of nature, it is not ideal, for if everyone acted in accordance to this principle, no one would ever be available to comfort even the most well-off individual in a time of need.

For my purposes, what Kant offers with the categorical imperative is an ideal solution to this problem, noting that

If, then, there is to be a supreme practical principle and, with respect to the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one such that, from the representation of what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, it constitutes an objective
principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law.\textsuperscript{113} Kant believes this principle is grounded in the belief that rational nature exists as an end in itself, and I maintain that Dasein necessarily represents its being in this way. Kant notes that we represent our existence merely as a subjective action, however, since we are also Being-in-this-world with others, our actions have a cumulative objective effect, as per Heidegger’s for-the-sake-of-which and Arendt’s concept of the interconnected web. As such, we should behave in a way where the categorical imperative can be restated as the principle of humanity; that we act in a way that considers humanity solely as an end, and never solely as a means.

Using this modified principle of absolute ethical concern for humanity, I return to Kant’s scenarios, noting that in the former it is not enough that the actions we choose do not affect humanity negatively. That is, even if withholding our potential ability does lead to negative consequences, we must seek to harmonize our talents and our actions with the hopes of preventing others from ever being treated as a means.

More importantly, Kant notes that the natural end that all of humanity has is their own happiness. As such, Kant affirms that everyone must try, as far as their means permit, to further the ends of others. Kant notes that although humanity might subsist, as clearly it has, without the contribution of the advancement of the happiness of the others by not taking away from the means from which the others would ideally be advanced, this is merely a negative form of contribution to humanity as an end in itself. That is because, as Kant maintains, “the ends of a subject who is an end in itself must as far as possible be also my ends, if that representation is to have its full effect on me.”\textsuperscript{114}

\section*{3.9 Get Up, Stand Up, Don’t Give Up The Fight: Life is Your Right}

\textsuperscript{113} White, Lewis Beck
\textsuperscript{114} Lewis White Beck
In *The Body As Object And Mechanistic Physiology*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers his belief that in communicating, we find our own subjective differences through which we are able to discover that each one of us is in fact constituted differently as Dasein with different perspectives to offer the world and each other. Although I accept this premise, I modify it in the sense that, much like Kant proposed, in acknowledging our differences, we find that we all ultimately share one thing in common; the desire to live a happy life. But why stop there? From a deontological perspective, it would appear as though if one desires to live a self-actualized life, it further seems that the limits of any human’s progression will always be bound to the limits of each and every one of the others’ ability to lead the same life as well. In a more altruistic sense, once the heterological historian has ideally reached a position in life where they are fortunate enough to have fulfilled the essential levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, it is incumbent upon them to help the others get to at least to an equal level.

Therefore, we will accept the supreme practical principle as that which calls for helping the others achieve eudemonia. As Arendt says, the active life essentially works to serve the ends of contemplation, and that it is only natural that the active life is described by those who themselves followed the contemplative way of life aligned with a life of actions. This supreme practical principle calls for those fortunate enough to be in a position to follow their own respective path to eudemonia to leave the comforting shores of the contemplative life and embark upon the waters of the active life in order for the others to be able to begin living the life of harmonizing contemplation and ethical action. Ideally, this is where the heterological historian would insert themselves into the world through both action and art by putting forth the claim: what is here was as such, but it could have been otherwise.
Chapter 4: My Name is Peace This is my Hour, Can I Get Just a Little More Power?

4.1 Art of Subconscious Illusion

In *Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism*, Paul Katsafanas begins his enquiry by posing the question “How can we justify normative claims about what there is reason to do, such as ‘there is reason not to lie,’ or ‘you should not murder’?” In response, Katsafanas introduces *constitutivism*, which claims that action has a certain structural feature that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. Essentially, Katsafanas claims, the authority of normative claims arise from the bare fact that we are agents.\(^{115}\)

Katsafanas proceeds to expand on this basic definition by introducing his own version of constitutivism, which employs an examination of the structure of human motivation by way of philosophical psychology in hopes of showing that action, in fact, has a constitutive aim that ultimately generates conclusions about what there is reason to do. In order to do so, Katsafanas relies on a Nietzschean interpretation of power, noting that, despite Nietzsche’s views on ethics, power maintains a privileged normative status in Nietzschean philosophy, as we are committed to it simply by virtue of acting. Essentially, Katsafanas argues that Nietzsche’s view that all actions manifest and are to be evaluated in terms of “will to power” is an attempt to move from a claim about the essential nature of action or willing to a claim about value. As a result, Katsafanas argues that Nietzsche uses a claim about the constitutive features of action to derive a standard of success for action.\(^{116}\)

Katsafanas claims that the Nietzschean version of constitutivism is predicated off the understanding that our actions are motivated by the distinctive psychological state known as *the*
drive. Katsafanas maintains that since our actions are motivated by the drive, actions are thus constitutively motivated at overcoming resistance. Katsafanas asserts that whenever we will an end, we aim to not only achieve the end, but also to encounter and overcome any resistance that arise in the process. Katsafanas affirms that this process can be used to ground normative conclusions about what there is reason to do.\textsuperscript{117}

Katsafanas proceeds to justify Nietzsche’s claim that power alone has a privileged normative status by first introducing Nietzsche’s view that we must engage in a “revaluation of all values”, in hopes of arriving at a presupposed principle which is itself exempt from revaluation. For Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche, this principle is the will to power. As Katsafanas affirms, however, the problem is Nietzsche himself endorses claims about value that call power’s privileged status into question, citing Nietzsche’s claims that “there are altogether no moral facts”, and that “there are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena.” Rather, Nietzsche is wont to say that that value is merely created by human activities.\textsuperscript{118}

Katsafanas offers three claims that Nietzsche accepts in regards to value, the first of which being that power has a privileged normative status, that there are no objective values, or objective facts about what is valuable, and lastly that all values are created by human activity. As Katsafanas claims, however, the problem of establishing a normative status in Nietzschean terms still remains, for if there are no objective values, and all values are created, why should power maintain a privileged status?

4.2 A Toast to The Dead

In order to solve this paradox, Katsafanas introduces constitutivism, which essentially states that there are reasons for action that arise merely from the fact that one is an agent. In order

\textsuperscript{117} Katsafanas, Paul
\textsuperscript{118} Katsafanas, Paul
to clarify this claim, Katsafanas gives the example of the “phenomenon” of a chess game. Katsafanas notes that it is simply not enough to move one’s pieces around the board in accordance to the rules of the game. Rather, Katsafanas affirms that one must also have the aim of achieving checkmate in mind, or else one is not really playing a game of chess. As a result, Katsafanas cites that the aim of checkmate is non-optional for chess players, claiming that “if you are playing chess, then you have the aim.”

Katsafanas proceeds to demonstrate that the aim of checkmate can be altered by outside influences and factors, but it cannot be entirely neglected. In order to demonstrate this point, Katsafanas introduces the example of playing a game of chess with a child. Katsafanas demonstrates how, despite the fact that the inevitable attainment of achieving checkmate may be delayed in an attempt to teach the child how to play chess, the ultimate aim of achieving checkmate cannot be entirely discarded, or else one will not really be playing chess. Rather, as Katsafanas claims, one would be engaged in a more complex task, namely teaching how to teach a child how to play chess, which has an entirely different constitutive aim.

In an attempt to further clarify a constitutive aim, Katsafanas offers the following criteria:

Let A be a type of attitude or event. Let G be a goal. The A constitutively aims at G if and only if

(i) each token of A aims at G, and

(ii) aiming at G is part of what constitutes an attitude or event as a token of A.

To clarify, Katsafanas offers the example of A being the attitude of belief and G being truth. According to Katsafanas, belief thus has a constitutive aim at truth if and only if each token of belief aims at truth and aiming at truth is what constitutes an attitude as belief. In order to

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119 Katsafanas, Paul
establish the importance of constitutive aims, Katsafanas notes that they offer a standard of success. That is, as Katsafanas claims, if the purpose of chess is checkmate, then the level to which checkmate is achieved will dictate the level of success enjoyed by the individual achieving checkmate. Furthermore, as per the aforementioned views on intentionality, Katsafanas asserts that various aims may interact and modify one another. Continuing on the chess example, Katsafanas claims that while a particular move may serve to promote checkmate, while another may promote a more rewarding experience, the player may have reason to choose the latter.

According to Katsafanas, constitutive aims are important in that they generate intrinsic, non-optional standards of success. As a result, Katsafanas notes that if an action has a constitutive aim, then that aim will be present in every instance of action. As a result, we are given a non-optional standard of assessment for action that applies simply in virtue of something being an action. As a result, Katsafanas affirms that Nietzsche’s views on will to power show that power is the constitutive aim of willing (emphasis mine).\(^{120}\)

As a result, Katsafanas believes that Nietzsche’s views on will to power essentially offer a constitutivist argument for power. That is, as has been shown, there is some aim, power, that is involved in every scenario of willing. Therefore, Katsafanas believes that, granting the logical form of the argument, Nietzsche has a valid claim that power has a privileged normative status. Most importantly, Katsafanas asserts that Nietzsche does not have to rely on the claim that power is an objective value, for as previously shown, power is simply the standard of success by which willing is measured. Therefore, Katsafanas claims that Nietzsche grounds power’s privileged status in incapacity: it is the one value that cannot be given up, insofar as one is engaged in willing. As a result, Katsafanas asserts that Nietzsche has clarified any misconceptions that originally arose from his three views that power has a privileged normative status, that there are no objective moral

\(^{120}\) Katsafanas, Paul
values, and that values are created.  

4.3  I’m Livin’ in the 21st Century Doing Something Mean to it

In order to defend this view, Katsafanas believes it is important to defend two presuppositions inherent in establishing this claim, the former being a conceptual claim, the latter an empirical one. Specifically, Katsafanas first highlights the nature of the drive, noting that its structure dictates any drive-motivated action will in fact have the constitutive aim of overcoming resistance. Katsafanas notes that drives are motivational states that aim at their own continuous expression. Furthermore, aiming at continuous expression entails aiming to encounter resistances to overcome, as per the will to power. As a result, Katsafanas concludes that drive-motivated activities aim at encountering and overcoming resistance. Therefore, as per the previously established definition of constitutive aim, Katsafanas affirms that drive-motivated activities have the constitutive aim of overcoming resistance.  

In regards to the latter, Katsafanas seeks to validate Nietzsche’s view that all human actions are drive-motivated, as this will anchor the claim that human action has the constitutive aim of overcoming resistance. In order to solidify this point, Katsafanas relies on Nietzsche’s take on the nature of satisfaction, which affirms that the nature of human satisfaction indicates that human actions are drive motivated. As a result, Katsafanas establishes the first premise in Nietzsche’s argument:

(A) There is no state such that being in that state provides lasting satisfaction.  

In contrast to various utilitarian philosophers, Katsafanas claims that Nietzsche believes it is not the utilitarian conception of happiness as an experiential state that is the issue, but rather the issue of happiness as a state. Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche notes that Nietzsche rejects the

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121 Katsafanas, Paul
122 Katsafanas, Paul
123 Katsafanas, Paul
state-based conception of happiness, claiming that it is not a state at all. Rather,
Katsafanas-reading-Nietzsche claims that happiness obtains when engaged in efficacious pursuit
of a goal, not when we attain the goal. Katsafanas asserts that we think we are satisfied by stasis, by
being in a state of having attained some goal, but that we are really satisfied by successful activity,
by actively seeking and attaining goals. Katsafanas highlights that claim by setting forth the
argument that:

(B) There are processes such that engaging in those processes provides lasting
satisfaction 124

That is, Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche dictates that there are processes such that
engaging in said process provides satisfaction so long as the process lasts. Furthermore,
Katsafanas claims that this view is supported by recent empirical work in psychological research
that claims human beings are most satisfied when engaged in activities that provide them with
challenges that are neither too easy nor too difficult. Specifically, Katsafanas claims that
“enjoyment appears at the boundary between boredom and anxiety, when challenges are just
balanced with the person’s capacity to act.”125

As a result, Katsafanas asserts that the conditions of human satisfaction have a decidedly
odd structure in that humans desire to achieve certain ends, and are satisfied when doing so, yet not
so when the ends are met. As Katsafanas’-reading-Nietzsche claims, we aim to engage in the
process of encountering and overcoming resistances in the pursuit of ends, for humans are
motivated by drives. Katsafanas asserts that drives aim at their own expression, and take objects
solely as an occasion for expression. Furthermore, Katsafanas notes that the attainment of objects
does not satisfy the drive; only the performance of the drive’s characteristic form of activity serves

124 Katsafanas, Paul
125 Katsafanas, Paul
as a means of satisfaction.¹²⁶

4.4 Justice Could Just be Clearing a Path For People to Dream Properly

Katsafanas posits that, using this Nietzschean model, the standard of success to generate ethical claims manifests in two different ways, the first of which being the view that we have reason to seek actions that afford resistance. Per this view, Katsafanas notes that two prescriptions must first be taken into account. First, the action an agent chooses is dependent upon facts of their capacities and psychological makeup. That is, Katsafanas believes that an individual has reason to pursue those activities that afford difficulties that can be overcome, but not so difficult that they cannot be overcome.

Secondly, Katsafanas notes that the results are dependent on an individual’s environment, affirming that the particular course of action that constitute the highest realization of will to power differ according to the circumstances an agent finds themselves in. Katsafanas reminds us that this has had varied success throughout history, particularly in regards to historical epochs in which the highest expression of will to power manifested itself in physical violence and subjugation of one’s enemies. As Katsafanas ascertains, it is important not to filter Nietzsche, who was well aware that an implication of his view is the fact that, under certain pre-societal conditions, the flourishing human being will be the one who engages in the most horrific acts of oppression and subjugation. Katsafanas affirms, however, that Nietzsche’s view does not condone such behavior, but rather calls upon individuals to engage in artistic creation, the pursuit of self-understanding, and the willingness to engage in suffering to achieve one’s goals.¹²⁷

Katsafanas proceeds to assert that Nietzsche does not believe power is the only value affecting perception and deliberation, nor that it should be. Rather, Nietzsche affirms that new

¹²⁶ Katsafanas, Paul
¹²⁷ Katsafanas, Paul
values should be created, using the will to power as a “principle of reevaluation”. As a result, Katsafanas affirms that this reading lends itself to the view

…that facts about which actions we have reason to perform are determined not only by the degree of resistance that the potential actions afford, but also by facts about the relationship between potential actions and our values; however, these values must in some way be vetted by the standard of will to power.¹²⁸

Katsafanas claims that an agent’s values constrain and influence their behavior. Therefore, Katsafanas asserts that the agent’s values will interact with action’s constitutive standard, which in turn generate claims about which acts there is reason to perform, and ipso fact, the agent’s values as well.¹²⁹

Katsafanas maintains, however, that Nietzsche’s ethical theory requires that we assess potential acts along three dimensions, the first being the extent to which the act would present opportunities for encountering and overcoming resistance. The second of these dimensions should determine whether an act is permitted, recommended, or forbidden by the other values we embrace. Lastly, Katsafanas affirms that the extent to which the values derived from the second assertion should be compatible with the will to power. Through this, Katsafanas asserts that normative results can be generated.¹³⁰

4.5 The Message And The Money

It would appear as though, through Katsafanas, the heterological historian is now able to establish normative claims from the non-space of ethics instantiated upon them by the cataclysm. From this non-space, the heterological historian, citing past instances of subjugation and injustice, can ideally make value claims based of what they believe ought to be done to preserve the memory

¹²⁸ Katsafanas, Paul
¹²⁹ Katsafanas, Paul
¹³⁰ Katsafanas, Paul
of past, present, and future dead others. That is, citing a Nietzschean interpretation of constitutivism, the heterological historian can anchor their normative claim that “it ought not to have been thus.”

In that respect, the heterological historian can begin by making the normative claim that, in as far as one has satisfied certain levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, one is morally obligated to take into consideration the plight of the others. More specifically, as per Katsafanas’ above mentioned clarification on Nietzsche’s views one will to power, one is morally required to take up, amongst other things, artistic creation. In that regard, the heterological historian would ideally be called to insert themselves in to the world via various forms of artistic expression, such as photography, music, or artwork, to name a few, as a means by which they promote the plight of the dead others, all while avoiding the pre-established pitfalls of apathy, fascism, et cetera. In doing so, ideally the heterological historian would begin to open windows from which the plight of the others can enter the stream of consciousness of those who otherwise would never have heard of them or their struggle had it not been made aware to them.

Take for example the musician Felipe Andres Coronel, better known by his stage name Immortal Technique. Aside from using profits from his record sales to promote various social causes, such as building an orphanage for children in Kabul, Afghanistan, Coronel has used his position as an influential musician in the hip-hop community to promote awareness towards the plight of the others. In one particular instance, Coronel was filmed at a Freedom for Palestine benefit concert, where Coronel proceeds to recite lyrics to his song Toast to the Dead, stating:

Here’s a toast to the dead… for the freedom fighter killed by the Feds, for those who died hard in the streets soaking in red… A toast to the dead for those that I’ve forgotten,

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131 Wyschogrod, Edith xvii
132 Farooq, Sajid
written out of history by the corrupted and rotten. Black saints whitewashed during La
Reconquista. Thousands of Indios, Spaniards used to conquer the Incas… Long live
those who came before me, the warriors and the scientists that came before slavery…
Here’s a toast to the dead for all of my fam, I’ll never let an idea die with a man… But
some of you won’t survive the changes the earth makes, swallowed up by tsunamis
hurricanes and earthquakes. And that’s just the first stage of ‘you can’t reverse ways’,
and realize that we are one, regardless of our birthplace.

After concluding, Coronel proceeds to discuss how, following the attacks on the Twin Towers, he
was approached by various individuals asking if he was sure he wanted to continue supporting
Palestine. Coronel responds by stating

I won’t allow you to demonize these people. I won’t allow you to play the video from
1992 and tell me that those children were cheering the towers fall when you threw candy
to them ten years ago in the streets, you lying sons of bitches… I won’t let you use it as a
tool to divide Christian Palestinians and Muslim Palestinians…

Through his actions and words, Coronel is not only employing various tools of the
heterological historian, such as a leeriness towards the manipulation of photographs and the
overall intent such a manipulation hopes to establish, but is also responding to Nietzsche’s beliefs
that one need engage themselves in artistic creation. Furthermore, as the level of his commitment
towards promoting the plight of the others would dictate, Coronel is also willing to engage in the
suffering necessary to achieve one’s goals. What the process of Coronel’s self-discovery is
certainly a personal issue, but that is not the matter at hand.

Rather, the focus lies in the fact that, beginning with the normative claim that one is
morally required to take into account the plight of the others, the heterological historian now has
the means by which to challenge those who are undecided to take action. That is, if the world truly is filled with only two kinds of people, those who do harm and those who see harm and do nothing, the heterological historian is now able to anchor the catch twenty-two that, refusing to partake in the alleviation of needless suffering is to willingly partake in its perpetuation, as dictated by tacit consent.

Take for example Katsafanas’ instance of deciding to watch television as opposed to working on a difficult philosophical problem, as opposed of the opposite. Katsafanas notes that, while continuing to work on the problem offers the most resistance, and thus satisfies Nietzsche’s demands, given the fact that he has worked on the philosophy problem for several hours, to sit back and watch television is not really a bad thing. The problem really arises when dealing with extended periods of time, such as if he were to decide to simply continue relaxing, and ultimately completely stop working on the problem. In a move reminiscent of Kant, Katsafanas proceeds to show how, in the long run, one generally has more reason to perform the action that better fulfills the constitutive aim. Furthermore, Katsafanas claims that it is not the weight of the constitutive-aim derived reasons that generate this normative conclusion, but rather their *ubiquity* and *pervasiveness*.\(^{133}\) In heterological terms, it is not so much that the personal leisure afforded by watching television that is to blame, rather it is that the overall amount of needless suffering that needs attention.

Harkening back to Heidegger’s views on for-the-sake-of-which, imagine a world in which Coronel decided not to rap. In the Hegelian sense, *perhaps* somebody would have come along and taken his place, but in a more phenomenological sense, Coronel’s own personal subjective experience could never be duplicated, and thus, neither his own personal impact. So while another rapper may have come along to speak a similar message, the lack of rappers lining up to build

\(^{133}\) Katsafanas, Paul
orphanages before Coronel leads one to believe that they most likely would never have had the same impact that he has. Furthermore, assume an adolescent child, who has never heard of the struggle in the Middle East, is hearing Coronel’s views for the first time. Maybe they will have learned of the struggle later on in life, or perhaps they never would have been turned onto the plight of Palestinians, who knows. What is certain, however, is that had Coronel not dedicated so much time and effort to bringing awareness to the cause, the unfortunate Palestinian who was rendered voiceless would continue to do so until someone did.

4.6 Homeland And Hip-Hop

Moreover, in light of Katsafanas’ claims, Fukuyama’s views on the end of history become decidedly more burdened, namely in regards to Nietzsche’s views on the will to power. For one, although Fukuyama is not necessarily making a normative claim, in stating that history has come to an end, he is establishing an arbitrary standard. And much like Nietzsche’s views on morality, Fukuyama’s claim is one that can easily be called into question by the will to power; a two front process that questions both Fukuyama’s and the heterological historian’s claims.

That is, Fukuyama’s claim can clearly be defended by the will to power. As alluded to earlier, Katsafanas notes that the results of will to power are dependent on an individual’s environment, and that the highest realization of will to power differ according to the circumstances an agent finds themselves in. This is particularly difficult when the will to power is manifested by individuals in the position of power, for as Katsafanas reminds us, this expression of will to power manifested itself in physical violence and subjugation. As Katsafanas-reading-Nietzsche ascertains, the flourishing human being will be the one who engages in the most horrific acts of oppression and subjugation.\textsuperscript{134} That said, given the previously established critique that it is in the nature of those in power to try and remain in power by any means necessary, it would appear as

\textsuperscript{134} Katsafanas, Paul
though, given the various conditions of subjugation the others still find themselves in despite the incursion of Western liberalism, Fukuyama’s intentions, as altruistic as they perhaps may have been, are disingenuous at best.

4.7 Bullet With Butterfly Wings

Specifically, if Western liberalism in its current state truly is the end all, how is it possible that others, particularly those already enmeshed in Western liberalism, are still being subjugated? In this respect, as Katsafanas believes, Nietzsche was not concerned with establishing power as the sole value of legitimacy, and as such, leaves open the possibility for new values to be formed. While Fukuyama’s argument is not ethically driven, In The End of History?, we do see him try, and fail, to establish a privileged claim of his own, namely that history has come to an end by way of the fall of the Berlin Wall. As Katsafanas maintains, Nietzsche requires that we assess potential acts along three dimensions before accepting them as new values. Instead of focusing on Western liberalism as a whole, it will suffice to focus on a particular instance, which, in conformity to Fukuyama’s standard, will be the access to consumer culture.

As Katsafanas-reading-Nietzsche notes, to make a value claim is simply to state an object of valuing. That is, to say that access to consumer culture is a value is merely to say that one values access to consumer culture. Furthermore, valuing consumer culture has a certain kind of affective response, and that certain kinds of judgments can be made about valuing consumer culture, both of which are dependent upon the type of object or state of affairs being valued. As alluded to earlier, Katsafanas proceeds to assert that an agent’s values, in this instance, Fukuyama’s valuing of access to consumer culture, constrains and influences their behavior, and that an agent’s values will interact with the constitutive action, which in turn generate claims about which acts there are
reason to perform. 135

In regards to Fukuyama, it clear to see that he satisfies all three of these requirements. Not only has Fukuyama’s valuing of access to consumer culture led him to declare the end of history, satisfying the affective response criteria, it also serves as the standard for success of Western liberalism, and as a result the level of access to consumer culture afforded to an individual in question also satisfies Nietzsche’s judgment criteria. In turn, both of these requisites are simply byproducts of the state of affairs being valued, namely access to consumer culture. That is, if Fukuyama values access to consumer culture, then it stands to reason that his standard of success is the degree to which Western liberalism has afforded the opportunity.

In terms of Nietzsche’s ethical theory, Fukuyama’s beliefs that access to consumer culture signals the victory of Western liberalism in its essential form seem to be prima facie justified. For one, valuing the material goods produced by consumer culture clearly present opportunities for encountering and overcoming resistance. One need look no further than various instances citing the traditional American ideal that with enough hard work and dedication, someone with nothing can make something out of themselves in the land of opportunity. Furthermore, there seems to be no reason why valuing access to consumer culture should not be valued; in fact, both the nature of the Western liberal economy and innovation almost certainly dictate that one continually purchase items in order to keep the system afloat. Lastly, when seen through the perspective of Western liberalism, it is quite clear that access to consumer culture does not interfere with the will to power. In fact, in a society that values consumer goods, it seems justified to claim that the higher the level of access to consumer goods an individual has, the higher level of power they have.

When further inspected, however, Fukuyama’s values do not completely conform to Nietzsche’s criteria. For one, as alluded to earlier, Katsafanas’ constitutivism mandates that the

135 Katsafanas, Paul
prerequisites implemented upon an individual by a belief structure aiming for normative value must be psychologically grounded on their facticity and psychological makeup. That is, not only must the others in question have the infrastructure and support necessary to overcome resistances prohibiting them from benefiting from the access to consumer culture, it must be a resistance that is within their means to be overcome, or else risk being unsatisfied. Ideally, while this is an attainable goal for some, it is not readily available for all.

Take for example the hypothetical individuals Jose and Maria, who serve the role of DeParle’s concern for individuals from affluent families having a better opportunity than those from less advantaged background. In this instance, Jose comes from an affluent home owning family that, through trust funds, college funds, and parental presence, were able to secure a stable future for their son, who ultimately was able to attend an ivy league university. Maria, on the other hand, was born to a single mother who works two jobs and rents an apartment in a crime riddled neighborhood and, despite the fact that she was able to attend a state college, had to rely on student loans to graduate.

After graduating college, both Maria and Jose returned home with their parents to begin their respective careers. While both individuals were afforded similar opportunities, intuition dictates that Jose already has a leg up on Maria in the sense that he has a secure foundation from which to build upon. Thanks to his parents’ hard work, Jose does not have to worry about student loans, a mortgage, or any other mandate that is a byproduct of Western liberalism. Conversely, while Maria was at least able to move her mother out of her previous neighborhood, she still has to worry about paying rent, paying student loans, and various other expenses inherent in Western liberalism.

While it is not entirely impossible that Maria pay off her student loans and attain a higher
level of upward mobility, amongst other things, as has been shown, this is no longer as readily available as it used to be. So while Jose is able to continue partaking in the privileges afforded by a higher level of access to consumer goods, Maria is stuck floundering to get by. Furthermore, in continuing our example, we find that Maria is clearly attempting to partake in Western liberalism. Given her throwcity, however, it seems evident that she may never be able to achieve the same level of power as Jose.

Lastly, the sheer efficacy of material goods as valuable can be called into question through the will to power. While it is easy for some to say that “diverse contents” such as color televisions and rock music are hallmarks of the triumph of Western liberalisms success, these values can easily be inverted. That is, to say access to consumer culture is the hallmark of Western liberalism is a rather objective claim. Others, who may be less inclined to material goods, would argue things such as actual freedom, actual liberty, and actual equality, amongst others, are a better indicator. As such, it is clear that Western liberalism, contrary to Fukuyama’s assertion, can in fact still be expanded upon, explicitly by simply coalescing with the examples alluded to above, and perhaps more difficulty by providing a system which makes it easier for people to establish themselves, and thus truly enjoy the benefits of Western liberalism.

Furthermore, as Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche dictates, happiness is not an experiential state. As per Katsafanas, material goods afforded by consumer culture are simply objects of a drives; temporary goals that are the expression of drives. Conversely, an aim manifests drives in a distinctive form of activity. As has been shown, drives aim at expression, and are not satisfied by the attainment of any one determinate object. Instead, drives aim at the continuous attainment of objects and overcoming of resistances. Using Katsafanas’ example, there seems to be nothing

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136 I recall specifically an instance as an undergraduate in ethics class where the professor, after having asked what things the class valued most, responded “That’s how you know you’re in a philosophy class.” after there was no mention to material objects.
particularly important about running a predetermined amount of miles, yet for the marathon runner, the reward is in the actual process of overcoming the resistance intrinsic to running twenty-six miles.\textsuperscript{137}

In Fukuyama’s defense, it could argued that continuously buying into the ever evolving innovations afforded by Western liberalism, and putting forth the amount of work necessary to afford them, could in itself be considered both the aim and the drive of an individual inclined to consumer goods, with the purchasing of new objects being the expression of both. Whereas the marathon runner enjoys the overcoming of resistance by manifesting their will to power through endurance running, the consumer gains pleasure in the state achieved when hours of hard work and dedication manifest themselves in the form of a new color television.

The problem with this interpretation, however, is that it falls victim to yet another empirically sound psychological principle of the \textit{hedonic treadmill}, which holds that both good and bad events only temporarily affect happiness, with individuals quickly reverting to hedonic neutrality.\textsuperscript{138} In \textit{Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society}, Philip Brickman and D.T. Campbell posit that happiness and unhappiness are short-lived reactions to changes in people’s circumstances, and that people continue to pursue happiness because they falsely believe that a greater form of happiness is lying in wait. That said, while one ideally would experience a state of happiness when buying into varying mandates of Western liberalism, as has been shown, this happiness, unlike that prescribed by Nietzsche, is ephemeral at best.

Furthermore, this interpretation would also be running afoul of Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche’s view, which holds that intellectual, artistic, and creative endeavors are to be valued above all. As previously alluded to, this critique is best elucidated by Arendt, who believes the

\textsuperscript{137} Katsafanas, Paul
\textsuperscript{138} Brickman, P., & Campbell, D. T.
highest form of freedom is the ability to insert oneself into the world through both speech and
action. That is, it is not much the ability to simply buy into Western liberalism that is of
importance, but rather to do so through a means that empowers the individual to express their
subjective uniqueness, as opposed to having to labor for the given product. While it can be argued
that Western liberalism fosters the environment through which a successful artist, who is in high
demand, can in fact manage to buy into Western liberalism with the means afforded by their
artistic ventures, but such a scenario would certainly be the exception, not the rule. What is needed,
then, is an expanded form of Western liberalism that allows all individuals who desire to
contribute in ways other than labor and work, regardless of their level of success, to buy in to the
luxuries afforded by Western liberalism.

4.8 I’m Relying on Your Common Decency: So Far It Hasn’t Surfaced, But I’m Sure it Exists

In returning to Wyschogrod, we find her asking the question of whether it is possible to
shape a community of shared experience in the wake of the cataclysm. Furthermore, Wyschogrod asks what role the heterological historian plays in refiguring social existence always already disfigured by the cataclysm. Wyschogrod notes that the role of the heterological historian can only come to light as they react and respond to conflicting conceptions of communal life and situates [themselves] in dynamic relationship to them.

For Wyschogrod, the context of this enquiry is formulated around the framework of both
classical and contemporary views of community. Specifically, Wyschogrod names the
autochthony of Plato, which holds that communal bonds are strongest when engendered by
emergence from common soil, and modern accounts which are grounded in relations of production

\[139\] Wyschogrod, Edith PG 216
\[140\] Wyschogrod, Edith PG 218
and exchange, noting that both of these forms follow a structure of immanence. Contrarily, Wyschogrod asks if the heterological historian can formulate a community predicated on the existence of an incommensurable outside that is neither a rhetorical convention of transcendence nor ecstasy. That is, Wyschogrod is concerned with whether a community which transcends and fissures the immanent models of community presented above can ever be formed post-cataclysm, a community that does not strive to poeticize the past, nor offer an ethereal promise of fraternity.  

In order to establish this notion of community, Wyschogrod employs Jean Paul Sartre’s views on totalization, which, following the model of modernity discussed above, holds that the establishment of a phenomenological community is contingent upon the formation of a common consciousness of its members. As Wyschogrod-reading-Sartre notes, Sartre, in response to the French Revolution, envisioned a collective group of individuals unknowingly united in a common telos.

As Wyschogrod posits, however, the eventual drawback in Sartre’s view is both the inevitable ossification once the original passions that created it have cooled, as well as remaining a community based on production. Wyschogrod believes this model is unsuitable for the heterological historian’s purpose. Rather, Wyschogrod affirms that a de-nucleation of the self-coupled with a relation to exteriority is necessary for her vision of a heterological community to come into being. As Wyschogrod notes, the link with exteriority inaugurates a community other than that of production, the community of hospitality. As Wyschogrod notes, even in this heterological community, production is inevitable. Wyschogrod asks, however, if there is not some form of production that is gratuitous, workless, and resists ensnarement by the culture of images? Furthermore, Wyschogrod likens this type of community to a piece of artwork, noting that

141 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 218
value would originate in something other than labor.  

Wyschogrod posits that this type of community would serve to offer a self-temporalized future, manifested as hope, which would serve as a gift that individuals with no-thing in common could offer one another. In light of the cataclysm, however, Wyschogrod notes that hope must be re-evaluated so as not to serve as a mockery of that which cannot be spoken. Wyschogrod notes that this radical rethinking of hope requires a reasonable expectation of happiness, in the manner of either eudemonistic ethics or political utopian philosophy. Furthermore, Wyschogrod affirms that this gift be assessed in terms of it gratuitousness on the one hand, and its inevitable involvement in the sphere of economy on the other.

In order to solidify the efficacy of these claims, Wyschogrod begins by further analyzing the two models of community previously established, beginning with autochthony. Wyschogrod notes that, despite the overwhelming evidence of mass exodus from areas of mass killings and severe economic hardships, the myth of humans being from the earth has not disappeared. Rather, the notion of autochthony has only further served to establish proprietary claims that routinely result in fierce local wars.

Tracing its Platonic roots, Wyschogrod proceeds to note that, despite Plato and Aristotle’s views on the State and community, the heterological historian can scant afford to incorporate either. Wyschogrod shifts to Aristotle’s notion of friendship, claiming that despite the perceived self-regarding nature of Aristotle’s formulation, friendship is predicated upon facilitating the good life of the individual citizen. That is, Wyschogrod-reading-Aristotle maintains that friendship recurs to that which is good in relation to oneself; wanting to be who one is, being in harmony with oneself, concentration of soul, and consistency in choosing pleasures and pains. Wyschogrod notes

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142 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 219
143 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 219
144 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 220
that these qualities, which enable one to do what is best for oneself, should also be wished for and fostered in the friend who is a version of oneself.\textsuperscript{145}

Wyschogrod notes, however, that for Aristotle, the meaning of friendship differs from the traditional Greek meaning of an attraction between two human beings. Rather, Wyschogrod affirms that for Aristotle, the definition of friendship is a community of love, and as a result, that it is better to give love than to receive it. For Wyschogrod, this signifies a break in the self-serving thrust of Aristotle’s views on eudemonia. That is, rather than aiming solely for their own happiness, Wyschogrod-reading-Aristotle posits that one should wish others well for the other’s sake and for one’s own. For Wyschogrod, this is not a consequentialist outcome, but rather a deontological one, where good is done simply for its own sake, not for benefit.\textsuperscript{146}

However, the issues remains for Wyschogrod that production is in humanity’s essence. Wyschogrod notes that in the modern overturning of classical views on community, production took hold as the foundation of community. Citing Jean-Luc Nancy, Wyschogrod affirms that, despite the hope for a community free of class division, the very notion of human’s as producers caused Marxism to founder, for inevitably, they would continue to fall victim to “tecnhopolitical” domination.\textsuperscript{147} Wyschogrod notes that while this formulation of community was modified to include humanity as an essence, it still fell victim to what Nancy referred to as an essence that circulates as “economic, political, and technological production within a locked totality, and ‘immanent’ without essence that is ‘the general horizon of our time.”\textsuperscript{148}

In response, Wyschogrod introduces a Sartrian interpretation of community, which argues that the mode of production is basic to the determination of social structure, and the only reason

\textsuperscript{145} Wyschogrod, Edith PG 224  
\textsuperscript{146} Wyschogrod, Edith PG 224  
\textsuperscript{147} Wyschogrod, Edith PG 226  
\textsuperscript{148} Wyschogrod, Edith PG 226
social fragmentation and alienated atomized individuals ever took hold in the first place was because of a reaction to a post-Stalinist communist and capitalist world immediately following World War II. For Wyschogrod-reading-Sartre, this was only made possible due to the lack of access both culture and society had to the information culture.\textsuperscript{149}

In that respect, Wyschogrod notes that for Sartre, the community is a byproduct of \textit{totalization}, what she affirms as the open-ended process of human life as it is lived historically. Wyschogrod notes that Sartre distinguished between \textit{totality} and totalization, the former simply being a heuristic tool that acts both as an individual piece, distinct from the sum of parts, as well as a self-relation determined by its relationship of its parts among itself. Furthermore, Wyschogrod notes that each individual embodies the totality in a kind of macrocosmic-microcosmic parallelism. In other words, for Sartre, the individuals functions in relation to the universal as both part and whole, the relationship of which is predicated upon a reliance of one upon the other.\textsuperscript{150}

For Wyschogrod, this serves as a critique of dialectical reason that could only have arisen out of a post-Hegelian post-Stalinist world; a critique of an internalized and chronic alienation. Wyschogrod, citing Sartre, states that

[The individual’s] free activity in its freedom, will take upon everything that crushes him - exhausting work, exploitation, oppression, and rising prices… His liberty is the means chosen by the Thing and by the Other to crush him and to transform him into a worked Thing.\textsuperscript{151}

Wyschogrod notes that, despite its bleakness, Sartre’s insight offers a sliver of hope, for through totalization enters the wedge into the creation of community. Citing Sartre, Wyschogrod declares that only now can we have critique in its etymological sense as that which can “set limits to the

\textsuperscript{149} Wyschogrod, Edith PG 227
\textsuperscript{150} Wyschogrod, Edith PG 227
\textsuperscript{151} Wyschogrod, Edith PG 229
scope of totalizing activities in order to restore to them their validity.”

Essentially, this setting of limits is tantamount to a reevaluation of the traditionally held values of a post-World War II society. Wyschogrod notes that, despite its perceived drawbacks, need plays an important role in this process, as it serves as a means by which the “indigence of the tout autre opens out into production.” Wyschogrod claims that, according to Sartre, “Everything is to be explained through need.” Rather than a desire for material goods, however, Sartre’s need is read more in lines of the will to power, where “In its most primal form, need is the indigence of an organism, hunger, and its relief.” As per Wyschogrod’s reading of Sartre, need is the “natural” grounding for that which is most fundamental to social existence, economic scarcity.

Wyschogrod posits that, rather than a static state, scarcity is dynamic relation between human beings and the environment, and that human labor serves to satisfy needs in a material field of scarcity. Wyschogrod believes that it is scarcity, as dictated by historical events, that is inherently responsible for the sense that the other is a threat, thus making violence possible. This insight, Wyschogrod asserts, is key to Sartre’s belief that the transformation of one economic and political life is necessary to ensure the end of violence created by socially or naturally created scarcities.

For Sartre, this is overcome by the merging of a common consciousness, one which fills the void created by the unorganized collectivity of individuals which “makes itself into a community by feeling individual need as a common need, and by projecting itself… towards objectives that it

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152 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 229
153 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 230
154 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 230
155 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 230
156 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 230
produces in common.”  In order to demonstrate the efficacy of this example, Wyschogrod-reading-Sartre claims that this cohesion of community and common consciousness was personified during the French Revolution. Wyschogrod claims that after being deceived about their expected cache of arms, the city of Paris became a group fusion united in the common purpose of storming The Bastille. Wyschogrod, citing Joseph Catalano, notes that the structure of the group is best demonstrated by the view that “Each person approaching the group is not an individual other joining the group as a common other. Rather, each person is related to every other through the group itself. Of course, such a belief has its drawbacks, namely mob mentality and fascism, but the heterological historian must be aware this potential in order to avoid it, as dictated by Wyschogrod.

As per Wyschogrod’s reading of Sartre, this is only possible if the overcoming of reciprocal alienation and objectification that appears inherent in social existence is overcome “so that when I see the other, I see my own lived objectively.” Wyschogrod notes that in order for this cohesion to remain intact, this common consciousness must harden its identity in an effort to prevent fragmentation once its objectives are reached. In doing so, the group dedicates itself to preserving its being, which in turn serves the very ends that the group had been formed to combat. As Sartre notes, “The third party is my objectivity interiorized. I do not see it in him as Other but mine.”

In response, Wyschogrod asks what is to be made of a community that is not united in common purpose. Specifically, Wyschogrod traces her argument from the notion of community as shared proprietary interests, noting that proprietary refers to that which is one’s own, what belongs

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157 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 232
158 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 232
159 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 232
160 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 232
161 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 232
to the individual. Wyschogrod asserts that this view lays the foundation for the logic of modern community. Wyschogrod claims, however that after exploring derivative forms, it is possible to figure production so that it is no longer configured as work. Specifically, Wyschogrod contends that calculative communities, predicated on the circulation of goods and their symbolic equivalents, is invested in living within the self-enclosed circuitry of information and spectacle.\(^{162}\)

In that respect, Wyschogrod claims that a precursor for such a community is that joy demands freedom and that, in the context of social existence, such freedom is expressed in terms of rights. Unlike Fukuyama, who thinks the freedom inherent in Western liberalism is measured by access to consumer culture, Wyschogrod notes that this view of freedom takes into account different desires among individuals, desires which are at the same time constrained by the responsibility to others. Therefore, as alluded to previously, the aim is not to limit the amount of access one has to consumer culture, but rather to provide the means by which all individuals have similar access to all facets of consumer culture. In doing so, one is given not only the freedom to fulfill their basic needs, but also the opportunity to remain outside of the production process through that which resist disclosure, artwork.\(^{163}\)

4.9 Don’t Stop Thinking About Tomorrow: Don’t Stop, It’ll Soon be Here

Wyschogrod posits that in order for such a community to come into being, it is necessary to welcome the other by abandoning any pre-established hostilities. Wyschogrod affirms that, if hospitality and artwork are to serve as the non-ground of communal existence, the heterological historian’s creation of the ancient artifact must figure in the development of the community. That is, the heterological historian must consider the time scheme of the community of hospitality, namely that, in its exteriority, eludes presence. Likewise, Wyschogrod posits, “a community of

\(^{162}\) Wyschogrod, Edith PG 238

\(^{163}\) Wyschogrod, Edith PG 238-9
pre-originary production, that of artwork, does not re-present a given form, but rather dis-figures presence”. That said, something must be added that will take into account the present struggle.

For Wyschogrod, this is answered through the gift of community. Through community, one is given the gifts of both the future and a fraternal bond. Furthermore, community offers the gift of time, specifically that of the future. Wyschogrod asserts that if this future is to be a gift in the traditional sense, then it cannot be a future of despair, only that of hope. Wyschogrod posits that the heterological historian must be aware that such a gift of hope could serve to aestheticize the plight of the others. Particularly, Wyschogrod notes that such a gift of future hope can be neither one of utopia nor oblivion. Rather, hope should serve as a beacon for a future that is always yet to come but may never arrive. Wyschogrod contends that in order to remain hope, hope must desire the possible.

4.10 Give Away The Stone: Let The Waters Kiss and Transmutate These Leaden Grudges Into Gold

As has been show, through Wyschogrod’s reading of Sartre, we are afforded a new take on community, one which, if validated, would serve to undermine Fukuyama’s notion that history has come to an end. Specifically, if Wyschogrod is correct, and Western liberalism in its current state can in fact still be expanded upon, then Fukuyama’s contrary claim will have been definitively proven false. Following the predefined mandates of constitutivism, it is crucial for the heterological historian to establish the efficacy of this claim once and for all. Specifically, through Katsafanas’s reading of Nietzsche’s will to power, we find the instability of Fukuyama’s analysis rests on the basis that, in living under the mandates of his version of Western liberalism, the will to power of marginalized individuals is constricted. That is, unlike those on the winning side of

164 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 240
165 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 244
Fukuyama’s victory march, the voiceless others have certain possibility structures removed from their horizon of possibilities simply by virtue of having to satisfy lower levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs before they can ever embark on the path towards self-fulfillment. Much like the above mentioned early settlers of El Paso, the current others find themselves having to labor just to be able to support themselves, and as a result, are unable to pursue means of self-actualization.

Most importantly, however, given the trend of stifled upward mobility, this is a situation which may in fact be more difficult to rise out of than before, thus directly running afoul of Katsafanas’ pre-established mandate dictating that the line between boredom and anxiety is delineated by one’s ability to actually act. Rather than facilitate an environment in which all individuals are free to develop their own subjective authentic choices that emerge from their own personal will to power, Fukuyama’s approach perpetuates a top-down hierarchically imposed political system that perpetuates the kinds of inequalities and ethical omissions referred to throughout my thesis.

In that respect, Katsafanas’ Nietzschean constitutivism, coupled with Wyschogrod’s heterological historian, allow me to establish the efficacy of Wyschogrod’s views on a future oriented community predicated of hope and promise. Never mind the striking similarities shared by both Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche and Wyschogrod’s reading of Sartre. For our purposes sake, we need only focus on running Wyschogrod’s views on community through the lens of Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche, as was done with Fukuyama. Starting with Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche, we are reminded that to make a value claim is simply to state an object of valuing. In this instance, Wyschogrod is valuing the promise afforded by the future. In terms of Nietzsche’s ethical theory, Wyschogrod’s beliefs that the promise of the future as a means by which to establish a non-exploitative community of common consciousness seems to be justified. For one,
an open ended promise for the future clearly present opportunities for encountering and overcoming resistance; one would need look no further than the various attempts made for peace in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to see this. Furthermore, there seems to be no reason why valuing a future oriented community should not be valued. Operating under the pretense of coexistence, one would seem inclined to desire a state of tranquility. More importantly, the emergence of a perfect state is essentially what is dictated by Hegel’s conception of Spirit’s Absolute. Lastly, when seen through the perspective of a common consciousness, it is quite clear that a future oriented community does not interfere with the will to power. In fact, in a time where the subjugation of many individuals the world over is currently in effect, it would appear that a future oriented community feeds straight into the mandates of the will to power.

When further inspected, Wyschogrod’s values also do not seem to run afoul of Nietzsche’s criteria. For one, as alluded to earlier, Katsafanas’ constitutivism mandates that the prerequisites implemented upon an individual by a belief structure aiming for normative value must be psychologically grounded on their facticity and psychological makeup. This is not a problem for Wyschogrod, who is readily admitting that the goal of a future oriented community is to offer relief to those who are not in a position to attain higher levels of expression. Furthermore, Wyschogrod, like Katsafanas, contends that an individual has reason to pursue those activities that afford difficulties that can be overcome, but not so difficult that they cannot be overcome, further falling in line with Nietzsche’s criteria.

Additionally, as Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche dictates, happiness is not an experiential state. This falls perfectly in line with Wyschogrod, who readily admits that this future oriented community is subject to constantly shifting temporalities. Moreover, unlike Fukuyama, Wyschogrod’s views do not conflict with the will to power. In establishing a concrete end point to
history, Fukuyama is essentially shutting the door on any further progress that can be made. As has been shown, however, to remain in a state of stasis is not the nature of neither Spirit nor the will to power. This is not an issue for Wyschogrod, who freely admits that this future oriented community may or may not ever come to fruition, and as such, is constantly subject to expansion.

Most importantly, as per Katsafanas’ above mentioned clarification on Nietzsche’s views one will to power, one is morally required to take up, amongst other things, artistic creation. In that regard, Wyschogrod’s view is ever more attractive, for having established her updated views on production, Wyschogrod claims that it is incumbent upon the future oriented community to foster a state in which artistic expression is mandatory, particularly one which, like Felipe Coronel, is predicated off helping bring attention and relief to the plight of the others.
Chapter 5: Now I Could Let These Dream Killers Kill my Self-esteem, or Use my Arrogance as The Steam to Power my Dreams

5.1 Resistance is Fertile

Unlike Fukuyama, I claim that we are merely in a transition from one historical epoch to another historical epoch that is coming to an end via the information culture provided by the Internet. What follows once the Absolute end of history is reached, if ever, is subject to infinitely many assumptions. What demands our attention, however is that, given the information available demonstrating the continued subjugation of the voiceless others, it seems clear that Spirit has not yet reached its Absolute form. To argue otherwise, as Fukuyama has, is simply a form of cultural hegemony, for in an age where drone strikes on innocent civilians is commonplace, to say that history has come to an end is unacceptable.\textsuperscript{166} Rather than ethically progress to a point where we have come to understand that harming others either physically or socio-economically, whether intentionally or by indifference, is morally unjustified, we find ourselves at a punctiform moment in time where we can freely admit to ourselves that historical actions such as burning women at the stake for witchcraft in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century was a morally reprehensible act, but burning innocent civilians in the Middle East with white phosphorous for their associations with unacceptable political groups remains the norm.\textsuperscript{167}

When we attempt to analyze history in metaphysical terms, we find ourselves speculating about Absolutes and other difficult conceptualizations. In over 4,000 years of philosophizing, we still find ourselves with a lack of consensus in regards to what should and should not be universally accepted in terms of our social relations. As Wyschogrod notes, however, even such general consensus would not be enough:

\begin{footnotes}
\item{166} Isikoff, Michael
\item{167} Dehghanpisheh, Babak
\end{footnotes}
The discursive space of authorization presupposed by theoretical accounts of justice is not a claim about what is intrinsically good, or an assessment of the good in terms of the consequences of actions, but simply the realization that there is another and that the other’s existence obliges me to disown what is mine, to divest myself of myself and accept responsibility for the other.\textsuperscript{168}

The presupposition Wyschogrod refers to is that there is an underlying truth about which we all should agree, and that is that, unlike Fukuyama’s assertion, there is a group of others who in fact exist and that they have been marginalized for far long enough. As I discussed in previous chapters, the absence of the others who cannot speak for themselves mandates a moral responsibility for the heterological historian, dictated by the principle of humanity, to ensure that the conditions are satisfied that would allow the once-marginalized others to move beyond the lowest levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Even if we may never see their faces in person, Wyschogrod asserts that giving countenance to these others is a task we must all embrace, for in a future-oriented community, the only thing individuals with no-thing in common have to offer to ensure their survival is hope for an uncertain future. We need to begin by working now to mitigate the material uncertainty.

But not only do most people seem indifferent to Wyschogrod’s proposition, some, like Fukuyama, seem content promoting the exact opposite. As Wyschogrod notes, the evidence for this indifference to the needs of the most marginalized or disenfranchised people is most readily seen in the mass extermination of peoples in recent history. While Wyschogrod grants that war and mass death are nothing new in the annals of human history, she posits that the new guise which it has assumed is most troubling. Rather than the traditional character of mass destruction, Wyschogrod is wary of the inverse-utilitarianism created by the bureaucratic and technological

\textsuperscript{168} Wyschogrod, Edith xii
military industrial complex that is now employed to ensure the annihilation of the most amount of people in the least amount of time. The pitfalls of the supposed “victory of Western liberalism” that Fukuyama proclaims are most readily seen in contemporary American society, where we have made questionable humanitarian progress. That is, even with all the technology that has enabled us to feed, clothe, shelter, and heal on mass levels, we shockingly still have people who believe that it is wrong to feed the hungry, clothe and shelter the homeless, and care for the infirm. For example, according to *Feeding America*, one in six Americans goes hungry every day.\(^{169}\)

Wyschogrod argues that this is a systematic process that keeps others suppressed which, for my thesis, happens both intentionally and unintentionally. For someone like Fukuyama, I maintain that this disregard for others is intentional. But unlike previous Cataclysms that happened to groups of people living in particular regions, the active suppression of others can result “unintentionally” in mass death on a global scale. In other words, the current “genocide” of marginalized others is not intentionally limited to a particular culture, but rather permeates the whole rest of the world that is left out of the privileging of Spirit’s unveiling. “This privileging” is an equal opportunity discriminator that strikes any and every person it can without regard to age, sex, race, creed, et cetera; all that one has to do to qualify is to have the bad luck to be born into marginalized conditions in any given locale on earth—to be unintentionally unprivileged. And without the conscious realization that an immaterial change is necessary to bring about actual change, and the concerted effort by the heterological historian to manifest such an immaterial change in a timely manner, this continued material injustice will simply be allowed to perpetuate. What we need, therefore, is to radically and critically engage in the realm of consciousness, what I have been calling the realm of Spirit, if we want to challenge the Victory March of neo-liberal Western Capitalism.

\(^{169}\) Hunger in America
As I have shown in my thesis, I identify this sort of active engagement with the philosophies of Nietzsche and Hegel and how that occurs by way of re-evaluating the values of the dialectical evolution of consciousness in how that takes shape via the material forces of history. The only way the continued marginalization of the others will ever come to an end is by heterological historians, operating with a new conscious awareness, manipulating the information culture in such a way that enables a Wyschogrodian ethics of understanding to permeate into the realm of consciousness, in the hope that the Spirit of this generation simply will no longer tolerate the systematic neglect of the others.\footnote{Recently, an owner for the Los Angeles Clippers, a professional basketball team in the National Basketball Association, was banned from attending any NBA related events in light of racist’s remarks.} This can only be done by giving the traditionally repressed others a voice that enables them to combat the historically domineering narrative that has marginalized them with the telling of their own story through their own words.

With the emergence of technology, particularly the Internet and Internet-ready devices, the ability for any and every person to have a voice has never been more readily available. This act of empowerment enables the once voiceless others to dictate their own subjective narrative, as opposed to having it told by someone else, and is made possible only through technology. As Wyschogrod-reading-Heidegger notes, technology should be seen less instrumentally and more of a means for revealing truth.\footnote{Wyschogrod, Edith PG 138} Citing the philological roots of the ancient Greek work tecnhe, Wyschogrod posits that technology has at its foundation both the making of things and works of art as well as a knowing that implies expertise and understanding. As a result, Wyschogrod affirms that through technology, modernity reveals truth. From Wyschogrod’s reading of Heidegger, we better understand the duality of the epistemic grounding for knowing that is codependent upon both our ability to grasp technology as a powerful and power-generating means of production and our ability to understand how technology provides us with the means by which modernity is
revealed and makes itself evident to the knower. That is, while Wyschogrod’s reading of Heidegger admits that it is necessary for one to know the means by which the technology comes about and is applied, technology also plays a deterministic force in revealing itself and its role in modernity to those who seek it.

Accordingly, Wyschogrod notes that this act of revealing is driven by a latent destiny that propels the parousia inherent in the human-technology dichotomy of progress. As Wyschogrod contends, “To be sure, it is human beings who drive technology, but it is the essence of technology as a manner of revealing truth that drives them.”

Continuing with Heidegger’s critique, Wyschogrod notes that the traditional historian is thus limited by the confines of technology, confines which mandate that history be revealed as a mere recording and not a revealing. In returning to the difficulty of bringing to the fore that which has already passed, Wyschogrod affirms that the cataclysm, as “recorded” by the traditional historian, always takes place after having already taken place; that is, we are stuck with simple repetitions of one externally fixed perspective. Working from the ineffability of speech afforded by the paradox of unsayability, the historian is faced with the following problem; how can one speak of that which cannot be said? That is, how does one or how can one relate to a particular experience from an outsiders perspective?

Applying the work of Wyschogrod’s heterological historian, however, may help solve this paradox, for it is the essence of an image to speak without muttering a word. That is, unlike Fukuyama, who in failing to satisfy Hegel’s critiques of historiography by externally imposing his neo-liberal interpretation upon his analyses of Western liberalism’s supposed manifestation as Hegel’s Absolute Spirit or State, the heterological historian is able to embrace the information culture in a way that lets the narratives of the many others speak for themselves.

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172 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 138
The defining characteristic of the information culture is the increased connectivity that the Internet provides. However, the heterological historian—whose perspectives are ethically informed—is also well aware of the fact that technological devices, whose essence provides both the foundation of and access to the information culture, require conflict minerals in order for such devices to be created in the first place and to reveal the very information they provide. Therefore, the inherent contradiction that constitutes these devices directs awareness towards the marginalization of the very people who are mining the minerals used to create them in the first place is central to my thesis, and is that which I am calling the parousia that is inherent in Spirit’s unveiling and that reveals the suffering of those initially left out of Spirit’s unveiling to itself. It would appear, then, that the suffering of the Congolese and other voiceless others is not in vain, since their narrative can in fact be redeemed after all.

From the subjugation of the others, technology was given the conflict minerals necessary to manifest itself in ways such as computers and the Internet, which in turn, allowed these devices to give rise to the information culture. And much the same as the young El Pasoans who had satisfied the basic tenets of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs were able to take advantage of the growing economy by taking part and contributing to its development, individuals the world over who have also satisfied Maslow’s hierarchy of needs can embrace the connectivity provided by the Internet and employ it as future directed, community oriented heterological historians. In doing so, they would also help those who are yet to satisfy Maslow’s hierarchy improve their conditions, with the hopes that one day those who were once marginalized will be able to live authentic lives of self-actualization.

The urgency of the task of the heterological historian is accentuated when applying Hegel’s views that the realm of consciousness affects the material realm. By making a concerted effort to
apply the principles of empathy and compassion, the heterological historian can manipulate the information culture in such a way that exposes the world to the suffering of innocent people, and as a result, brings their condition to the attention of the collective oculus. In the previous epoch, such information was confined to dusty bookshelves of libraries that may or may not have been available, but with the transformation of the world and our cultural relations through technology, information is now ready-at-hand to anyone with Internet accessibility. Despite this increased connectivity, a renewed sense of exigency is placed on the ethical mandates of heterological historians, as they must be further driven by the need to speak for the billions of marginalized people in the world who either do not have Internet connectivity or adequate access to technology, until the time inevitably comes when such technology will be readily available to all of Dasein. This idea is central to my thesis, for it is the responsibility of heterological historians to elevate all marginalized individuals who have been rendered voiceless to a position where they are able to insert themselves into the world on their own.

As alluded to earlier, Wyschogrod’s method is informed by the Communist Manifesto’s inversion of Hegel’s dialectic, and as a result, it is imperative that heterological historians acknowledge their responsibility to the others and seize Spirit’s unveiling by manipulating the information culture in such a way that brings an end to the others marginalization, rather than stand passively by and let Spirit play itself out in the process of self-reflexive unveiling. Ideally, this would solve the omissions that happen through the critical negations of Hegel’s historical dialectic, and its distorted appropriation by Hegelians like Fukuyama, by coalescing those who were outside of Spirit into the essence of Spirit itself. This coalescing move then would enable Spirit to continue on its quest for self-actualization as its Absolute self.

Of course, this cannot be done given Fukuyama’s model, for essentially, if history had in
fact ended with the fall of The Berlin Wall, Sprit would have remained in constant negation. If we remain faithful to the vision of Hegel’s logic, however, remaining in negation is a logical fallacy, since the core tenet of the progression of Spirit is that it continues to change. And inherent in change is the binarism of decline and rebirth, namely, life leading to death and death leading to life. That metaphysics entails that Spirit embarks upon a journey of constant death and renewal in which it continuously obliterates itself in the hope of arising anew. That means that not only is Spirit open to an unknown future but Spirit is also made stronger and more stable than before via its dialectical process of the laborious work of history to build its own pyre in which to immolate itself, only to arise as a Phoenix in ever-new glorious reincarnations.

But for us, Spirit can be said to have evolved to a point where it has realized in its many incarnations that the path it has trodden thus far, one that has repeatedly resulted in the subjugation of the others, is simply not working. In doing so, it has unveiled a portion of the parousia that we, the future subjects of history, experience as a hidden awakening and that allows us to harness the cunning of reason and put it to work in a manner that does not involve slaughter benches nor subjugation. If Spirit is truly a self-reflective process of becoming, then I believe Wyschogrod is correct in claiming that history is coming to an end via the technological transformations that enable us to re-imagine ourselves differently, through an ethical manipulation of the very images provided by this transformative technological process.

Having realized that a change in social patterns is necessary in order to escape the current state of political and cultural oppression, the passions of Individuals have manifested themselves into modern technology, which in turn has lead us to our current information culture. In a move of self-affirmation, images can be said to be a death and a rebirth in the sense that technology has simultaneously put an end to the dead other’s inability to voice the pain of their own personal
cataclysm, and ipso facto, given birth to the ability for their story to be told via the image-centrism of contemporary information culture. No longer “voiceless” the narratives of the dead others has blurred the line between being and reality.

In turn, this blurring of boundaries has made way for skepticism to enter into the heterological historian’s arsenal, giving them a means of saying that which previously could not be said. Most importantly, skepsis allows us, the future subjects of history, to manipulate our consciousness in a way that allows us to recognize and rectify the obstacles facing Spirit. As stated by Heidegger, “[skepsis] renders the spirit for the first time competent to examine what the truth is, for it brings about a state of despair about all of the so-called natural ideas, thoughts and opinions which obstruct Spirit’s progress.”173 Because of this, we are no longer able to carry on with “business as usual”, for our history of advancing through the slaughter-bench of oppression at the expense of the others is itself becoming history. The heterological historian is called to action under the precept that they no longer have an excuse to allow the pervading thought process manifest itself in such a marginalizing manner like it did in the past. Unlike before, the heterological historian has available to them a plethora of images giving birth to a new consciousness that will no longer tolerate death and destruction, one that embraces Spirit’s manifestation as technology and employs it in a constructive manner.

What we have witnessed in the rise of images is the birth of a punctiform moment in time that forces us to become aware of what previously could not be said. We partake in the experience of what we are witnessing, and as such, take the form of the image upon ourselves to materialize the effects an image may have on us as we may. In viewing a photograph, we are placed in a position of power, for as Wyschogrod states, “to watch is to control, and to be watched is to be

173 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 123
powerless.” In that respect, it is incumbent upon us, the viewer, to take action for those who are not in a position to do so. In doing so, we inherently would be influenced by means that at one point did not exist, namely the voice of the dead others. In giving voice to these others, the heterological historian is also giving faciality to the dead others, a move that enables them to do posthumously what they were not able to do while enmeshed in the grips of the cataclysm—to insert themselves into the world. Furthermore, as beneficiaries of the principle of humanity, those who are given their voice are thereby also given the ability to create their own works of art that reflect their own subjective experience, as opposed to having to rely on individuals who do not share in their experience do it for them. Given the mandates of Hegel’s dialectic, once the thoughts of the others enter into the realm of consciousness, it has already satisfied the preliminary measures necessary to manifest the eventual change in the physical realm that will directly lead to an improvement of material conditions. Therefore, in satisfying Nietzsche’s criteria of engaging in the arts, the pursuit of self-understanding, and the suffering necessary to achieve one’s goals, we find that the others also set Nietzsche’s revolution—with its evaluation of values—in motion. That is, rather than attempt to manifest change in some form of physical rebellion, the others, like the Jewish people in Nietzsche’s parable, combat the master narrative through an artistic effort that can only be measured in terms of an ethical “spirituality”. In doing so, they fulfill Wyschogrod’s desire of saying “This is as it was, and it should not have been so.”

None of this will be possible, however, if the conditions that foster such a possibility structure are not first made available. Much the same as the original inhabitants of El Paso employed labor and work in order to satisfy the basic levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, and thus ensuring the structures that foster the pursuit of self-actualization, so to must the heterological historian ensure the that the work is undertaken that will facilitate the establishment of

174 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 85
Wyschogrod’s future oriented community.

As Wyschogrod notes, this is only achieved through giving up any pre-established hostilities, as well as inverting the production paradigm to establish a non-exploitative means of production. Much like Nietzsche, Wyschogrod believes this is best achieved through artistic endeavors. Therefore, as a final expansion to Wyschogrod’s heterological historian, the onus to insert themselves into the world through word and action is of utmost importance. Ideally, the works of art would reflect a conscientious effort that actively intends to bring awareness to the plight of the others, such as the case of the previously mentioned hip-hop artist Felipe Coronel.

The belief that one is driven by an ethics of understanding to insert themselves into the world through Wyschogrod’s re-imagined views on production is crucial to my thesis. Given the mandates of Western liberalism, however, I understand that asking for individuals to engage in artistic endeavors directed towards shedding light on the plight of the others, for the sake of establishing a future-oriented community predicated on the circulation of goods and their symbolic equivalents, is not only a sizeable request to make, but a lofty ideal, as well. But given the other option and what we have been made aware of, to blatantly reject such a request would be an exercise in bad faith. Furthermore, while it is simple to personify Kant’s example and be that person who, despite the fact they are able to contribute, chooses not to, the result, as has been shown, is the continued marginalization of the others. If every action by a particular individual truly does have an effect on the universal whole of humanity, then to be apathetic towards this subjugation, especially after having been made aware of it, is to signal participation through tacit consent.

As Nelson Mandela once said, “What counts in life is not the mere fact that we have lived. It is what difference we have made to the lives of others that will determine the significance of the
One’s actions are the ultimate intentionality that gives one’s life meaning, and not only is one defined by their actions, but also by the purpose their actions serve Dasein. As alluded to earlier, actions create a chain of network events, a progress through which worlds are created. That said, action with the intent of avoiding marginalization would ideally ensure the future-oriented community predicated off of hope and promise will be ready for when the others do catch up. If that time comes, the future oriented-community gains the ability to move forward into the next epoch of history. Of course, as Wyschogrod asserts, this idealistic future is always, until its manifestation, nothing more than a promise.

And while it perhaps may in fact be a very idealistic promise to maintain, the heterological historian can take comfort in the words of Marianne Williamson, who states that

Our deepest fear is not that we are inadequate. Our deepest fear is that we are powerful beyond measure. It is our light, not our darkness, that frightens us. We ask ourselves, ‘Who am I to be brilliant, gorgeous, talented, fabulous?’ Actually, who are you not to be? You are a child of God. Your playing small does not serve the world. There is nothing enlightened about shrinking so that other people won’t feel insecure around you… We are born to make manifest the glory of God that is within us. It’s not just in some of us; it’s in everyone. And as we let our own light shine, we unconsciously give other people permission to do the same. As we are liberated from our fear, our presence automatically liberates others.  

While this future-oriented community may in fact be not only a lofty desire, but at the moment nothing more than an empty intention, as has been show, it will only remain so if one consciously choose to let it be so.

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175 Mandela, Nelson
176 Williamson, Marianne
Through Spirits manifestation as technology, the means to rectify the contradiction in Hegel’s dialectic is made possible. By being empathetic to the relationship between all of Dasein, the understanding that it is incumbent upon all Dasein to help save the others is necessary in order to help usher Spirit into its next evolution as human history. This can only be done, as Wyschogrod claims, through an ethics of understanding that serves to instill through art and action a future oriented community predicated off hope and promise. As Wyschogrod notes, however, this must be done before it is too late, as the only way to “distinguish the future from the past is [through] future’s seemingly ubiquitous relation to possibility. As the present moves ahead, the multiple possibilities of the future drop away; the future is lived as an annihilation of possibilities.”

In light of what I have conveyed in my thesis, the heterological historian must understand that the option to simply reflect on history after it has unveiled is no longer an option; for one must actively partake in the manifestation of Spirit. In doing so, the heterological historian gives voice to innumerable others who have been left out of Hegel’s Spirit, and instill in them the words of Kenyan actress Lupita Nyong’o, who, upon winning an Academy Award, ended her impassioned speech with an affirmation to all the others by stating “every little child… no matter where you are from, your dreams are valid.” It is this mantra that the heterological historian embodies in hopes of receiving the ultimate cosmic recognition, that is, a wink in the mirror of reflection acknowledging all humans, regardless of their position in life, we were created to recognize that which we were created from—the Absolute.

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177 Wyschogrod, Edith PG 167
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Vita

My name is Isaac Aaron Ceniceros, and I was born in north-central El Paso, Texas on December 1st, 1986. I am proud of my community and of the collective experiences we share with others the world over who were thrown into similar circumstances. Experiences which were marked by a noted struggle in attempting to keep up with the mandates of Western liberalism after starting the race from far behind. Despite this, I refuse to make excuses for the conditions I found myself thrown in to, which is why after graduating from Austin High School in 2005, I joined the United States Coast Guard with the sole intent of receiving the Montgomery G.I. Bill and moving up in the world through education. After receiving an honorable discharge in late 2008, I applied the benefits I earned while in the service to pay for my education, attaining my bachelor’s degree in philosophy from The University of Texas at Austin in three years, immediately followed by my master’s degree in philosophy from The University of Texas El Paso in two years. Now, with my degree in one hand and my thesis in the other, I plan on leaving the academic world to incite change in the real world, a feat I intend to accomplish through words, both written and spoken. To that extent, I consider December 1st, 2013 the day I consciously inserted myself into the world with the release of my first hip-hop album, Here’s To Life, under my nom de guerre, Ice Nice.

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