Stable and Unstable Dictators: Examining the Effects of Authoritarian Regime Classifications on Domestic Terrorism, 1972-2008

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Stable and Unstable Dictators: Examining the Effects of Authoritarian Regime Classifications on Domestic Terrorism, 1972-2008

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Stable and Unstable Dictators: Examining the Effects of Authoritarian Regime Classifications on Domestic Terrorism, 1972-2008

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Abstract

This thesis examined four authoritarian regime types and their relationship with domestic terrorism. It is argued that military authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience civil strife than other forms of authoritarian regimes. In addition, this thesis challenges the notion that multi-party authoritarian regimes and civil strife are positively correlated. This study also demonstrates the relationship between regime type and domestic terrorism when controlling for when the country is experiencing civil war. To conduct this research, I used data from the Global Terrorism Database, Correlates of War, and Hadenius and Teorell’s “Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited”. The results demonstrate that military and one-party regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism when engaged in a civil war, and found that the level of development when interacted with the regime variables was also a significant indicator of domestic terrorism. Therefore, the type of authoritarian regime does play a role in the likelihood of experiencing domestic terrorism when interacted with other variables.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Outline

Which types of authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism in their country? Many scholars in recent years have focused their research on this topic by disaggregating classifications for authoritarian regimes. This thesis will focus on four classifications of authoritarian regime types, which are as follows: military regimes, monarchies, limited multi-party regimes, and one-party regimes. This topic has become more and more relevant in these recent years in international relations due to the Arab Spring events in Egypt, Libya, and etc. that shifted focus to why these countries experienced civil strife. Could the type of authoritarian regime been one of the main reasons for producing civil strife? This topic has recently received more attention by international relations scholars as we have seen a shift from studying democratic forms of government to studying autocratic forms of government in more detail. In addition, it has been more feasible to study authoritarian regimes and domestic terrorism as data have become more available and updated to keep up with recent events.

Civil strife has been measured more by civil war than by domestic terrorism. This thesis sees how both forms of civil conflict are inter-related and how regimes play a significant role in being responsible for producing civil strife. The significance of this study pertains to different characteristics of regimes and how those characteristics may play a role in determining the amount of civil strife a country experiences.

Democracies have always been the subject of interest when examining terrorism without much emphasis on autocracies. In the Global Terrorism Database from the years 1972-2008, we see that democracies have experienced 22,188 domestic terror attacks while military, monarchial, multi-party, and one-party authoritarian regimes have combined experienced 19,980 domestic terror attacks. Therefore, for comparative purposes, this study will shift the focus from democracies to different types of autocracies and the likelihood of experiencing domestic terror attacks. In order to be able to demonstrate the relationship, I first provide you with some examples of different types of authoritarian regimes and the number of total domestic terror attacks.
attacks that regime has experienced. In addition, I provide a regime score using the Polity IV scale, which ranges from -10 being the most autocratic to 10 being the most democratic (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). After this, I will provide important literature on the subject of authoritarian regimes, domestic terrorism, and civil war to see what has been done in the past on subject and how it can be improved. I follow that with theoretical expectations and hypotheses that will be tested to determine the relationship between authoritarian regimes and terrorism. After the theoretical framework chapter, I include the methodological chapter, in which I describe the scientific methods that are used to test the hypotheses, which are followed up with results of the analyses.

1.2 ONE-PARTY AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

In this section I will provide a case illustration on One-party Regimes. The classification and definition that will be used will be from Hadenious and Teorell (2012). They classify one-party regimes as those where only one-party can participate in elections and includes satellite parties that may be allowed to participate; however, they are not allowed take an independent position (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). According to the Global Terrorism database, one-party regimes have experienced a total of 617 domestic terror attacks from 1972-2008 and had an average Polity score of -7.40. The case that was chosen to look at the possible effect the type of regime has on producing domestic terror attacks will be Mozambique. In Figure 1.1, from the years 1975-2006, Mozambique was classified as three separate types of regimes. Mozambique was first classified from 1975-1976 as a military authoritarian regime and had an average Polity score of -8. Then from 1977-1993 they were classified as a one-party authoritarian regime with an average Polity score of -7.5 and from 1994-2006 they were classified as a multi-party authoritarian regime with an average Polity score of 5. During the years 1975-1976, they were classified as a military regime and experienced zero domestic terror attacks; however, the span was only two years. During the years 1977-1993 they were classified as a one-party regime and they experienced 132 domestic terror attacks, but then only experienced one domestic terror
attack during the years 1994-2006 when classified as a multi-party regime. Here we can see a really interesting fact that during the 17 years of one-party rule there was a high number of attacks than the 13 years of multi-party rule. Could it have been the regime itself that produced these attacks or were there other factors that could have contributed? The civil war going on at the time likely made it easier for citizens to engage in domestic terror attacks because of the instability in the country. This is why exploring the concept of different authoritarian regimes has caught the interest of many, we can see that the differences between these regimes can trigger domestic terrorism. This thesis looks to capture the effects regime type has on producing domestic terrorism, when controlling for other possible factors that can be a likely cause like civil war.

![Mozambique](image)

**Figure 1.1: Mozambique**

**1.3 Multi-Party Authoritarian Regimes**

This section focuses on multi-party authoritarian regimes and used two case illustrations to explore the possible relationship with domestic terrorism. Hadenious and Teorell (2012) have classified countries as limited multi-party if they hold parliamentary or presidential elections where other candidates are able to participate and are independent of the ruling regime, and
include those cases where parties were absent but not as a result of prohibition of doing so. According to the Global Terrorism database, multi-party regimes have experienced a total of 12,499 domestic terror attacks from 1972-2008, and have an average Polity score of 0.16. I use Kenya and Tanzania to illustrate the possible relationship between regimes and terror attacks. In Figure 1.2, during the years 1972-1991, Kenya was classified as a one-party authoritarian regime, with an average Polity score of -6.75, and experienced 12 domestic terror attacks, but from 1992-2002 they were classified as a multi-party authoritarian regime with an average Polity score of -2.45 experienced 45 domestic terror attacks. In Figure 1.2.2, Tanzania was classified as a one-party authoritarian regime during the years 1972-1994 with an average Polity score of -5.87 and experienced one domestic terror attack and classified from 1995-2008 as a multi-party authoritarian regime, with an average Polity score -1, where they experienced no domestic terror attacks. The reason for providing these two cases is because they both transitioned from one-party to multi-party authoritarian regimes during a similar time-frame. However, Kenya experienced much more domestic terror attacks than did Tanzania. The explanation for this can be due to the political violence that erupted during the 1992, 1997, and 2002 elections, where Kenyan citizens were displaced, injured, or killed based on their ethnic background (Njogu, Ngeta, Wanjau; 2010). The perpetrators of this violence were party supporters, political aspirants, youth wingers, and organized groups (Njogu, Ngeta, Wanjau; 2010). The violence occurring against Kenyan minorities could have been the explanation for an increase in domestic terror attacks in Kenya and only zero in Tanzania even though they were really similar in regime type.
Figure 1.2.1: Tanzania

Figure 1.2.2: Kenya
1.4 Monarchial Authoritarian Regimes

This section presents two case illustrations to examine the relationship between regime type and domestic terror attacks. Monarchy was another category of authoritarian regime type included by Hadenious and Teorell (2012). In this type of regime a person with royal decent inherits the position to govern over the state according the practices or constitution and exclude ceremonial monarchies that do not exercise any power (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012).

According to the Global Terrorism database, monarchial party regimes have experienced a total of 263 domestic terror attacks from 1972-2008, and have an average Polity score of -8.48. The two cases that are examined in this section are Bhutan and Iran. In Figure 1.3, Bhutan from the years 1972-2006 was classified as a monarchy; with an average Polity score of -9.68, and experienced one domestic terror attack. Iran from the years 1972-78 was also classified as a monarchy with an average Polity score of -10, but experienced many more domestic terror attacks with a total of 33. Could it have been that Iranians wanted to overthrow the Shah of Iran by engaging in domestic attacks against the regime in place? It begs the question to see if once controlling for these other possible factors, if the type of authoritarian regime matters at all.

Figure 1.3: Iran/Bhutan
1.5 Military Authoritarian Regimes

Finally, I illustrate military authoritarian regimes using both El Salvador and Honduras. Hadenious and Teorell (2012) classified a country as a military regime if the military exercised political power, whether it is directly or indirectly. According to the Global Terrorism database, military party regimes have experienced a total of 6,601 domestic terror attacks from 1972-2008, and have an average Polity score of -5.76. In Figure 1.4.2, you can see that Honduras from the years 1972-1981 was classified as a military authoritarian regime, with an average Polity score -2.22 and experienced 13 domestic terror attacks during that time span. In Figure 1.4., El Salvador experienced 1,173 domestic terror attacks during the years 1982-1990 while classified as a multi-party authoritarian regime with an average Polity score of 5.33 and 1,068 domestic terror attacks during 1972-1981, while classified as a military authoritarian regime with an average polity score of -2.63. The reason I chose these two cases was to illustrate they are neighboring countries and both were classified as military regimes during the same time frame. However, the difference was the number of terrorist attacks experience by each country. Honduras experienced significantly lower rates of domestic terror attacks than did El Salvador, which can be contributed to the civil war going on in the country at the time. Therefore, this thesis explores other possible options to explain what produces domestic terror attacks and if the type of regime holds significant once controlling for factors like civil war.
Figure 1.4.1: El Salvador

Figure 1.4.2: Honduras
1.6 Summary

This chapter provided you with an introduction to the subject of the thesis and how I intend to study the subject of authoritarian regimes and domestic terrorism. I provided cases to illustrate the differences in number of domestic terror attacks between the different types of authoritarian regimes and provided possible explanations to some cases where regime type appeared to not play a role. For instance, the possible effects civil war the regime might be experiencing might have led to the high amounts of domestic terror attacks in El Salvador. In the following chapter I explain what research has been done on the topic and what can be improved when looking at authoritarian regimes and domestic terrorism. Following this chapter, I present the theoretical expectations and the hypotheses that are tested. Then I present the research design chapter that explains what methods are used to test the hypotheses. Following this, I provide the results of the analysis and conclude with discussion on why this topic should be further explored.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Outline

This section of the study focuses on reviewing the existing literature that is relevant in exploring the relationship between authoritarian regime types and domestic terrorism. First, this chapter goes into literature on domestic terrorism and how democracies have been the focus of most studies. Secondly, I introduce research that has been developing regarding the different types of authoritarian regimes and different types of conflict. Finally, I present the research that has focused on both domestic terrorism and authoritarian regime types and how it can be improved upon.

2.2 Domestic Terrorism

Most of the empirical studies published in the past have found that democratic regimes are more likely to experience terrorist movements and experience terrorist attacks (Blomberg and Rosendorff, 2009; Braithwaite and Li, 2007; Eubank and Weinberg, 2001, 1998, 1994; Lai, 2007; Li and Schaub, 2004; Pape, 2003; Piazza, 2008, 2007; Wade and Reiter, 2007). Boehmer and Daube (2013) mention that the growing literature examining whether democracies are more prone to terror attacks is due to their open societies and limited governments. Braithwaite and Li (2007) found in their research that country size, the level of democracy, government capability, and past incidents all had a positive statistically significant effect on the number of transnational terrorist incidents. However, their research focused only on transnational terrorist incidents and did not include domestic terrorist incidents. Li and Schaub (2004) also found that the level of democracy positive and statistically significant when looking at transnational terrorist incidents. They used the level of democracy as a control variable to see what effect economic globalization has on transnational terrorism holding level of democracy constant. Most research has focused on democracy and transnational terrorism instead of domestic terrorism.

Domestic terrorism has been understudied as most focus has been on international and transnational terrorism. In addition, the availability of data for domestic terrorism has recently
become readily available. Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011) devised a method to be able to separate data from the Global Terrorism Database into both transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. They understood that there had to be a differentiation between the two types of terrorism as they both had different sources and impacts. Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011) believe that transnational terrorism can have a greater adverse effect on economic growth than domestic terrorism. Sanchez-Cuenca and De la Calle (2009) argued that more about international terrorism than they do about domestic terrorism as many quantitative analyses on terrorism focuses primarily on international attacks because data on domestic attacks was not available. Sanchez-Cuenca and De La Calle (2009) point out that the focus on international terrorism is unfortunate as it can generate important biases. They argue that the widely shared belief that terrorism consists of violence against civilians or noncombatants is due to the familiarity with international terrorist attacks and when you examine domestic terrorism closely you can see that the targets are police forces and military (2009).

Abadaie (2004) argues that countries with intermediate levels of political freedom are more likely to experience terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes. The results of his research show how geographic factors may be important to sustain terrorism such as average elevation, tropical weather, and country area can be powerful predictors of terrorism. Abadaie (2004) failed to find a significant association between terrorism and economic variables and found consistent results countries in transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies experience increases in terrorism. This thesis does not focus on transitions of authoritarian regimes and democratic regimes, but does see differences in the number of domestic terror attacks when a country transitions from one type of authoritarian regime to another type of authoritarian regime as shown in Chapter 1.

Boehmer and Daube (2013), contrary to Abadaie (2004), found that there is a significant association between terrorism and economic variables. They found that domestic attacks appear to increase as states become wealthier (Boehmer and Daube, 2013). However, when testing for curvilinear effects development is positive and development squared is negative; which show
that when the function of development, terror incidents takes an inverted U-shape distribution (Boehmer and Daube, 2013). Therefore, the wealthiest and poorest states have fewer incidents than those states in the intermediate level of development. Boehmer and Daube (2013) found that democracies with stable regimes and high polity scores are less prone to domestic terrorism. Boehmer (2014) demonstrated again that there is an inverted U-shape relationship with domestic terrorism and level of democracy and development; therefore, demonstrating that domestic terrorism is less likely to occur in states that are wealthy and strongly democratic. Sambanis (2008) in his research found that terrorism and civil war are closely inter-related. He argues that civil wars create environmental opportunities for terrorists to attack and also generate the conditions in which domestic terrorism can occur. This argument is relevant as it is seen in Chapter 1 how some countries that were experiencing a civil war saw large amounts of domestic terrorist attacks. This can cause some issues when studying domestic terrorism, as you do not know how much of the terror attacks can be attributed to civil war and what can be attributed to other factors. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the effects of authoritarian regime types and controls for effects that others have used and new controls that they have not used.

2.3 Authoritarian Regimes

There has been much literature on the topic with regime type usually used as a control or independent variable on civil strife. Fearon and Laitin (2001) found that more ethnically or religiously diverse countries were not more likely to experience significant civil war once you controlled for per capita incomes and growth rates, in addition to using regime type as a control variable (Fearon and Laitin, 2001). Most of the literature that has focused on regime types has not concentrated on the disaggregated types of authoritarian regimes.

One of the first to start classifying the types of authoritarian regimes was Geddes (2003), where she classified authoritarian regimes either as personalistic, militaristic or single party authoritarian regimes. Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002) were one of the first to use Geddes dataset in their article Dictatorial Peace, where she examined the likelihood of
authoritarian regimes engaging in conflict with each other as most research had focused on the Democratic Peace Theory.

Fjelde (2011) made mention of the limitations of not using disaggregated data on authoritarian regime types in her article that focused on authoritarian regimes and civil conflict between 1973 and 2004. She mentions that “previous research has largely ignored the large institutional differences between various forms of authoritarian rule and has, both theoretically and empirically, conflated the risk of civil conflict among these regimes (2011, pg. 215)”. Fjelde (2011) also mentions that the emerging view that types of political institutions do not have an influence on the risk of civil conflict is due to usage of aggregate data that hide the variations in institutional types and the risk that is associated with civil conflict. An example Fjelde (2011) gives is that on the Polity scale the Chinese communist regime, the Burmese military junta, and the monarchy of the United Arab Emirates have all at one point held the same score total. Fjelde (2011) argues that these three types of authoritarian regimes under the Polity scale appear to be similar; however, it does not demonstrate the different characteristics between the three types of authoritarian regimes. Fjelde (2011) found in her research that military regimes and multi-party electoral autocracies have a higher risk of conflict than single-party authoritarian regimes. Fjelde (2011) however, instead of using the classifications provided by Geddes (2003), she used a dataset from Hadenius and Teorell (2012), who build on Geddes’ dataset (2003) and make a key distinction between single-party regimes and military regimes, in addition to creating another category from single-party regimes where there is a multiparty electorate. A multiparty electorate is defined as there being “one or more opposition parties are allowed to contest the election, but the connection between voter preferences and electoral outcomes is marred by irregularities, so the regime remains authoritarian (Fjelde, 2011; pg. 205)”. The inclusion of this category and the addition of monarchies into the data by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) have made it more favorable to researchers like Hanne Fjelde to utilize rather than use Geddes (2003). With regards to types of authoritarian regimes, Lai and Slater (2006, pg. 113) argue that there has been “excessive focus on the personalization or institutionalization of authoritarian regimes’ decision-
making procedures has distracted attention from the more critical issue of what institutions these regimes deploy to enhance social control and secure political incumbency.” They contend that military regimes are systematically less effective than single-party regimes at developing different forms of authoritarian institutions, and that they are more likely to resort frequently to desperate measures to fend off domestic challenges to their control of government (Lai and Slater, 2006). Therefore, Lai and Slater (2006) found empirical support for their hypothesis that military regimes will be more than likely to initiate military disputes than single-party regimes. While this research will focus more on civil strife within a country, there is reason to believe that if military regimes will employ desperate measures to suppress and civil strife, which will cause more tension within their country.

2.4 AUTOCRATIC REGIMES AND DOMESTIC TERRORISM

Research examining the differences between authoritarian regime types and the likelihood of experiencing domestic terrorism has been largely under-researched. Much literature has focused on literature examining how democracies are more likely to experience domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism than autocratic regimes. Li and Schaub (2004) stated that the common argument is that democracies give the political rights of its citizens, which in turn gives terrorist groups more freedom in association that can explain why democracies might experience more incident of terrorism. Wilson and Piazza (2013) appear to be the first to focus on the relationship between the different types of authoritarian regimes and the issue of domestic terrorism together. They note that “studies have been fixated on the relationship between democracy and terrorism, arguing that democratic institutions that provide for policy concessions and tolerate political opposition activity make terrorism more likely (2013, pg.2)”. However, a shift towards domestic terrorism by Wilson and Piazza (2013) examined the conditioning effects of authoritarian regime types on terrorist attacks for the periods 1970 to 2006. Their results show that party-based authoritarian regimes experience fewer terrorist attacks than other regimes
and that military regimes experience more terrorism incidents than other types of authoritarian regimes (Wilson and Piazza, 2013). In addition monarchies and mixed regimes are less likely than military regimes to experience zero attacks (Wilson and Piazza, 2013). They used the authoritarian regime typology created by Geddes (2003); however, this study uses Hadenius and Teorell (2012) typology as it differentiates between one-party and multi-party authoritarian regimes. This thesis argues that not all party based authoritarian regimes are the same and there are key differences that differentiate the number of attacks they experience. Therefore, the Hadenius and Teorell (2012) typology is used as it helps with the distinction of single party authoritarian regimes and multi-party authoritarian regimes.

2.5 SUMMARY

This chapter covered existing literature on the topics of domestic terrorism, authoritarian regime types, and some on civil war. As you can see most literature focuses on democracies and their likelihood of experiencing terrorism. However, you can see a shift from studying democracies to studying authoritarian regimes. Particularly, you see that research on the relationship between terrorism and authoritarian regime types is largely understudied with only one paper examining the relationship between both. Therefore, this study looks to expand the interest in studying authoritarian regime types and domestic terrorism, as most research has primarily focused on democracies and terrorism.
Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses

3.1 Outline
When examining the effects of authoritarian regime type on domestic terrorism, one must first look at the type of characteristics that make up that particular authoritarian regime type. This chapter looks at the characteristics of military, one-party, and multi-party regimes and their ability to produce civil strife. First, I describe military regimes and what characteristics and behaviors they exhibit that make them likely to experience civil strife. Secondly, I describe both types of party-based authoritarian regimes, the differences in characteristics between both and why one is more prone to civil strife than the other. Lastly, this section covers the likelihood of regimes to experience more domestic terrorism when there is a civil war going on in that particular regime, and why it is necessary to control for those effects.

3.2 Militaristic regime characteristics
Some studies have found that military authoritarian regimes are more likely to initiate international conflict than other forms of regime types (Sechser 2004, Lai and Slater 2006, Debs and Goemans 2010, Weeks 2011, Fjelde 2010). Some of the arguments explaining this occurrence are the lack of popular accountability, fear of severe punishment, diversion, infrastructural power, and the military mindset of military officers (Weeks 2011). Arguments regarding why military juntas are more conflict prone lead to assumptions that they will experience higher rates of domestic terror attacks as people from that particular country might not be strong enough to engage in a direct civil war. Debs and Goemans (2010) in their research found that civilian autocrats are significantly less likely to become involved in war than military autocrats. Aydin and Gates (2007), found that military regimes and genocide were positive and statistically significant as the characteristics of military authoritarian regimes indicate that they are more likely to oppress their people and have the means to promote control over their
population; therefore, giving people no other option than to asymmetrically engage the regime with terrorist attacks than all out civil war. The first hypothesis is:

\[ H1: \text{Militaristic authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism than other types of regimes.} \]

### 3.3 Party-based Authoritarian Regime Characteristics

Fjelde (2010) in her research found that multi-party authoritarian regimes are also more likely to experience civil war within a country. However, she did not include a separate category for one-party authoritarian regimes as a separate independent variable in her model. Fjelde (2010) makes the argument that one-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to have civil strife than multi-party regimes. The reason this thesis makes this argument is based on the perception of individuals in any given state. Given the perception of a multi-party elected government structure, individuals will be less likely to engage in domestic terrorism or civil conflict because of the appearance of more representation as there is more than one-party allowed to participate in elections. One-party authoritarian regimes will experience more civil strife as they are perceived as a corrupt form of government and appears to demonstrate less representation among its people. Aydin and Gates (2007) found in their research of authoritarian regime types and genocide that single-party authoritarian regimes were also more likely to commit genocide, which strengthens the theoretical expectation that one-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience civil strife than limited multi-party authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the second hypothesis is:

\[ H2: \text{One-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism than limited multi-party authoritarian regimes.} \]
In addition, I test another hypothesis for the effects of military authoritarian regimes on producing domestic terrorism, but this time controlling for the effects of civil war. In some countries like Mozambique and El Salvador, we saw that the high number of domestic terrorist attacks could have been attributed to the civil war the country was experiencing at the time. As we have read in the literature review chapter, when the country is experiencing a civil war, domestic terror attacks are more likely to occur as there is great instability. The environments civil wars create also facilitate insurgencies, which use terror tactics as a form of asymmetrical warfare. Therefore, people find it easier to engage in terrorism when there is a civil war occurring and the chances of being punished if caught are slimmer. The civil war variables that were used are from the Correlates of War database (Dixon and Sarkees). There are three different classifications of civil war which are non-intercommunal, control of central government, and local/regional issues. The reason for including the three different classifications is to control for any civil conflict already occurring that can produce domestic terror attacks. This better helps us understand the relationship between regime type and domestic terror attacks. Therefore, the third hypotheses that is tested:

\textit{H3: Militaristic authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism than other types of regimes; when controlling for the effects of a civil war for control of central government.}

The fourth hypothesis is:

\textit{H4: Militaristic authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism than other types of regimes; when controlling for the effects of a civil war concerning local and regional issues.}

The fifth hypothesis is:
H5: Militaristic authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism than other types of regimes; when controlling for the effects of non-intercommunal civil wars.

The sixth hypothesis that is tested:

H6: One-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism than limited multi-party authoritarian regimes; when controlling for the effects of a civil war for control of the central government.

The seventh hypothesis is:

H7: One-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism than limited multi-party authoritarian regimes; when controlling for the effects of a civil war concerning local and regional issues.

The eighth hypothesis is:

H8: One-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism than limited multi-party authoritarian regimes; when controlling for the effects of non-intercommunal civil wars.

3.5 Summary

The hypotheses were all tested to determine the effects of regime type on domestic terrorism, and realize that civil war can be a significant indicator of producing the likelihood of domestic terror attacks. Therefore, including the three types of civil war variables as controls helps better understand the effects a particular regime has on domestic terrorism when controlling for other possible explanations. The next chapter will provide the research design to test the hypotheses discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 4: Research Design

4.1 Outline

This section of the study includes the methods used to test the hypotheses using quantitative research techniques. After this section, you see how different concepts are measured to understand the relationship between the different types of authoritarian regimes and domestic terrorism, as well as see what other relationships may exist between the variables. First, I introduce the scope and type of statistical analysis test that was used. Then I describe what dependent, independent, and control variables I used and how they are measured. Finally, I introduce and describe two interactive variables, which are included in the final models to see what effect the interaction has on domestic terrorism.

4.2 Scope

This study focuses on the years between 1972 and 2008, to test the effects of authoritarian regime types on domestic terror attacks. The research uses a cross-sectional time-series analysis with the unit of analysis being state-years. This study employs a negative binomial regression estimator to analyze the relationship with authoritarian regime types. The reason for the use of a negative binomial regression analysis is due to the dependent variable being a count variable. The analysis consists of running a total of seven models. The first two models include civil war variables and each were run with a different measure for population. The next three models each include one of the three different forms of civil war and the last two models include two different types of interactive variables. The baseline for the authoritarian regime type variable is democracy, occupation, or other, as I am comparing each type of authoritarian regime against all other types.

4.3 Dependent Variables

The dependent variable for the research is Domestic Terror Attacks, a count variable constructed counting the number of domestic terror incidents in any year from 1972-2008
Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011, pg. 321) define terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”. Enders, Sandler, Gaibulloev (2011, pg. 321) differentiate between transnational and domestic terrorism by defining domestic terrorism as “homegrown in which the venue, target, and perpetrators are all from the same country…thus, domestic terrorism has direct consequences for only the venue country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies.” Since this thesis focuses on civil strife within a country, it does not include any incidents of transnational terrorism.

4.4 Independent Variables

For this study, the independent variables are dummy variables for the different autocratic regime types. The first independent variable used was Monarchy, which is defined by Hadenious and Teorell (2012, pg. 5) as “those regimes in which a person of royal descent has inherited the position of head of state in accordance with accepted practice and/or the constitution.” In addition, Hadenious and Teorell (2012) exclude ceremonial monarchies where the sovereign exercises no real political power. Monarchies were coded 1 if they fit the characteristics stated by Hadenious and Teorell and coded 0 if otherwise.

The second independent variable used was Military, which is defined as the threat or use of military force “where the armed forces may exercise political power either directly or indirectly (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012; pg. 6).” They exclude regimes where persons with military background are chosen in open elections (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). Military regimes were coded 1 if they fit the characteristics stated by Hadenious and Teorell and coded 0 if otherwise.
The third independent variable used was One-party, where only one-party is allowed to take part in elections and all others are forbidden (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). They coded “a small number of non-party candidates may also be allowed to take part and get elected; there may be satellite parties that are autonomous in name, but which cannot take an independent position, and competition between candidates from the same (ruling) party may also obtain” as one-party regimes as well (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012; pg. 6). It is not enough, moreover, that a regime calls itself a one-party state; elections in such a structure must also be held (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). One-party regimes were coded 1 if they fit the characteristics stated by Hadenious and Teorell and coded 0 if otherwise.

The final regime independent variable in my analysis was Multi-party, which are defined as regimes that hold parliamentary or presidential elections in which, candidates are able to participate who are independent of the ruling regime (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). This classification holds even when opposition parties refrain voluntarily from taking part in elections (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). It also embraces cases where parties are absent, but where this is not the result of any prohibition against party activities: the candidates in question have simply chosen to stand for election as individuals (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). Multi-party regimes were coded 1 if they fit the characteristics stated by Hadenious and Teorell and coded 0 if otherwise.

4.5 Control Variables

The research analysis includes 10 control variables to control for other possible effects on the causes of domestic terrorism. The first control variable is Ethnic Fractionalization variable used by Fearon (2005), which was interpolated and expanded by Boehmer and Sobek (2013). This variable was constructed by multiplying two scales of ethnic and religious heterogeneity
and then adding back the maximum of the two scales. The second control variable is *Ethnic Dominance* is also used by Fearon (2005), which was also interpolated and expanded by Boehmer and Sobek (2013) is a dichotomous variable where 1 equals largest ethnic group between 45 and 90 percent and coded 0 if otherwise. The third control variable in this study is *Geographic Concentration* which measures the population dispersion within a state and is coded from zero to one (Fearon, 2005; Boehmer and Sobek, 2013). The fourth control variable is the *Log of Population*, which is the natural log of the population with the state lagged one year (Boehmer and Sobek, 2013). The reason for the use of population as a control variable is due to Piazza (2006, pg.166), who found that countries with large populations will have higher incidents of domestic terrorism. Piazza believes this happens because “countries with large populations will have to face higher costs for counter-terrorism policies…terrorists can use large populations to obscure their operations, escape detection, finance operations, and recruit members”. The fifth control variable is the *Log of GDP Per Capita*, which is the natural log of GDP per capita lagged one year from the Correlates of War database (Boehmer and Sobek, 2013). The sixth control variable is the natural log lagged one year of *Military Expenditures* from the Correlates of War database, which will control for the effects of military capabilities in suppressing domestic terror attacks (Boehmer and Sobek, 2013). The seventh control variable, which is to be run in a separate model, is the natural log lagged one year of *Urban Population* also from the Correlates of War Database, as a measure due to the assumption that terrorist find it easier to hide in larger Urban Populations (Boehmer and Sobek, 2013). The assumption is that regimes with large Urban Populations have capable police agencies that are used to combat domestic terror events and do not rely on the military to do so. Therefore, controlling for the
effects of these variables helps this research by examining the effects authoritarian regime types holding these variables constant.

The next control variables are from the Correlates of War Database which has expanded their COW typology for wars. There are three different civil war variables are run independently of each other in models 3-8. The reason for controlling for civil war is due to existing literature addressing the issue that when a country is experiencing a civil war, domestic terror attacks are more common as a tactic by insurgents. Therefore, we want to control for the effects of civil war has on producing domestic terror attacks to examine what effect regime has on domestic terrorism. The first civil war control variable for the Model 5 is Non-Intercommunal CW, a dummy variable coded 1 if non intercommunal conflict occurred within that year and coded=0 if otherwise. Inter-communal conflict is defined as wars that involve combat either between or among two or more non-state entities with that particular state (Dixon and Sarkees, 2012). This variables includes all civil wars that are not inter-communal and subsumes all those over regional issues or over the central government. The second civil war control variable for Model 3 is Control for the Central Government CW, a dummy variable coded 1 if central government civil conflict occurred within that year and coded=0 if otherwise (Dixon and Sarkees, 2012). Therefore, it must be a conflict for the control of the central government. The third civil war control variable for Model 4 is Local/Regional Issues CW, a dummy variable coded 1 if civil conflict based on local and regional issues occurred within that year and coded=0 if otherwise (Dixon and Sarkees). Therefore, it must have experienced a conflict or dispute involving regional or local issues. The reason this thesis is differentiating between different types of civil conflict is due to not all civil wars are fought for the same causes. Therefore, it is important to see if there is a variation between the different issues that cause civil wars and to see which types of civil war
is a strong predictor of domestic terrorism. In addition, for a state to be considered a war participant it must have either committed 1,000 troops to war or have suffered 100 battle-related deaths as a minimum required. The reason this paper uses the COW civil conflict database instead of the UCDP/PRIO database that Fjelde (2011) used is because the COW definition for civil conflict provides a higher threshold of 100 battle-related deaths compared to UCDP/PRIO’s 25 battle-related deaths threshold. In addition, the COW database provides subtypes of civil conflict that is very beneficial in studying the effects of authoritarian regime types on civil strife.

4.6 Interactive Variables

This thesis introduces two types of interaction terms with the regime variable classifications for future exploration. The first set of interactive terms was the interaction between the variables types of authoritarian regimes and GDP per capita. This measures the level of development of a regime and examine if the level of development of the regime type has any effect on experiencing domestic terror attacks. The higher the GDP per capita in the type of authoritarian regime the more developed the type of regime will be. The second type of interactive term was the interaction between regime type and civil war. This measures if the interaction civil war and regime type has an effect on experiencing domestic terror attacks. The purpose of this study was to examine the effects authoritarian regime types has on domestic terror attacks; therefore, examining the interaction of authoritarian regimes has with other variables to see if that in turn has any effect on domestic terror attacks.

4.7 Summary

In this chapter, you can see the different ways in which I test the hypotheses. There are several control variables used with the assumption that they have either a negative or positive effect on domestic terrorism. In addition, there are interaction variables included in separate models to be able to see what kind of relationship exists between the type of authoritarian regime and domestic terrorism. The next chapter presents results from the empirical tests.
Chapter 5: Results

5.1 Outline

This chapter examines the analyses results from all the models. I first introduce results for Models 1 and 2, which do not include the civil war variables and uses two different measures of population. Then I present the results of Models 3-5; which each model includes one of the three different types of civil war variables, and includes predicted discrete changes of domestic terror attacks. Finally, I present the results from Models 6 and 7, which include the two types of interaction variables, and include the predicted discrete changes of domestic terror attacks.

5.2 Models 1-2

In this section I discuss the results for Models 1 and 2, with the only difference between the two models was the measurement for population. Table 1.1, shows that for Model 1 I include total population and for Model 2 I include Urban Population. For Model 1, the analysis demonstrates that both monarchial and one-party authoritarian regimes have a negative relationship on terror attacks, meaning they are less likely to experience domestic terror attacks. Monarchy and One-party both are statistically significant and negative. Military and Multi-party are both statistically insignificant in this model. Therefore, Military and Multi-party demonstrate that they have no effect on the likelihood of experiencing domestic terror attacks, than other regime types.

I now discuss the results of the control variables on domestic terror attacks in this model. Ethnic Fractionalization demonstrates a negative relationship; therefore, the higher the level of Ethnic Fractionalization, the less likely the state is to experience domestic terrorist attacks. The Total Population, Military Expenditures, and the Geographic Concentration control variables all demonstrated to have a positive relationship on domestic terror attacks. Therefore, an increase in all three of these variables will lead to an increase of domestic terror attacks.
For Model 2, you can see similar results as Model 1 which was run with the Total Population variable. However, the one difference was that the Military Expenditures variable became statistically insignificant when the model includes the Urban Population variable. All other variables produced similar results as Model 1. Comparing models, we see that Urban Population was more statistically significant and had a larger marginal effect on domestic terror attacks than Total Population. Therefore, in the models I run my analysis with the Urban Population control variable rather than the Total Population variable. These two models did not provide any support for neither of the hypothesis which argues that Military and One-party regimes are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks. The analysis in both models suggests that One-party regimes are actually less likely to experience domestic terror attacks, which is contrary to the theoretical expectation.

Table 1.1: Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime Classification, and Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Attacks</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>Std. Err.</td>
<td>z</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>-1.56</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-5.78</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-party</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-party</td>
<td>-1.59</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-10.77</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-8.84</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Dominance</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Concentration</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<td>0.81</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.0716</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
5.3 Models 3-6

This section of the results section focuses on the analysis of Models 3-6, which differs from Models 1 and 2 because of the inclusion of civil war variables. For Model 3, the civil war variable that was included was for conflict for the Control of the Central Government. Similar to the results in Models 1 and 2, Monarchy and One-party have a negative relationship with Domestic Attacks, which makes them less likely to experience domestic terror attacks. Military and Multi-party results came back statistically insignificant; therefore, they have no effect on the likelihood of experiencing Domestic Attacks. Ethnic Fractionalization also has a negative relationship on Domestic Terror Attacks, which means the higher the level of Ethnic Fractionalization the less likely domestic terror attacks will occur. Both Geographic Concentration and Urban Population demonstrate a positive relationship on Domestic Attacks, which shows that an increase in these variables will increase the number of domestic terror attacks. The civil war variable for control of the central government was statistically insignificant in this model. This finding means that when there is a civil war for control of central government, it does not increase the likelihood of experiencing Domestic Attacks.

For Model 4, the civil war variable measures conflicts concerning local and regional issues. Similar to the results of Model 3, the only regime variables to be statistically significant were Monarchy and One-party regimes, and they have a negative relationship on Domestic Attacks. Military and Multi-party are not statistically significant; therefore, they show that they have no effect on the likelihood of experiencing domestic terror attacks. Ethnic Fractionalization was statistically significant and also has a negative relationship with domestic terrorism. Both Urban Population and Geographic Concentration are again positive and statistically significant,
and our civil war variable for conflict concerning local and regional issues came back statistically insignificant. This finding means that when there is a civil war due to local and regional issues, it does not increase the likelihood of experiencing Domestic Attacks.

For Model 5, the civil war variable for the analysis was Non-Intercommunal Conflict. Similar to the results in Models 3 and 4, only Monarchy, One-party, and Ethnic Fractionalization are statistically significant and negatively related, while Urban Population and Geographic Concentration are statistically significant but positively related with domestic attacks. The civil war variable for Non-Intercommunal civil war also is also statistically insignificant, as were the other civil war variables. This finding means that when there is a civil war for control of central government, it does not increase the likelihood of experiencing Domestic Attacks.

In Table 2.1.1, I include predicted discrete changes in Domestic Terror Attacks, when including Non-Intercommunal Civil War. Monarchies experience 1.74 fewer attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at their mean. One-party experience 2.78 fewer attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Urban Population increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by 2.37, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Ethnic Fractionalization decreases the rate of domestic terror attacks by -1.22, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Geographic Concentration increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by .35, holding all other variables at their mean. Here the variables to expect increases in domestic terror attacks are both Urban Population and Geographic Concentration. Monarchy, One-party, and Ethnic Fractionalization are all expected to decrease the number of domestic terror attacks, which provides support against the argument of this thesis.
Table 2.1: Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime Classification, and Control Variables including Civil War Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Attacks</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-4.06</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-4.08</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-4.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.28</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
<td>1.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multi-party</td>
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<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
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<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
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<td>-0.42</td>
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<td>One-party</td>
<td>-1.67</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-11.15</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-11.10</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>-11.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>9.39</td>
<td>0.56</td>
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<td>9.41</td>
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<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
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<td>-0.67</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.10</td>
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<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
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<td>-7.35</td>
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<td>-7.45</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>-7.32</td>
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<td>Ethnic Dominance</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<td>1.56</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geographic</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Concentration</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<td>2.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control of Cen. Gov. CW</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.40</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local/Region Issues</td>
<td>CW</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intercommunal CW</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Prob&gt;Chi-squared</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.069</td>
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<td>0.069</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant P-values in bold (p<.05, p<.01, p<.001)

Table 2.1.1 Discrete Changes in Rate for Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime Classification, and Control Variables with Civil War Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Terror Attacks</th>
<th>min to max</th>
<th>standard deviation increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>-1.74</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Party</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-Party</td>
<td>-2.78</td>
<td>-1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
<td>53.79</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>-3.10</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 5.4 Models 6-7

This section of the results analyzes the two interactive terms that are used to test for interactive relationships that could be related to domestic terror attacks. Given that regimes may be more or less likely targets for terrorism during civil war or depending on their wealth, I explore the interaction between the type of regime and Civil War and GDP Per Capita. Model 6 included the interaction between the authoritarian regime variable and Non-Intercommunal civil wars. The analysis shows that the results are similar to the ones in the previous models when concerning the Monarchy, One-party, Ethnic Fractionalization, Urban Population and Geographic Concentration variables. The interesting portion comes from the results of the interactions, as one of them is statistically significant. The interaction with the military authoritarian regime variable and civil war was positive and statistically significant. The estimates demonstrate that when a military authoritarian regime is experiencing a civil war, they are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks. This is interesting as we saw in previous models that neither military authoritarian regimes nor the civil war variables were statistically significant when run independently. Therefore, I find support for my hypotheses that states military regimes are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks, but is only the case when interacted with civil war.

Model 7 includes the interaction between the authoritarian regime variables and GDP per capita. This helped measure the level of economic development of the authoritarian regime to see
what effect development has on domestic terrorism. The variables that were statistically significant and demonstrated a negative relationship were Monarchy, One-party and Ethnic Fractionalization, which was similar to previous models. Urban Population, Military Expenditures, Ethnic Dominance, and Geographic Concentration were all statistically significant and demonstrated a positive relationship on Domestic Attacks. The interesting portion of this model is related to the interaction variables as three of the four interaction variables were statistically significant. The first statistically significant variable was the level of development of monarchial regimes. The results show that the higher the level of development of a monarchial regime, the more likely they will experience domestic terror attacks. This is interesting as monarchial regimes run independently in previous models came back consistently with a negative relationship, but when interacted with level of development it shows as a positive relationship. The second statistically significant variable was the level of development of military regimes. The results show that the higher the level of development of a military regime, the more likely they will experience domestic terror attacks. This is interesting as military regimes ran independently in previous models was consistently statistically insignificant, but when interacted with level of development it came back as a positive relationship and statistically significant. The third statistically significant variable was the level of development of multi-party regimes. The results show that the higher the level of development of a multi-party regime, the more likely they will experience domestic terror attacks. This is interesting as multi-party regimes run independently in previous models came back consistently statistically insignificant, but when interacted with level of development it came back as a positive relationship and statistically significant. One possible explanation as to why wealthier authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience Domestic Attacks can be attributed to
capabilities. If a regime is wealthy, so are the increased capabilities to oppress their population. Another possible explanation can be that the concentration of wealth is in the hands of those in power. If it appears that wealth is not accessible for others, grievances against the regime can resort to Domestic Terror Attacks against the government. These interactive terms shed light on other avenues of exploration and research when concerning what increases the likelihood of experiencing domestic terror attacks. Civil strife continues to cause problems in many countries, therefore providing research on what causes civil strife can let leaders know if their country is at risk and can try to institute policies and changes to address concerns that lead to conflict.

In Table 3.1.1, I include predicted discrete changes in Domestic Terror Attacks, when including the interaction between authoritarian regime type and civil war. Monarchies experience 1.76 fewer attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at their mean. One-party experience 2.80 fewer attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Urban Population increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by 2.28, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Ethnic Fractionalization decreases the rate of domestic terror attacks by -1.02, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Geographic Concentration increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by .42, holding all other variables at their mean. The interaction between civil war and Military experiences 11.8 more attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at their mean. The predicted discrete of domestic terror attacks shows that Military with civil war are expected to experience the most number of domestic terror attacks.

In Table 3.1.2, I include predicted discrete changes in Domestic Terror Attacks, when including the interaction between authoritarian regime type and the level of development. Monarchies experience 1.88 fewer attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at their
mean. One-party experience 2.94 fewer attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Urban Population increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by 1.99, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in GDP Per Capita decreases the rate of domestic terror attacks by -1.18, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Military Expenditures increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by .82, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Ethnic Fractionalization decreases the rate of domestic terror attacks by -1.14, holding all other variables at their mean. Ethnic Dominance experiences .56 more attacks than other variables, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Geographic Concentration increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by .27, holding all other variables at their mean. The interaction between GDP Per Capita and Monarchy experience 6.90 more attacks than other interaction variables, holding other variables at their mean. The interaction between GDP Per Capita and Military experience 5.40 more attacks than other interaction variables, holding other variables at their mean. The interaction between GDP Per Capita and Multi-party experience 5.26 more attacks than other interaction variables, holding other variables at their mean. The predicted discrete of domestic terror attacks demonstrated that Monarchy, Military, and Multi-party interaction with civil war is expected to experience the most number of domestic terror attacks. This is an interesting finding as Monarchy alone is expected to decrease the amount of domestic terror attacks; however, when interacted with GDP Per Capita they are expected to experience the largest increase of domestic terror attacks compared to all other variables.

Table 3.1: Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime Classification, and Control Variables with Interactive Terms
| Domestic Attacks          | Model 6 |           |  | Coef. | Std. Err. | z  | Coef. | Std. Err. | z  |
|--------------------------|---------|-----------|  | ------|-----------|----|------|-----------|----|
| Monarchy                 | -1.37   | 0.31      | -4.39 | -1.55 | 0.32      | -4.93 |
| Military                 | -0.03   | 0.14      | -0.24 | 0.22  | 0.15      | 1.48  |
| Multi-party              | -0.16   | 0.15      | -1.02 | -0.08 | 0.17      | -0.49 |
| One-party                | -1.79   | 0.15      | -11.71 | -1.90 | 0.15      | -12.31 |
| Urban Population         | 0.57    | 0.06      | 9.44  | 0.50  | 0.06      | 8.36  |
| GDP per capita           | -0.07   | 0.08      | -0.82 | -0.43 | 0.11      | -3.93 |
| Military Expenditures    | 0.06    | 0.05      | 1.13  | 0.15  | 0.05      | 2.87  |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.00    | 0.00      | -6.38 | 0.00  | 0.00      | -7.31 |
| Ethnic Dominance         | 0.19    | 0.10      | 1.81  | 0.24  | 0.11      | 2.29  |
| Geographic Concentration | 0.95    | 0.28      | 3.33  | 0.60  | 0.29      | 2.05  |
| Civil War Monarchy       | 2.17    | 2.44      | 0.89  |       |           |      |
| Civil War Military       | 1.84    | 0.54      | 3.42  |       |           |      |
| Civil War Multi-party    | 0.98    | 0.66      | 1.48  |       |           |      |
| Civil War One-party      | 0.92    | 0.88      | 1.05  |       |           |      |
| Non-Intercommunal CW     | 0.04    | 1.02      | 0.04  | 0.71  | 0.50      | 1.42  |
| Development Monarchy     |         |           |       | 0.62  | 0.25      | 2.46  |
| Development Military     |         |           |       | 0.74  | 0.14      | 5.28  |
| Development Multi-party  |         |           |       | 0.69  | 0.16      | 4.26  |
| Development One-party    | -0.07   | 0.14      | -0.50 |       |           |      |
| N                        | 2474    |           |      | 2464  |           |      |
| Prob>Chi-squared         | 0.000   |           |      | 0.000 |           |      |
| Pseudo R-squared         | 0.0719  |           |      | 0.0735|           |      |

Significant P-values in bold
(p<.05, p<.01, p<.001)

Table 3.1.1 Discrete Changes in Rate for Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime Classification, and Control Variables with Civil War Interactive Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Terror Attacks</th>
<th>min to max</th>
<th>standard deviation increase</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>-1.76</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Party</td>
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<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-Party</td>
<td>-2.80</td>
<td>-1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>min to max</td>
<td>standard deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Terror Attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>-1.88</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Party</td>
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<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-Party</td>
<td>-2.94</td>
<td>-1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
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<td>1.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>-1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
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<td>Development Monarchy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development One-party</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1.2 Discrete Changes in Rate for Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime Classification, and Control Variables with Development Interactive Variable
5.5 Summary

In this chapter, I presented the results from all of the models. The results show which variables are positively and negatively related to domestic terror attacks and which are statistically significant and which are not. This section also demonstrated that authoritarian regimes only increased the likelihood in number of terrorist attacks when interacted with either the level of development or civil war. I found that there is support for my hypotheses that military authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism, but only the case when interacted with civil war and the level of development. I also found that the level of development in monarchies increases the likelihood of experiencing Domestic Attacks. This is interesting, as in previous models, Monarchy displayed a negative relationship with Domestic Attacks. Therefore, I conclude with a summary of findings and their significance in the following chapter and what could be done for future exploration on the topic.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis on authoritarian regime types and their effects on the likelihood of experiencing domestic terrorist attacks provided very interesting results. Overall, there were mixed results about the relationship between authoritarian regime types and domestic terror attacks. Monarchies and one-party authoritarian regimes were the only consistently significant variables, but showed that they are the least likely to experience domestic terror attacks. Military regimes had a positive relationship with domestic terror attacks, when including the interaction with civil war and the level of development. In addition, there was a relationship between both Multi-party and Monarchies with domestic terror attacks, but only when the interaction with level of development was included. The civil war variables that were included as well were not significant indicators on the likelihood of experiencing domestic terror attacks. Overall, the analysis demonstrated that the impact authoritarian regime has on the likelihood of experiencing domestic terror attacks were for the most part insignificant until you included the interaction variables.

This study found that military regimes when interacted with GDP per capita and civil war are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks. This shows support for the hypotheses that argued that military authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks; however, this is only the case when interacted with either GDP per capita or civil war. Therefore, the characteristics those military regimes exhibits are more likely to produce domestic terrorism when they are experiencing a civil war. This can be attributed to military regimes being unable to remain stable within the regime structure when civil war is occurring. When concerning the level of development of military regimes, the more developed they are the more they experience domestic terrorism. This makes sense as with increased capabilities to oppress the population, people resort to domestic terrorism rather than engage in an all-out civil war. Terrorism is an easier way to engage an enemy as it is a more asymmetric way hurt the regime, than engage them in a full civil war.
An interesting finding was the interaction between Monarchy and GDP per capita. Monarchies were less likely to experience domestic terrorism, but when interacted with the level of development they became more likely to experience domestic terrorism. This is a very interesting result as it demonstrates that people engage in domestic terrorism if they monarchial regime is more wealthy. This perhaps can be attributed to the concentration of wealth being held by royal members of the monarchy, which can cause grievances among the rest of the population that live in poverty. Also addressing these issues can prove difficult as the electoral process is controlled by those members of the royal family, which leaves people with no other options at the time than to engage in terrorist activities to promote their agenda.

We also saw that multi-party regimes when interacted with GDP per capita are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks. This interaction provides support against the hypotheses that multi-party regimes are less likely than one-party regimes to experience domestic terrorism; however, this is only the case when interacted with either GDP per capita. Therefore, the characteristics that multi-party regimes exhibit, are more likely to produce domestic terrorism when they are more developed. This can also be attributed to the capabilities a regime has to oppress the population, which leads people to engage in terrorist attacks to weaken the stability of a regime since engaging the regime directly would be more difficult.

Therefore, the results of this study demonstrate that the type of authoritarian regime does play a role in the likelihood of experiencing an increase of domestic terror attacks. This is a very important finding as there has not been much research on what effect authoritarian regime types has on domestic terrorist attacks, and those who have, did not control for effects of civil war or included possible interactions with other variables. For future research, to examine the effects of authoritarian regime types on domestic terror attacks more closely, I could alter the baseline. Altering the baseline to be military regimes, while removing democracy and other types of regimes, would help analyze the effects of authoritarian regimes to see what changes can be seen by dropping non-authoritarian regimes from the model. Countries during the Arab Spring witnessed vast amounts of civil unrest and conflict which could have produced domestic terror
attacks, as this study demonstrated that domestic terror attacks can arise by the interaction between regimes and civil war. This research provides readers with empirical evidence that the type of regime has an effect on producing civil strife, as those regimes exhibit certain characteristics that produce instability and grievances amongst its people.
References


Dixon, Jeffrey and Meredith R. Sarkees. 2012. *A GUIDE TO INTRA-STATE WARS: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2007* by Jeffrey Dixon and Meredith Reid Sarkees


Vita

A native of El Paso, Texas, Yahve Gallegos graduated from Mountain View High School in 2007. Yahve first attended El Paso Community College for the first two years of his undergraduate education. During this time, he enlisted in the United States Army, and served his remaining six years of his contract as a reservist. Yahve, was promoted to sergeant and was given his own squad of soldiers to lead, and held the position until he finished his military obligations in 2014. While attending school, Yahve worked as a construction estimator in charge of bidding million dollar projects and managing project budgets. After El Paso Community College, he attended the University of Texas at El Paso, where he received his B.A. in Criminal Justice with a minor in Political Science. Yahve initially wanted to attend law school and was accepted, but instead decided to enroll in the graduate program in Political Science. While a graduate student, Yahve, worked as a teaching assistant for numerous instructors. Yahve presented with Manuel Gutierrez at the Western Social Science Association Conference in Albuquerque, NM, their research titled “Voting, Clientelism, and Rain: A Quantitative Analysis of Voter Turnout in México”.

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