Motivations for a Source to Resist an Interrogation: Consequences to the Self versus Consequences to an Other

Julia Labianca

University of Texas at El Paso, jlabianca@miners.utep.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd

Part of the Law Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Labianca, Julia, "Motivations for a Source to Resist an Interrogation: Consequences to the Self versus Consequences to an Other" (2013). Open Access Theses & Dissertations. 1658.
https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd/1658
MOTIVATIONS FOR A SOURCE TO RESIST AN INTERROGATION: CONSEQUENCES TO THE SELF VERSUS CONSEQUENCES TO AN OTHER

JULIA ROSE LABIANCA

Department of Psychology

APPROVED:

Christian A. Meissner, Ph.D., Chair

Jessica K. Swanner, Ph.D.

Michael A. Zarate, Ph.D.

Penelope P. Espinoza, Ph.D.

Benjamin C. Flores, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School
Copyright ©

by

Julia LaBianca

2013
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated my parents Mindy and Tony. I wouldn’t be here without you.
MOTIVATIONS FOR A SOURCE TO RESIST AN INTERROGATION: CONSEQUENCES TO THE SELF VERSUS CONSEQUENCES TO AN OTHER

by

JULIA ROSE LABIANCA, B.S.

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at El Paso
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO
August 2013
Acknowledgements

They say it takes a village to raise a child. What they don’t tell you is that it also takes a village to support a graduate student. Over the past three years I have been fortunate enough to incorporate an amazing group of people into my life. Without these people I would not be where I am today.

First, I’d like to thank my advisor, Dr. Christian Meissner, for the time and energy he has dedicated to helping me find my career path. I cannot express how grateful I am for all of the opportunities he has afforded me. I’d also like to thank my committee, Drs. Jessica Swanner, Michael Zarate, and Penelope Espinoza, for their willingness to support my growth as a student and scholar. The knowledge and expertise they have imparted upon me has been invaluable. A special thank you goes to Dr. Kate Houston, Dr. Ana Schwartz, and my undergraduate mentor Dr. Stephanie Wright. Their endless words of encouragement and willingness to guide me both professionally and personally have gone above and beyond their professional duties, and I am forever grateful.

I also need to thank the incredible number of friends who have supported me during my time at UTEP: my labmates Amy Ross, Skye Woestehoff, and Stephen Michael, and my unofficial labmates Mosi Dane’el, Brandt Smith, and Scott Frankowski. Their endless patience and support have been instrumental to both my academic and personal development.

Finally, thank you to my parents, Mindy and Tony, and my brother, Joe. I have the greatest family in the world, and I wouldn’t be where I am today without their constant love and support.

So to my village, thank you. I owe everything to you.
Abstract

The current research investigated the effect of situational and dispositional factors on a source’s decision to confess guilty knowledge of another’s actions to an interrogator. The extant literature suggests that potential consequences to the self are a major motivator for decisions to confess or resist an interrogation. Previous research also suggests that the potential consequences to the other person may also influence a source’s motivations to confess guilty knowledge. Additionally, personality measures related to interdependence versus personal independence (collectivism and individualism) and individual loyalty may also influence a source’s motivations to cooperate with or resist an interrogation. However, few experiments have investigated how these factors may combine to affect a source’s decision-making in an interrogative context. Therefore, the proposed experiments will model how characteristics of the “other” (entitativity and dissimilarity) as well as individual personality differences (collectivism, individualism, and loyalty) affect a source’s decision to confess guilty knowledge to an interrogator.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ..............................................................................................................v

Abstract ................................................................................................................................... vi

Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ v

List of Tables ....................................................................................................................... viii

List of Figures ...................................................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1: General Introduction ..........................................................................................1
  1.1 Group Membership ......................................................................................................6
  1.2 Individual Differences ..............................................................................................11
  1.3 Overview of the Current Studies .............................................................................13

Chapter 2: Experiment 1 ....................................................................................................15
  2.1 Method ..................................................................................................................16
  2.2 Results ..................................................................................................................21
  2.3 Experiment 2 Discussion ......................................................................................29

Chapter 3: Experiment 2 ....................................................................................................32
  3.1 Method ..................................................................................................................33
  3.2 Results ..................................................................................................................37
  3.3 Experiment 2 Discussion ......................................................................................41

Chapter 4: General Discussion ...........................................................................................43
  4.1 Group Membership and Altruistic Confessions .....................................................43
  4.2 Dissimilarities and Altruistic Confessions ..............................................................47
  4.3 Individual Differences ............................................................................................49
  4.4 Additional Future Directions ................................................................................52
  4.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................54

References ..........................................................................................................................56

Tables ....................................................................................................................................66

Figures ...................................................................................................................................71

Appendices ...........................................................................................................................78

Curriculum Vita ....................................................................................................................96
List of Tables

Table 1 ........................................................................................................................................66
Table 2 ........................................................................................................................................67
Table 3 ........................................................................................................................................68
Table 4 ........................................................................................................................................69
Table 5 ........................................................................................................................................70
Table 6 ........................................................................................................................................70
List of Figures

Figure 1 ................................................................................................................................71
Figure 2 ................................................................................................................................72
Figure 3 ................................................................................................................................72
Figure 4 ................................................................................................................................73
Figure 5 ................................................................................................................................74
Figure 6 ................................................................................................................................75
Figure 7 ................................................................................................................................76
Figure 8 ................................................................................................................................77
Chapter 1: Introduction

In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001, research on the psychology of terrorism quickly developed. Psychologists have investigated the effects of terrorist attacks in relation to exposure to trauma (Costello, Erkanli, Keeler, & Angold, 2004; Hoven, Duarte, Wu, Erickson, Musa, & Mandell, 2004), mental health consequences (Knudsen, Roman, Johnson, & Ducharme, 2005; Gould, Munfakh, Kleinman, Lubell, & Provenzano, 2004; Ford, Adams, & Dailey, 2007), substance use by military personnel (Moore, Cunradi, & Ames, 2004), and coping mechanisms (Wadsworth, Gudmundsen, Raviv, Ahlkvist, McIntosh, Kline, Rea, & Burwell, 2004; Holman & Silver, 2005), to name a few. While many of these studies have been conducted through a clinical lens, a growing number of psychologists have begun studying terrorism through experimental research (e.g., Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007; Johnson, 2010; Strelan & Lawani, 2010). Among these experimental researchers is an even smaller subset of psychologists studying terrorism from a national security perspective (e.g., Narchet, Meissner, & Russano, 2011; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012). These researchers are less concerned with the way terrorism shapes individual attitudes and ideologies, and are more focused on developing better methods of detecting, preventing, and countering possible terrorist threats and other illegal activity.

One area of interest in the burgeoning field of terrorism-related research is the study of suspect and source interrogations. Two types of interrogations have been identified in the psychological literature: criminal interrogations and human intelligence gathering interrogations (often referred to as HUMINT interrogations; see Evans, Meissner, Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010). According to Evans et al. (2010), “The goal of a HUMINT interrogation is to obtain reliable information from a source about the past, present, or future which can be used to
improve national security and/or further national interests.” That is, the goal of a HUMINT interrogation is often to obtain a confession of guilty knowledge from a source rather than a primary confession of guilt, as a source may not be directly involved with a crime or threat. The goal of HUMINT interrogations is therefore in contrast with the goal of criminal interrogations, which is usually to secure a confession of guilt that can later be used to obtain a conviction during a criminal trial (Evans et al., 2010). Confessions during a criminal interrogation can come in two forms: primary and secondary confessions. A primary confession is an admission of guilt by the perpetrator, while a secondary confession is an admission of guilty knowledge by anyone other than the perpetrator (e.g. an informant or an accomplice; Neuschatz, Lawson, Swanner, Meissner, & Neuschatz, 2008). Although the goals associated with HUMINT and criminal interrogations are slightly different, they can both involve the elicitation of confessions of guilty knowledge (or secondary confessions) of someone not directly responsible for a crime. Thus, a growing area of interest involves developing methods for the elicitation of guilty knowledge from informants and sources (e.g., Swanner, Beike, & Cole, 2010; Gamer, 2010; Houston, Meissner, Kleinman, LaBianca, Ross, & Woestehoff, 2013), though this research is relatively limited given its recent emergence. For the purposes of the current experiments, rather than differentiating between informants and sources, from this point on anyone being interrogated about a crime they did not commit will be referred to as a source. Additionally, all source confessions (i.e. confessions of guilty knowledge about the perpetrator and secondary confessions) will be referred to as “confessions” or “confession decisions.”

Given the paucity of research on interrogations of sources, questions remain to be answered surrounding sources’ motivations for complying with or resisting interrogations. According to the HUMINT field manual for the United States Army (hereafter AFM), a source’s
motivations for cooperating with or resisting an interrogation should largely dictate which interrogation methods are used by the interrogator (AFM 2-22.3, 2006). For example, the AFM instructs interrogators to identify a source’s emotional motivators (e.g., love of family) and use those motivators as incentives for cooperation (e.g., protecting the source’s comrades).

Early reviews of the psychology of confessions identified two broad sources of motivation for suspects to resist an interrogation: fear of “real” consequences and fear of “personal” consequences (Jayne, 1986; Gudjonsson & Petursson, 1991; St-Yves & Deslauriers-Varin, 2009). Real consequences are described as tangible consequences such as going to jail, paying fines, and other penal sanctions. Personal consequences are more intangible consequences such as social stigma, loss of self esteem, and loss of respect (from the self and others). However, little empirical research has been conducted to determine whether (and to what degree) these consequences might influence decisions to confess. Unfortunately, the research that does exist is outdated and arguably flawed: for example, surveys of convicted criminals by Gudjonsson and Petursson (1991) found weak support for suspects’ consideration of personal consequences (referred to as inhibitory factors), but this research was limited by its sample of convicted criminals and narrow in its scope. Using prisoners as a sample is problematic as all prisoners included in the sample had chosen to confess, thus the motivations of those who chose to confess could not be compared to the motivations of those who chose to remain silent. Additionally, the presence of a co-defendant, accomplice, or informant was excluded from Gudjonsson and Petursson’s (1991) sample, so the influence of another person’s presence on motivations to confess could not be explored. Given that personal consequences can include social consequences such as social stigma and loss of respect from others (Gudjonsson & Petursson, 1991; St-Yves & Deslauriers-Varin, 2009), it may be the case that motivations for
solo criminals to resist an interrogation differ from the motivations of accomplices and informants. Thus, it is difficult to assess from Gudjonsson and Petursson’s (1991) research whether real and personal consequences act as motivators for a source to resist an interrogation. One purpose of the current series of experiments is to further explore the influence of real and personal consequences, particularly on the decisions of those not directly responsible for the crime (e.g., sources) to confess guilty knowledge about a perpetrator.

Cassidy (2004) identified three motivations for sources to resist interrogations: fear of self-incrimination, fear of retaliation, and allegiance to a suspect. Swanner and Beike (2009) further noted that allegiance to a suspect can take a variety of forms including loyalty to an in-group member, group cohesiveness, and attachment formed from shared experiences. While finer grained than the previous categorizations of motivations to resist, each of Cassidy’s (2004) descriptions of motivations to resist interrogations can easily fit under the category of either real consequences or personal consequences. Self incrimination and retaliation carry with them very tangible consequences (e.g., going to jail and/or physical harm), potentially classifying them as real consequences. Sacrificing allegiance to an in-group member, however, is associated with more intangible consequences given that it involves betraying loyalty to that group member. Incriminating another person, particularly an in-group member, may carry with it feelings of guilt and loss, arguably classifying it as a personal consequence. However, it should be noted that some inconsistencies exist in the literature as to whether or not impact on others is classified as a real or personal consequences (St-Yves & Deslauriers-Varin, 2009). For example, sending a spouse to prison may result in loss of income (real consequence) as well as feelings of guilt (personal consequence). Therefore, “consequences to self” and “consequences to other” may prove a better categorization for the motivations influencing a source’s decision to confess guilty
knowledge. Empirical evidence for this distinction has recently been reported by Houston et al. (2013) who found that guilty participants reported consequences to an accomplice, as well as consequences to themselves, as being primary motivators for how much information was given to an interrogator.

Given that there are potentially two sets of consequences (consequences to the self versus consequences to an other) that a source might consider when being interrogated, it remains an empirical question which set a source will consider more heavily in situations where consequences are unavoidable. Legal and social psychological researchers have investigated how people strategically weigh consequences during interrogations through the use of social games such as the Little Fish (Enders & Jindapon, 2011) and Stag Hunt games (McAdams, 2008), as well as through the use of confidence games (Leo, 1996). However the most popular method of studying decision making in interrogations is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (McAdams, 2008; Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, & Walkowitz, 2011; Yamagishi, Mifune, Liu, & Pauling, 2008). In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a participant must choose to either cooperate or compete with another participant depending on how they foresee the other participant acting (Pathos, Perry, Corr, Matthew, & Busemeyer, 2011; Hirsh & Peterson, 2009). The game is designed to be most beneficial if both participants cooperate with one another (i.e., little or no consequences for both), most detrimental if one participant cooperates and the other competes (i.e., no consequences for one, maximum consequences for the other), and neither beneficial nor detrimental if both compete (i.e. moderate consequences for both; Hirsh & Peterson, 2009; Pathos, Perry, Corr, Matthew, & Busemeyer, 2011). However, this literature is limited in that participants are making decisions based upon how they foresee their partner responding. Interrogations of a single source do not always afford the source any opportunity to consider
another person’s confession decisions. Additionally, there is always a possibility of the participant walking away without any negative consequences in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Many real life interrogations do not afford sources an opportunity to avoid all consequences, whether they are to the self or to another person.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is currently only one study (Tipton & Jenkins, 1974) in which an individual must choose between suffering negative consequences themselves or potentially causing another person to suffer those negative consequences, without the possibility of any personal gain to the individual. However, this study is limited in its applicability to interrogation research given that participants had neither met nor interacted with the person to whom they caused negative consequences. Thus, the current psychological literature is lacking information on which set of consequences holds more weight in the mind of a source during an interrogation, as well as which factors may contribute to the source’s decision to choose one set over the other. The goal of this research is to determine which factors could affect a source’s motivation for choosing one set of consequences (consequences to self versus consequences to another) when the source is faced with both. Under this construal, consequences to the self can include real consequences associated with confessions, such as jail time and further interrogations. However, consequences to the self can also include personal consequences associated with confessions, such as stigmatization and loss of respect from group members. Similarly, consequences to an other can include the same types of real and personal consequences for the other person, such as jail time and loss of respect (to the “other”).

1.1 Group Membership

Individuals tend to categorize similar others as being members of their in-group (e.g., those who share similar world-views) and dissimilar others as members of an out-group (e.g.,
those with opposing word-views; Brewer, 1999). One widely established principle of social psychology is intergroup bias, which observes that individuals prefer members of their in-group to those of their out-groups (e.g., Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). Many researchers believe that this bias partially stems from an individual’s desire to maintain high self-esteem and a positive social identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Petersen & Blank, 2003). By viewing the group to which an individual holds membership (in-group) in a more positive manner than those to which no membership is held (out-groups), that individual is able to bolster his or her positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Accordingly, increasing one’s social identity in a positive manner leads to increased self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Abrams & Hogg, 1988).

The preference for in-group members is expressed in many forms including increased loyalty to in-group members (Mooreland & McMinn, 1999), more positive impressions of personality (Platow, McClintock, & Lieberand, 1990), and higher levels of trust for in-group members (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009). Additionally, Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) have demonstrated that individuals are more likely to act in an altruistic and cooperative manner for fellow in-group members than they are for out-group members. According to Choi and Bowles (2007), an individual is altruistic if he or she engages in an act that benefits a fellow group member, even if there is direct cost or benefit to the individual or other out-group members. Numerous theories exist to explain acts of altruism for an in-group member including kin selection (Hamilton, 1964), increasing one’s odds of receiving reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), and an individual’s desire to maintain a positive reputation within the group (Mifune, Hashimoto, & Yamagishi, 2010). For example, Mifune et al. (2010) found that while playing a
dictator game, participants allocated more money to an in-group member (compared with an out-group member) when being monitored, suggesting that maintaining a positive reputation within an in-group is a primary motivator for altruistic acts.

For a source, having to decide whether to act in an altruistic manner is logical in an interrogation. Based on Choi and Bowles’ (2007) definition of altruism, during the course of an interrogation if a suspect/source chooses to incur negative consequences in order to protect another person from negative consequences, that individual would be acting altruistically. For example, one situation in which a person may choose to act altruistically would be during the interrogation of a source who is known to possess information about a group member to whom that source maintains strong loyalty (i.e., an in-group member). If the source chooses to remain silent, it is possible he could a) be jailed for withholding information pertinent to an investigation (*United States vs. Abdullahi Farah*) or b) implicate himself, particularly if he is considered a suspect (Clary & Shaffer, 1980; Shaffer & Case, 1982). Either of these scenarios could result in further interrogations and possible jail time. However, if the source chooses to betray his group member and reveal the incriminating information, that group member may be sent to prison. As previously stated, intergroup bias increases an individual’s motivation to engage in acts of altruism for a fellow in-group member (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). Thus, if a source is being questioned about a fellow in-group member, the source would be more willing to act altruistically by personally accepting the potential negative consequences and therein protect their group member from suffering any negative consequences.

**Entitativity.** Although sources may be more motivated to act altruistically for in-group rather than out-group members (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008), it should be noted that not all in-groups are equal. All groups vary in terms of entitativity, which is the degree to which they are
perceived to be a single, cohesive unit (Campbell, 1985). That is, in-groups can vary in terms of their perceived “groupness.” Perceiving a group as a stronger cohesive unit can affect the way observers process information about the group and evaluate the group’s potential collective influence (Lickel, Hamilton, Wieczorkowsk, Lewis, Sherman, & Uhles, 2000). Many factors may contribute to a group’s entitativity including similarity of group members (Campbell, 1958), common fate (Campbell, 1985; Moscatelli & Rubini, 2011), level of organization (Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 1998), and interconnection among group members (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998). According to Lickel et al. (2000), families and friends are examples of groups that are perceived to be high in entitativity, while groups that are perceived to be low in entitativity include classmates, or gender and ethnic affiliations.

Research has suggested that increasing a group’s perceived entitativity can lead to stronger intergroup bias among its members (e.g., Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Moscatelli & Rubini, 2011). Additionally, Lickel et al. (2000) found a strong correlation between perceived entitativity of an in-group and personal importance of group membership. As previously mentioned, individuals are more likely to act altruistically for in-group members due to in-group favoritism (e.g., Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). If increased entitativity is related to higher reports of intergroup bias and feelings of group importance (e.g., Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Lickel et al., 2000), then it is possible that individuals will be more motivated to act altruistically for in-group members from a highly entitative in-group compared to individuals from an in-group low in entitativity.

**Interpersonal closeness.** Another reason why acts of altruism are likely to increase with in-group entitativity is related to the way in which people identify with and relate to close others. Just as groups vary in terms of perceived cohesion, individual relationships can also vary in
terms of perceived interconnectedness. According to Aron, Aron, Tudor, and Nelson (1991), interpersonally close relationships can be viewed in terms of self-other merging, or including cognitive representations of the “other” in cognitive representations of the ”self.” That is, as two people become more interpersonally connected, the boundaries between their own self concept and their concept of the other become blurred, creating a shared sense of “oneness” (sometimes referred to as “we-ness,” see Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). According to Cialdini et al. (1997), family members are examples of individuals considered to be interpersonally close to the self, while classmates are examples of individuals not regarded as interpersonally close to the self. These examples mirror the list of entitative groups generated by Lickel et al. (2000), suggesting that as in-group entitativity increases, so too does interpersonal closeness. Additionally, researchers have shown that, like entitativity, various components contribute to the degree to which we perceive others as being included in the self, including shared resources (Aron et al., 1991), exchanging personal information (Aron, Melinat, Aron, Vallone, & Bator, 1997), and similarity (Aron et al., 1991; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992).

Researchers have also demonstrated that as interpersonal closeness increases, so too does likelihood of altruism (Cialdini et al. 1997, Maner & Gailliot, 2007), though the exact motivations behind these acts of altruism are debated. According to Batson (1997) and the empathy-altruism hypothesis, people engage in acts of altruism because of genuine empathic concern for another person, due in part to an ability to take on the perspective of the person in need. Additionally, Aron et al. (1991) found that perspective taking is stronger for close others, suggesting that close others may invoke greater feelings of empathy and, thus, a greater willingness to act altruistically. In a study conducted by Maner and Gailliot (2007), empathy-induced helping for close others was supported when empathic concern was found to predict
altruism for close family members, but not for strangers. Similarly, Stürmer, Snyder, and Omoto (2005) found that empathic concern predicted altruism for similar others, but not dissimilar others. That being said, the empathy-altruism hypothesis has been countered by researchers who believe altruism is the result of egoistic motivations that stem from incorporating another person in one’s sense of self. For example, Cialdini et al. (1997) found that, controlling for empathic concern, relationship closeness predicted acts of altruism, suggesting that the altruistic acts were motivated by feelings of “oneness” rather than true empathy. Thus, according to Cialdini et al., altruistic acts motivated by “oneness” cannot be considered truly altruistic because helping the other person is, in essence, helping the self.

Regardless of the motivations, research has demonstrated that acts of altruism are more likely for interpersonally close others than non-interpersonally close others (Cialdini et al. 1997, Maner & Gailliot, 2007). Additionally, as mentioned earlier, examples of interpersonally close and non-interpersonally close individuals appear to mirror examples of high and low entitativity group members. Thus, in an interrogation context, a source may be more willing to act altruistically for a high-entitativity group member than a low-entitativity group member due to feelings of interpersonal closeness.

1.2 Individual Differences

Loyalty. While it is clear that situational factors such as group membership status and level of entitativity should influence one’s decision to choose consequences to the self over consequences to the other, an individual’s disposition may also influence the decision. As previously argued, individuals are likely to maintain stronger loyalty to in-group members than to out-group members (e.g., Moreland & McMinn, 1999). Haidt and Graham (2007) offer an
explanation for the phenomenon of in-group loyalty, suggesting that in-group loyalty is an innate moral foundation that has evolved from the survival benefits of maintaining a cooperative group.

Although loyalty is often studied under the assumption that it is situationally dependent, Beer and Watson (2009) argue that interpersonal loyalty may also be dependent on dispositional traits that can be measured in terms of individual loyalty (e.g., to a friend or family member) and group loyalty (e.g., to one’s country). Similarly, Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, and Ditto (2011) argue that, although innate, people can vary in the degree to which they endorse moral foundations, including in-group loyalty.

According to Baxter et al.’s (1997) model of loyalty, when an individual maintains loyalty to one group/person, that individual is simultaneously neglecting loyalty to another group/person, which can include oneself. The demands associated with this conceptualization of loyalty could be argued to be similar to the demands of altruism. That is, both acts of loyalty and acts of altruism involve sacrificing one’s own well-being for the well-being of another. Given Beer and Watson’s (2009) and Graham et al.’s (2011) arguments, one might assume that loyalty is partially a product of one’s disposition. Furthermore, as argued above, maintaining loyalty to someone could parallel as an act of altruism. Thus, taken together this literature suggests that individuals scoring highly on loyalty measurements may be more inclined (in an interrogation context) to act altruistically and accept potential negative consequences to themselves in order to protect and maintain loyalty to their guilty group member. In other words, an individual who is highly loyal to their in-group may, for example, remain silent during an interrogation even if the result is imprisonment, in an effort to maintain loyalty to an in-group member.

Collectivism and individualism. In addition to loyalty, dimensions related to interdependence versus personal independence, specifically collectivism and individualism, may
also be related to an individual’s willingness to sacrifice his or her own well-being for the well-being of another person. According to cross-cultural psychology, members of collectivistic societies hold higher value in their identities as group members than their identities as individuals and will thus consider their own personal goals as subordinate to the goals of the group (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Conversely, individuals living in individualistic societies hold greater value in maintaining a positive self-identity than they do maintaining a positive group identity and are more likely to disassociate themselves from an in-group that requires subordination of one’s personal goals. (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

According to Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, and Lucca (1988), collectivism and individualism can be measured at the individual level, (sometimes referred to as allocentrism and idiocentrism, respectively). Like collectivistic societies, a person high in collectivism places more emphasis on group (vs. individual) goals and well-being. Similarly, a person high in individualism places more emphasis on attending to his or her own needs than the needs of the group, much like individualistic societies (Triandis et al., 1988). In related research, people high in collectivism appear to hold more positive attitudes toward in-groups (a characteristic of intergroup bias) than do people high in individualism (Lee & Ward, 1998). Thus, during an interrogation of a source, a high sense of collectivism may be more predictive of altruistic confession decisions than a high sense of individualism, given that collectivism is associated with valuing group members over the self.

1.3 Overview of the Current Studies

A review of the extant literature suggests that both situational factors such as group member characteristics and dispositional factors such as individual loyalty and collectivistic/individualistic tendencies could have an effect on a source’s motivations for
confessing guilty knowledge about another person (e.g., Beer & Watson, 2009; Lickel et al., 2000; Triandis et al., 1988; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). The purpose of the current studies is to determine the degree to which these situational and dispositional factors affect the consideration of consequences to the self and consequences to an other, and thus a source’s motivations for providing a confession. The proposed experiments will investigate this question by manipulating in-group entitativity and participant/group member similarity (a component of intergroup bias, entitativity, and interpersonal closeness), as well as measuring individual levels of loyalty, collectivism, and individualism. Specific hypotheses for each experiment will be discussed prior to the corresponding Method sections.
Chapter 2: Experiment 1

The goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate the relationship between degree of group entitativity and a source’s decision to act altruistically for a member of that group (a classmate, co-worker, close friend, or family member). The effects of personality differences (loyalty, collectivism, and individualism) on acts of altruism were also investigated. For the purposes of this experiment, two of four possible confession decisions were considered acts of altruism: choosing to withhold incriminating information or accepting personal responsibility for the crime (choosing to confess the knowledge or choosing to confess partial knowledge was not considered an act of altruism). It was hypothesized that participants would be most likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when they possessed guilty knowledge about a family member (a high-entitativity group member; Lickel et al., 2000) and least likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when they possessed guilty knowledge about a classmate (a low-entitativity group member; Lickel et al. 2000). Second, it was hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to themselves when they are being questioned about a classmate. It was also hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to the other person when they were being questioned about a family member. Finally, measures of individual loyalty, collectivism, and individualism were hypothesized to predict altruistic confession decisions such that higher loyalty and collectivism would be associated with a higher likelihood of altruistic confession decisions, while higher individualism would be associated with a lower likelihood of altruistic confession decisions.
2.1 Method

Participants. Participants were 143 undergraduate students from the participant pool of the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP). All participants were recruited through the university’s online recruitment system. Of the 143 participants recruited, 2 were excluded from analyses for being under the age of 18, and 21 participants were excluded for failing attention check questions, resulting in a final sample of 120 participants. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 41 years ($M = 20.42$ years, $SD = 4.08$ years) and were majority female (65.8%) and Hispanic (87.5%).

Design. Group member entitativity was manipulated between-subjects. Participants read a script in which they possessed incriminating information about a classmate, a co-worker, a close friend, or a close family member. According to research conducted by Lickel et al. (2000), classmates are considered low level entitativity group members, co-workers are mid-low level entitativity group members, friends are mid-high level entitativity group members, and family members are high level entitativity group members. Scripts differed only on this level of relationship.

Materials.

Consent from. Before beginning the experiment, each participant reviewed an informed consent form that explained the nature of the experiment, why the research was being conducted, and the participant’s right to choose not to participate (See Appendix A). Additionally, participants were informed that participation could be discontinued at any time. Participants were also informed that consent could be withdrawn at any time, even after the completion of the experiment, in which case the data would be removed from analysis. Participants were then instructed to type their full name into the consent form if they agreed to participate.
**Interrogation scenario.** Four highly similar interrogation scenarios were developed by the researcher for use in this experiment (see Appendix B). All participants were instructed to imagine that they possessed guilty knowledge about a classmate, a co-worker, a close friend, or a family member regarding a fictitious embezzlement scandal. Participants were then instructed to imagine that they had been contacted by the local authorities and were being questioned about this guilty knowledge. Participants were informed that not confessing the guilty knowledge about the perpetrator could result in legal implications for them, while confessing the guilty knowledge could result in legal implications for their family member.

**Dependent measures.** All participants responded to three 5-point Likert-type scales with anchors of 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree) that assessed the likelihood that they would a) confess all of the guilty knowledge, b) confess partial knowledge, and c) claim personal responsibility. After answering all of the Likert-type items, participants were asked to select one of four confession options as their final decision (confess knowledge, do not confess knowledge, confess partial knowledge, or claim personal responsibility). Additionally, participants were asked to rank-order up to three primary motivations for (not) confessing. Following the rankings, a free response item asked participants to describe any additional motivations they may have had. Finally, participants were asked to rate on two 5-point Likert-type scales with anchors of 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree) a) how much the potential for consequences to themselves weighed into their decision and b) how much the potential for consequences to the other person weighed into their decision (see Appendix C).

**Manipulation check.** Although not manipulated directly, a review of the literature suggests that perceived interpersonal closeness should vary with entitativity. Thus, closeness was

---

1 Responses for likelihood of claiming personal responsibility were significantly positively skewed. Transformations did not normalize the distribution, so this item will not be discussed further.
measured to ensure that participants’ perceived closeness was increasing as entitativity level increased. Two items were used to measure closeness. The first item, the Inclusion of the Other in the Self (IOS) scale (Aron et al., 1992), measures perceived self-other boundary overlap by presenting seven pairs of circles that overlap in varying degrees. Participants choose the pair of overlapping circles that best represents their relationship with the group member from the interrogation scenario. The second item, a measure of “we-ness” asked participants to rate on a 7-point Likert-type scale the likelihood that they would use the term “we” to describe their relationship with their group member (see Appendix C). Consistent with previous research (Cialdini et al., 1997; Maner & Gailliot, 2007), these two items were summed in analyses to form a single measure of perceived closeness. The reliability for the combined scores was high (α = .77).

**Collectivism/Individualism scales.** The collectivism / individualism scales developed by Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk and Gelfand (1995) were used in the current study (see Appendix D). The scales represent collectivism and individualism as involving horizontal and vertical components. According to Singelis et al. (1995), the horizontal dimension reflects a belief that all individuals within a society are equals. The vertical dimension, however, reflects a belief in a hierarchy of people within a society and emphasizes the importance of competition among society members. Thus, four subscales are produced by the measure: horizontal collectivism (HC), vertical collectivism (VC), horizontal individualism (HI), and vertical individualism (VI). Each subscale is made up of 8 Likert items ranging from 1(*strongly disagree*) to 9(*strongly agree*) for a total of 32 items. Scores on each subscale can range from 9 to 72, with higher scores indicating higher HC, VC, HI, and VI. Reliabilities for the HC, VC, HI, and VI subscales have
been shown to be high (.74, .68, .67, and .74, respectively; Singelis et al., 1995). Reliabilities for the HC, VC, HI, and VI subscales in this sample were .70, .52, .67, and .79, respectively.

**Individual and Group Loyalty Scale.** The Individual and Group Loyalty Scale (IGLS) is a 20 item measure of interpersonal loyalty that was developed by Beer and Watson (2009) (see Appendix E). The IGLS can be divided into two subscales: the Individual Loyalty Scale (ILS) and the Group Loyalty Scale (GLS). The ILS subscale measures loyalty to individuals such as a friend or members of one’s family. The GLS subscale measures loyalty to larger, more abstract, groups such as school and country. Because the focus of this experiment is on loyalty to individual group members, only the ILS subscale will be used. The ILS contains twelve 5-point Likert items with anchors of 1 (*strongly disagree*) and 5 (*strongly agree*). Examples of items include “I would never turn my back on a friend” and “I stand by my friends, even when they make mistakes.” Individual scores are calculated by summing the responses. Scores can range from 12 to 60 with higher scores indicating higher levels of individual loyalty. The ILS has been shown to have high reliability independent of the GLS ($\alpha = .82$). The reliability of the ILS for this sample was $\alpha = .83$.

**Demographics questionnaire.** The demographic questionnaire contained a series of items asking participants to report basic demographic information such as gender, age, race/ethnicity, education level, and socio-political orientation (see Appendix F).

**Coding scheme.** Free response data for confession motivations were categorized into one of five distinct categories by two independent coders: *concern for self, concern for other, internal motivations, innocence/avoidance of accountability, and miscellaneous.* *Concern for self* included any physical (“I do not want to go to jail”) or social (“Don't want to look like a criminal with my loved ones”) consequences to the self. *Concern for other* included physical
consequences to the other ("I didn’t want my friend to get in trouble"), but also a more abstract show of concern for the other ("Family is first"). Internal motivations included feelings of guilt ("guilty conscience") as well as moral justifications ("doing what is right"). Innocence/avoidance of accountability included claims of personal innocence ("I am innocent") as well as desires to avoid personal responsibility for the situation ("Not my problem" or "My family member should take responsibility"). Any motivations that did not fit under concern for self, concern for other, internal motivations, or innocence/avoidance of accountability were placed into a miscellaneous category. The inter-rater reliabilities of the first, second, and third ranks were .83, .74, and .74, respectively. See Appendix G for the full coding sheet and instructions to coders.

Procedure. All participants were recruited through the University of Texas at El Paso’s online recruitment system (SONA). Participation was completed through Qualtrics, an online survey program. Measures were counterbalanced such that after reading the consent form and providing informed consent, participants either completed the scenario and dependant variables first or completed the individual difference measures first. Participants read one of four interrogation scenarios which varied only in the target of the participants’ guilty knowledge (classmate, co-worker, close friend, or family member). After reading the interrogation scenario, participants responded to the three likelihood of confession questions, followed by a single item that asked them to select one final confession decision. Participants were then asked to list their top three motivations for (not) providing a confession. Subsequently, participants answered an open-ended item that asked them to list in detail any additional motivations for their confession decision. Participants also responded to the two Likert-type items that assessed the degree to which consequences to themselves and consequences to the other person factored into their final confession decision. Participants then responded to the IOS and we-ness items. When responding
to the individual difference measures, all participants completed the measures of collectivism and individualism as well as the Individual Loyalty Scale (ILS). Finally, participants completed a series of demographic questions related to gender, age, ethnicity, year in school, and political orientation. All participants were then thoroughly debriefed and thanked for their participation.

2.2 Results

Manipulation checks. Scores from the IOS and we-ness scales were summed to create a single measure of closeness. A 4 group (classmate vs. co-worker vs. friend vs. family member) one-way ANOVA was run on closeness scores to determine whether the group member manipulation resulted in different levels of perceived participant/group member closeness across conditions. The main effect of group was significant, $F(3,116) = 9.67, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .20$, such that participants reported higher levels of interpersonal closeness for the family member than for the co-worker, $t(58) = 3.96, p = .001, d = 1.02$, and classmate, $t(58) = 2.88, p = .021, d = .74$.

Similarly, participants rated significantly higher levels of interpersonal closeness for the friend than for the co-worker, $t(58) = 4.59, p < .001, d = 1.19$, and the classmate, $t(58) = 3.48, p = .004, d = .90$. There were no significant differences between the family member and friend conditions, nor were there any significant differences between the co-worker and classmate conditions (all $p$s $> .05$) (see Table 1). Because there was no differentiation between the classmate and the coworker, or between the friend and family member, in terms of perceived closeness, classmate and co-worker will be collapsed into one group (low closeness) and friend and family member will be collapsed into one group (high closeness). Analyses using four group comparisons (classmate vs. co-worker vs. friend vs. family member) as well as the collapsed group comparisons (low closeness vs. high closeness) are presented below.
Confession decision.

Altruistic confessions.

Four group comparison. It was hypothesized that participants would be most likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when they possessed guilty knowledge about a family member (a high-entitativity and high interpersonal closeness group member) and least likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when they possessed guilty knowledge about a classmate (a low-entitativity group member and low interpersonal closeness group member). To test this hypothesis final confession decisions were classified into either altruistic or non-altruistic confession decision categories. A 4 (classmate vs. co-worker vs. friend vs. family member) x 2 (altruistic vs. non-altruistic confession decision) chi-square was then run to test the association between group member and final confession decision. There was a significant association between group member and final confession decision $\chi^2(3) = 8.56, p = .04$. Cramér’s $\phi = .27$. Participants were more likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when they were being questioned about a family member than when they were being questioned about a classmate, $\chi^2(1) = 5.93, p = .015$. Cramér’s $\phi = .31$, and a co-worker, $\chi^2(1) = 5.93, p = .015$. Cramér’s $\phi = .31$. There were no other significant differences between group members (all $p$s > .05).

Percentages of participants who chose altruistic confession decisions in the classmate, co-worker, friend, and family member conditions were 20%, 20%, 33.3%, and 50%, respectively.

Collapsed comparisons. A 2 (low closeness vs. high closeness) x 2 (altruistic vs. non-altruistic confession decision) chi-square was then run to test the association between group member closeness and final confession decision. There was a significant association between group member and final confession decision $\chi^2(1) = 6.60, p = .01$. Cramér’s $\phi = .24$. Participants were more likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when they were being questioned
about a high-closeness group member than when they were being questioned about a low-closeness group member. Twenty percent of participants in the low closeness category chose an altruistic confession decision while 42% of participants in the high closeness category chose an altruistic confession decision. Total cell frequencies for both the four group and collapsed comparisons can be found in Table 2.

**Likelihood of confessions.** Given the skewness of responses to the item that assessed likelihood of claiming personal responsibility, only analyses on likelihood of confession and likelihood of confessing partial knowledge were conducted. The correlation between these two likelihood of confession items was weak ($r = -.29, p = .002$), thus these items were analyzed with ANOVA rather than MANOVA.

**Four group comparisons.** A 4 group (classmate vs. co-worker vs. friend vs. family member) ANOVA run on likelihood of confession revealed a significant effect of group member on likelihood of confession, $F(3,116) = 5.73, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .13$, with participants in the family member condition indicating significantly greater reluctance to confess than participants in the classmate, $t(58) = -3.33, p = .008, d = -.86$, and coworker, $t(58) = -3.59, p = .003, d = -.93$, conditions (see Figure 1). There was no significant difference between the friend and any other condition ($ps > .05$). A one-way (classmate vs. co-worker vs. friend vs. family member) ANOVA run on likelihood of confessing partial knowledge failed to observe a significant difference across the four groups, $F(3,116) = 1.70, p = .17, \eta_p^2 = .04$ (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).

**Collapsed comparisons.** An independent samples t-test was used to assess the effect of high and low group member closeness on likelihood of confession. A significant effect of group member closeness on likelihood of confession was observed, $t(118) = 3.91, p < .001, d = .72$ (see
Figure 2), with participants in the high closeness category showing a lower likelihood of confession than participants in the low closeness category (see Table 1). The effect of high and low group member closeness on likelihood of confessing partial knowledge was non-significant, $t(118) = -1.77, p = .08, d = -.33$.

**Motivations for confession decision.** It was hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to themselves when they were being questioned about a classmate. It was also hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to the other person when they were being questioned about a family member. To test these hypotheses participants’ ranked motivations were categorized into one of five categories by two independent coders: concern for self, concern for other, internal motivations, innocence/avoidance of accountability, and miscellaneous. However, only the first four categories will be included in analyses due to low cell frequencies in the miscellaneous category. Additionally, because of low cell frequencies across the four group member conditions, analyses will be run on the collapsed comparisons only. The analysis focuses on the primary motivations (first rank) reported by participants.2

A 2 (low closeness vs. high closeness) x 4 (concern for self vs. concern for other vs. internal motivations vs. innocence/avoidance of accountability) chi-square was used to test the association between group member and type of primary (first rank) confession motivation. There was a significant association between group member closeness and primary confession motivation, $\chi^2(3) = 13.16, p = .004$, Cramér’s $\phi’ = .35$. Follow-up analysis indicated that the effect was a result of a majority of participants in the high closeness category being motivated by

---

2 For the interested reader, analyses were run on the second rank, but this analysis was non-significant. Analysis of the third rank was significant, but this analysis suffered from low cell frequencies.
concern for the other person (39.3%) while only 9.4% of participants in the low closeness category were motivated by concern for the other person, \( \chi^2(1) = 13.02, p < .001, \text{Cramér’s } \phi' = .35. \) Although it was hypothesized that participants in the classmate condition (included in the low closeness category) would be motivated more by concern for themselves, participants in the low closeness category made their final confession decisions based upon internal motivations (43.4%) more than concern for themselves (35.8%). The difference between those motivated by concern for themselves in the high vs. low closeness categories was not significant, \( \chi^2(1) = 1.52, p = .22, \text{Cramér’s } \phi' = .12, \) nor was the difference between internal motivations in the high vs. low closeness categories, \( \chi^2(1) = 3.31, p = .069, \text{Cramér’s } \phi' = .17. \) Total cell frequencies can be found in Table 3.

**Degree of motivation.** Participants were provided Likert-type scales to assess the degree to which their decision to (not) confess was motivated by their perceptions of the consequences to themselves and consequences to the other.

**Four group comparison.** Two one-way ANOVAs assessed the degree to which consequences to the other person and consequences to themselves motivated participants’ decisions. Neither the analysis of consequences to other, \( F(3,116) = 2.32 p = .08, \eta_p^2 = .06, \) nor consequences to self, \( F(3,116) = 1.63 p = .19, \eta_p^2 = .04, \) was significant (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).

**Collapsed comparison.** Two independent samples t-tests were used to assess the effect of high and low group member closeness on the degree to which participants’ final confession decisions were motivated by consequences to the other person and consequences to themselves. A significant effect of group member closeness on consequences to the other was observed,

---

3 Percentages reflect participants included in the analyses. That is, the eleven participants who chose a miscellaneous motivation are not included in the total.
\( t(118) = -2.32, p = .02, d = -.43 \) (see Figure 3), with participants in the high closeness category showing more concern for consequences to the other person than participants in the low closeness condition (see Table 1). A significant effect of high and low group member closeness on the degree to which participants’ final confession decisions were motivated by consequences to themselves was also found, \( t(118) = 2.14, p = .04, d = .39 \) (see Figure 4), such that participants in the low closeness category showed more concern for consequences to the themselves than participants in the high closeness category (see Table 1).

**Individual difference measures.** Each participant received a single summed score on the Individual Loyalty Scale (ILS). The ILS contained twelve 5-point Likert items with anchors of 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree). Final ILS scores ranged from 35 to 60 (\( M = 50.03, SD = 5.33 \); scale \( M = 4.17, SD = .44 \)). Scores on the HC scale and the VC scale were significantly positively correlated (\( r = .31, p = .001 \)), so these scores were combined to form a single measure of collectivism (\( \alpha = .68 \) for the combined scales). The HC and VC scales each contained eight Likert items ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) for a total of 16 items. Scores for total collectivism ranged from 63 to 129 (\( M = 96.41, SD = 12.50 \); scale \( M = 5.99, SD = .84 \)). Scores on the HI and VI scales were also significantly positively correlated (\( r = .38, p < .001 \)), so these scores were combined to form a single measure of individualism (\( \alpha = .80 \) for the combined scales). The HI and VI scales each contained eight Likert items ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) for a total of 16 items. Scores for total individualism ranged from 48 to 137 (\( M = 95.97, SD = 15.43 \); scale \( M = 5.97, SD = 1.00 \)). Total collectivism and ILS scores were significantly positively correlated (\( r = .32, p < .001 \)) as were total collectivism and total individualism scores (\( r = .21, p = .02 \)). Total individualism and ILS scores were not significantly correlated (\( r = .10, p = .26 \)).
It was hypothesized a priori that individual loyalty and collectivism would positively predict altruistic confession decisions, while individualism would negatively predict altruistic confession decisions. However, given the effect of group member closeness on confession decisions, coupled with the fact that closeness, collectivism, and individualism all involve degrees of interpersonal connectedness, it was also of interest to assess whether closeness resulted in any indirect effects of collectivism and individualism on confession decisions. To test the a priori hypotheses and explore the meditational effects of closeness on collectivism and individualism, a path analysis was computed on likelihood of confessing with closeness score, ILS score, total collectivism score, and total individualism score as predictors (see Figure 5 for the overall model). A direct effect of closeness was observed on likelihood of confession, $b = - .54$, $z = - 6.75$, $p < .001$, such that greater perceived closeness was associated with a lower likelihood of confession. A direct effect of collectivism was also found on closeness, $b = .24$, $z = 2.68$, $p = .007$, such that higher collectivism was associated with greater perceived closeness. ILS score, $b = -.01$, $z = -.17$, $p = .86$, collectivism score, $b = .12$, $z = 1.35$, $p = .18$, and individualism score, $b = -.07$, $z = - .92$, $p = .36$, did not directly predict likelihood of confession. However, a significant indirect effect of collectivism was found through closeness, $b = -.13$, $z = - 2.52$, $p < .05$, such that higher collectivism was associated with a lower likelihood of confession. Having all predictors in the model accounted for 28% of the variance in likelihood of confession. The overall model provided good fit, $\chi^2(1) = 2.46$, $p = .117$, CFI = .98, GFI = .99, NFI = .96 (see Figure 6).

A similar path analysis was also run on likelihood of confessing partial knowledge with closeness score, ILS score, total collectivism score, and total individualism score as predictors (see Figure 7). A direct effect of closeness was observed on likelihood of confessing partial
knowledge, $b = .19$, $z = 2.06$, $p = .039$, such that greater perceived closeness was associated with a higher likelihood of confessing partial knowledge. A direct effect of individualism was found on likelihood of confessing partial knowledge, $b = .19$, $z = 2.16$, $p = .031$, such that higher individualism was associated with a greater likelihood of confessing partial knowledge. A direct effect of collectivism was again found on closeness, $b = .24$, $z = 2.68$, $p = .007$, such that higher collectivism was associated with greater perceived closeness. However, the indirect effect of collectivism on likelihood of partial confession was not significant, $b = .05$, $z = 1.50$, $p > .05$.

There were no direct effects of collectivism, $b = -.16$, $z = -1.69$, $p = .09$, or ILS score, $b = .12$, $z = 1.27$, $p = .21$, on likelihood of partial confession. Thus, loyalty and collectivism did not predict likelihood of partial confession. Having all predictors in the model accounted for 9% of the variance in likelihood of confessing partial knowledge. The overall model provided good fit, $\chi^2(1) = 2.46$, $p = .117$, CFI = .95, GFI = .99, NFI = .94.

Finally, a path analysis with a binary outcome was run on final confession decision (altruistic vs. non-altruistic) with closeness score, ILS score, total collectivism score, and total individualism score as predictors (see Figure 8). A direct effect of closeness was found on final confession decision, $b = .51$, $z = 6.32$, $p < .001$, such that greater perceived closeness was associated with a higher likelihood of choosing an altruistic confession decision. A direct effect of collectivism was again found on closeness, $b = .24$, $z = 2.68$, $p = .007$, such that higher collectivism was associated with greater perceived closeness. The direct effect of collectivism on final confession decision was not significant, $b = -.14$, $z = -1.62$, $p = .11$. However, the indirect effect of collectivism on final confession decision was significant, $b = .13$, $z = 2.60$, $p < .05$, such that higher collectivism was associated with a greater likelihood of choosing an altruistic confession decision. Direct effects of ILS score, $b = .05$, $z = .62$, $p = .53$, and individualism, $b = .
.11, \( z = 1.42, p = .16 \), were not significant. Having all predictors in the model accounted for 27% of the variance in final confession decision. The overall model provided good fit, \( \chi^2(1) = 2.46, p = .12 \), CFI = .97, GFI = .99, NFI = .96.

2.3 Experiment 1 Discussion

It was hypothesized that participants would be most likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when they possessed guilty knowledge about a family member (a high-entitativity group member) and least likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when they possessed guilty knowledge about a classmate (a low-entitativity group member). This hypothesis was supported with 50% of participants in the family member condition choosing an altruistic confession decision while only 20% of participants in the classmate condition chose an altruistic confession decision.

It was also hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated by a desire to avoid potential negative consequences to themselves when being questioned about a classmate. This hypothesis was not supported. Instead, most (43.4%) participants in the low-closeness category (which included the classmate condition) made their final confession decisions based on internal motivations (e.g., “guilt” or “morals”) while only 35.8% of participants in the low-closeness category were motivated by self-concern (e.g., “I don’t want to get in trouble”).

It was further hypothesized that when questioned about the actions of a family member, participants’ confession decisions would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to their family member. This hypothesis was partially supported. The majority of participants in the high-closeness category (which included the family member condition) reported that their final confession decisions were primarily motivated by concern for the other
person (39.3%). However, it should be noted that this motivation category included both consequences to the other person as well as a more abstract show of concern for the other person. The implications for this distinction will be discussed further in the general discussion. Additionally, analysis of Likert-type ratings of perceived consequences to the other and self demonstrated that high closeness led to consideration of the other while low closeness led to consideration of the self. Analyses that included the full four group design failed to demonstrate significant effects.

Finally, it was hypothesized that measures of individual loyalty and collectivism would positively predict altruistic confession decisions, while individualism would negatively predict altruistic confession decisions. This hypothesis was partially supported. While there was no direct effect of loyalty, collectivism, and individualism on confession decision, perceived closeness significantly mediated a negative effect of collectivism on likelihood of confession. A similar indirect effect was found for collectivism on final confession decision such that perceived closeness significantly mediated a positive effect of collectivism on likelihood of choosing an altruistic confession decision. Finally, significant effects of both closeness and individualism on likelihood of confessing partial knowledge were found, though these results are difficult to interpret given the ambiguity of the partial confession item. That is, it is unknown whether someone would choose to not confess partial knowledge because they would rather confess all of their knowledge (not an act of altruism) or because they would rather confess none of their knowledge (an act of altruism). The problems associated with interpreting this item will be discussed further in the general discussion.

It is also interesting to note that although four levels of group membership were manipulated the results of the closeness measure suggest that only two distinct groups were
perceived by participants. That is, there were no significant differences between the classmate and co-worker conditions, indicating that classmates and co-workers fell within the same category of perceived closeness by participants. This also appeared to be the case for the friend and family member conditions. These results were used to inform the design of Experiment 2, which investigated the degree to which dissimilarities could decrease the likelihood of altruistic confession decisions.
Chapter 3: Experiment 2

As previously mentioned, sources may be reluctant to provide guilty knowledge about an in-group perpetrator due to allegiance to that perpetrator (Cassidy, 2004). Thus, interrogators often have a vested interest in finding ways to elicit information from these uncooperative sources. One method by which an interrogator may try to reduce a source’s reluctance to cooperate is by socially distancing the source from the perpetrator by making salient dissimilarities between the source and their group member (a component of interpersonal closeness; Aron et al., 1991). Thus, the purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether an interrogator could reduce a source’s desire to act altruistically for a group member during an interrogation by mentioning dissimilarities between the source and their group member. The results of Experiment 1 suggested that acts of altruism were likely only for high-entitativity / high-interpersonal closeness group members, suggesting there may be little need for an interrogator to decrease the likelihood of altruism for low-entitativity / low-interpersonal closeness group members. Additionally, results of the closeness measures from Experiment 1 suggested no perceived differences in closeness between the friend and the family member (both high entitativity and interpersonally close group members). Thus, Experiment 2 focused on an interrogator’s ability to decrease acts of altruism for a family member only, by suggesting dissimilarities between the source and the family member (no dissimilarities, one dissimilarity, or two dissimilarities were mentioned by the interrogator). The effects of personality differences (loyalty, collectivism, and individualism) on acts of altruism were again investigated. As in Experiment 1, two of four possible confession decisions were considered acts of altruism: choosing to withhold incriminating information or accepting personal responsibility for the crime (choosing to confess the knowledge or choosing to confess partial knowledge was not considered
an act of altruism). It was hypothesized that acts of altruism would be most likely when no dissimilarities were mentioned and least likely when two dissimilarities were mentioned. Second, it was hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated more by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to themselves when they were being questioned about a two-dissimilarity family member than when they were being questioned about a no-dissimilarity family member. It was also hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated to a greater extent by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to the family member when no dissimilarities were mentioned than when two dissimilarities are mentioned. Finally, measures of individual loyalty, collectivism, and individualism were hypothesized to predict altruistic confession decisions such that higher loyalty and collectivism would be associated with a higher likelihood of altruistic confession decisions, while higher individualism would be associated with a lower likelihood of altruistic confession decisions.

3.1 Method

The materials and procedure employed in Experiment 1 were also used in Experiment 2, with the exception of minor changes to the interrogation scenario. Any changes to the stimuli and information on participants are detailed below.

Participants. Participants for Experiment 2 included 127 undergraduate students from the participant pool at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP). All participants were recruited through the university’s online recruitment system. Of the participants recruited, 37 were excluded for failing at least one of three attention check questions, resulting in 90 usable participants. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 46 years ($M = 21.12$ years, $SD = 4.53$ years) and were majority female (61.1%) and Hispanic (78.9%).
Design. Family member dissimilarity was manipulated between-subjects with scenarios differing only on number of dissimilarities between the participant and the family member mentioned by the interrogator. Participants read a scenario in which they possessed incriminating information about a family member with either no dissimilarities between the participant and the family member mentioned by the interrogator, one dissimilarity mentioned, or two dissimilarities mentioned.

Materials.

Interrogation scenario. Three highly similar interrogation scenarios were developed by the researcher for use in this experiment (See Appendix B). All participants were instructed to imagine that they possessed guilty knowledge family member regarding a fictitious embezzlement scandal. Participants were then instructed to imagine that they had been contacted by the local authorities and were being questioned about this guilty knowledge. The interrogator suggested to the participant either one or two ways in which the participant was dissimilar to their family member, or made no mention of dissimilarities. Participants were informed that not confessing the guilty knowledge about the perpetrator could result in legal implications for them, while confessing the guilty knowledge could result in legal implications for their family member.

Dependent measures. All participants responded to three 5-point Likert-type scales with anchors of 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree) that assessed the likelihood that they would a) confess all of the guilty knowledge, b) confess partial knowledge, and c) claim personal responsibility. After answering all of the Likert-type items, participants were asked to select one of four confession options as their final decision (confess knowledge, do not confess knowledge, confess partial knowledge, or claim personal responsibility). Additionally, participants were

---

4 As in Experiment 1, responses for likelihood of claiming personal responsibility were significantly positively skewed. Transformations did not normalize the distribution, so this item will not be discussed further.
asked to rank-order up to three primary motivations for (not) confessing. Following the rankings, a free response item asked participants to describe any additional motivations they may have had. Finally, participants were asked to rate on two 5-point Likert-type scales with anchors of 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree) a) how much the potential for consequences to themselves weighed into their decision and b) how much the potential for consequences to the other person weighed into their decision (see Appendix C).

**Manipulation check.** The Inclusion of the Other in the Self (IOS) scale (Aron et al., 1992) and the measure of “we-ness” used in Experiment 1 were also used in Experiment 2 to measure perceived closeness (see Appendix C). Consistent with previous research (Cialdini et al., 1997; Maner & Gailliot, 2007), these two items were summed in analyses to form a single measure of perceived closeness. The reliability for the combined scores was high (α = .72).

**Collectivism/Individualism scales.** The collectivism / individualism scales developed by Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk and Gelfand (1995) were also used in Experiment 2 (see Appendix D). Reliabilities for the HC, VC, HI, and VI subscales in this sample were .67, .55, .76, and .77, respectively.

**Individual and Group Loyalty Scale.** The Individual Loyalty Scale (ILS) developed by Beer and Watson (2009) was also used in Experiment 2 (see Appendix E). The ILS has been shown to have high reliability (α = .82). Reliability of the ILS for this sample was α = .86.

**Demographics questionnaire.** The demographic questionnaire contained a series of items asking participants to report basic demographic information such as gender, age, race/ethnicity, education level, and socio-political orientation (see Appendix F).

**Coding scheme.** Free response data for confession motivations was coded by two independent coders according to the same coding scheme used in Experiment 1. The inter-rater
reliabilities of the first, second, and third ranks were .80, .71, and .76, respectively. See Appendix G for the full coding sheet and instructions to coders.

**Procedure.** All participants were recruited through the University of Texas at El Paso’s online recruitment system (SONA). Participation was completed through Qualtrics, an online survey program. Measures were counterbalanced such that after reading the consent form and providing informed consent, participants either completed the scenario and dependant variables first or completed the individual difference measures first. Participants read one of three interrogation scenarios which varied only in amount of dissimilarities between the participant and their family member mentioned by the interrogator (none, one, or two). After reading the interrogation scenario, participants responded to the three likelihood of confession questions, followed by a single item that asked them to select one final confession decision. Participants were then asked to list their top three motivations for (not) providing a confession. Subsequently, participants answered an open-ended item that asked them to list in detail any additional motivations for their confession decision. Participants also responded to the two Likert-type items that assessed the degree to which consequences to themselves and consequences to the other person factored into their final confession decision. Participants then responded to the IOS and we-ness items. When responding to the individual difference measures, all participants completed the measures of collectivism and individualism as well as the Individual Loyalty Scale (ILS). Finally, participants completed a series of demographic questions related to gender, age, ethnicity, year in school, and political orientation. All participants were then thoroughly debriefed and thanked for their participation.
3.2 Results

**Manipulation check.** Scores from the IOS and we-ness scales were summed to create a single measure of closeness. A 3 group (no dissimilarities vs. one dissimilarity vs. two dissimilarities) one-way ANOVA was used to assess the effect of the dissimilarity manipulation on perceived closeness scores. The ANOVA was non-significant, $F(2,87) = 1.43$ $p = .25$, $\eta^2_p = .03$, suggesting that the dissimilarity manipulation did not have a significant effect on perceived participant/family member closeness. Means and standard deviations for each of the three dissimilarity groups can be found in Table 5.

**Confession decision.**

*Altruistic confessions.* It was hypothesized that participants would be most likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when no dissimilarity was suggested by the interrogator and least likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when two dissimilarities were suggested. To test this hypothesis final confession decision was collapsed into altruistic and non-altruistic confession decision categories. A 3 (no dissimilarities vs. one dissimilarity vs. two dissimilarities) x 2 (altruistic vs. non-altruistic confession decision) chi-square suggested no significant association between level of dissimilarity and final confession decision, $\chi^2(2) = .42$, $p = .813$, Cramér’s $\phi' = .07$ (see Table 6 for all cell frequencies).

*Likelihood of confession.* The correlation between the likelihood of confession and likelihood of partial confession measures was non-significant ($r = .17$, $p = .11$), thus two 3 group (no dissimilarities vs. one dissimilarity vs. two dissimilarities) one-way ANOVAs were used to assess the effect of the dissimilarity manipulation on ratings of the likelihood of full confession and likelihood of partial confession. No significant effect of dissimilarity was observed for either
measure, $F(2,87), = .09 p = .91, \eta_p^2 = .002,$ and $F(2,87), = 2.15 p = .12, \eta_p^2 = .05,$ respectively (see Table 5).

**Motivations for confession decision.** It was hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to themselves when they were being questioned about a family member with two dissimilarities. It was also hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to their family member when they were being questioned about a family member with no dissimilarities. To test these hypotheses participants’ ranked motivations were again grouped into one of five categories by two independent coders: *concern for self, concern for other, internal motivations, innocence/avoidance of accountability,* and *miscellaneous.* However, only the first three categories were included in analyses due to low cell frequencies in the *innocence/avoidance of accountability* and *miscellaneous* categories. As in Experiment 1, only results from analysis of the primary motivation (first rank) are being reported. A 3 (no dissimilarities vs. one dissimilarity vs. two dissimilarities) x 3 (“concern for self” vs. “concern for other” vs. “internal motivations”) chi-square showed no significant association between the dissimilarity manipulation and type of motivation, $\chi^2(8) = 5.15, p = .74.$ Cramér’s $\phi' = .17.$

**Degree of motivation.** Two 3 group (no dissimilarities vs. one dissimilarity vs. two dissimilarities) one-way ANOVAs were also conducted on the Likert-type items that assessed the extent to which consequences to the family member and consequences to the self motivated participants’ decisions. The dissimilarity manipulation failed to influence either variable, $F(2,87) = 1.14, p = .33, \eta_p^2 = .03,$ and $F(2,87) = .23, p = .80, \eta_p^2 = .005,$ respectively (see Table 5).

---

5 Analyses were run on the second and third ranks, but both analyses were non-significant and suffered from low cell frequencies.
Individual difference measures. Each participant received a single summed score on the ILS. The ILS contained twelve 5-point Likert items with anchors of 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree). Final ILS scores ranged from 35 to 60 ($M = 50.71$, $SD = 6.11$; scale $M = 4.23$, $SD = .51$). Scores on the HC scale and the VC scale were significantly positively correlated ($r = .40$, $p < .001$), so these scores were combined to form a single measure of collectivism ($\alpha = .71$ for the combined scales). The HC and VC scales each contained eight Likert items ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) for a total of 16 items. Scores for total collectivism ranged from 62 to 125 ($M = 99.02$, $SD = 13.36$; scale $M = 6.19$, $SD = .84$). Scores on the HI and VI scales were also significantly positively correlated ($r = .27$, $p = .012$), so these scores were combined to form a single measure of individualism ($\alpha = .78$ for the combined scales). The HI and VI scales each contained eight Likert items ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) for a total of 16 items. Scores for total individualism ranged from 70 to 141 ($M = 103.31$, $SD = 14.58$; scale $M = 6.46$, $SD = .91$). Total collectivism and ILS scores were significantly positively correlated ($r = .47$, $p < .001$). Total collectivism and total individualism scores were not significantly correlated ($r = .001$, $p = .99$), nor were total individualism and ILS scores ($r = .17$, $p = .114$).

It was hypothesized a priori that individual loyalty and collectivism would positively predict altruistic confession decisions, while individualism would negatively predict altruistic confession decisions. However, as in Experiment 1, it was of interest to assess whether closeness resulted in any indirect effects of collectivism and individualism on confession decisions. To test the a priori hypotheses and explore the meditational effects of closeness on collectivism and individualism, a path analysis was run on likelihood of confessing with closeness score, ILS score, total collectivism score, and total individualism score as predictors (see Figure 5 for the
overall model). A direct effect of individualism was found on closeness, $b = -.24, z = -2.37, p = .018$, such that higher individualism was associated with lower perceived closeness. However, there were no other direct effects. Closeness, $b = -.15, z = -1.43, p = .153$, ILS score, $b = .01, z = .12, p = .90$, collectivism score, $b = -.13, z = -1.10, p = .27$, and individualism score, $b = -.19, z = -1.78, p = .08$, did not predict likelihood of confession. Having all predictors in the model accounted for 6.6% of the variance in likelihood of confession. The overall model provided good fit, $\chi^2(1) = .998, p = .318$, CFI = 1.00, GFI = 1.00, NFI = .98.

A path analysis was also run on likelihood of confessing partial knowledge with closeness score, ILS score, total collectivism score, and total individualism score as predictors. A direct effect of individualism was again found on closeness, $b = -.24, z = -2.37, p = .018$, such that higher individualism was associated with lower perceived closeness. However, there were no other direct effects. Closeness, $b = .08, z = .79, p = .429$, ILS score, $b = -.19, z = -1.65, p = .10$, collectivism score, $b = -.11, z = -.94, p = .35$, and individualism score, $b = .16, z = 1.53, p = .13$, did not predict likelihood of confessing partial knowledge. Having all predictors in the model accounted for 8% of the variance in likelihood of confessing partial knowledge. The overall model again provided good fit $\chi^2(1) = .998, p = .318$, CFI = 1.00, GFI = 1.00, NFI = .98.

Finally, a path analysis with a binary outcome was run on final confession decision (altruistic vs. non-altruistic) with closeness score, ILS score, total collectivism score, and total individualism score as predictors. The direct effect of individualism was again found on closeness, $b = -.24, z = -2.37, p = .018$, such that higher individualism was associated with lower perceived closeness. However, there were no other direct effects. Closeness, $b = .18, z = 1.67, p = .10$, ILS score, $b = .05, z = .44, p = .66$, collectivism score, $b = .07, z = .59, p = .56$, and individualism score, $b = .15, z = 1.38, p = .17$, did not predict final confession decision. Having
all predictors in the model accounted for 6% of the variance in final confession decision. The overall model provided good fit, $\chi^2(1) = 1.00, p = .32$, CFI = 1.00, GFI = 1.00, NFI = .98.

3.3 Experiment 2 Discussion

It was hypothesized that participants would be most likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when they possessed guilty knowledge about a family member with no dissimilarities and least likely to choose an altruistic confession decision when they possessed guilty knowledge about a family member with two dissimilarities. This hypothesis was not supported. Altruistic confession decisions did not differ significantly across the three dissimilarity conditions. Additionally, the dissimilarity manipulation failed to influence the likelihood of confession or partial confession.

It was also hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to themselves when they were being questioned about a family member with two dissimilarities and motivated by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to their family member when they were being questioned about a family member with no dissimilarities. These hypotheses were not supported. Participants’ primary confession motivations did not differ across the three dissimilarity conditions. Additionally, there were no significant differences across the dissimilarity conditions in terms of the items that assessed degree to which consequences to the self and consequences to the other influenced final confession decision.

Finally, it was hypothesized that measures of individual loyalty and collectivism would positively predict altruistic confession decisions, while individualism would negatively predict altruistic confession decisions. This hypothesis was not supported. Although there was a significant direct effect of individualism on closeness, there were no significant direct or indirect
effects of loyalty, individualism, or collectivism on any of the confession variables. Thus, loyalty, individualism, and collectivism did not in any way predict altruistic confession decisions.
Chapter 4: General Discussion

The purpose of the current experiments was to investigate the effects of situational and dispositional factors on a source’s decision to confess guilty knowledge of another’s actions to an interrogator. Specifically, Experiment 1 investigated whether group members from different levels of entitative in-groups affect a source’s decision to confess or not confess the guilty actions of another person to an interrogator, as well as the source’s motivations for doing so. Additionally, Experiment 1 investigated whether individual differences such as collectivism, individualism, and loyalty affect a source’s decision to confess guilty knowledge about a perpetrator. Similarly, Experiment 2 investigated the effects of collectivism, individualism, and loyalty on confession decision, but also investigated whether group member dissimilarity could affect source confession decisions and motivations.

4.1 Group Membership and Altruistic Confessions

In Experiment 1, it was found that participants in the family member condition indicated a lower likelihood of confessing the guilty knowledge (thus incriminating their family member) than participants in the classmate condition. Additionally, when making a final confession decision, a greater number of participants chose an altruistic confession decision when being questioned about a family member (50%) than participants being questioned about a classmate (20%). Furthermore, participants’ motivations for confession decisions differed significantly for various group members. These results suggest that, as hypothesized, group members from highly entitative in-groups provide more motivation for acts of altruism than group members from low-entitativity in-groups.

The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with previous findings regarding acts of altruism for different group members. Hosch, Culhane, Jolly, Chavez, and Shaw (2011) found
that, when asked about their willingness to provide a false alibi, participants were significantly more willing to perjure themselves for a family member than for an acquaintance. However, the experiment by Hosch et al. (2011) was limited in that participants were only asked about general willingness to lie, not about willingness to lie in specific contexts. It may be the case that people are willing to give a false alibi (an act of altruism) when the risk of consequences to themselves is low, but not when the risk of consequences is high. The current experiment provided participants with a context; specifically, a context in which risk of consequences to themselves was high. Thus, the current experiment was able to identify when people are willing to accept potential negative consequences themselves in order to help a fellow group member. Given the results of Experiment 1, it appears that people are more willing to accept negative consequences for themselves when being interrogated about a group member from a high-entitativity group, but not from a low entitativity group.

Cialdini et al. (1997) also found that participants were more willing to act altruistically for family members than acquaintances (classmates, specifically). However, the current experiment was different from Cialdini et al. (1997) in that participants were responsible for the fate of their group member. Additionally, the current experiment put participants in a situation where their own self-interest was opposed to that of their group member. That is, by helping themselves participants put their group member at risk, and by helping their group member participants put themselves at risk. In Cialdini et al.’s (1997) study, participants’ acts of altruism were reactive attempts to reduce suffering rather than proactive attempts to protect against suffering, so participants were never responsible for the fate of their group member. Thus, participants did not have to choose between causing themselves harm and causing harm to their group member. By giving participants control of the situation and opposing their interest with the
interest of their group member, the current experiment was able to examine when a person’s self-interest is less of a priority than the interest of another person. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that self-interest is less of a priority than other-interest when the “other” is a group member from a high-entitativity group.

It is also interesting to note the impact that interpersonal closeness had on participants’ motivations for (not) confessing. The purpose of the closeness measure was to assess whether entititative group affiliations were differing in the manner that theory suggested: that group members from high-entitativity groups would be perceived as interpersonally closer than group members from low-entitativity groups. Although four levels of group entitativity were manipulated, the closeness measures suggested that only two distinct “closeness” (and by extension, entitative) groups were perceived by participants: classmates and co-workers comprised a low-closeness group, while friends and family members comprised a high-closeness group.

It was hypothesized that participants’ confession decisions would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to themselves when they were being questioned about a classmate and motivated more by a desire to avoid the potential negative consequences to the other person when being questioned about a family member. However, given that only two distinct closeness groups were observed, differences in motivations were found only for the high- and low-closeness groups. The effect of closeness on confession motivations may lend support to Cialdini et al.’s (1997) conclusion that acts of altruism result from self-other merging and are thus egoistic in nature. That is, altruism may be the result of including others within ourselves, so when we help others we are in essence helping ourselves. However, given that the current study did not include measures of empathy, it is impossible to
rule out Batson’s (1997) empathy-altruism hypothesis. Thus, future studies should include a measure of empathy to begin disentangling the effects of closeness and empathy on motivations for altruistic confession decisions.

Additionally, although it was hypothesized that participants being questioned about a family member (included in the high-closeness category) would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential consequences to their family member, it was found that the majority of participants in the high-closeness category were primarily motivated by an abstract concern for their relationship with their group member. In fact, of the participants who listed concern for other as their primary motivation for (not) confessing, only 18.5% mentioned an explicit desire to protect their group member from actual consequences. The remaining 81.5% of participants who listed concern for other as their primary confession motivation demonstrated a desire to protect their relationship with their group member (e.g., “family comes first” and “my friend trusted me”) rather than protecting their group member from specific negative consequences.

This desire to protect relationships with close others may be related to the idea that individuals have different and competing definitions of their own self-concept. According to Sedikides, Gaertner, and O’Mara (2011), the most prevalent self-concepts are the individual self and the relational self. The individual self refers to a unique self-definition that differentiates us from others, while the relational self reflects bonds and attachments to others and defines our role in relationships (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; Sedikides et al., 2011). Sedikides et al. (2011) found that when the interests of the individual self and the relational self compete, the individual self emerges as the primary form of self-definition. That is, people are more motivated to protect their individual self-definition than their relational self-definition. However, Sedikides et al. (2011) note that the relational self can increase in priority if it is incorporated into the individual
self due to increased interpersonal closeness, particularly through self-other merging. In the current experiment, given that participants in the high closeness category were motivated primarily by a desire to maintain a positive relationship with their group member, it may be that participants’ relational selves increased in priority (due to increased closeness) to a point that surpassed the priority of their individual self. Thus, it may be that participants were not motivated by a desire to protect their group member, but rather were motivated by a desire to protect their sense of relational self.

Additionally, although it was hypothesized that participants being questioned about a classmate (included in the low-closeness category) would be motivated by a desire to avoid the potential consequences to themselves, it was found that the majority of participants in the low-closeness category made their final confession decisions based primarily on internal motivations such as feelings of guilt and morality. Although these findings are not consistent with the original hypotheses, feelings of guilt have been found to be significant motivators for confessions (Gudjonsson & Petursson, 1991; St-Yves & Deslauriers-Varin, 2009). Thus, in the hierarchy of confession motivators, it may be the case that feelings of guilt provide more motivation for confession decisions than desires to avoid potential negative consequences to the self.

4.2 Dissimilarities and Altruistic Confessions

The findings of Experiment 2 suggested that the current manipulation of dissimilarities between participants and their family members did not provide sufficient motivation to decrease the likelihood of a source acting altruistically during an interrogation. That is, having an interrogator mention dissimilarities between a source and their family member did not affect a
source’s likelihood of (not) confessing guilty knowledge, nor did the mention of dissimilarities affect sources’ motivations for their confession decisions.

A possible explanation for the lack of significant findings in Experiment 2 is a weak manipulation of dissimilarities. In the present study, the interrogator simply mentioned perceived dissimilarities in personality and physical appearance, which may not have been considered relevant dissimilarities to participants. Although studies employing the minimal group paradigm have observed that even innocuous dissimilarities can result in intergroup bias, these studies often make salient dissimilarities between strangers, not family members (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, R, & Flament, 1971). Research has shown that family members are considered one of the most entitative in-groups (Lickel et al., 2000) and highly interpersonally close (Cialdini et al., 1997). Thus, it may be the case that the pre-established relationships between family members are too strong for dissimilarities in personality and appearance to have any effect on entitativity or intergroup bias, which could explain the lack of changes in likelihood of altruism by sources. Consistent with this notion were findings by Hosch et al. (2011), who also failed to find significant differences in likelihood of altruistic acts for twins (highly physically similar family members) and regular siblings.

This explanation for the lack of significant findings is also supported by the fact that the dissimilarity manipulation did not result in any differences in perceived closeness across the three dissimilarity conditions. As suggested in Experiment 1, increased perceived closeness may have driven the differences in confessions and confession motivations. Without significant differences in closeness across the dissimilarity conditions, it is not surprising that differences in confessions and confession motivations were not observed. It may be the case that a stronger
dissimilarity manipulation is needed to create differences in perceived closeness for family members, which could then result in differences in confessions/confession motivations.

However, it may also be the case that perceived dissimilarities will never result in decreased acts of altruism for close others. Instead, the opposite may be true. That is, making similarities (rather than dissimilarities) between a source and a perpetrator salient may be more effective in reducing acts of altruism when the source and perpetrator are interpersonally close. Research by Cialdini and Richardson (1980) suggests that individuals have an inherent desire to distance themselves from close others whose behavior reflects badly on that individual’s own self-image. By making similarities salient, a source may become more aware of his closeness to the perpetrator. If a source has incorporated the perpetrator into his self-definition, then the source may internally distance himself from the perpetrator in order to protect his own self-definition from the negativity associated with committing a crime and, thus, be more willing to confess guilty knowledge about the perpetrator.

4.3 Individual Differences

Finally, in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 measures of individual loyalty, collectivism, and individualism were hypothesized to predict altruistic confession decisions such that higher loyalty and collectivism would be associated with a higher likelihood of altruistic confession decisions, while higher individualism would be associated with a lower likelihood of altruistic confession decisions. This hypothesis was partially supported, though findings were inconsistent across experiments. In Experiment 1, none of the individual difference measures directly predicted acts of altruism. However, as hypothesized higher collectivism was associated with a higher likelihood of altruism, albeit indirectly. Increases in collectivism were associated with increases in perceived closeness, which in turn was directly related to an increased
likelihood of altruism. Although the relationship between collectivism and interpersonal closeness was not predicted, given that collectivism and closeness both involve interconnections of self and other, the association between collectivism and closeness is theoretically consistent.

Experiment 1 also found significant direct effects of closeness and individualism on likelihood of confessing partial knowledge, such that both closeness and individualism were associated with a higher likelihood of confessing partial knowledge. However, interpretation of this item is difficult given the ambiguity of the item. While participants who chose to confess partial knowledge were asked what kind of information they were providing, it is impossible to determine why participants who chose not to confess partial knowledge (or indicated a low likelihood of doing so) made that decision. That is, a person who indicated they would not confess partial knowledge may be doing so because they would rather confess all knowledge, or they could be doing so because they would rather confess no knowledge. Thus, it is impossible to know if responses to this item are consistent with the hypotheses. If this item is to be used in future studies, then participants should be asked about their motivations for not choosing a specific confession decision in addition to asking about motivations for their final decision.

Experiment 2 again failed to find any direct associations between any of the individual difference measures and altruistic confession decisions. However, individualism did significantly predict closeness, such that higher individualism was associated with lower perceived closeness. Although this finding is theoretically consistent, it is interesting to note that it was not found in Experiment 1. Similarly, the significant effect of collectivism found on closeness in Experiment 1 was not replicated in Experiment 2. These inconsistent findings may be due to problems associated with the way in which collectivism and individualism were measured. Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2001) argue that implicit cultural values may not be measurable using
declarative measures such as Likert scales. Instead, a better approach may be to prime an individual’s sense of individualism or collectivism and subsequently measure their performance on a set of dependent variables (Oyserman et al., 2001). This approach could be used in an interrogation setting by having interrogators prime sources’ with collectivistic/individualistic values and compare their willingness to act altruistically with sources whose cultural values have not been primed. If future studies use the priming approach, it may become clearer what kind of effects individualism and collectivism have on a) feelings of closeness and b) acts of altruism.

In both Experiments 1 and 2, individual loyalty failed to predict altruistic confession decisions. However, it should be noted that the ILS is a relatively new measurement of loyalty and has not been widely used in other research. It may be the case that this particular scale is not sufficient at measuring the type of loyalty that would be associated with acts of altruism. However, it may also be the case that loyalty is simply not related to a source’s willingness to act altruistically for a group member. Future studies may be able to further investigate the effects of loyalty on altruism, as well as other potential predictors, by using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) developed by Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, and Ditto (2011). This questionnaire measures the degree to which individuals value different moral constructs, including loyalty to in-group members. However, because the MFQ measures additional moral constructs such as fairness and reciprocity, researchers could explore other potential predictors of altruism.

Finally, the fact that closeness was the only direct predictor of altruism in Experiment 1 again lends support to the idea that perceived closeness was the driving explanation for differences in confession decisions and confession motivations. Although this finding was not replicated in Experiment 2, the lack of significance was likely due to the fact that there was
limited variability in the measure given there were no differences in closeness across any of the three dissimilarity conditions. Future studies should attempt to replicate the findings of Experiment 1. However, as previously mentioned, a measure of empathy may also be useful in determining why closeness was significantly associated with altruistic confession decisions.

4.4 Additional Future Directions

As previously discussed, the dissimilarity manipulation in Experiment 2 may not have been effective due to the degree of closeness between family members. Additionally, given that very few participants acted altruistically for the classmate and co-worker in Experiment 1, low-entitativity/low-interpersonal closeness group members are of little further interest, as these group members are already providing little motivation for sources to withhold information. Thus, future studies should focus on mid-level group members, such as sports teammates (Lickel et al., 2000). An in-group member neither too high nor low in entitativity or interpersonal closeness may provide sufficient motivation for altruistic acts when the source and that group member are similar, but not when they are dissimilar.

However, it should be noted that interrogators may still have a vested interested in reducing a source’s willingness to act altruistically for highly close group members. Thus, future studies should also investigate different methods of distancing sources from highly close group members. For example, although Sedikides et al. (2011) found that the relational self becomes more of a motivator as closeness increases, priming a source’s sense of individual self may be effective in restoring the individual self as the primary motivator, thus reducing the likelihood of altruistic confession decisions.

Additionally, the current experiments used theories of group membership and interpersonal closeness to investigate when a source would be willing to act altruistically for
another *individual* during an interrogation. However, there may be incidences when a source is being interrogated about *group* activity rather than an individual’s activity. For example, in the case of *United States vs. Farah* (2012), the defendant was charged with contempt of court for refusing to testify against a group of sex traffickers, not an individual. Thus, it may be of interest to begin investigating when a source is likely to withhold information about group activity rather than an individual’s activity.

The findings of Experiment 1 supported Sedikides et al.’s (2011) idea that the relational self becomes relevant as the other’s inclusion in the self increases. In addition to the relational self, researchers have identified a third self: the collective self (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; Sedikides et al., 2011). The collective self reflects valued membership in social groups and stems from bonds to in-group members that are formed based upon common attributes that differentiate in-group members from out-group members (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; Sedikides et al., 2011). Sedikides et al. found that, of the three selves (individual, relational, and collective), the collective self is subordinate to and less of a motivator than the individual and relational selves. However, if the relational self becomes more relevant as self-other merging increases (interconnectedness at the individual level), the collective self may become more relevant as entitativity increases (interconnectedness at the group level). If increasing entitativity does in fact result in a more relevant collective self, a source may be more willing to act altruistically for a highly entitative group in order to protect the source’s sense of collective self. Thus, future research should investigate the effects of entitativity on a source’s willingness to act altruistically for a *group* rather than an *individual*.

Finally, the current experiments may have been limited by the use of scenarios rather than a behavioral paradigm. Participants were simply asked to predict how they would react in
the given situation, so at this point is difficult to assess whether their predictions would match their actions if they were placed in an analogous situation. In fact, findings by Swanner and Beike (2010) suggest that increased closeness does not have an effect on a source’s willingness to confess guilty knowledge during a live interrogation. However, Swanner and Beike induced closeness experimentally through the use of “getting to know you” questions that were answered by the participant (the source) and a confederate (the target of the interrogation). As Swanner and Beike point out, experimentally inducing closeness may not result in the same degree of closeness experienced with friends and family members, and this may be the degree of closeness required to produce a reluctance to confess guilty knowledge. The results of Experiment 1 support this claim given that participants in the family member and friend conditions were more likely to act altruistically (i.e. less likely to confess) than participants in the classmate and co-worker conditions. Thus, the results of these experiments can inform future studies that wish to investigate source motivations in experimental paradigms. Rather than inducing closeness experimentally, future studies might use pre-established relationships, such as friends or family members, to determine whether these types of close relationships truly do provide sufficient motivation for a source to resist an interrogation.

4.5 Conclusion

Overall, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that a source’s motivations for choosing to cooperate with or resist an interrogation differ depending on who the source is being interrogated about. Thus, interrogators should be cognizant of who a source has information about and how that other person may be affecting the source’s motivations for providing (or not providing) a confession of guilty knowledge. Additionally, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that the practice of distancing sources from their group members by suggesting dissimilarities may not be
effective in changing a source’s confession motivations. Instead, having interrogators prime a
source’s sense of individualism or collectivism may be effective at changing feelings of
closeness, thus changing a source’s willingness to cooperate. Future studies are needed to
replicate the effects of collectivism and individualism on perceived closeness and determine
whether the results of the current experiments will replicate during live interrogations.
References


59


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Likelihood of Confession</th>
<th>Likelihood of Partial Confession</th>
<th>Consequences to Self</th>
<th>Consequences to Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M(SD)</td>
<td>M(SD)</td>
<td>M(SD)</td>
<td>M(SD)</td>
<td>M(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Closeness</td>
<td>4.72(2.60)</td>
<td>4.15(0.84)</td>
<td>2.63(1.41)</td>
<td>3.82(1.14)</td>
<td>2.75(1.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classmate</td>
<td>5.10(2.64)</td>
<td>4.10(0.80)</td>
<td>2.70(1.44)</td>
<td>3.87(1.07)</td>
<td>2.67(1.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-worker</td>
<td>4.33(2.55)</td>
<td>4.20(0.89)</td>
<td>2.57(1.41)</td>
<td>3.77(1.22)</td>
<td>2.90(1.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Closeness</td>
<td>7.47(3.09)</td>
<td>3.38(1.26)</td>
<td>3.07(1.26)</td>
<td>3.35(1.25)</td>
<td>3.27(1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>7.67(3.06)</td>
<td>3.57(1.28)</td>
<td>2.83(1.26)</td>
<td>3.27(1.34)</td>
<td>3.43(0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Member</td>
<td>7.27(3.16)</td>
<td>3.20(1.24)</td>
<td>3.30(1.24)</td>
<td>3.43(1.17)</td>
<td>3.17(1.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Member</td>
<td>Altruistic</td>
<td>Non-Altruistic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Closeness</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classmate</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-worker</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Closeness</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Member</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Member</td>
<td>Concern for Self</td>
<td>Concern for Other</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Innocence/Avoidance</td>
<td>Misc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Closeness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classmate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-worker</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Closeness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Member</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

Confession Motivation Frequencies Across Group Member Conditions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dissimilarity Condition</th>
<th>Closeness M(SD)</th>
<th>Likelihood of Confession M(SD)</th>
<th>Likelihood of Partial Confession M(SD)</th>
<th>Consequences to Self M(SD)</th>
<th>Consequences to Other M(SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Dissimilarities</td>
<td>7.73(2.69)</td>
<td>3.43(1.19)</td>
<td>3.23(1.33)</td>
<td>3.23(1.38)</td>
<td>3.60(.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Dissimilarity</td>
<td>8.20(3.06)</td>
<td>3.57(1.31)</td>
<td>2.73(1.36)</td>
<td>3.17(1.39)</td>
<td>3.53(1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Dissimilarities</td>
<td>6.90(3.27)</td>
<td>3.47(1.22)</td>
<td>3.40(1.19)</td>
<td>3.40(1.33)</td>
<td>3.20(1.24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5

*Final Confession Decision Frequencies Across Dissimilarity Conditions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dissimilarity Condition</th>
<th>Altruistic</th>
<th>Non-Altruistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Dissimilarities</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Dissimilarity</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Dissimilarities</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6

*Confession Motivation Frequencies Across Dissimilarity Conditions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dissimilarity Condition</th>
<th>Concern for Self</th>
<th>Concern for Other</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>Innocence/Avoidance</th>
<th>Misc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Dissimilarities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Dissimilarity</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Dissimilarities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Likelihood of confession across group member conditions. Significant differences were found between the classmate and family member conditions and the co-worker and family member conditions ($ps < .01$).
Figure 2. Likelihood of confession across perceived closeness categories. A significant difference was found between the low and high closeness categories ($p < .001$).

Figure 3. Degree that consequences to the other motivated final confession decision across closeness categories. A significant difference was found between the low and high closeness categories ($p < .05$).
Figure 4. Degree that consequences to the self motivated final confession decision across closeness categories. A significant difference was found between the low and high closeness categories ($p < .05$).
Figure 5. Generic model being tested to assess the direct and indirect effects of closeness, collectivism, individualism, and loyalty on three dependent measures of confession.
Figure 6. Path model showing significant direct effect of closeness and significant indirect effect of collectivism on likelihood of confession.
Figure 7. Path model showing significant direct effects of closeness and individualism on likelihood of partial confession.
Figure 8. Path model showing significant direct effect of closeness and significant indirect effect of collectivism on likelihood of altruism.
Appendix A: Participant Consent Form

University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) Institutional Review Board
Informed Consent Form for Research Involving Human Subjects

Protocol Title: Perceptions of Interrogations
Principal Investigator: Julia LaBianca
UTEP: Psychology

In this consent form, “you” always means the study subject.

1. Introduction

You are being asked to take part voluntarily in the research project described below. Please take your time making a decision and feel free to discuss it with your friends and family. Before agreeing to take part in this research study, it is important that you read the consent form that describes the study. Please ask the study researcher or the study staff to explain any words or information that you do not clearly understand.

2. Why is this study being done?

You have been asked to take part in a research study of individual perceptions of interrogations. Approximately 90 students will be enrolling in this study at UTEP. You are being asked to be in the study because you have expressed an interest in doing so, but you are not required to participate. If you decide to enroll in this study, your involvement will last about 20 minutes.

3. What is involved in the study?

If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete two personality measures. You will then read a brief interrogation scenario imagining that you are the person being interrogated. After reading the interrogation scenario you will be asked to decide whether or not you would confess the information to the interrogator. Finally, you will be asked to complete a standard demographic questionnaire.

4. What are the risks and discomforts of the study?

There are no known risks associated with this research.

5. What will happen if I am injured in this study?

The University of Texas at El Paso and its affiliates do not offer to pay for or cover the cost of medical treatment for research related illness or injury. No funds have been set aside to pay or reimburse you in the event of such injury or illness. You will not give up any of your legal rights by signing this consent form. You should report any such injury to Julia LaBianca at (440) 667-
6. Are there benefits to taking part in this study?

There will be no direct benefits to you for taking part in this study; however, your participation will contribute to the understanding of how people perceive interrogations. For your participation, you will receive credit in your psychology class.

7. What other options are there?

You have the option not to take part in this study. There will be no penalties involved if you choose not to take part in this study.

8. Who is paying for this study?

This study has not received funding.

9. What are my costs?

There are no direct costs. You will be responsible for travel to and from the research site and any other incidental expenses.

10. Will I be paid to participate in this study?

You will not be paid for taking part in this research study.

11. What if I want to withdraw, or am asked to withdraw from this study?

Taking part in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose not to take part in this study. If you do not take part in the study, there will be no penalty.

If you choose to take part, you have the right to stop at any time. However, we encourage you to talk to a member of the research group so that they know why you are leaving the study. If there are any new findings during the study that may affect whether you want to continue to take part, you will be told about them.

The researcher may decide to stop your participation without your permission, if he or she thinks that being in the study may cause you harm.

12. Who do I call if I have questions or problems?

You may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may call Julia LaBianca at (440) 667-6565 or e-mail her at jlabianca@miners.utep.edu.
If you have questions or concerns about your participation as a research subject, please contact the UTEP Institutional Review Board (IRB) at (915) 747-8841 or irb.orsp@utep.edu.

13. What about confidentiality?

Your participation in this study is confidential. None of the information will identify you by name. It will not be possible to match your data to you in any way. All records will be kept in a locked file. The results of this research study may be presented at meetings or in publications; however, your identity will not be disclosed in those presentations.

15. Authorization Statement

I have read each page of this paper about the study (or it was read to me). I know that being in this study is voluntary and I choose to be in this study. I know I can stop being in this study without penalty.

Participant Name: ___________________________ Date: __________
Participant Signature: _________________________ Time: __________

Consent form explained/witnessed by: ________________
Signature

Printed name: ________________________________
Date: __________ Time: __________
Appendix B: Interrogation Scenarios

Experiment 1

Please read the following interrogation scenario. Imagine that you are the one being interrogated and that all of the information presented is true.

Imagine that over the past few weeks you have been volunteering to help with a fundraiser for a local charity. One day you are working alongside a classmate/co-worker from your part time job/close friend/close family member and the two of you strike up a conversation. During the course of the conversation your classmate/co-worker/close friend/close family member admits to you that over the past few weeks they have been stealing some money from the fundraiser in order to pay some overdue bills. They explain that money has been tight lately and ask you not to tell anyone because they’re worried about getting in trouble with the authorities and potentially losing their job.

A few days later you’re contacted by the local police department. You learn that the authorities have been notified that money was stolen from the fundraiser where you had volunteered. The police have been notified that you handled some of the stolen money and therefore have reason to believe you may have had some involvement. The police bring you in for questioning and ask that you confess any knowledge that you may have about the scandal, stating that if you do not confess anything they may have reason to believe that you are not responsible for the stolen money.

Take a moment to imagine what it would be like to be in this situation. What would you be thinking? How would you be feeling?

Experiment 2

Please read the following interrogation scenario. Imagine that you are the one being interrogated and that all of the information presented is true.

Imagine that over the past few weeks you have been volunteering to help with a fundraiser for a local charity. One day you are working alongside a close family member and the two of you strike up a conversation. During the course of the conversation your family member admits to you that over the past few weeks they have been stealing some money from the fundraiser in order to pay some overdue bills. They explain that money has been tight lately and ask you not to tell anyone because they’re worried about getting in trouble with the authorities and potentially losing their job.

A few days later you’re contacted by the local police department. You learn that the authorities have been notified that money was stolen from the fundraiser where you had volunteered. The police have been notified that you handled some of the stolen money and therefore have reason
to believe you may have had some involvement. The police bring you in for questioning and ask that you confess any knowledge that you may have about the scandal, stating that if you do not confess anything they may have reason to believe that you are not responsible for the stolen money. (While questioning you the interrogator points out that there are quite a few differences between you and your family member. He states that, “Your personalities seem very different.” “The two of you don’t even look similar.”)

Take a moment to imagine what it would be like to be in this situation. What would you be thinking? How would you be feeling?
Appendix C: Dependent Measures

The police have asked you to confess any knowledge you have about the stolen money. Given the information you have just read and assuming you do indeed possess information, what is the likelihood that you would choose each of the following confession decisions:

2. I would confess my knowledge of the stolen money.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree                                      Agree
Completely                                               Completely

3. I would confess SOME of my knowledge of the stolen money.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree                                      Agree
Completely                                               Completely

4. I would claim PERSONAL responsibility for the stolen money.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree                                      Agree
Completely                                               Completely

5. If you could only choose ONE, what would your decision be?

____Confess knowledge
____Do not confess knowledge
____Confess partial knowledge
Please specify______________________________________
____Claim personal responsibility

6. Please list the top THREE things that motivated your decision:
1. ____________________________________________
2. ____________________________________________
3. ____________________________________________

7. What else has motivated your decision? Please be as detailed as possible:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
8. How much did the potential consequences to YOU influence your decision?

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Not at all                                                  Completely

9. How much did the potential consequences to the OTHER PERSON influence your decision?

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Not at all                                                  Completely

10. Considering yourself as Self and your classmate/co-worker/friend/family member as the Other, please circle the picture below that best describes the way you see the relationship between you and your classmate/co-worker/friend/family member.

11. How likely would you be to use the term ‘we’ to characterize you and your classmate/co-worker/friend/family member?

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Very Unlikely                                                  Very Likely
Appendix D: Horizontal and Vertical Collectivism and Individualism Scale

Please read the following items carefully. For each item you will be asked to provide a rating indicating the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each statement. Please be as honest as possible.

1. I prefer to be direct and forthright with people.

   1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
   Strongly    Strongly
   Disagree    Agree

2. My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me.

   1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
   Strongly    Strongly
   Disagree    Agree

3. I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity

   1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
   Strongly    Strongly
   Disagree    Agree

4. Winning is everything.

   1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
   Strongly    Strongly
   Disagree    Agree

5. One should live one’s life independently of others.

   1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
   Strongly    Strongly
   Disagree    Agree

6. What happens to me is my own doing.

   1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
   Strongly    Strongly
   Disagree    Agree
7. I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

8. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

9. It is important to maintain harmony within my group.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

10. It is important that I do my job better than others.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

11. I like sharing little things with my neighbors.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

12. I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

13. We should keep our aging parents with us at home.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
14. The well-being of my co-workers is important to me.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

15. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

16. If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

17. Children should feel honored if their parents receive a distinguished award.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

18. I often “do my own thing.”

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

19. Competition is the law of nature.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree

20. If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
21. I am a unique individual.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                    Strongly
Disagree                     Agree

22. To me, pleasure is spending time with others.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                    Strongly
Disagree                     Agree

23. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                    Strongly
Disagree                     Agree

24. I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                    Strongly
Disagree                     Agree

25. I like my privacy

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                    Strongly
Disagree                     Agree

26. Without competition it is not possible to have a good society.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                    Strongly
Disagree                     Agree

27. Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                    Strongly
Disagree                     Agree
28. I feel good when I cooperate with others.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                                                                                       Strongly
Disagree                                                                                      Agree

29. I hate to disagree with others in my group.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                                                                                       Strongly
Disagree                                                                                      Agree

30. Some people emphasize winning; I’m not one of them.*

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                                                                                       Strongly
Disagree                                                                                      Agree

31. Before taking a major trip, I consult with most members of my family and many friends.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                                                                                       Strongly
Disagree                                                                                      Agree

32. When I succeed, it is usually because of my abilities.

1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7------------8------------9
Strongly                                                                                       Strongly
Disagree                                                                                      Agree

*Reverse coded
Appendix E: Individual Loyalty Scale

Please answer the following items by selecting the appropriate number:

1. I would not betray someone’s trust.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree                                      Agree
Completely                                               Completely

2. If I make a promise to a friend, I will keep it.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree                                      Agree
Completely                                               Completely

3. People can always count on me.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree                                      Agree
Completely                                               Completely

4. I stand by my friends, even when they make mistakes.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree                                      Agree
Completely                                               Completely

5. I consider myself to be a loyal person.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree                                      Agree
Completely                                               Completely

6. I am always ready to come to the aid of a friend.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree                                      Agree
Completely                                               Completely
7. I would sacrifice my time and money to help a friend.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree Agree
Completely Completely

8. I am concerned about the well-being of my friends.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree Agree
Completely Completely

9. I will defend my friends against criticism, even when they are not present.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree Agree
Completely Completely

10. I can still be a friend to someone who does things that I dislike.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree Agree
Completely Completely

11. It is important for me to keep in touch with old friends.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree Agree
Completely Completely

12. I would never turn my back on a friend.

1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5
Disagree Agree
Completely Completely
Appendix F: Demographic Information Sheet

1. Your Gender:  ____ male
                ___ female

2. Your Age:    ___ years

3. Your Race/Ethnicity:  ___ African American
                        ___ Asian
                        ___ Hispanic (*please specify ___________
                        ___ White (Caucasian)
                        ___ Other: ____________

4. Year in college: ___ first year
                    ___ second year
                    ___ third year
                    ___ fourth year
                    ___ fifth year or above

5. Your Major(s):  ___________________________________
                    ___________________________________

6. Current Psychology Course(s):  ___________________________________
                    ___________________________________

7. First Language:  ___ Spanish
                    ___ English
                    ___ Other: ____________

8. Second Language: ___ Spanish
                    ___ English
                    ___ Other: ____________
                    ___ No second language
9. Please rate your position on most social and political issues by selecting one of the numbers on the line below:

1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7
Extremely Liberal        Middle of the Road        Extremely Conservative

12. How did you hear about this study?
Appendix G: Coding Sheet for Confession Motivations

1. Concern for the Self
   Anything that demonstrates concern for what could happen to the SELF (the participant). This can include physical consequences (going to jail, being arrested, etc) and social consequences (I don’t want my family to think badly of me). Concern for self is when someone is concerned about what could happen to them, like going to jail, getting a bad record, etc.

   Ex: “I don’t want to be punished,” “I don’t want the blame on me”

2. Concern for the Other
   Anything that demonstrates concern for the person who actually stole the money. Again, this can include physical consequences (I didn’t want my friend to get in trouble), but also a more abstract show of concern (i.e. I am loyal to my friends). However, they must be showing concern for the person with whom they worked. This category does not include concern for people not involved in the crime (e.g., “my children”).

   Ex: “My friend trusted me,” “Loyalty,” “To protect my friend,” “Family comes first,” “Friendship”

3. Internal motivations
   There are any internal motivations that are related to the crime, not the other person. This category is meant to catch anything that involves someone's sense of right and wrong when it comes to doing something bad, like stealing, hurting a charity, lying to the police, or maintaining their own integrity.

   Ex: “Guilt,” “It’s the right thing to do,” “Morals,” “Stealing from a charity,” “Justice”

4. Avoidance of accountability/innocence
   This category includes anytime someone cites their own innocence as a reason for their decision, or says that it's the other person's responsibility (or the police's responsibility) to find out/say what happened. These are also the people who say something like it wouldn't be fair for them to confess to something they didn't do (or if they just say fairness), or say that the other person needs to be the one to confess to what they did. This does NOT include mentioning their own responsibility for telling the authorities. That would go under internal. Basically,
these are the people who think that, because they didn't do anything, this isn't their problem/their innocence will save them.

Ex: “I didn’t do anything,” “The other person needs to take responsibility,” “I don’t want to be involved,” “Police’s responsibility to find out what happened” “I’m innocent”

5. **Miscellaneous**

Anything that doesn’t fit into the other categories.

Ex: “Police involvement,” “Upset that I was put in this situation”
Curriculum Vita

Julia LaBianca was born on November 27th, 1987 near San Francisco, California. The first and only daughter of Mindy and Tony LaBianca, she grew up outside of Cleveland, Ohio. Immediately after graduating from Strongsville High School in 2006, Julia attended Coastal Carolina University in Conway, South Carolina where she majored in Psychology and minored in Pre-Law. During the summer of 2008 Julia completed an internship with the Horry County Courthouse where she worked with the local drug court and victim’s advocacy center. She graduated summa cum laude in December of 2009 and received the President’s Award for attaining the highest cumulative GPA in her graduating class.

After receiving her B.S. in Psychology, Julia moved to El Paso, Texas where she has been and continues to work on her Ph.D. in Legal Psychology at the University of Texas at El Paso. She currently works in the lab of Dr. Christian Meissner where she studies different methods of interrogations and investigative interviewing. Julia’s research interests also include effects of Fifth Amendment usage on juror’s perceptions of a defendant’s guilt.