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An Interactive Assessment Of Democracy: Economic And Cultural Determinants Of Democratic Development

Won Ha Reyes Gonzalez
University of Texas at El Paso, wonhagonzalez@gmail.com

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AN INTERACTIVE ASSESSMENT OF DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL

DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

WON HA GONZALEZ

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

APPROVED:

_____
Taeko Hiroi, Ph.D., Chair

_____
Charles Boehmer, Ph.D.

_____
Larry A. Valero, Ph.D.

_____
Patricia D. Witherspoon, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School

AN INTERACTIVE ASSESSMENT OF DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL

DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

By

WON HA GONZALEZ, B.A.

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Introduction

Of all the fascinating concepts that exist in the field of comparative politics, there are few that have as resounding of an impact as that of democracy. Even before the days of the American and French revolutions, influential figures have debated the merits of democracy as a form of governance. While the early conceptions of democracy were dismissed by early philosophers as "mob rule" and oppression by the majority, democracy has since gained widespread acceptance. Today, the idea of democracy has gained so much popularity that states who are arguably non-democratic insist on labeling themselves as democracies in their official titles. Western democratic politicians extol the values of democracy and offer the spread of democracy throughout the world as a means to create peace and development. The findings of democratic peace theory and several economic development theories lend credence to these politicians' claims.

With the emergence of the Bush Doctrine, democratic regime change became an important component of that administration's foreign relations policy goals. However, one can easily argue that states can "change" to democracies in name only. In order to truly achieve the effects that result from democratic peace, states that interact with each other must both have high levels of democracy in action, not solely in institutional definition. If the spread of democracy is indeed important for the spread of peace and development throughout the world, we must attempt to understand what causes development of democratic practices.

Several theories have been created in order to explain democratic development. These theories cover a wide range of ideas that include economic explanations (Lipset 1959, Przeworski et al. 2000) and cultural explanations (Almond and Verba 1965, Inglehart and Welzel 2003). However, these theories often lack a solid causal mechanism for the emergence of

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democracies. Economic based theories, such as modernization theory appeared to have a clear causal mechanism for the emergence of democracy. However, later studies have emerged to counter this claim finding that economic development helped democracies to survive but did not improve odds of democratic emergence (Przeworski et al 2000).

Given that separate economic and cultural explanations have not completely borne out, a model that incorporates both the economic and cultural determinants must be used in order to find the cause for greater levels of democracy. Using cultural modernization theory as the foundation, this thesis will argue that both economic and cultural determinants must be considered simultaneously. Socioeconomic development in and of itself is a necessary condition for democratic development, but not a sufficient condition. Socioeconomic development should lead to changes in the values of the people within a state. Because the quality of life has improved for the average person within a state that is developing economically, these changes in the values of the people within the state should lead to changes in the level of democracy in that state, as they no longer need to focus their attention on matters of survival. As economies development and values move more towards democratic values, the level of democracy of a state should become higher.

What follows in the next chapter will be a thorough discussion of the literature of democratic development. Because the literature of democratic development is so expansive, this thesis will focus on what is often known as modernization theory. In the discussion of modernization theory, the inference on the importance of culture will also be discussed. Along with these components of modernization theory, a review of the literature that asserts the importance of culture's influence on democratic development will be made.

From there, this thesis will move on to discuss how this author believes the literature on democratic development can be improved and show the results of the models tested using this line of thought. Chapter 2 will introduce a way of determining whether economic development and culture can be simultaneously influencing democratic development. The interactive model of modernization theory will be discussed there. Chapter 3 will then discuss the data used and the methodology employed to create this interactive framework of modernization theory.

Chapter 4 will focus on the analysis of the models used test the interactive framework and will discuss what the implications of the outcomes are. The findings of this chapter add further support for the notion that economic development is good for democratic development. However, the findings also suggest that culture may not have as strong an influence on democratic development as many scholars had thought. This thesis will end with a summary of the outcome and suggest why the results are the way are and how future scholars or policy makers can use these results as a guide to for action.

Chapter 1: A Look at Democratic Development

Economic and cultural explanations for the varying levels of democracy throughout the world have surfaced as two major research points for comparativists. This is not surprising considering that many other theories in the field of political science lend credence to the important role of both economic motivation and personal values. However, the problem with separating these two factors is not the fact that they fail to explain the phenomenon of democracy, but it is in the fact that they fail to explain the phenomenon in a wholly satisfying manner. That is, while each field has generated interesting findings about levels of democracy, the separate fields have only explained bits and pieces of the phenomenon. This thesis argues that the reason for this is that economic and cultural determinants cannot be separated when discussing the level of a democracy in a state.

1.1 Economic Focus

There has been a great deal of work on what has been labeled as "modernization theory." This economic theory of democratic emergence, as well as theories that branch out from the core theory, is most often attributed to Seymour Martin Lipset (1959). This theory argues that societies go through a progression of economic development where at a certain point a new form of government needs to be instituted in order to effectively run society. All societies start as immature, traditional societies, but as they become wealthier, they evolve into mature, modern societies. Once they have become modern, a new form of government, democracy, is needed as dictatorships are no longer sustainable in this environment as they lose control of their effectiveness thanks to access to more advanced technologies for the average citizen.

The structural argument for why democratic development is so high in a wealthy country mainly revolves around the expansion of the middle class. As a society becomes wealthy, a

growing segment of the population will then have access to the resources needed in order to attain higher education, thus creating a more intellectually sophisticated population. Along with education levels rising in society, a developing society will also see increasing access to information. That is, individuals in developing societies will be able to have more access to news thanks to the wealth attained in a country that can go to purchasing radios and televisions. For the wealthiest of countries, individuals now have access to news, and now through the World Wide Web (Lipset 1959, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).

All of this culminates in a growing middle class that is knowledgeable about their environment, which place demands on the regime of the state in order to gain more access to resources. For some scholars, like Edward N. Muller, this means that the level of economic inequality plays a vital role in the emergence and development of a democracy (1995). Muller argues that the presence of economic inequality shows the absence of a large middle class and that this inequality is an unhealthy environment for the development of democracy. Muller states, "If redistributive policies are blocked in the legislature or are not even proposed, then the subordinate classes in the legitimacy of the democratic process will be eroded" (1995, 968). He then goes on to argue that these segments of society will just as likely turn to an authoritarian regime to rule society.

Scholars (Lipset 1959, Przeworski, et al. 2000) have pointed out that this framework suggests that on top of wealthy countries having higher levels of democracy, wealthy democracies are also more likely to survive and sustain high democracy levels. However, this implication is not necessarily true. Przeworski, et al. finds that wealth has no determining factor on when democracies emerge and how they develop (2000). The authors use Latin America as an example of a region that experimented with democracy in conditions that are not conducive to

the development of democracy. The region, as a whole, was underdeveloped and many Latin American countries experienced a high level of political instability as dictatorships were continuously overthrown, often replaced by democracies. Wealth, in these cases, was not a major factor in the emergence of the new democratic regimes that often followed the fall of dictators. This example, as well as their statistical models, point to a problem with the initial framework of modernization theory, which assumes that there is only one reason and mechanism for the emergence of democracies, economic development (Munck 1994, 361). Przeworski, et al. continue this line of thought by arguing that many European countries and Argentina are examples of states where democracy emerged as a result of, not economic development, but war (2000, 89) or the death of a dictator (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 158).

Przeworski, et al. do however, find that there is a high correlation between a regime's wealth and its likelihood of survival. That is, the greater wealth that a state has, the more likely that the regime in power will continue to rule. While, at first glance, this finding may seem like validation for the "survival" portion of modernization theory, it turns out to be a double-edged sword that also inflicts some damage to the theory. The authors determined that the probability that dictatorships survive, along with democracies, increase once the country reaches a certain level of wealth, $7000 GDP per capita. The authors' models show that dictatorships do indeed grow more unstable as wealth in the country accumulates. However, once this threshold is met, dictatorship survivability grows. This seems to be precisely what is occurring in quickly developing nations like Russia, China, and Singapore. As Przeworski, et al. assert, "with 25 dictatorships surviving in wealthy countries and 36 falling in poor ones, the causal power of development in generating democracies cannot be very strong" (2000, 94).

This seems to be precisely what is occurring in quickly developing nations like Russia, China, and Singapore. These examples can be cited as evidence that some alterations need to be made to the basic form of modernization theory. It has been argued in a case study of Russian political development that the Russian state has developed into an "illiberal" regime, rather than an authoritarian regime (Robinson 2000). The reason for this stems from the fact that the state is not strong enough to collect taxes from each individual in the society. Unlike Western capitalist states, whose governments were able to evolve along with the international market, "late developing states are often illiberal, if not authoritarian, because they have to compensate for their weaknesses as economic managers" (2000, 1393).

However, according to World Bank economic indicators, the Russian market has continually grown from 1999-2005 (World Bank 2010). It seems unlikely that such impressive growth can be attributed to a state that has so little control over its national market. This leads us back to modifying modernization theory to account for why late, quickly developing states are often not turning the page towards democracy. To address this problem, a conditional hypothesis has been generated to answer the issue of stability of regimes at high levels of economic development, regardless of regime type. By creating a conditional model, Ryan Kennedy was able to show that high levels of economic development is a stabilizing factor for regime, but if any major institutional change occurs, the change will likely be to a democratic regime (2010).

Modernization theory's inability to fully explain democratic emergence and higher levels of democracy can be attributed to the fact that it lacks an important component, culture. Institutions cannot be effective if those who live under its authority do not have the beliefs and values that would support the governing system. Lipset himself admits the importance of values in the formation of a democracy; "If a political system is not characterized by a value system

allowing for the peaceful 'play' of power – the adherence by the 'outs' to decisions made by the 'ins' and the recognition of the 'ins' of the rights of the 'outs' – there can be no stable democracy" (1959, 71). While inserting the term "value", Lipset completely disregards this nuance of his definition. This is the result of the absence of culture as a key variable for why modernization theory has not held true. It is now time to contrast economic theories of democracy with cultural theories of democracy.

1.2 Cultural Focus

Whenever bringing up the concept of culture as a causal factor, we must look at the constructivist theories that have developed from this line of thought. Constructivists argue that cultures can be molded and not given natural states. As stated by Clark, Golder, and Golder, "Cultures can change in response to social, economic, and political actors" (2009, 212). This is in direct contrast to primordialists who believe that cultures cannot be changed and are fixed to what they are, no matter what influences surround it. If primordialists are correct, some cultures are inherently incompatible with democratic governance. Democratic governments of the world must be willing to accept this fact and refrain from attempting to spread democracies internationally, whether they believe it is the ideal form of government or not. However, if constructivists are correct, then it is more than possible that democracies can be established and maintained in areas of the world that have not experienced democracy.

Key to this constructivist idea is the work of Alexander Wendt (1992). In an attempt to account for the limiting scope of realism, which argues that state interests run in the direction of establishing self-security causing a global atmosphere of conflict, Wendt posits that states learn this type of behavior based on the previous experiences and interactions with other states (1992). States do not necessarily have to live in a "self-help" world. Through multiple cooperative

interactions, states can learn cooperative behavior and create cooperative identities and interests. We can take this key concept of interaction leading to identity and conforming behavior to the plane of government establishment. If continuous iterations of cooperation lead to the creation of a conforming identity within a society, that society will then have a framework for structure of governance.

Putnam makes this correlation in *Making Democracy Work* (1993). In his study of local Italian governments, he finds that the governments located in the northern regions of Italy were generally more likely to have success in implementing and maintaining democratic processes and government effectiveness than their southern counterparts (1993). Putnam found that these local governments had similar institutional structures but varied in their effectiveness. Putnam determines that the northern regions had a higher level of civic culture than the southern regions due to their early experiences with republican governance. Essentially, civic culture is an intervening variable, while democratic history is what leads to democratic success.

Addressing the concept of "civic culture" will be important in regards to further discussion of cultural effects on democracy. Almond and Verba state that only culture provides the "psychological basis of democratization" (1965, 9) and that without this specific psychology, the odds for democratic sustainability are slim (Clarke, Golder, and Golder 2009, 212). This democratic mindset involves high levels of interpersonal trust, preference for gradual social change, high level of support for the existing political system, and high levels of life satisfaction. These are some of the variables that are used in studies that support Putnam's arguments (Muller and Seligson, 1994). Other scholars, stemming from the works of Montesquieu (1989 [1748]) have found that enlistment in associations and other social groups help to nurture these values, and therefore are beneficial to democratic development (Paxton, 2002; Putnam 2000).

Samuel P. Huntington has famously argued the importance of culture in his works (1991, 1996). The author posits that one of the reasons for "the third wave" of democracy was the Catholic Church's reformation of values. He argues, along the line of Max Weber (1905) that Protestant values of individuals and individual responsibility were greatly in line with values that are in sync with the idea of democracy. Given this fact, it would only be natural for changes in the Catholic Church's interpretation of values to lead to the emergence of democracies in Latin America and Eastern Europe (1991). A similar argument is made by other scholars (Lipset 1963, Silvert 1967, Lambert 1967, Trentmann 1988, De Jong et al., 2006, Kwok and Tandesse 2006), in regards to culture's effect on economic development. In the context of Modernization theory and democratic development, economic development is an intervening variable on democratic development.

1.3 Pitfalls of the Cultural Argument

However, these cultural studies are not without fault. While Putnam's comparative study of northern and southern Italy reveals that cultural values were very important to establishing effective democratic governments, as Hyeong-Ki Kwon (2004) points out, Northern Italy's strong support for Mussolini's Fascism is counter-intuitive to his Putnam's findings. The findings of Huntington's *The Third Wave* can be dismissed simply by understanding which countries existed and did not exist by 1950. Of the countries that were independent by this time, only those in Latin America showed instability in regime types, while countries from outside the region generally exhibited stability (Przeworski et al 2000, 40). All the while, new countries became independent and these new countries tended to be authoritarian. As Przeworski and Limongi state, "the proportion of democracies among these "new" countries grew slightly with no waves rolling down or up. In turn, the decline of the aggregate proportion of democracies in

the world during the 1960s is largely due to the emergence of new countries rather than the transformation of old ones (1997, 171)."

There is also the question of whether democracy causes changes in political culture or if changes in culture develop the emergence of democracy. This argument is a temporal one in which "the chicken and the egg" question is evident. Muller and Seligson argue that Almond and Verba (1965) and Inglehart (1988, 1990) do not have the correct temporal order in their models of effect on democracy. Muller and Seligson argue, "the problem is that the possibility of an effect of years of continuous democracy on civic culture attitudes is ignored (1994, 636).

These authors go on to find that most civic culture attitudes do not have major impact changing levels of democracy. The only attitude the authors list as having a significant impact is the "support for gradual reform". They also find that democracy actually has more of a significant impact on attitudes pertaining to interpersonal trust. This finding correlates with the idea that democratic experience is what causes cultural change (1994). Seligson goes on to conduct his own study of how individual values affect democracy in an attempt to invalidate Inglehart and Welzel's results (2002). After making several changes to the methodology used by Inglehart and Welzel, Seligson takes a completely different reading of the findings and believes that Inglehart and Welzel has overstated the relation between individual values and democracy.

Inglehart and Welzel address all of these issues of methodology and modernization theory in *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy* (2005). The authors first find a significant relationship between economic development and changes in individual value, finding that as states develop economically, there is a positive change in what they term "self-expression" values. These self-expression values are important because they are the values associated with democratic culture, similar to that of the civic culture described by Almond and

Verba (1965). This addresses a simple assumption made by social capital scholars. Social capital scholars never explain how individuals develop the type of democratic values that are often encouraged by networking in associations, unions, and other social groups. It is simply assumed that these individuals hold democratic values and these values are nurtured within their social group (Paxton, 2002; Putnam 2000). According to Inglehart and Welzel, these individuals have time on their hands to join these social groups and have developed a set of values based on the fact that they are more financially secure. This will be discussed in more elaboration in the next section. Inglehart and Welzel then find that these self-expression values are also related to the democracy levels of a state. As self-expression values move in a positive direction, democracy scores also improve (2005).

As can be seen from the works listed above, many pitfalls present themselves when attempting to unearth why some countries exhibit high levels of democracy while other countries have not.   A new perspective on democratic development must be taken in order to find a more comprehensive answer to the puzzle of what causes high levels of democratic development. Thus far, Inglehart and Welzel's work (2005) has been the most encompassing as far as capturing the cause for why democracies emerge and what factors are involved in their survival. By combining the economic and cultural aspects of democratic development, Inglehart and Welzel have created a logically sound model for how democracies emerge. This thesis will continue this line of reasoning as illustrated in the chapter below.

Chapter 2: Using Interaction Terms in Modernization Theory

Given the many problems that are associated with both the individual study of economic or cultural effects on democracy, it is possible that using a more cultural modernization approach would be more appropriate in explaining democratic development. By using a cultural modernization approach to explaining the phenomenon, both socioeconomic development and culture are involved simultaneously. Given the fact that Lipset and others describe the modernization process as going from immature societies to mature societies, it is not out of line to draw the conclusion that the attitudes of society change as they mature. Thus, it is possible that economic development causes cultural changes in the society, which creates a call for democratic reform. This is precisely what Inglehart and Welzel argue and what they attempt to capture in their study (2005).

It is apparent that another factor during this developing phase of economic growth facilitates democratic development. It is during this stage of development that many variants of modernization theory claim socioeconomic changes occur, resulting in the downfall of dictatorships and the emergence of democracies. The reason for this is the state is dependent on the revenue that can be accumulated from its society, particularly the elites. The society will allow for the state to collect revenue if they believe the current structure of governance is suitable to their needs. Here we can see that there is a fundamental change in the attitude of the society in regards to its relationship to the state. It is during this developing stage in which the members of society realize and express their power vis-à-vis the state. Thus, a change in the values and beliefs in society will create a demand on the state for a form of government that meets the approval of its citizens. If the state refuses to acquiesce to these demands there is still a risk to the stability of its regime because of the new values held by its citizens. The change in

culture, created by socioeconomic development, creates the opportunity for democratic development and the emergence of democratic regimes.

Economic Development ⟶ Cultural Change ⟶ Democratic Development

This thesis will use the basic foundations for modernization theory laid out by previous scholars. As the flow chart above illustrates, culture is often thought of as an intervening variable to democratic development. Inglehart and Welzel demonstrated that this by breaking down the two segments of this flow chart and testing them separately, in order to determine the two independent variables' effect on democratic development.

Economic Development ⟶ Cultural Change; THEN
Cultural Change ⟶ Democratic Development

This thesis, along with testing the individual effects of economic development and culture, will test the two variable's effect on democratic development in conjunction with each other and expect to find that while economic development is a necessary condition for democratic development, it is insufficient by itself. Democratic values must exist within the culture in order for a democracy to develop. In essence, the economic development and culture interact with each other. To determine if this is true, this thesis will purpose two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Economic development within a state will lead to rise in levels of democracy.

Hypothesis 2: Economic development conditions changes in cultural values within a state that lead higher levels of democracy.

Chapter 3: Data and Methodology

In order to test these models, it is necessary to identify the key variables, being economic development, cultural values, and levels of state democracy. Each will be measured with specific databases already in existence. As stated above, modernization theory asserts that the result of the economic development within a state allows the state to become more democratic. Personal values are also changed as the wealth of the average citizen increases. First, modernization theory will be tested in a similar manner to how Inglehart and Welzel test it. Both economic development's and personal value's effects on the level of democracy of a state will be tested. Then, it will be determined whether values condition economic development's effect on the level of democracy. In order to do this, variables must be identified.

3.1 Dependent Variable

A state's level of democracy, the phenomenon of interest, is the dependent variable. This will be measured using the 2010 Freedom House *Freedom in the World* dataset. Gauging the effectiveness of legally backed institutions is important, but one can argue that institutional definitions of democracy are not enough. Personal freedoms and civil liberties are also important parts of democracy. These important elements are often missing in other datasets that measure state levels of democracy, such as Polity IV, which focuses mainly on institutional democracy. Inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Freedom House has included both the institutional liberties and civil liberties for their *Freedom in the World* dataset (Freedom House 2010).

This dataset uses survey data from around the world to assess the level of political and civil liberties within a state. Like Polity IV, Freedom House uses a scale to grade each state. Democratic development is judged in two categories, political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). Political rights scores are based off of electoral processes, political pluralism, and

functioning of government. Civil liberties scores are based off of freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights. A score of 1 ranks as the highest level of freedom and a score of 7 ranking as the lowest level of freedom. For the purposes of this thesis, the civil liberties and political rights scores will also be added together to create a third score to measure a state's level of democracy. This total score (FH) will have a score of 2 to indicate the highest possible level of democracy and a score of 14 to indicate the lowest possible level of democracy. All three indicators (PR, CL, and FH) will be used to assess the independent variables' impact on democracy.

3.2 Independent Variables

World Values Survey (WVS) data will be used to measure the independent variable of cultural values of individuals within a society. The WVS is a series of surveys of individuals that are conducted in over eighty countries spanning from 1981-2005.[1] The data are aggregated and released at, approximately, five year intervals. By using this database, it is possible to analyze the change of socio-cultural and political beliefs of the people in a state. Like Freedom House, Inglehart and Welzel break down their cultural data into two categories: survival vs. self-expression (from here on self-expression values) and traditional vs. secular-rational (from here on secular values). In both self-expression and secular categories no observation has a score lower than -2.0 (which indicates more survival oriented or traditional attitudes) or higher than 2.5 (which indicates more self-expression and secular attitudes).

In particular, Inglehart and Welzel bring attention to self-expression values as it is strongly linked to higher levels of democracy. The authors state, "as external constraints on human choice recede, people (and societies) place increasing emphasis on self-expression values or individualism. This pattern is not culture-specific. It is universal" (2005, 138). This

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[1] Countries used for dataset will be provided in the Appendix.

statement falls into a similar line of thought introduced by Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs, which asserts that once a person has fulfilled a more fundamental need, they will be motivated to fulfill higher level needs like esteem and self-actualization (1943, 1954). While both categories will be used for the culture variable here, particular attention will also be placed on the effects of self-expression values in accordance with the emphasis placed on it by Inglehart and Welzel. We can then use these to understand its relation with economic development and its relation with levels of democracy.[2]

The independent variable of economic development (*GDPpcppp*) will be measured using the gross domestic product, purchasing power parity per capita. By using this value at any given year, we are able to determine the relative wealth of the average individual within a state, helping us to identify how wealthy a state and its people are.

In order to work these independent variables into the framework of the hypotheses in the previous chapter, both the variables for culture and the variable for economic development will be lagged by one year. This allows for analysis of the dependent variable, level of democracy, given that it is affected by the independent variables prior to the observation year.[3]

In addition to the two separate independent variables, another variable will be used to determine how much economic development and cultural values interact with one another. An interaction term will be created by multiplying the *GDPpcppp* variable with each of the WVS variables. By doing this, an assessment can be made on conditioning effects of culture on

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[2] Cultural Values for the Federal Republic of Germany will be taken from the WVS scores for West Germany. After the unification of East and West Germany, WVS data continue to obtain data from the two regions separately.
[3] Due to the restrictions of WVS data, lagging cultural values is only possible by inserting data for the year not specifically captured by the release of WVS data. For instance, WVS contains data for the release years of 1990 and 1995, but not 1991-1994. In order to lag WVS data, the years 1991-1994 take the value of 1990 for the given country.

economic development. By combining *GDPpcppp* with both secular values and self-expression values, the interactive terms *GDP*/Secular and *GDP*/Self-expression will be created.

3.3 Control Variables

In order to test the effects of other possible explanations for a state's level of democracy, control variables will be used. These control variables will be drawn for other theories that use democracy as the dependent variable. The first of these control variables is a dummy variable that takes into account whether a state's colonial legacy helps to determine its level of democracy. This allows for testing the importance of colonialism shaping culture and test the idea that democracies of former British colonies are more likely to be successful based on the fact that they were ruled over by what is considered to be a strong democracy (Horvath 1972)

Due to the perceived importance of ethnic fractionalization on democracy (Almond 1956, Welch 1993, Fish and Kroenig 2006) this thesis will also use a variable to test this idea. The variable for fractionalization will be the ethnic fractionalization variable calculated by Alesina et al. (2003) to measure ethnic heterogeneity in a state. Values, range from 0 to 1. Lower scores indicate greater homogeneity while higher scores indicate greater fractionalization. Additionally, to test the idea that oil producing states and states that receive large amounts of foreign aid are not likely to grow as democracies (Barro 1999, Ross 2001, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) the 2008 World Bank's World Development Indicators will be used.

3.4 Models

Cross-sectional time series will be used to determine the relationship between socioeconomic development, cultural values, and democracy. By applying this framework to test this theory, this thesis hopes to find a thorough relation between economic development, culture, and democratic development through the use of OLS regression. By testing the

individual components of the Freedom House scores, along with the Freedom House score, and the separate cultural scores, six tables have been created to show the results of these regression analyses. Additionally, to test the basic model of modernization theory, Hypothesis 1, cultural variables will be used as a control variable. By using all of the control variables mentioned above in a single model, the number of observations was drastically reduced. In order to minimize the reduction of observations, each control variable is tested individually with the *GDPpcppp* and the culture variables. This results in having six models in each of the six tables. Tables and models of note will be discussed and shown in the next chapter, while the others will appear in the appendix.

The same approach will be taken to test the interactive theory of modernization, resulting in six tables with six models in each. Both *GDPpcppp* and cultural variables will be used as independent variables and combined to form an interactive term. These interactive terms will show whether economic development and culture work in conjunction to develop democracies. These values will illustrate the amount of that culture conditions *GDPpcppp*'s effect on democratic development. Based on the stated variables and theory specifications above, presented here are the models that will be used to test the previously proposed hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1

Level of Democracy = α + (b1) ln GDPpcppp $_{(t-1)}$ + (b2) Survival vs. Self-expression values $_{(t-1)}$ or Traditional vs. Secular values$_{(t-1)}$ + (b3) Former British Colony + (b4) Ethnic Fractionalization Alesina + (b5) Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports$_{(t-1)}$ + (b6) Aid Received per Capita$_{(t-1)}$ + ε

Hypothesis 2

Level of Democracy = α + (b1) ln GDPpcppp $_{(t-1)}$ + (b2) Survival vs. Self-expression values $_{(t-1)}$ or Traditional vs. Secular values $_{(t-1)}$ + (b3)[(ln GDPpcppp $_{(t-1)}$)*(Survival vs. Self-expression values $_{(t-1)}$ or Traditional vs. Secular values $_{(t-1)}$)] + (b4) Former British Colony + (b5) Ethnic Fractionalization Alesina + (b6) Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports $_{(t-1)}$ + (b7) Aid Received per Capita $_{(t-1)}$ + ε

Chapter 4: Data Analysis

Because of the multiple variables this thesis uses to measure democratic development and culture, there are several different combinations that can be used in order to test the interaction model. In order to find out which variables affect democracy, models that show the effects on FH scores were tested first. This is then followed by testing the effects of the variables on the individual components of democracy, PR and CL. Testing begins by testing the merits of the basic models of modernization theory.

4.1 Basic Modernization Analysis

Modernization theory contends that as a state develops economically, the level of democracy within that state will improve. This is supported by the models tested in this thesis. Table 1a displays the effects of the models that contain the secular values on a state's total FH scores. Note that a negative coefficient indicates development towards democracy as lower democracy scores reflect greater levels of democracy. Table 2a displays the effects of the models that contain the self-expression values. In each of the models, economic development has a significant impact towards higher levels of democracy. These tables also show that a state's cultural level does not have a significant effect on democratic development. Neither the secular value, nor the self-expression values had effect on the FH scores

The control variables, whether used individual alongside the economic and cultural variables or in a single model, were largely insignificant. The only control variable to have any significance was the percentage of fuel exports of a state's merchandise exports. Tables 1a and 2a both show that the models that contained this variable supported the notion that increased reliance on fuel exports is detrimental to democratic development.

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Table 1: Coefficients for Regression of Basic Modernization Model on Freedom House scores using Traditional vs. Secular values

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-2.74433** (.334044)	-2.82762** (.3383351)	-2.68885** (.3606918)	-2.71602** (.3854066)	-2.52444** (.4996452)	-2.67170** (.6825124)
Traditional vs. Secular	.1792291 (.2784551)	.1013452 (.2710987)	.2532622 (.2837968)	.3290638 (.2839167)	.2991763 (.3997088)	.4580423 (.3894831)
Former British Colony		-1.079727 (.7386226)				-.5677283 (.1.362224)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.7422373 (.9667905)			-1.419341 (.1.636282)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.029322* (.0143582)		.043404* (.0165823)
Aid Per Capita					-.0804332 (.0135249)	-.0121874 (.0141884)
R^2	0.5622	0.5692	0.5635	0.5789	0.3336	0.3857
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0009
# of Obs.	971	971	961	891	466	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval.
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 2: Coefficients for Regression of Basic Modernization Model on Freedom House scores using Survival vs. Self-Expression values

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-2.347033** (.3219433)	-2.510891** (.3531266)	-2.264376** (.4068042)	-2.155014** (.4010589)	-2.303374** (.4223192)	-2.492681** (.7387684)
Survival vs. Self-Expression	-.3966424 (.2627662)	-.3225861 (.2599078)	-.4237147 (.2705365)	-.4828287 (.2538505)	-.3884845 (.4849527)	-.4075767 (.443151)
Former British Colony		-.9710317 (.74484)				-.69740411 (1.355288)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.5143628 (.9909176)			-1.945472 (1.857713)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.0288909* (.0128143)		.0400683* (.0155141)
Aid Per Capita					-.0211397 (.0129561)	-.0121393 (.0131595)
R^2	0.5678	0.5735	0.5683	0.5822	0.3309	0.3750
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0005
# of Obs.	971	971	961	891	466	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 3: Coefficients for Basic Modernization Model on Civil Liberties using Survival vs. Self-Expression values

Independent Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-1.101396** (.1326573)	-1.186598** (.1446131)	-1.057225** (.1678535)	-1.051279** (.1701879)	-1.030393** (.1679351)	-1.149677** (.3011526)
Survival vs. Self-Expression	-.2836692* (.1160463)	-.2451617* (.1547349)	-.2966303* (.1189572)	-.3024672** (.1112789)	-.2486523 (.2139806)	-.226897 (.2019752)
Former British Colony		-.5049125 (.2963887)				-.3139524 (.5380394)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.2969027 (.4645905)			-.780232 (.7774912)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.0115314 (.0062384)		.0168049* (.0074009)
Aid Per Capita					-.0097275 (.0057671)	-.0051237 (.0056676)
R^2	0.5963	0.6027	0.5977	0.6116	0.3362	0.3790
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0005
# of Obs.	971	971	961	891	466	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Most of the other tables that show the effects of the variables on the individual components of democracy, PR and CL, produce the same outcome.[4] In these tables only *GDPpcppp* and the percentage of fuel exports had any significant effect on the level of political rights and civil liberties. However, Table 2c did show that culture could have an effect on the level of democracy in a state. Specifically, this table shows that self-expression values do have an effect towards greater civil liberties within a state. Here, four of the six models show this result. The two models where self-expression values are insignificant are the two models in which the number of observations is reduced the most by the limited data available in the models. This finding may support Inglehart and Welzel's emphasis placed on self-expression values (2005).   It is in the self-expression values that the authors placed questions that pertained to interpersonal trust, tolerance towards other groups, and support for gender equality (2005, 54). Perhaps, it is not surprising, then, that self-expression values lead to greater CL scores as the CL component of FH focus more on the individual aspects of democracy rather than the institutional aspects of democracy.

4.2 Interaction Model of Modernization

By using the interactive framework, it is possible to find any conditional effect that variables may have on each other in relation to their overall effect on democratic development. The models run here find that neither *GDPpcppp* nor the cultural values had any conditioning effect on the other. That is, economic development did not condition culture, and more importantly culture does not condition economic development. Thus, hypothesis 2 is not supported.

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[4] Tables 1b, 1c, and 2b can be found in the Appendix.

Table 4: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Freedom House using Traditional vs. Secular values and Interactive Term GDP/Secular

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-2.7145** (.3145573)	-2.7959** (.3166781)	-2.6658** (.3427277)	-2.6593** (.3383723)	-2.6144** (.5058248)	-2.6539** (.5768234)
Traditional vs. Secular	.4102853 (.5388724)	.2931705 (.538504)	.4618422 (.5407273)	.8544673 (.5609556)	1.097742 (.7152512)	1.585739 (.6670355)
Interactive GDP/Secular	-.0000188 (.0000227)	-.0000152 (.0000225)	-.0000175 (.0000235)	-.0000383 (.0000245)	-.0001228 (.0000634)	-.0001678 (.0000682)
Former British Colony		-1.001576 (.7417739)				.0743421 (1.377729)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.6706792 (.9950364)			-1.93843 (1.706724)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.0344427* (.0131634)		.046051** (.0149819)
Aid Per Capita					-.0190296 (.0129682)	-.0096089 (.0134353)
R^2	0.5627	0.5686	0.5636	0.5904	0.3568	0.4272
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
# of Obs.	967	967	957	891	462	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Figure 1: Interaction Relation of Economic Development conditioning Traditional vs. Secular values for Model 6 in Table 4 regarding Freedom House score

Figures 1 and 2 show that regardless of whether you are looking for the conditioning effect of economic development on culture, or if you are looking for the conditioning effect of culture on economic develop in regards to levels of democracy, you find that the effect is so minimal, that they fail to register any visualization. This minuscule effect is present in every model of every table generated with the interactive terms included in the model.[5] Regardless of the different combinations possible with the multiple variables to gauge a state's democracy and the multiple variable to display culture, this model has found that culture has, no more than a minute conditioning effect on economic development, putting in to question the idea that culture is an important variable on a state's economic capacity. Neither does economic development

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[5] Because every graph displaying interactive effects displays the same lack of visualization, the other graphs will not be included in this thesis.

have a conditioning effect on culture, which conflicts with the conclusions drawn by Inglehart

and Welzel (2005).

Figure 2: Interaction Relation of Traditional vs. Secular values conditioning Economic Development for Model 6 in Table 4 regarding Freedom House score

Within the tables that include interaction terms, it is still possible to determine whether or

not the control variables have any significant relation to democratic development. Just as in the

tables displayed for the basic modernization models, we see that the only control variable that

has any significance is percentage of fuel exports. Again we see that dependence on fuel exports

is detrimental to the development of democracy within a state, further bearing support for the

"oil curse".

Table 5: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Freedom using Survival vs. Self-Expression values

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-2.2995** (.3312406)	-2.4577** (.3654719)	-2.2162** (.4162132)	-2.1531** (.4057658)	-2.1793** (.4393472)	-2.16890** (.6803234)
Survival vs. Self-Expression	-.7391555 (.5764408)	-.6517138 (.5659984)	-.7525789 (.5740711)	-.8150022 (.5306772)	-.7092839 (1.253229)	-1.227087 (1.151631)
Interactive GDP/Self-Expression	.0000182 (.0000182)	.0000174 (.0000226)	.0000174 (.0000231)	.0000191 (.0000217)	.0000366 (.0001447)	.0001183 (.0001319)
Former British Colony		-.9087711 (.7509945)				-.5906789 (1.360173)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.5245248 (1.015339)			-2.059653 (1.875632)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.0286386* (.0131301)		.0426392** (.0149934)
Aid Per Capita					-.0220152 (.0134988)	-.0132958 (.0134447)
R^2	0.5694	0.5744	0.5698	0.5851	0.3336	0.3810
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0014
# of Obs.	967	967	957	891	462	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Given the relevance on the study of democratic development, it is not surprising to find a vast amount of research on this topic. Not only has democracy seemingly become the preferred form of governance globally, but democratic peace theory has shown that democratic states are unlikely to enter into wars with each other (Ray 1998, Oneal and Russett 1999). Increasing the number of democratic states globally would certainly be a worthy goal of any foreign policy if democracies do not go to war with each other. Thus we find ourselves at the question, what factors contribute to democratic development?

Modernization theory contends that economic development is the key to developing levels of democracies. As the average citizen of a state finds themselves having more resources, they find themselves struggling less just to survive. The additional resources in their lives afford them more time and opportunities to focus on other things such as what role they play in respect to society and how they feel the state should protect them. This idea is given credence by the work of Inglehart and Welzel (2005). This is supported by the results of the models tested in this thesis, which examine the direct relationship between economic development and democratic development. In the models used to test the relationship between the two, each show significant support for this idea.

Additionally, this thesis attempts to rework their findings by testing the effects of economic development and the role of culture on democratic development in conjunction with each other. The results of the interactive model found in this thesis, however, show that culture's role as an intervening variable on democracy is questionable. Furthermore, the models show that culture and economic development have negligible conditioning effects on each other.

5.1 Does Culture Matter?

By adding cultural components to each of the models tested, we find that the inferred importance of culture does not have a significant effect on democratic development. In fact, we find a surprising lack of support for this idea. The only significant relation found in all the models tested was between the effects of self-expression values on civil liberties scores. In these models, the more that personal values moved way from survival values and towards self-expression values, the more civil liberties were found in a state.

Because the idea that culture plays a significant role in democratic development is such a popular concept, it is necessary to speculate on why the results of the models presented in this paper largely show that culture does not play a significant role. Because the questions posed in WVS includes commonly used questions regarding interpersonal trust and views on equality, the composition of WVS data is likely not the cause for the insignificance of culture on democratic development. When studying the works of Inglehart and Welzel (2003, 2005), one notices that there is a diverse range in which democratic countries appear. By taking into account both the findings of this thesis and observing the distribution of states' values found in Inglehart and Welzel's work, one can determine that developing culture to meet a set standard is not what is of importance. Instead, it is possible that only the growth rates of those values may be where scholars should direct their focus. To be more precise, it is not the position of the cultural values of the observed state, but the amount of change in those cultural values.[6]

It is also possible that focus should now be shifted away from the importance of culture and onto some other intervening variable. A structural variable may be a more likely avenue to finding effects on democratic development. For decades scholars have often tied culture to the

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[6] However, this method could not be used to account for states in a dataset who have already achieved high levels of democracy and have shown high levels of democracy throughout the time span presented in the data.

way government and economy are structured in a state, particularly those interested in Latin American development (Johnson 1959, Lambert 1967). Combining this idea with the results of the interaction models in this thesis, one can then move on to theorize that culture, in and of itself, does not have a major causal effect on levels of democracy. However, culture may have influenced the type of structure that is present within a state, which may affect democratic development. In this case, culture is not what directly affects the level of democracy found in a state. Instead, it is the structure that the state's cultural legacy has left behind. By focusing more on structural factors, such as whether or not plantations make up the bulk of the agricultural sector or the effect of the middle class, future scholars will be able to further investigate the link between economic development and democratic development.

However, the reason for why culture is not a significant variable may be because of the limited nature of WVS. As stated above, WVS datasets are composed in only a fraction of the countries throughout the world. Additionally, these datasets only go back as far as the year 1981 and are only released approximately every five years. Due to the nature of survey data, WVS is very limited in the amount of information it can provide.

5.2 Where to Focus?

Yet, it is important to remember that the models presented in thesis did show a very specific relationship in which culture was significant. Personal values moving towards self-expression values did show a greater likelihood that there will be more civil liberties within a state. This finding may help to focus on scholars works on where culture has a significant effect on democratic development.

By eliminating culture as an important component of democratic development, researchers and policy makers can now focus on other avenues of study to further the knowledge

of democratic development. The importance of these findings will allow future policy makers with the hopes of spreading democracies globally to create comprehensive policies that focus attention in the right areas. Continued effort in economic development should be a key objective, while further understanding of the role structural variables play may help to further fulfill those goals.

Of the control variables added to the models only one had any significance. This variable lends support to the idea of the "oil curse" often attributed to states that lack high levels of democracy. As a whole, we can determine that increased reliance on the sale of oil as a proportion of a state's total exports have a detrimental effect on a state's level of democracy. The effects of ethnic fractionalization, aid received per capita, or having been a British colony had no significant effect on democratic development.

What we find in the models presented is that the focus placed on the effects of culture may be misplaced. The results presented above show that the effects of culture may be more specific than previously thought. Future research including both culture and democratic development should then focus on how culture affects the type of civil liberties found in a state.

The results of these models may allow future policy makers to focus their attention. Those with the hopes of spreading democracies globally will be able to create comprehensive policies that have a focused strategy to achieve that objective by keeping the outcome of the models presented here in mind. Continued effort in economic development should remain a key objective as it is strongly related to democratic development. Focused effort on the culture of a state should allow for the development of civil liberties in a state. However, further understanding of the role that structural variables play in democratic development may be

needed in order to have a more thorough knowledge on how to spread higher levels of democracies throughout the world.

Appendix 1

Tables of Coefficients for Regression of both Basic Modernization Model and Interactive Model

Table 6: Coefficients for Regression of Basic Modernization Model on Political Rights using Traditional vs. Secular values

Independent Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*
ln GDPpcppp	-1.36996** (.2022276)	-1.40655** (.1953327)	-1.34270** (.2164771)	-1.33238** (.2288219)	-1.36832** (.3110568)	-1.41861** (.4227828)
Traditional vs. Secular	.078687 (.1564097)	.0444717 (.1530122)	.1153199 (.1620127)	.1704532 (.1615395)	.1570509 (.226991)	.2547151 (.2233619)
Former British Colony		-.4743364 (.46244)				-.2956429 (.8468581)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.3530021 (.530189)			-.8417879 (1.021278)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.0179521* (.007344)		.025177** (.008904)
Aid Per Capita					-.0114192 (.0076385)	-.0073725 (.0082495)
R^2	0.4946	0.4993	0.4952	0.5081	0.2971	0.3437
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0015
# of Obs.	971	971	961	891	466	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval.
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 7: Coefficients for Regression of Basic Modernization Model on Civil Liberties using Traditional vs. Secular values

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-1.37437** (.1396482)	-1.42107** (.1390388)	-1.34614** (.1528299)	-1.38364** (.162644)	-1.15612** (.2044194)	-1.25308** (.280674)
Traditional vs. Secular	.1005421 (.1276338)	.0568735 (.1243973)	.1379422 (.1281009)	.1586106 (.1279398)	.1421254 (.1766573)	.2033272 (.1756325)
Former British Colony		-.6053903 (.3072385)				-.2720854 (.5437758)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.3892352 (.4813751)			-.5775531 (.6833172)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.0113699 (.007304)		.0182261* (.0081794)
Aid Per Capita					-.0090141 (.0060585)	-.0048149 (.0061632)
R²	0.5824	0.5915	0.5846	0.6005	0.3333	0.3857
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0003
# of Obs.	971	971	961	891	466	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval.
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 8: Coefficients for Basic Modernization Model on Political Rights using Survival vs. Self-Expression values

Independent Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-1.24563** (.2048913)	-1.324293** (.22468)	-1.207152** (.2545826)	-1.03736** (.2442166)	-1.272981** (.2729993)	-1.343005** (.4681752)
Survival vs. Self-Expression	-.1129733 (.1555124)	-.0774244 (.1547349)	-.1270845 (.2174602)	-.1803615 (.1528072)	-.1398322 (.2855685)	-.1806797 (.2719016)
Former British Colony		-.4661192 (.4717035)				-.3800887 (.8444149)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.2174602 (.555432)			-1.16524 (1.133718)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.0713596* (.0069164)		.0232634** (.0086718)
Aid Per Capita					-.0114122 (.0073848)	-.0070156 (.0078054)
R^2	0.4952	0.4998	0.4950	0.5056	0.2920	0.3315
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002	0.0006
# of Obs.	971	971	961	891	466	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 9: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Political Rights using Traditional vs. Secular values and Interactive Term GDP/Secular

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-1.352** (.19279)	-1.3870** (.1953327)	-1.3282** (.2077304)	-1.2991** (.2014429)	-1.4132** (.3217383)	-1.4088** (.3728314)
Traditional vs. Secular	.1923818 (.31041)	.1419376 (.3108493)	.2178045 (.3121956)	.4785653 (.3217299)	.5699704 (.4219239)	.8741444 (.3918346)
Interactive GDP/Secular	-9.44 e-06 (.00001)	-7.91e-06 (.0000131)	-8.85e-06 (.0000134)	-.0000224 (.0000137)	-.0000641 (.0000378)	-.0000922 (.0000382)
Former British Colony		-.431403 (.4635295)				.0570383 (.8727132)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.3150514 (.5404982)			-1.126917 (1.024559)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.020955** (.0066334)		.026631** (.0081941)
Aid Per Capita					-.0106938 (.007365)	-.0059561 (.0078425)
R^2	0.4943	0.4982	0.4946	0.5220	0.3161	0.3815
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002	0.0000
# of Obs.	967	967	957	891	462	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval.
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 10: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Civil Liberties using Traditional vs. Secular values and Interactive Term GDP/Secular

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-1.3625** (.130505)	-1.4088** (.1294893)	-1.33754** (.1444297)	-1.3602** (.1442204)	-1.2012** (.1960924)	-1.24508** (.2270077)
Traditional vs. Secular	.2179035 (.2370962)	.1512329 (.2358226)	.2440376 (.237558)	.375902 (.2463067)	.5277718 (.3042119)	.7115942 (.2902607)
Interactive GDP/Secular	-9.32 e-06 (.000010)	-7.30e-06 (.0000102)	-8.68e-06 (.000011)	-.0000158 (.0000114)	-.0000587 (.0000273)	-.0000756 (.0000316)
Former British Colony		-.5701726 (.3082372)				.0173039 (.5325363)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.3556279 (.498144)			-.8115131 (.7516744)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.0134877 (.0068506)		.0194191* (.0073404)
Aid Per Capita					-.0083359 (.0057879)	-.0036528 (.0058264)
R^2	0.5835	0.5914	0.5853	0.6086	0.3591	0.4258
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
# of Obs.	967	967	957	891	462	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 11: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Political Rights using Survival vs. Self-Expression values

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-1.2161** (.2117695)	-1.2902** (.2336248)	-1.1779** (.2618478)	-1.1024** (.2481793)	-1.2762** (.3008158)	-1.2444** (.468359)
Survival vs. Self-Expression	-.3459192 (.340149)	-.3049417 (.3350101)	-.3508653 (.339668)	-.4118486 (.3156984)	-.1205565 (.7983642)	-.4300658 (.7549539)
Interactive GDP/Self-Expression	.0000125 (.0000134)	.0000121 (.0000134)	.000012 (.0000136)	.0000133 (.0000129)	-.0000104 (.0000915)	.000036 (.0000844)
Former British Colony		-.4258743 (.4782242)				-.3486344 (.8464831)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.2210582 (.5665118)			-1.199987 (1.14032)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.0171837* (.0070819)		.0240458** (.0082529)
Aid Per Capita					-.0116579 (.0078188)	-.0073675 (.0081261)
R^2	0.4976	0.5015	0.4973	0.5106	0.2939	0.3332
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0010
# of Obs.	967	967	957	891	462	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Table 12: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Civil Liberties using Survival vs. Self-Expression values

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln GDPpcppp	-1.0834** (.1357961)	-1.1674** (.1492348)	-1.0382** (.1707651)	-1.0507** (.1711204)	-.90307** (.1645428)	-.92443** (.2574793)
Survival vs. Self-Expression	-.3932363 (.2515759)	-.3467721 (.2479631)	-.4017135 (.2497761)	-.4031536 (.2332945)	-.5887274 (.4824288)	-.7970214 (.4526149)
Interactive GDP/Self-Expression	5.69e-06 (9.87e-06)	5.24e-06 (9.78e-06)	5.40e-06 (.00001)	5.80e-06 (9.45e-06)	.000047 (.0000562)	.0000823 (.0000527)
Former British Colony		-.4828968 (.2975634)				-.2420445 (.5377174)
Ethnic Fractional Alesina			.3034665 (.4756507)			-.8596668 (.7834641)
Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports				.0114549 (.0063568)		.0185935 (.0072708)
Aid Per Capita					-.0103573 (.0058583)	-.0059283 (.0056021)
R^2	0.5969	0.6027	0.5984	0.6127	0.3429	0.3930
F < Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0013
# of Obs.	967	967	957	891	462	420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.

Appendix 2

List of countries included for cultural variables

Albania	Iraq
Algeria	Ireland
Andorra	Israel
Argentina	Italy
Armenia	Japan
Australia	Jordan
Austria	Kyrgyzstan
Azerbaijan	Latvia
Bangladesh	Lithuania
Belarus	Luxembourg
Belgium	Macedonia
Bosnia	Malaysia
Brazil	Mali
Britain (input as United Kingdom)	Malta
Bulgaria	Mexico
Burkina Faso	Moldova
Canada	Montenegro
Chile	Morocco
China	Northern Ireland
Colombia	Netherlands
Croatia	New Zealand
Cyprus	Nigeria
Czech Republic	Norway
Denmark	Pakistan
Dominican Republic	Peru
E. Germany	Philippines
Egypt	Poland
El Salvador	Portugal
Estonia	Puerto Rico
Ethiopia	Romania
Finland	Russia
France	Rwanda
Georgia	South Africa
Ghana	South Korea
Greece	Saudi Arabia
Guatemala	Serbia
Hong Kong	Singapore
Hungary	Slovakia
Iceland	Slovenia
India	Spain
Indonesia	Sweden
Iran	Switzerland

Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay
United States
Venezuela
Vietnam
W. Germany
Zambia
Zimbabwe

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Curriculum Vita

Won Ha Gonzalez was born in Wiesbaden, Germany. The first child of Mion and Jesse Gonzalez, he graduated from Andress High School in El Paso, Texas in 2002 and entered the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, California. Here he became interested in and gained knowledge in Political Science, graduating in spring 2006. Following this, he worked as an analyst at DTI Associates Inc., working on a backlog of foreign labor applications. He then entered the University of Texas at El Paso to pursue a Master of Arts in Political Science. During his two and a half years at UTEP he worked as both a research and teaching assistant. He graduated from UTEP in spring 2011 and plans on pursuing a career in the Foreign Service.

Permanent Address: 853 Southwick Dr.
                     El Paso, Texas 79912