Rents, loyalty, and the economy: How an unstable economy plays a role in the occurrence of coups d'état
Abstract
This thesis examines why coups d’état still occur, regardless of institution type, in some states but not others. Building off Wintrobe’s and Hiroi and Omori’s observations, an elite theory is presented that attributes the success of avoiding coups lies in both the stability of economic growth and a system of internal incentives that create a direct link between the government and the people. Without either present, the elite in government are not constrained from engaging in undemocratic behavior and usurping power, ultimately resulting in coups. Using a zero-inflated negative binomial logistic regression, indicators of economic stability and internal loyalty systems are quantitatively analyzed with the occurrence of coups in several states during the period between 1946 and 2008. These findings may provide a new perspective on the dynamics and triggers of coups d’état.
Subject Area
Political science
Recommended Citation
Infanzon, Alexandra Elizabeth, "Rents, loyalty, and the economy: How an unstable economy plays a role in the occurrence of coups d'état" (2015). ETD Collection for University of Texas, El Paso. AAI1593108.
https://scholarworks.utep.edu/dissertations/AAI1593108